Light and Truth after the World Tragedy

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J. Anthony Sturke

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LIGHT AND TRUTH AFTER THE WORLD TRAGEDY

A POLITICAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN WAR of 1914-1919

By

J. ANTHONY STARKE

Author of these Political Pamphlets

THE TRUE SITUATION (1896) Gold Standard *vs.* Free Silver

NATIONAL EVOLUTION (1908) Electoral, Immigration and Office-Tenure Reform

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NOTE. The main occurrences of the war being still vividly in the public mind, a consecutive reading of this book is not strictly necessary. With this point in view, the separate articles were each made as complete as possible. This plan accounts for the occasional repetition of statements which may be found.

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INTRODUCTION

The great war was ended by the armistice of November 11, 1918, and final peace was concluded on June 28, 1919. The lapse of time since has enabled the public mind gradually to emerge from the oppression in which it had been held by the awful cataclysm and to return to a more normal state. But sufficient time has not yet passed for the American public to arrive, unassisted, at a correct comprehension of the stupendous events of 1914 to 1919. The underlying political conditions and the immediate motives of the great conflict still remain indistinct to the large body of the people; the passions and prejudices which were aroused still retain sufficient hold upon them to prevent a correct valuation of what has taken place. However, there is evidence now that enough progress in receptiveness and insight has been made by the most enlightened sections for the fruitful presentation of impartial facts and arguments to elucidate the subject. May truth and calm reason now rapidly dispel the misapprehensions and emotional delusions which still prevail in this country and elsewhere in regard to the war!

Many books have appeared on the war, during the same and since, and an immense amount of periodical literature all endeavoring to trace the causes of the conflict and to explain the objects of the contending nations, but the arguments offered are mostly prejudiced, evolved under the influence of abnormal psychological tension, lacking in clearness of outlook and adherence to facts. Most of the American, English and French early war books and articles in magazines and the daily papers were distinguished for absolute one-sidedness and studied malice of presentation, while the enemy countries were almost entirely deprived of rejoinder by the operation of the censorship abroad and prescriptive regulations in this country. Now, however, the accumulation of enlightening information and the important political developments which have

taken place since peace was signed enable us to clearly recognize and analyze the **true realities** which precipitated the war, their historical background and all the attendant economic and social factors which combined brought on the terrible complication. In the light of such examination we begin to realize to what a distorted state of emotion and astonishing perversion of reasoning powers the entire world, almost, had been brought during the war by the **nefarious methods** which inaugurated and accompanied the upheaval. Truth was dethroned by black deceit; all normal feeling and judgment became stifled; unreasoning passion was given free run! Our examination will also disclose those disturbing social and ethical tendencies which were active in Europe for years and contributed their share to the conflict and its strange ending.

In its turn, the war has given to these non-political questions an increased importance which will make them, perhaps, **its greatest resulting problems.** In this way we will endeavor to establish the correct relationship between the war and all the facts of political and social life and the individual man. No other, narrower, examination of this world catastrophe can have any value of true information and furnish us with real guiding lessons for the future. In order to reach this combined view on the political and social side of the problem and a well-balanced estimate of the conflict as a whole, it will be necessary to present the war to a large extent from the point of view of Germany and her allied powers **in order to check our present preponderating impressions with the other side of the case.** We have been given the Entente representation of the war so exclusively, almost, that it becomes necessary for us also to know the German view and relations of the war in all its factors if we are to arrive at a correct judgment on the struggle and our own part in it.

We must, therefore, aim to be impartial, hide nothing and spare no one, whether it be on our side or on that of the enemy. Great deeds of valor, ability, devotion and sacrifice have been done by all the nations engaged in the war! From the merely physical and intellectual point of view the war is for all concerned a testimonial of merit! All the same, **when we include also the moral and ethical factors and grasp**

the commotion as a whole the war is for all its actors and the world at large a picture of horror, shame and remorse; the bright individual spots are extinguished by the revolting moral outrage of this unwarranted and monstrous fratricide! It compels us to denounce the political motives and methods which led to and reigned during the war **and reign to-day** in the most scathing terms which language can find. The war was a nauseating mass of falsehood and low sordid cunning—an ethical fraud—and a maze of incomprehensible aberration! This Gordian knot of foul conceits, calumnies and lies must be cut asunder by fearless strokes of dissecting criticism till the truth shall stand revealed and the guilty be exposed! In this iniquitous war gigantic, relentless and often barbarous physical forces and methods were projected into the arena and sustained by equally unnatural, corrupt moral impulses. There was an absence, on all sides, of grand purposes, of honest and true enmities, of real enthusiasm for a just cause or noble ideal; instead there were the low designs of material ambitions, lust of power for its own sake, all covered by a web of false pretenses. This war lacked even the brutal nobility of openly avowed conquest or of a fanatical religious or general sentimental object; it was, from beginning to end, **the war of meanest motives of all history**—the war of cold, cruel political and material calculation—the negation of all our moral and religious pretensions—a crushing accusation against all mankind! It is absolutely necessary that this base character of the war be revealed to all peoples at this time—**now**—not in twenty years hence— if we wish to prevent an early similar or even more awful atrocity. The hideous character of the war is particularly illustrated by the cynical cunning with which its perversity was sought to be hidden to the great majority of men in all countries **by an organized system of hypocritical pretense, on the part of the Entente powers, of being engaged in a conflict for liberty, justice, human rights and civilization against a barbarous people and autocratic Kaiser who had risen to destroy these!** What a nightmare of an idea!—mendacious and unbelievable on its very statement. With us in America, alas! this cruel deceit became transformed into an exalted but false illusion and inspiration which led

us into war and in its course cost us over a hundred-thousand lives, heavy material sacrifices and deep suffering, and has brought us mostly burdens and disappointment.

This book is not a history of the war in the ordinary sense. The reader is assumed to be acquainted with the general course of events, diplomatic and military. Reference to these is made only as appears necessary to illustrate the author's point of view and elucidate his deductions. The general trend of these has been indicated in the preceding statements and may be formulated more specifically, as to the political issues of the war, as follows:

1. To show that the official advanced war motives of America against Germany were founded on imperfect information and skilfully aroused prejudices, and that they were colored and sustained by an idealism which, while genuine as far as the large body of the people was concerned, had been artificially inspired by an interested clique which wanted war for a variety of reasons, of which some were as sordid as those of the European Entente powers.
2. To repel with all possible emphasis the charge that Germany had plotted and started the war for motives of political aggrandizement and a general policy of "world conquest," and to roll back this infamous charge of **her sole responsibility** upon its authors and restore the name of Germany, as to this important issue, to the estimation in which it was held before the war.
3. To disprove the charge of "systematic and official cruelty" and "wanton destructiveness" in the conduct of the war by the Central powers **beyond the general war practice of other nations in an enemy country,** and to expose and denounce the unprincipled exaggeration with which this charge has been exploited for sentimental purposes in the allied countries, particularly in America.
4. To protest against the annihilating terms of peace imposed upon Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, **but particularly upon Germany,** and to arouse a sentiment for their immediate revision on lines of what is politically

just under the conditions of Section 2 and reasonably possible of fulfillment. **The admission of the joint responsibility by all the powers involved must become the basis of the peace revision.** Also to insist that in regard to economic questions and territorial adjustments a settlement be made in agreement with natural geographical and true racial boundaries and approved by a free plebiscite of the populations affected.

5. To bring about gradually through the realization of the fact that **the world was enslaved by a mistaken conception of the origin and nature of the war,** the conviction that a great wrong has been done to Germany and her allies, and that, in reparation of this wrong, not only should the Treaty of Versailles be revised, as stated in Section 4, but these stricken countries be rehabilitated as speedily as possible and their present acute distress relieved.

6. In America to stimulate by word and example a softening of the aspersity and prejudices which were aroused by the war against our fellow-citizens of German birth or descent, and who were compelled to suffer much undeserved abuse and heavy material losses. **In these respects the war recollection should be buried as speedily as possible.** It would be thoroughly wrong, un-American and most regrettable if the former relations of mutual esteem and confidence were not promptly restored with our German-American and other late "enemy" fellow-citizens, in business as well as socially.

We see from the preceding that the just determination of these political questions is not a matter of mere interested argument as to "who is right and who is wrong" **for its own sake** but a necessary procedure for helping the world out of the evil consequences of the war. We cannot expect to arrive at this result until a just peace is determined on the basis of truth; until this is done all settlements made will prove mere makeshifts. We may, naturally, wish to squirm out of our own responsibilities in the premises, and also to assist our friends to do the same, but it will not avail! As a final dispo-

sition of the war issues and results, the Treaty of Versailles is an **international calumny** and must be wiped out, cost what may in hurt feelings of national pride and violation of opinions and sentiments with which we have deceived ourselves! There can be no real peace, no world regeneration, no new prosperity and new comity among the nations until this treaty is rewritten on the basis of war facts now established beyond all doubt. The day for acknowledgment has come!

The importance of the social and ethical questions related to and focused by the war conditions is now fully recognized; they have become the absorbing intellectual problem of the world, from philosophers and doctrinary preachers to statesmen and the educated of all nations. The author's views on these questions are presented in scattered instalments in connection with the text subjects of articles XII B, XIII B, XIV and XV. In regard to socialism of every kind and degree, its further spread on the lines and aims now followed is deprecated, the movement being, in the opinion of the writer, defective in several important respects in its fundamental theory and impractical in application on a large scale **through not taking sufficient account of the general laws of nature and the limitations of human nature and individual character.** Socialism will require to purify and strengthen its system in the direction stated in the text to enable it to place its promise to mankind upon a firmer footing. Above all, socialism and all the other present surging movements of life reform, political reform and industrial reorganization should be divorced, as to their ethical foundation and purpose, from supernatural beliefs and be founded upon a natural system of life philosophy, called "rationalism" by the author, and set forth in the book at the various points mentioned. The opinion is expressed that supernatural religion and related schools of thought **should not be made the source and guide of our code of practical life ethics** for the individual and society. The author makes the attempt, in all earnestness, to show that the false morality which proceeds from these phantastic beliefs, and which produced a fatal inertia of spiritual outlook as applied to political relations, was in reality **the ultimate cause of the war.** By their power of distorting man's conception of his own nature they promote,

instead of restrain and suppress, the low selfish impulses of our animal character. Religion, as we understand it in its practical aim, has not succeeded to enthrone the virtues which it counsels and has not brought the real brotherhood of man—not after several thousand years of work. Such progress as has been made towards these ideals is due almost entirely to the advance of man's natural intelligence—which carried the advance in religious thought with it—**and must now carry us out of it.** The fault is not in the purpose but in the mistaken fundamental idea and in the method of teaching. It is these which are responsible for the lamentable, barren results shown to-day in the moral and social chaos which pervades the world. The reader should thoroughly understand that the author's ideas are not the result of any narrow antagonism to religion as such but **of a deep conviction that our everyday morality needs a less illusory foundation, one more convincing and, therefore, more authoritative and in better agreement with the quality of 20th century intellect.**

The war has been a terrible destroyer, not only of human lives and material possessions but of beliefs, hopes, illusions and false ideals of every kind, in regard to man's nature and the problem of existence. Surely, **our life philosophy must be reconstructed!** The childish myths about a "soul" apart from the body, of a "conscious life" after death, of the belief in "divine providence," in "eternal justice" and in a "predetermined destiny" as to our position and course in life and the occurrences in the world in general must be dismissed as a nebulous inheritance from the infancy of man and incompatible with this age. Nothing, certainly, has been more thoroughly demonstrated by the war **than the utter untenability and emptiness of these beliefs!** These propositions will, no doubt, seem very extreme to many but they are not out of proportion to the existing world malady, neither is there anything new in them; doubt about the supernatural is as old as mankind itself. What we have stated is impartially deduced from the facts of life and is held as incontrovertible in ever widening circles; now the war and the ghastly exhibition it has made of man has given to these views a glaring vividness and convincing basis of truth. We seem to have walked in a

wrong direction; the illusory and supercilious character of our thought and feeling—the whole false pretense of our life and living—stand to-day **exposed** and must be remodeled if civilized society is not to succumb!

In the article entitled "The Summit" the conclusions outlined above are pursued further, and the attempt is made to focus not only the war and our immediate life interests but **the position of our civilization as a whole** in the light of larger history and of the great cosmic laws to which human existence is subordinated. In this view civilization is seen to come and go in ascending and retreating waves of achievement, now carried by this people or part of the world and now by another. It is also revealed that stagnation and retreat are mainly caused **by the failure of the moral philosophy (religion, if you prefer) of a particular time,** and in a lesser degree by the exhaustion of the physical and mental powers, by external subjection or other material agencies. Applying this deduction to our own time, we are brought to the conclusion that such a failure and retreat of civilization is vividly indicated **by the actuality of the war's occurrence and the general conditions of our day.** These, and certain parallel physical symptoms which are plainly in evidence, are a warning to us that the civilized western world may have reached the crest of such a wave of historical development. Shall we fall and fail utterly or, after a period of stagnation and travail, rise again to new heights of achievement?

RETROSPECT AND PROGNOSTICATION

DEC. 1st, 1922

Since the publication of this book, important events have taken place which confirm the position of the author in every particular. As to the public, the four years of reading and reflection on the war and the events since its close—together with the stagnant and desperate situation in Europe—cannot have passed without effecting a far-reaching change in the opinions and sentiments of the American people and opening the minds of a large part of the reading public to the truthful presentation of the war motives, objects and conduct as given in this book. As time recedes and passions cool down, the intelligent American should revive his interest in the war **which has now become a great historical occurrence seen from a distance** and in all its reactions. It is in this sense that the author makes the second offering of his book, in bound form and accompanied by an explanatory map. His treatise is a historical, political and ethical investigation based on the most authentic information.

Early in the year the **Limitation of Armaments Conference** was called at Washigton by this government, partly as a step for necessary international economy and partly as a sentimental impulse to reduce the possibility of future wars. The latter aspect took great hold upon the imagination of the American people and engendered many hopes that war would, practically, be abolished by this conference. Women's clubs and church circles were especially active for this humanitarian object. But these hopes were rudely disappointed. On the subject of standing armies, **France positively refused to accede to any reductions on her part;** and her position effectively closed that question. As to the proposed reduction of the great navies, which was finally adopted after much contention, the reduction is confined to the elimination of a number of the "old bottoms" of the principal naval powers, but leaves the most effective battleships, and cruisers, etc., intact, so that the **relative** fighting strength and

the **concrete power** of the different navies remains practically as before. The "scrapping" of the eliminated ships is still to be done, most of it, both here and abroad, according to the best available information.

This conference also reached a consultative offensive and defensive agreement in the so-called "four-power compact"—between England, France, the United States and Japan—to limit the possibility of an outbreak of war in that dangerous region by submitting any threatening situation which may arise to a conference of these powers before hostile action be taken by any one or more. This is good in principle; but its binding power and real efficacy can only be tested and proven by each specific case. Yet another important agreement was reached by the conference, i. e. **to suspend construction of new naval armament for a period of ten years** by the four powers previously mentioned and also including Italy and Spain—the so-called "six-power agreement." This is also good in principle but operates much the same as the measure for the reduction of the navies by elimination, leaving their strength not much impaired. The fact is that there is sufficient left, all around, for a right royal world naval fight! Moreover, the important questions of **the employment of air-craft forces, of the sleek submarine and the deadly new explosives** were left untouched—thanks again to the position taken by France. It is amusing to reflect how all the indignant talk during the war about "the barbarous Germans" using these agencies has suddenly been forgotten. Without doubt, submarines, air-craft and frightful explosives will be used by every nation in the first new war which will break out!

In one other most important matter the Washington conclave of lofty pronouncements for peace and humanity proved a regrettable failure in that it entirely **omitted to outlaw the employment of the cruel hunger blockade against non-combatants of an enemy country,** in spite of the awful spectacle enacted in the late war in this respect and in spite of strong pressure brought upon the conference from all parts of America to adopt this humane resolution. Were the conferees afraid to "arraign the British" by such action, for their conduct in the war? We see, thus, that the results of the Arms Conference were largely negative; it left a wide gap between program and actual accomplish-

ment; there was an atmosphere of suspicion and reticense about it; the attendance of some important nations **whose mind was made up before they came** was merely complimentary. One nation at the conference table preserved, by admirable diplomatic skill, all its real objects and made the minimum of concessions, while gayly participating in the general game of bluff and sweet pretenses. That nation was—Japan.

Turning to the situation in Europe—which revolves around the "reparations" question like a wheel around its axle—we find **that absolutely no progress has been made,** thanks again to France, in the settlement of the political and economic war inheritance. Conditions in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, and also in every one of the "liberated" reconstructed countries—Poland, Szecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia—have gone from bad to worse, all of them merely "existing" in a floundering way, politically and industrially, their money standards depreciated to a cypher. The condition of these countries, historical and economic, is fully analyzed in the text. One special conference after another of the great allied powers has taken place. Prime ministers have met and met again; the "Supreme Council" of the allies, the Reparation Commission and sundry special financial and economic commissions have met, traveled around and investigated, presented "ultimati" and threatened exacting reprisals—all and all without results. The whole of these proceedings signify an attempt **to do the impossible**—but out of an empty pot you cannot get any milk. It comes, in fact, precisely to this: The enforcement of the reparations terms and other Versailles peace conditions against the defeated countries **without a substantial reduction of these terms** is simply impossible. This fact is now slowly becoming clear to even the most obsessed of the war victors and war "avengers." The story of Germany, her struggle for political and financial stability, is daily put before the people of this country by the press and can be summed up in a few words: Chancellor has succeeded chancellor, one coalition party after another has obtained governmental control, but all have failed to pump the billions of gold marks of the "reparations and general indemnity bill" out of a people completely impoverished, save for a small number of usurers and speculation profiteers. The masses are again—after a very short period of

partial recovery—next door to starvation and complete despair. Food riots and looting of stores are the daily reports; the "mark" is ever falling and has now reached the rate of over 6000 to the dollar, while before the war it was 24½ to the dollar. Prices of all commodities are soaring to a point which puts them beyond the reach of the average man, as wage adjustments cannot be made with sufficient rapidity and to a corresponding extent. The factories in Germany are said to be "humming" and everybody is working to the utmost, but it does not signify a legitimate and normal "business" with a profit and satisfaction for effort attached. It means only a frantic struggle to **pay off at least a part of the reparations sums with merchandise** to keep the hated enemy from still further encroaching upon the country and fastening his talons still more upon its coveted natural resources—coal, iron, other metals, nitrates and other chemicals, timber, salt, etc. What an arraignment this recital makes, in this year 1922, the age of claimed super-civilization! Alas! these humans of the most highly developed countries even are daily demonstrating that they are no more than dressed-up brutes.

As to the Austria of today—the small fragment of the former empire which now carries that once illustrious name—it is in a state of hopeless collapse and apathy, even worse, if possible, than that of Germany. Austria is cut off from its former agricultural resources and the extensive industrial activities which were flourishing throughout its provinces; she is incapable of reviving without the great powers taking complete control of the government and the finances of the country on the basis of a large long-term loan and a substantial reduction of the war indemnities. But the only permanent and logical solution for Austria's ills will be, as stated in the book, **her amalgamation with Germany** whenever that country will have been given the opportunity to regain its feet. Are the allies at last reaching the same conclusion in the case of Austria as in that of Germany? And how about poor, outraged and tattered Hungary, robbed of her birthright and territory to reward a calculating war ally? **When and how will this awful injustice in Europe ever end?** No one can tell; but one thing is absolutely certain about it: It is a complete demonstration of the ruinous character

of the Versailles treaty, of the utter impossibility of its fulfilment. All eyes are now turned upon the approaching Brussels conference of the allied powers as **the last effort at a peaceable adjustment;** if it fails, the French war dogs stand ready and eager to be unleashed.

But from Turkey we have quite another story. The complete territorial spoliation of that country, the occupation of Constantinople by the allies, the control of all national activities, from government to business—and to which must be added the invasion of Asia Minor by Greece—have raised, after a period of complete dejection, **a powerful current of nationalist sentiment,** in reaction to the unbearable oppression. Under the leadership of the undaunted **Kemal Pacha** and his party of the Angora government, this revoluntary new Turkey succeeded, after many trials and reverses in the field, to dislodge and defeat the usurping Greeks decisively and to drive them out of the country to the last man. It was a most remarkable achievement, both as a military feat and in its political consequences. It enabled the new-born Turkey to tear up the Sevres treaty and demand of the allies the reinstatement of Turkey in Constantinople and in the eastern part of the ancient province of Thrace, including reduction of the fiscal terms of that treaty. Refusal meant **immediate advance upon Constantinople** by a numerous army of victory-flushed troops, fresh from the burning and looting of Smyrna. Under the negative attitude taken by France and Italy (who begged to be excused) and in view of the Russian Bolshevists' support of Turkey, **England was forced to yield, or to fight—single-handed—a new war in the near East,** a step she could not afford to take under all the domestic and foreign circumstances of the empire. This backing-down by England led directly to the fall of Premier David Lloyd George from power. In Turkey, therefore, **the arbitrament of arms has** completely uprooted at least one of the four onerous and impractical peace treaties of the allies, imposed upon their helpless foes in unparalleled cruelty and grasping greed, born of the blind exultation of victory. Will similar arbitrament by the force of arms be the only way, perhaps, in which Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary can obtain justice? The example has made a deep impression in those countries! When desperate men have no

guns and swords, they will fight with sticks and stones, with fire and poison. Let France beware!

In connection with this reversal of the situation in Turkey, and also with regard to the continued paralysis of Europe, may we not ask the question: "Where is the **League of Nations** which was to be an agency of such beneficent political regulation for justice and lasting peace? How is it that in so threatening a situation as that which developed in Asia Minor, at the gates of Constantinople, the League was not assembled to solve the problems presented? An illustration has now been furnished the world that the League is merely a perfunctory body, the existence and "action" of which depends on the pleasure of the principal victorious powers to the war! The situation on the Bosphorus was **for over a week within an ace of actual hostilities** between the British and the Turks—yet the League of Nations was not called in. And may we, of the United States, not congratulate ourselves to have been kept out of this League, impotent of quick and effective action in a given crisis and, yet, capable of drawing us into dangerous entanglements in the course of time? The factor of America's participation or abstention has absolutely no bearing on the intrinsically faulty character and limited scope of this *quasi* association of nations.

In France there is in power today, as Prime minister, the man who more than any other—or at least fully as much as his Russian confederate, **Sazanoff,** the Czar's Prime minister in 1914 **—is responsible for the inception** and outbreak of the great war, **Poincare**—war-President of France. Until this man and his extreme party of "revanchists" and "imperial militarists" are driven out, **Europe will remain in chaos!** Nothing constructive and conciliating will come from them to heal the wounds of the war and restore old Europe to life and hope. We are again made painfully aware of this spirit from the very first utterance on American soil by **ex-Premier Clemenceau** of France, when he says: "In the world at this time there is a crisis which has not been settled." True; it has not been settled; **but he fails entirely to state that it is France who prevents that settlement** by her more than unbending attitude—**by her aggressive designs!** M. Clemenceau says, further, that "this crisis must be settled right." True again; but for him and his political school this means

the annexation by France of the entire left bank of the Rhine! It is well known that France made the most strenuous efforts at the Paris peace conference to have this scheme embodied in the peace terms to Germany. When the plan failed through the firm opposition of England, Italy and the United States, **France fell back upon the imposition of such an enormous indemnity upon Germany as should be wholly beyond the capacity of that country to pay**, and would, in due time, and partly by actual provision in the treaty—give to France the opportunity to seize that territory for annexation.

The most accusing omission in M. Clemenceau's argument is his refusal to accept for France one dot of responsibility for the war. On this subject he is as silent as the grave—for good reasons! Yet, there is no myth of the war argument of the Allies which has been more thoroughly destroyed than **this one of Germany's sole responsibility for the war.** France, England, Austria and Russia were equally guilty—each in its own way—and must assume their share of **guilt, of war costs and damages.** Germany and her allies must not be made to shoulder the whole of the guilt and to pay the entire war bill. Until this position is reached, there will be no real progress in the European situation!

From press reports it appears that ex-Premier **Viviani,** of France, is to back up the speech-making campaign of M. Clemenceau with a series of articles to run in a number of prominent papers here, in a joint effort **to recapture American sympathy and support for France,** preparatory to the launching of her policy of force against Germany. From all these schemes it is clear that **France** is the real stumbling-block in the lifting of the European deadlock and misery. England, Italy, the United States and all the other war powers have shown a favorable disposition for the reopening of the Versailles peace terms on a basis which can be fulfilled by the defeated countries, yet make their general revival possible. In these circumstances it can fairly be prognosticated that if "a new temper" is not manifested by France at the forthcoming Brussels conference, and conditions will, instead, be allowed to drift to their logical ending **nothing will be able to save Europe from a new war of vengeance, of the fiercest desperation and on a scale of mutual annihilation which will pale even the horrors of the past war!**

What has America to say at the vision of such a terrible and imminent possibility? We have, wisely, refrained from actively participating in the political troubles of Europe, confining ourselves to their purely humanitarian aspect, **and we surely do not want to enter upon another war based on poor information and unsound sentiment;** yet we cannot remain indifferent to the dangerous situation looming ahead, outraging to all our ideals for peace and world happiness. Humanity, civilization, right and justice are at stake—and we must take our part. Is M. Clemenceau, who has come here for a bad purpose, to be given the glad hand of welcome, approval and support or, rather, to be **plainly made to understand that the aims and methods of France—irreconcilable and aggressive—are disapproved here?** Let America speak boldly, and insist with all her moral force and material pressure—minus any war threat or unnecessary asperity—**that the political and financial relations of Europe must be put in order without further delay on a basis of plain justice and practical common sense,** that the danger of a new war may be quickly removed, real peace made to reign at last and these unfortunate peoples be enabled to revive, recuperate and live again!

THE MAP

The map herewith given has been selected as being a particularly useful one to elucidate the political and economic features of the great war—the Berlin-Bagdad railroad and its ship connections to the orient, the political and commercial possibilities connected therewith and the visible encroachment carried by them upon England's domination in the East. The author contends in the book that—aside from France's "revenge" dreams for 1871, **this was the deepest motive which precipitated the great war** (the only one on England's part)—jealousy of Germany's growth in political importance and material strength.

The map also covers practically the whole of the war theatre, and allows the military events, briefly related in the text, to be followed with better understanding, especially if the reader will have at hand any one of the numerous detail maps which appeared during the war.

Explanation: The plain red tint shows the original boundaries of Germany in 1914 and her important African colonies. Alsace-Lorraine, at the southwest corner of Germany, is [illegible] brownish tint shows Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, in Europe and Asia, the countries under the benevolent political influence of Germany in connection with her B-B railroad and eastern expansion policy, as explained in the text. The pale pink tint shows Italy, which up to the outbreak of the war, was politically affiliated with Germany through the Triple Alliance. Pale pink also covers Persia, to indicate the probable extension of German political influence over that country as a natural consequence of the realization of her eastern expansion policy. The narrow horizontal red hatching indicates the enemy territories which were conquered and occupied by Germany in the course of the war—in France, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Roumania and Italy.

A. ANTE-WAR POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE

I. 1639-1793

These six Introductory Articles were written to furnish the reader with the historical outline indispensably necessary to enable him to comprehend the political and general situation in Europe as it existed at the time just previous to the war. Without these facts fully understood, he would not be able to gauge correctly the political, racial and economic factors which entered into the motives and objects of the war on the part of the several nations involved. The American reader needs this information particularly because foreign history and geography are not taught to any great extent in our public schools, such study being reserved for the higher colleges. We also lack in our public life the animated intercourse which exists in Europe between men for discussing history and pending political questions and which gives even to the European of ordinary education a fair grasp of past and current events. When we join to this deficiency the circumstance that the average American is too far removed in his interests to feel a very keen concern in the political affairs of Europe, except during some great event like the war just closed, it becomes evident that we may easily fall victims to false information spread before us in times of agitation or actual hostilities by those interested to suppress the truth, and who may wish to work upon our national pride, racial sympathies or humanitarian impulses for their own selfish purposes.

The greatest event still intimately connected with the political history of Europe as the shaping influence of modern conditions **is the French Revolution of 1789-1795.** In its tempestuous course the revolution aroused the opposition of

the other European states, trembling for the established social and political order of the world, and this brought on the "wars of the French Republic." These, in turn, produced General Napoleon and the defeat of the external enemies of France, yet ultimately led to the fall of the French Republic. The military savior turned dictator and the republic was succeeded by the empire and Napoleon as emperor, in his astounding career of military and political triumphs. These ended in his own defeat and eclipse at Waterloo, followed by the Congress of Vienna and the final, second, peace of Paris in 1815. The settlement there made in regard to the boundaries and sovereignties of the different countries involved in the long struggle—France, Austria, independently and also as nominal head of the German Empire, Russia, England, Holland, Scandinavia, Spain, Sardinia, and Prussia and a number of smaller independent German States forming the Germany of that day—is the foundation and starting point of modern political Europe.

It is not necessary for the purpose of this book to dwell in much detail upon the events of the wars of the French Revolution, of those preceding it and of the Napoleonic era. The reader who desires to inform himself thereon may study up on the story of these stirring times from any of the standard books of history. But it is necessary for our future argument on the war just closed to recite at least the salient facts of Germany's unfortunate position and acute sufferings in these many wars at the hands of France. This recital will trace **the origin of the deep-seated resentment which the Germans feel towards the French** in consequence of these aggressions and depredations. We must go back to the time of Louis the XIV of France and Frederick the Great of Prussia, in fact still further back to Louis the XIII and his famous cardinal-minister, Richelieu, **to find the record that sections of Alsace, a part of Germany since the Middle Ages, were first seized by the French,** in the year 1639, in the course of the complications which arose out of the thirty-years' war of the Reformation (Luther and Protestantism—1618-1648). About ten years later, in the peace of Westphalia (1648), which terminated that historic religious conflict, these first gains of France in Alsace were

confirmed to her and reluctantly conceded by prostrate Germany, exhausted by the long war.

Early in the reign of Louis the XIV, concurrent with the time of the Great Elector of Brandenburg (founder of the Prussian dynasty), the second incursion of France into the upper Alsace and into the Palatinate, and beyond the Rhine into the Frankish countries, took place, conducted by the feared general Turenne. He devastated these sections in a barbarous manner, burning and pillaging as he went, and extending his raids all along the rivers Saar and Moselle, in Lorraine (1674-1678). In the peace of Nymwegen (1679) new districts of Alsace were claimed by the French and also the first tentative hold obtained over parts of Lorraine. These successes, made relatively easy by the weakness and lack of unity of the small German princes who ruled over these countries, emboldened Louis the XIV to make additional demands. He proceeded to issue his famous "decrees,"—a sort of compulsory declaration of political adherence—and had them promulgated by the bribed and overawed "Reunion Councils" which he had set up. In pursuance of these steps he boldly seized a series of additional towns, villages and country districts of Alsace. In the very midst of ostensible peace he had his general fall upon the free German city of Strassburg with a strong force, disarm the defenders and compel them, upon their knees and under pain of instant death, to swear allegiance to France (1680). All these robberies of German lands had to be conceded—under protest—by the disconcerted and divided German and Austrian rulers of these parts, unable to defend themselves against their powerful enemy, and were assigned to the French in the peace of 1684.

But still greater trials were in store for Alsace and Lorraine and the unfortunate Rhine countries which formed the buffer states between France, on the one side, and Austria and Prussia beyond. A fourth invasion, dictated wholly by monarchical ambitions and entirely devoid of provocation on the part of Alsace or Germany, occurred in the so-called "Orleans War" for the succession to the rule of the Palatinate (1690-1697), in which dispute Louis the XIV was determined again to have his ambition prevail. The German empire, Austria,

the Netherlands, Spain and Savoya were involved in this contention. In order to prevent these enemies invading French territory, the French war minister, Louvois, ordered **the systematic and merciless devastation of the Rhine countries and Alsace.** The work was done so well that it required fifty years for the afflicted districts to recover from the ruin wrought by the relentless French general Melac, who had charge of the operations. The famous fortress-castle of Heidelberg on the right side of the Rhine, a structure of immense strength and ramified extent, was undermined and almost entirely blown up. To this day the shattered round-tower of the castle is a mute witness to these outrages. The bridge acros the river Neckar, at Heidelberg, was also blown up and the greater part of the town laid in ashes. Many other isolated strongholds were similarly destroyed. The cities of Worms and Speier, in the Palatinate, shared the fate of Heidelberg; the inhabitants were driven out, and the houses and the venerable old cathedrals burned and all but destroyed. In the town of Mannheim the citizens themselves were compelled to raze the fortification walls under pain of death. In the country districts, fields and vineyards were uprooted, barns and stocks of produce burned, cattle mutilated—all by orders of the wanton French government and its generals, drunk with power! The countries arrayed against France were unable to stem the tide against the mighty French monarch with his well-equipped armies, skilful commanders, abundant supplies; and in the peace of Ryswick (1697) all previously acquired parts of Alsace-Lorraine and the Palatinate, and many new conquests made in this latest raid, including several important towns and districts on the right bank of the Rhine were confirmed to France **as the prize of overwhelming main force overriding right and tradition and the nationality of the populations affected.**

This settlement of force lasted undisturbed for nearly a hundred years. The Alsatians became Frenchmen outwardly, but retained their Teutonic national character, language and customs as before. In 1793, however, new disturbances began in Alsace-Lorraine when, at the beginning of the wars of the French revolution, as already related, German and Austrian

coalition troops crossed the Rhine to put down the revolution and its reign of blood horrors. In the course of this invasion of France and its progress toward Paris, the Germans held these their old native lands again for about a year. But the able French generals of the revolution soon turned the scales against the Germans and Austrians and broke their hold in Alsace completely. In the disastrous peace of Basel (1795) France won back all and more than she had ever held before of Alsace and Lorraine. The whole west bank of the Rhine, including Holland, had to be abandoned to her and Germany was compelled to accept the Rhine as "the natural frontier" between the two countries. It was, once again, **a victory of might over right; nothing could withstand the fierce spirit of the French in the years of the revolution!** Soon thereafter, however, the cities of Heidelberg and Mannheim, which had been ceded in the above peace to France, were retaken by Austrian troops after a violent period of siege and destruction, and rejoined to Germany. All this perpetual warring and taking of lands and cities had, from the beginning (in 1639), been **a mere game of superior power and covetous conquest on the part of France, in which the inhabitants of the affected districts had no voice and could but submit and suffer.** The acceptance of this degrading peace of Basel, of 1795, illustrates well how a defeated enemy may be compelled by force of political circumstances to submit to onerous terms of armistice and peace, although not entirely crushed. Austria and Prussia were not exhausted, but were confronted by greater troubles brooding in Poland at this time and to meet which it was necessary for them to conserve their strength by a temporary peace with France.

II. 1793-1815

Nothing further occurred to affect the political status of Alsace-Lorraine till 1870. But it is necessary for our general argument to present a similar rapid sketch of the further military visitations to which the Rhine countries and entire Germany were subjected at the hands of their imperious and unceasing enemy, **France.** In the years from 1793 to 1799,

during the wars of the French Republic and following the peace of Basel (as already related), all southern Germany, from the Rhine to the heart of Bavaria and even into the Tyrol and Upper Austria, **was intermittently overrun by the French, accompanied by battles, siege, fire and pillage.** Anyone acquainted with these countries knows that to this day there is scarcely a town or city within them that has not got "its legends and its ruins" to point to as reminders of the passage of the "French scourge" of those days!

With the year 1800 and the seizure of complete power by Napoleon as First Consul of the Republic, the Napoleonic era began. From its commencement, in the military sense, by a new raid into Bavaria by the French general Moreau, which culminated in the battle of Hohenlinden (1801), and thence through the entire Napoleonic gamut—invasion of Hanover (1801)—second invasion of South Germany, capitulation of the fortress of Ulm and battle of Austerlitz (1805)—formation of the compulsory "Rhinebund" and dissolution of the German empire, the frightful battle of Jena, surrender of the principal fortresses of Prussia and entry into Berlin, all in 1806—the "bloodiest" of all battles, that of Eylau on the borders of Poland (1807)—surrender of the Silesian fortresses and battle of Friedland, also in 1807—Napoleon's triumphal conclave in the city of Erfurt (1808)—territorial spoliation of Sweden (1809)—the battles of Aspern and Wagram, also in 1809—the campaign against Russia, battle of Borodino and the memorable "retreat from Moskau" in flames (1812)—(five hundred thousand went, eight thousand came back)—the combats of "the liberation," ending with the world-battle of Leipzig, the dissolution of the forcible and hated "Rhinebund" and of the Napoleonic creation of the kingdom of Westphalia (1813)—entry into Paris by the triumphant coalition allies (1814)—Elba, the Congress of Vienna, and finally, WATERLOO (1815)—**Germany, to its remotest parts, was the battlefield in these tremendous conflicts, Germany had to sustain and quarter the French armies and give them through-passage into Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Russia!**

Let the reader study the full account in any textbook of history and fully picture all this in his mind and grasp the

magnitude of the trials heaped upon the German people for a continuous period of twenty years by the ambitions of this overbearing neighbor-nation, **France,** and the unscrupulous schemes of a military adventurer, **Napoleon the First,** and consider that all this had occurred without any provocation whatever having been given by them! Even those who will not read the detailed history of the Napoleonic wars can form an idea from the above rapid recital of events—a succession of wars and battles which in number, magnitude and intensity had never before been crowded together into the space of fifteen years—**what this must have meant for Germany, who had to bear the physical brunt of it all, quite independent of the political humiliation and spoliation which she had to suffer.** It left her crushed and exhausted from every angle.

In the second peace of Paris (November, 1815) France, at last defeated by the coalition against her, was retrenched to her borders of 1790, which included Alsace and parts of Lorraine, but without the additional territories which had been ceded to her in the peace of Basel of 1795. Considering all the historical facts, this magnanimous settlement was one of the most remarkable political concessions of all times! Here was plainly the opportunity for Prussia, in her hour of triumph, to take revenge for the many wrongs and sufferings inflicted upon her and all Germany, especially the southern parts thereof, by France, **and to make the claim for the return of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany** as independent German principalities and members of the greater empire. England, Austria and Russia were willing to entertain this proposition—but Prussia repelled the temptation! She hesitated to sow the seeds of a new war over the possession of these countries. **Napoleon,** the firebrand and usurper, who had victimized France almost as much as he had all the other countries of Europe, being **gone,** Prussia did not desire that France should be too deeply humiliated and torn. Regrettable, fateful generosity!—but in spite of wars there existed at that time a close intellectual sympathy between Germany and France in philosophy, arts and letters which justly claimed its expression by this lenient political peace.

It is not necessary to establish in detail all the political

interests connected with this perpetual strife between France and Germany, from 1639 to 1815, and to determine the exact responsibility in each case. France was brutally aggressive, without question; but some blame also attaches to the lack of unity, vaccillation of policy and bartering covetousness of the German kings and princes. These were much left to follow their own separate interests, in the absence of a strong political direction on the part of the nominal German empire and Kaiser. The authority of both was more titular than real and concertedly effective. Austria, which held the imperial power, and whose ruler was also, therefore, the emperor of all Germany, was through her territorial and dynastic relations with Italy, Spain, the Netherlands—and even with France—not in a position to carry on an effective and strictly German imperial policy apart from her own interests. The indisputable fact remains that from the reign of Louis XIII to the end of the revolution, from 1639 to 1797, **the French were always the aggressors in these wars and that their object was the forcible acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine, and general dictation over the German countries immediately east thereof.** This is the verdict of impartial history. But under Napoleon I this traditional "objective" of France was quickly widened out to obtaining political domination over entire Germany and securing actual "administrative occupation" of large areas on the right bank of the Rhine, notably of the entire provinces of Westphalia and Hanover.

From the above it should be apparent to the reader that for a period of 175 years, from 1639 to 1815, Germany suffered with but little intermission **a continuous campaign of attack and destruction from her turbulent and haughty neighbor, France.** These violations were dictated solely by lust for increased power and wealth; there was an entire absence of active provocation on the part of the German princes of these districts or by the powers of the empire or the inhabitants of the territories in question. No claim of race identity or close relationship even, or of political preferences of the people of Alsace and Lorraine, the Bavarian Palatinate or the western Rhine provinces were ever advanced by France as a justification of her policy of aggression. All these peoples were origi-

nally pure German in stock, language and customs; they remained so in overwhelming proportion even up to 1870. **The ethnological proof of this is incontrovertible;** one needs but to read the family names, those of the towns and cities, rivers, mountains and woods of Alsace and Lorraine to be convinced!

Will the people of the United States, after reading these plain and true statements, begin to understand the deep resentment felt by the Germans against the French, their implacable enemy and despoiler for three centuries? The story we have given is the one which the German boy and girl hears from the lips of father and mother when they are gathered around the fireside and are old enough to understand! **France has no such story of unprovoked wrong from the Germans to tell its children—not even to-day!** It is this story which sinks into the young blood and heart of German children, from the Rhine to the Baltic, and lurks and boils; this story which we must understand—be willing to understand—to comprehend the German frame of mind and point of view in regard to France in general and Alsace-Lorraine in particular. And at this very hour a new story of unheard-of rapacity and national strangulation of Germany by France is being added to the old! The above recital explains the action of Germany in 1871, of rejoining these provinces to the new empire; it also explains the attitude and temper of her people in the great war just ended and which, in the light of their experiences, **was but a deliberate attempt to throw them down once more, to rob them again of Alsace-Lorraine, to destroy the successful State which they had built up in scarce more than forty years, that it may no longer be a thorn in the side of their jealous enemies!** It is well to keep all this in mind to allow us to correctly appraise the French claims at the "peace table" not only for the return of Alsace and Lorraine, but **for the annexation of the entire German left bank of the Rhine!** How shockingly these "outrageous claims" clashed with the pretended idealism for liberty, justice, humanity and nationality which was so adroitly put forward as the war motive of the Entente allies!

Has America forgotten with what execration **the Englishman** was regarded in this country for the one hundred years

or more following the war of the American revolution? Yet the history of our contention against England bears no comparison in the degree of aggravation and injury to that of Germany against France! Except that the superficiality of our knowledge of the history of Europe excuses us somewhat, we should be truly ashamed of the unmerited villification dealt out to Germany by America in the Alsace-Lorraine argument with its cry of "the crime of 1871" and the persistent misrepresentation of this question during the war and to this day!

III. 1815-1870

From 1815 to 1870 no military actions took place between France and Germany. It was a period of **reaction from the political ideas of the French Revolution and of internal political commotions followed by monarchical restorations in almost every country of Europe.** Between 1840 and 1850 a new period of agitation for democratic institutions set in, not only in France but in Germany and other countries. In the course of these convulsions France became a republic for the second time, under the presidency of **Louis Napoleon,** nephew of the Great Napoleon, who soon imitated his uncle by making himself emperor of the French (1852), and reigned as such till 1870. In all other directions, also, Napoleon III aimed to revive the glories of the former French empire in pomp, political dictation, wars of conquest, in general vainglorious-ness and opulence of life, and he succeeded very well. France was once more at her height, Paris again the mistress of elegance, the pinnacle of ostentatious civilization. The great International World's Fair at Paris, in 1867, was the triumph of Napoleon's reign, the scene of political fraternization among all the peoples and of their homage at the feet of France. To some simple minds it seemed as if the millennium had come!

In Germany, during this period, a wonderful spirit of **national revival** had arisen, a striving for concentration, union of effort and progress, political and material. After the republican movements of 1848, in different parts of the country, and the reaction which followed in favor of firmly governed monarchial states on the pattern of Prussia, the several in-

dependent kingdoms and principalities vied with each other to bring all their administrative institutions, the universities, colleges and art academies, public school instruction, the physical training of the young and the military service to the highest development. All intellectual pursuits—literature, art and music—flourished. Prussia gradually took the national leadership; her predominating size of territory and rapid material progress, the ability of her kings and statesmen, her magnificent military organization on the basis of universal conscription service **pointed her out as the leader to bring about a new united German fatherland**—the dream of the several peoples of the disjointed German nation, from poets and scholars to princes and peasants ever since the terrible Napoleon I had set his heavy foot upon them. Austria seemed disqualified for the task of active national leadership because of her largely slavic composition and Italian interests, if for no other reason.

External political events marched rapidly apace towards new and favorable constellations. In 1864 Prussia and Austria were jointly drawn into a war with Denmark about the succession to the partly Danish and partly German provinces of Schleswig and Holstein. After a tortuous course of diplomatic negotiations, followed by hostilities, Denmark lost the fight at both ends and agreed to the surrender of these provinces to the victors. This conflict ended with an acrimonious dispute between Austria and Prussia about the division of occupation and administration of the two provinces. This laid the foundation for the war of 1866, although both Schleswig and Holstein were ultimately conceded to Prussia by Austria and incorporated into her dominions. The double success of Prussia in this war, in which her new military organization had demonstrated its superiority in actual warfare for the first time, and her diplomacy, under the leadership of **Bismarck,** had won the victory over Austria, established her predominant position in Germany beyond question. Soon her plans for the reconstruction of the North-German union or "Bund" upon a more effective basis, eliminating Austria, led to serious internal constitutional agitations in Germany itself, during 1864-66, and, together with the Schleswig issue, finally

to the war between Prussia and Austria and to the fratricidal strife between the different smaller German States and Prussia, in 1866, many of which still vacillated in their "leanings" between Prussia and the hereditary Austrian authority. The dangers and uncertainties of these times of external conflict and internal fermentation towards a new national life weighed heavily upon the German patriotic heart; all that had been hoped for, striven for, bled for in the war with Denmark seemed to hang in the balance! Unfortunately the far-seeing and practical ideas of the king of Prussia, William I, of Bismarck, of von Moltke, for bringing about a strong and united Germany were not fully comprehended; events came too rapidly for the stolid mind of the mass of the people; their irresistible consequences would have to be pounded into the heads of princes and people alike with cannon shots and saber cuts!

The military campaign of the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria developed rapidly. In the famous battle of Koeniggraetz, or Sadowa, in Bohemia, the Austrians suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Prussia. Her star now flamed in the zenith! The victory resulted **in the immediate and complete elimination, thenceforth, of Austria from German national political affairs.** Those North-German and South-German States which had risen against Prussia's uncomprehended plans were now quickly defeated, in their turn, by Prussia. The states of Hannover, Nassau and Kurhessia were annexed and incorporated into her dominions and their rulers dethroned, under liberal compensations. The kingdom of Saxony and most of the central Saxon principalities now entered into the perfected political union, or "Bund," with Prussia and came under her complete leadership. The South-German states of Baden, Wurttemberg, Bavaria and Hessia retained their constitutional independence but entered into a close military convenion with Prussia in order **to create a uniform army system for the whole country.** These political arrangements provided the general foundation and paved the way for the one and united German Empire which came five years later. As a fact, the unification of the military service and revenue customs, establishment of a federal judicial system and con-

certed internal legislative action had resulted, practically, in a "united new Germany" even at that time, 1866-1870. (The contemporaneous war, in 1866, between Austria and Italy for the latter's final deliverance from foreign rulers and her complete unification is described in a later article on Italy.)

IV. THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-71

Our review has now reached the great years of 1870-71. Many volumes have been written on the political events and diplomatic moves which culminated in this momentous war, which was in many respects the most wonderful military event of all history. It would carry us too far to trace all these factors and describe the course of the war in much detail. The rise of the German federation, under Prussia's leadership, and the military strength of Prussia has been related in the preceding article. This was one of the factors; another was the new spirit for German unity. Whether France purposely provoked the war of 1870 or whether Prussia did, or whether the occasion was, perhaps, equally welcome to both sides bears no important relation to the argument we are interested in most. After all information available is sifted down, these salient facts appear: That Napoleon III was deeply chagrined by the failure and tragic ending of the French expedition to Mexico to set up Prince Maximilian, of Austria, as emperor of Mexico, in 1864, and that he was ready to embrace any opportunity to restore the injured prestige of France; that he viewed with apprehension **the rising power of Prussia and the prospective early erection of a unified and strong Germany** which might challenge the pre-eminent position of France on the continent; that he was fully aware of the activities of his many internal enemies—royalists and republicans—whom nothing could conciliate, no surveilance, control or repression intimidate, and who were bent upon his fall; that he knew himself to be, like his great uncle, an usurper of the imperial power by force and intrigue alone and artificial endorsement, devoid of real devotion by the people; that alone **great deeds of glory by battle or diplomacy for French honor and renown could long hold the glamour of his reign.** His opponent, the astute Bismarck,

gauged the position of Napoleon accurately and felt that a war with France, under all the circumstances, was only a question of time and opportunity. He made his preparations, military and diplomatic, accordingly, to be ready when the hour of fate should strike.

A matter for serious dispute between France and Prussia soon arose—the succession to the Spanish throne—but the ostensible point of contention was merely the hinge upon which the deeper political motives at work were balanced and revolved, until they finally led to the declaration of war by France upon Prussia, in July, 1870. It must be conceded that Napoleon, a man of very high intelligence and good natural instincts, was driven upon this fatal course by an ambitious **entourage,** headed by the Empress Eugenie, and by other circumstances beyond his control; moreover, in diplomatic skill he was like putty in the master hand of Bismarck! In his scheming, Napoleon made one fundamental miscalculation: He relied upon the ignoble and unpatriotic record of South German princes of former times in their covetous submission to the Bourbon kings and to Napoleon the Great, he believed that he could detach the South German states of Baden, Wurttemberg, Bavaria and the Hessias, which had not yet fully entered into the German "Bund" (see preceding article) from Prussia by adequate promises of compensation. In this reckoning Napoleon plainly underestimated the new German spirit and purposes for a united fatherland. In his moves to realize his object he soon proved himself no match for the forensic and persuasive diplomacy of Bismarck. Napoleon's plans and hopes in this respect, and also in respect to England, Austria, Russia and Italy in his quest for allies, were foredoomed to failure! When hostilities broke out, France stood alone and was confronted **by a militarily united Germany,** commanding forces which in numbers exceeded and in equipment and leadership far outclassed her own. Events also proved quickly that the regime of favoritism and corruption which had eaten into French court and official life in the later years under Napoleon III had left behind a demoralized army, inefficient generals and empty arsenals.

The result is known: The defeat of France was rapid and complete. Napoleon and General MacMahon were hopelessly beaten at Sedan and surrendered with 380,000 men and 2000 cannon; General Bazaine was crushed in the series of frightful battles around Metz (Gravelotte, Saint Prieux, Pont-a-Mousson) and pressed into the fortress, and later compelled to surrender with 180,000 men; Paris was besieged and starved into submission after heroic resistance. Previous to these events at Sedan and Metz the fortress of Strassburg, and many minor ones, had fallen or were ready to surrender. In the Southwest—along the Swiss border—as well as in the West, about Orleans, the German armies met with stout resistance, but were ultimately victorious. French troops fought valiantly on all fields—as always—and the Provisional Republican government, under the genius and fire of the great commoner, **Gambetta,** made heroic efforts to arrest the final disaster, but without avail. The military collapse of France was early followed by political revolution, civil war and the terrible days of the "Commune," marked by the burning of Paris and a reign of terror akin to that of the great revolution of 1789. At Sedan, and with what followed, Napoleon lost his throne and soon died in exile. In January, 1871, six months only after the outbreak of hostilities, **the German Empire was proclaimed and established** in Versailles itself, with the king of Prussia, William I, as William I, emperor. In the final peace a war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs ($1,000,000,000) was laid upon France by the victors, and a portion of the country occupied temporarily as security for payment of the indemnity. The territorial exaction was that the whole of the **province of Alsace and the German part of Lorraine were re-annexed to Germany,** partly as an act of political restitution and partly as a measure of military protection.

The world was consumed with astonishment and admiration at the cyclonic rapidity and titanic grandeur of these military and political events! Germany had leapt with one bound to the front rank of nations and in a short time became the dominating political power on the continent. In eulogy of the ability and force demonstrated by Germany in this war we are bound to add: Compared with the energy and concen-

tration of action, the rapid succession of grand and decisive battles, the successful sieges of Paris, Metz, Strassburg, etc., the whole lightning-like splendor of the war of 1870, the war of 1914-18 was a tame exhibition in the sluggishness of its immense masses of men, the desultory monotony of the trench fighting, the total failure of attaining even one really brilliant and decisive military action on a large scale by either side! The staggering loss of life in the great war was partly due to intensity of actions, but mostly to the great numbers of soldiers in the field, the destructiveness of the modern explosives and machine guns and the increased size and range of modern artillery. In genius of leadership, the war of 1870 far outshines the one just closed, but in individual valor of troops on both sides the two wars compare very favorably.

Defeated France, happily, was **not all a loser in the war of 1870-71.** The fortunate consequence of her disaster was—after the passage of a few years of turbulence and uncertainty—the failure of all monarchical and Napoleonistic plots at restoration and **the definite establishment of free government under the present republic.**

The War Indemnity of 1871. It is interesting, at this time, to compare the money indemnity exacted by Germany from France in 1871—five billions of francs in gold—with the money indemnity demanded by the leading Entente Allies from Germany, now settled at approximately 134 billions of marks in gold, equivalent to about **167½ billions of francs in gold!** (Fr. 167,500,000,000, or $34,000,000,000 gold, approximately). In 1871 there was, also, great destruction in France, and many excesses—atrocities—had occurred, but one heard little about these, either during the war or thereafter. The French took all that as the unavoidable accompaniment of war by a military force in an enemy country; **the British sentimental propaganda had not then been invented!** We will admit, certainly, that the wealth of nations has greatly risen in the period between the two wars, also that the scale of the later war was much larger as to men, ships, guns, engineering and new devices.

Yet one fails entirely to comprehend the figures demanded from Germany, except on the assumption **that something more than bona fide war damages is included in and intended by these demands!**

V. THE PROBLEM OF ALSACE-LORRAINE

Our prime interest in the preceding sketch of the war of 1870-71 centers in the question of Alsace-Lorraine which has figured so largely as a leading motive in the late war and was one of the great problems of the peace conference. The historic background of this question is given in Articles I and II. As stated, Germany re-annexed these provinces in 1871 primarily as **a restitution of lands Germanic in national character, language and traditions,** but equally as a step necessary from considerations of military security. It was necessary to protect the Rhine by a strip of land on its west bank, **a river** generally being the most vulnerable boundary between two hostile countries, no matter how well it may be protected by fortifications. This precaution arose from the certainty felt by the German leaders, even in 1871, that France would seek revenge for her unparalleled defeat sooner or later, **whether Alsace-Lorraine were taken from her or not.** Still more it arose from the voice of history, the story of persistent French attack and invasion in the past, which we have related in preceding articles. To do otherwise would have been blindness and weakness combined on the part of Germany in the circumstances. Thomas Carlyle, the renowned English philosopher, critic and historian, wrote as follows on this subject: "No people has had **such a bad neighbor as Germany has possessed during the last four hundred years in France.** Germany would have been mad had she not thought of erecting such a frontier wall between herself and such a neighbor when opportunity offered." These are indelible words from an absolutely impartial thinker. England conceded the perfect justice of the re-annexation, and made no protest against it in spite of her warm friendship for France. That the re-annexation was not only proper politically, but also an act of wisdom is proven by the fact that it assisted largely to secure the long

period of peace between Germany and France which followed —forty-three years—a fact well worth remembering to-day.

In order to maintain a close connection with all that has been stated on this matter in the preceding Articles, we will at once pursue this subject of Alsace-Lorraine to the finish. Nothing of great moment had occurred to affect this question in the interval of peace, from 1871 to 1914. The Germans instituted the complete re-Germanization of the annexed provinces and spent immense sums in reconstruction of the cities, in promotion of enterprise and industry, in railroads, canals, and bridges, in betterments of every kind. These efforts to benefit the country and win the population were not unaccompanied with some friction, due to the rigidity of German official methods, but there was **at no time any evidence of real discontent on a large scale with the new political association.** Such hostile incidents as did happen were, naturally, greatly exaggerated in France and other countries antagonistic to Germany's rise. The recalcitrant and irreconcilable French elements in Alsace-Lorraine were encouraged to complain and revolt against the annexation by their sympathizers in France, but all this did not avail much as the substantial benefits of German rule became apparent to the people.

In France, also, the solidity, wisdom and benefit of German rule was being recognized. There were even those "cooler heads" in France who believed that this national wound would ultimately heal if it were not being continually torn open afresh at every slight German provocation of France by that small band of irreconcilables led by Foreign-affairs Minister Delcassé, and later by the future President Poincaré. This agitation was seconded by articles in French papers inspired by England and Russia, whose interests were **opposed to the sincere efforts of Germany and a minority of enlightened Frenchmen** to bring about a genuine *rapprochement* between the two countries. From about 1908 on, this hostile agitation gained great impetus through the secret entente which had been effected between England, France and Russia by Edward VII (in pursuance of deep-laid and long-visioned English objects), and **towards the year 1914 had carried almost the whole French nation with it in a delirious desire for revenge.**

President Wilson, and others, adopting a term coined by the French soon after the war of 1870, have called this re-annexation "the crime of 1871." This inflaming term is a pointed example of that vicious practice of exaggerated language which has characterized the late war and caused so much misunderstanding! How and wherein was there a crime in this natural and legitimate act of re-annexation? The war of 1870 had been honestly fought by Germany; the terms of peace were agreed to and ratified by the French Congress; it was in all respects a "reasonable peace" which Germany had exacted, but a just amount of indemnity and reparation and guaranties of security could not be dispensed with. It may have been "unwise" of Germany to re-annex the provinces and thus sow the seeds of later troubles, but the Germans believed differently, and were probably correct in their estimate of the stability of peace with France whether Alsace-Lorraine were taken or not. There was every historical and ethnological reason for France to accept the situation loyally and cultivate the amicable relations so sincerely desired by Germany, instead of keeping up a fateful friction by the cry of revenge! It should be thoroughly understood by the American reader **that it was not territory originally French which was taken in 1871 but districts which were, racially, German and had, in spite of a hundred and seventy-five (175) years of French rule, remained overwhelmingly German in character!** How otherwise than with dismay and resentment could Germany view this perpetual agitation by France for a new conflict the purpose of which was to rob her again of these two valuable provinces of essentially German population, which she had regained in a costly war and upon which she had spent prodigious efforts and billions of money to bring up to a high level of development and prosperity?

That which **will be a crime** is the intended (now accomplished) restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, in the light of the historic facts presented in these articles and in the face of the principle "of nationality and self-determination" so eloquently urged as the "guide-to-be" in the territorial adjustments of the Peace Congress. This author believes that the only just and durable solution of this problem would be

the autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine as a free state, and its union as such with the new German Federated Republic, if—as the writer believes—the people will so declare by a plebiscite. The people themselves should be invited to decide this question of preferential allegiance and should for their own contentment and that of the world in general declare in a free and full plebiscite in which direction—and in what proportion—their political sympathies lie! Only in such a settlement will all the factors of this problem find their logical and just satisfaction. To those Americans and others who lean to the French side in this contention it is desirable to submit some important "practical considerations"—studiously kept from their view but of wide bearing on the subject—in order to strip from this argument the "halo of artificial sentiment" so adroitly wound about it.

It should be known that the protestations of the French of their great love for the Alsacians and Lorrainers have a very materialistic sub-stratum: The coal and iron fields of Longwy and Briey are as valuable in the eyes of the French as in those of the Germans; the sturdy Germanic vitality of these people has been as a tonic to the French nation in its effete depopulizing social habits and has furnished them great workers, thinkers, soldiers, field-marshals, business men and financiers; the productivity of Alsace-Lorraine in agricultural and dairy lines, fruit, poultry, cattle, etc., is an important asset even for so richly blessed a country as France. It must, in addition, be particularly appreciated by the American reader **that the Alsace-Lorraine of to-day is not that of 1871.** It has been magnified tenfold in all its activities, wealth and culture by the beneficence of forty years of German stewardship of ability and honesty!

When the French rode into Strassburg, Muehlhausen, Colmar, Metz, etc., at the end of the late war, they rode into splendid, stately, clean cities which spoke of order, system, sanitation, prosperity and civic pride. Great industrial establishments were found throughout the country; agriculture, farm buildings, cattle stocks were at the top of development; the smallest places were found possessed of waterworks, electric-light plants and other installations for modern comfort

and convenience; everywhere the French met evidences of progress, prosperity and popular contentment. **Surely such a country was a desirable one to re-annex** by France irrespective of any pretensions of sentiment! When the Germans rode into the same cities in 1871 they found them reeking with rats, mice, black roaches and similar vermin that thrives on dirt and negligence. The evidence of second-empire sloth, official laxity and public vice were everywhere. The transformation is significant: It cannot all be ascribed to the general progress of the times; it was **not necessary for the Germans to do all these things;** they are the result of the working of a principle! Strassburg, to-day, is transfigured from a cramped-up, dirty, middle-age fortress town to one of the finest of the many fine German cities. The Alsatian and Lorraine people have been raised 100 per cent in efficiency, physical and moral character, general and technical education, happiness and well-being. Is it not reasonable to assume that a people so benefitted should be **proud of its new position and glad to remain united with its German tyrants?** There are many among them living to-day who, in 1870, were anywhere from 16 to 36 years of age and who have been witnesses of the transformation. The Germans were never afraid of a popular vote in Alsace-Lorraine, provided it would be taken under proper safeguards to eliminate unfair pressure by the French army of occupation. Just now the French, naturally, flatter their new wards and exert themselves to win their favor; but in course of a little time Paris will again indulge itself in the witticisms and thinly veiled aspersions against the Alsatians which were so frequently heard before the war of 1870. France, better than anyone else, knows that she can never convert this population of German race, traits and physiognomy into real French people—and the inborn antipathies will find sarcastical vent as of yore!

VI. OTHER POLITICAL EVENTS CONTRIBUTARY TO THE WAR CONDITIONS OF 1914. (1854-1914)

Additional to the preceding subjects we must take cognizance of several other important political events and conditions

in Europe, long prior to 1914, which became active factors in the making of the great war. We will describe them under the following divisions: **A. The Russo-Turkish and Balkan Question; B. The Unification and Development of Italy; C. Germany's Phenomenal Rise to World Power. Her Oriental Expansion Policy; D. Austria's Political Character and Destiny; E. The Ensuing Combinations of the Powers.** All these events and moves on the European chessboard are so intricate and extensive that it will not be possible to state more than the outline facts of each group, but that much we believe to be absolutely necessary to enable the American reader to form a correct conception of the exceedingly complicated and explosive situation which existed in Europe towards the fateful year 1914.

A. THE RUSSO-TURKISH AND BALKAN QUESTION

This problem enjoys the merit of having always been inspired by the same motives and objects and conducted by the same means—intentional militant provocation, insidious diplomatic intrigue. Since the time of Peter the Great it has been the unmistakable purpose of Russia to obtain seashore control and freedom of shipping from the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea to the Mediterranean. **A glance at the map is sufficient to explain this.** Russia's northern coast is icebound; even the sheltered port of Archangel is open only for a part of the year. Her Baltic coast is more free in this respect, but the passage through the Danish straits is tortuous and consumes much time before the open North Sea is reached. It is subject to the hostile interference of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. As for the Siberian seacoast, it is too far removed from the most important part of Russia, the western section, to make its full value available even at the present time; but before the construction of the Trans-Caspian railway, from Moskau to Vladivostok, it was so far removed as to be useful only for the fishing industry and local shipping. Thus Russia, an immense empire with a population of close to 150 millions, **is largely landlocked.** Her rapid and unrestricted intercourse with the countries bounding on the Mediterranean, with England, with the Orient through he Suez

Canal is hemmed. These conditions, naturally, were and are unfavorable for the legitimate development of Russia's industry and commerce.

This geographical disability, and the consequent political designs to which it gave rise, linked with Russia's position **as the head of the Greek-catholic church and the natural protector of all Greek-catholic countries and districts along the Mediterranean borders, and of such populations within the Turkish dominions,** led to frequent demands upon Turkey for redress of grievances, and, at times, to sharp protests over troubles of violence arising out of this general situation. Under the great Czar Nicholas (between 1850 and 1854) serious friction of this nature had arisen between the Greek catholics and the Roman catholics in regard to the jurisdiction over the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. This dispute brought on a clash of the "spheres of interest" between Russia and France, as the latter had assumed to occupy the same protective position in regard to Roman catholics in the Orient and near-Orient as Russia held in regard to the Greek catholics. This led to a state of embitterment between the two countries, between the Czar Nicholas and Napoleon III. Also, this situation could not help undermining the political authority of Turkey over the catholic christians of both confessions within her own borders. Instead of yielding to proposals of compromise, Nicholas, a masterful man, remained unbending in his claims and increased his demands for control over the Sultan. Russia, moreover, declared herself the champion of the **Slavic nationalities** within European Turkey at that time (Bulgars, Serbs, Bosnians, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, etc.) who were beginning agitation for their political emancipation.

This attitude soon made it clear to the other powers that Russia's object was much more that of her territorial extension and seashore rights than of her benevolent interest in the Greek catholics and the Slavs. In consequence of this delicate and dangerous political *empasse*, England and France championed the sovereignty of Turkey and demanded the recession of Russia from her defiant attitude for control over Turkey. These representations failed of any result, and **the war of the Crimea** broke out (1854-55). In this war France,

England and Turkey, joined later by Sardinia, were arrayed against Russia. For its short duration, it proved one of the most costly, in human life, of the older types of war. The armies were exposed to unspeakable sufferings from climatic hardships and disease, as during the campaign the dread Asiatic cholera broke out in the ranks. The most famous action of the war was the siege and fall of the Russian fortress of Sebastopol, on the Crimean peninsula in the Black Sea, in September, 1855. Famed, also, is "the charge of the Six Hundred" of the British Light Brigade, at Balaclava, nobly immortalized in Tennyson's stirring poem. In the midst of these events Emperor Nicholas died suddenly. His successor, Alexander II, being more peacefully inclined than his father, and realizing the superior power of the enemy coalition, soon brought the bloody conflict to an end by making acceptable concessions. Military honors were about evenly divided between the belligerents.

The peace concluded in the Congress of Paris, 1856, guaranteed the political integrity of Turkey as she was before the war; it trimmed down the pretensions of Russia as the sole protector of the christian slavic Balkan inhabitants and, instead, conferred this function upon the victorious signatory countries, extending it also to the christian peoples of Asiatic Turkey. This settlement laid the foundation of at least one side of that ever-burning Balkan question. From that time on, numerous atrocious massacres and persecutions of Christians, and consequent insurrections arising out of these religious and racial animosities, have taken place in the Balkan countries and in the christian sections of Asiatic Turkey, notably in Armenia, and have deeply stirred European feeling against the Turk. In consequence, a second war occurred between Turkey and Russia on the same issues, 1877-78. This was followed by a politico-religious war between the allied Balkan States and Turkey, and, later, by a political war among the Balkan States themselves, and ending finally by one between the Balkan States and Greece. This succession of wars, together with the four-years' war just concluded, have made of that south-eastern corner of the map of Europe a veritable cockpit! Yet, in 1914, the Balkan question was

still far from being settled; to the religious and racial strife against the Turk there was now joined the keen contention for individual nationality among these peoples. Within a comparatively small territory there are thrown together in that area some seven or eight nationalities, and semi-nationalities: Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania, to which we must add Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Turkey and Italy to make this political crazy-quilt complete. The Balkan and adjoining slavic nationalities are largely intermixed along their real and imaginary boundary lines, and the whole area is permeated by Greeks, Turks, Italians and numerous Jews, also some Austrians and Germans. Each country claims parts of the others on ethnological and historical grounds; each has proud traditions of former independence; they all claim the glories of ancient Greece and Rome as their heritage. In reality they are a collection of "wreckage peoples," evolved from the transition periods of ancient civilizations, mixed with nomadic settlers from the east and, hence, of most indefinite lineage. In character they are turbulent, hot-blooded, ignorant, vengeful, treacherous and cruel and, therefore, of the worst possible political reputation. They have been the trouble-makers in Europe for 75 years; if, figuratively speaking, the whole of them could be made to disappear in the Mediterranean Sea, it would be a benefit for the peace of the world!

England is directly responsible for this exasperating and baffling state of affairs. By nourishing in these peoples, under the impulse of Gladstone's humanitarian eloquence, an inordinate sense of importance quite beyond their deserts and the nationalistic possibilities of the situation as it stood at that time, she directly encouraged their restlessness and violence, increased the racial jealousies between them and interfered with **the natural evolution of these related countries to a strong and united slavic state under Austrian guidance**—the fertile scheme of the murdered prince Francis Ferdinand!

The Balkan question is important to our argument in that it furnished one of the causes of the great war. The peace of Paris (1856) by no means succeeded to make Russia give up her ambitions along the southern waters; **this ambition is**

her natural, her necessary national policy. She now turned further east, to Asia, to find a way. By the gradual conquest of Turkestan and the Caucasus district, by the instigation of a revolt in Afghanistan against England in India, and by the occupation of parts of Persia she sought a position of political influence in these countries to enable her to reach her object at least partly at the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. But these steps were blocked by England in the defeat of the Afghan insurrection, 1880. In the Balkans, having been checkmated by the great powers in her direct line of action, **she resorted to intrigue and cabal to further her designs** and used these states as "a club" towards her most direct antagonists, Austria and England, as the Balkan states carried an inherent and constant threat to the peace of Europe. Russia now urged with increasing insistence her "slavic-race protectorate" argument, her racial and dynastic relationship with **Serbia** in particular, and by both these agencies worked through the Balkan states for the achievement of her own political purposes: **The elimination of Turkey from Europe; possession of or dictation over Constantinople; acquisition of Aegean and Adriatic sea ports; complete freedom of navigation through the Bosporus and Dardanelles for her commercial ships and navy.** For the realization of this program in Europe, Russia would probably have been willing to renounce definitely any further designs to reach the Persian gulf and Arabian Sea. This aspect of the matter is important as it carried within itself the possibility of that later *rapprochement* with England which atually took place and was such an important factor for the war of 1914. The connection is plain: England could afford to look with much less concern upon Russia obtaining her southern-sea outlet policy in European than in Asiatic waters **because of the lesser danger therefrom to India.** For, holding the Suez Canal and Gibraltar, she had it in her power, with her superior fleet, to block any sea aggression from the Mediterranean from any or all the countries bounding thereon.

All the same, these schemes of Russia were opposed to the interests of England on general political principles as well as on account of India, and were opposed to the in-

terests of Austria because of the latter's long historical and necessary economic association with the Balkan states and Adriatic countries, and because of her established position on the east coast of the Adriatic, from Trieste to Antivari. **This was Austria's only sea coast, and her commercial and naval ports were located there; she could not entertain their possession being questioned from any quarter.** And, in more recent years, a new antagonist to Russia's Balkan policy arose —**Germany**—by her plans, also from economic necessity, to extend her supply sources and markets eastward through **Austria, the Balkans, the Black Sea and Turkey into Mesopotamia, to Bagdad and the Persian gulf in order to reach the Orient by a quicker and safer route than that by the sea past England, France, Spain, Gibraltar, the Mediterranean, past Malta and through the Suez Canal!** This grand and bold German scheme necessarily carried with it the making of confidential and financial conventions with the countries through which this line of communication—**the Berlin-Bagdad railroad**—was to pass, to guarantee the physical necessities and safety of the line. Russia's fear of Germany in this enterprise was not so much due *per se* to the latter's plans of commercial extension than to the interference she was sure would flow from the accompanying alliances with her own policy of securing freedom of shipping ports and political position along the Aegean and Adriatic. It must be acknowledged that Russia was honest enough to disclaim any suspicion that Germany's proposition carried with it any deeper political plot of permanent annexations, or that silly bugaboo of "world dominion" ascribed to her by the Entente enemy. Yet, these great plans of Germany not only threatened to thwart Russia **but were also a formidable challenge to England;** they would strengthen Germany's commercial position, extend her sphere of political influence and bring her dangerously near to Persia and to India itself. Thus this near-oriental complication with its irreconcilable interests was the most important factor—**the Russo-English factor**—that brought on the war of 1914. Its acute development will be discussed in detail in the succeeding articles.

B. THE UNIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITALY

This historical event engages our interest more in its accomplishment than in the processes of its evolution, but the latter are one of the most fascinating studies of modern history. Italy as "a country" has, like Germany, been more a political term than national identity. There were independent kingdoms and principalities of great number, and many of them dominated by foreign ruling dynasties. Of such, Austria had held a strong hold in central and upper Italy for several hundred years. The struggle for Italian unity is comparatively a recent event, 1858-1866, disregarding the earlier movements. After the war between France and Austria, 1858-60, in which Napoleon III had championed the cause of Italian unity and independence from foreign yoke, and which defeated and dissolved several of the Bourbon and Austrian kingdoms and smaller principalities, there followed a series of revolutions in lower Italy for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Naples (founded by Napoleon I). This movement was led by the famous patriot **Garibaldi.** Soon thereafter a number of minor dynastic conflicts occurred in Lombardy, undertaken by the strong and patriotic king of Sardinia, **Victor Emanuel,** for the final clean-up of these small sovereignties, native as well as foreign. These conflicts and revolutions, which extended from the Sicilies to northern Italy, resulted in a few years' struggle in a united country, but not as a republic, as so many had hoped, but as a kingdom under Victor Emanuel of Sardinia, a man who had not only proved his ability and leadership in this struggle for nationality, but had won the confidence and regard of the entire people. The province of Venice and the Papal State, the latter under strong French, Spanish and Austrian protection, alone were left out of the fold. Seldom before in the history of mankind have the united and inspiring efforts of but a few able, high-minded and patriotic men succeeded to fire a people to such a pitch of national enthusiasm—Cavour, Garibaldi, Mazzini and Victor Emanuel—and attained in so short a period **so complete and magnificent a political success for their ideals.** To emperor Napoleon III, his liberal mind, political intelligence and well-

meaning interest United Italy also owes an eternal debt of gratitude.

In 1866, when the war clouds began to rise between Prussia and Austria for the final trial of strength for German leadership, king Victor Emanuel, morally supported by Napoleon III, saw the opportunity—and did not hesitate to seize it—**for definitely expelling the remaining hated rule of Austria from the province of Venice,** the last of the true Italian provinces still in foreign possession. (The Papal State was always regarded in a light not purely political and was, also, an absolutely native state within Italy.) Austria was, however, in spite of her pressing difficulties with Prussia, unwilling to cede Venice without a struggle, to satisfy her prestige at least, and thus war resulted between the two countries. After a few engagements between the opposing armies, running parallel with Austria's disastrous campaign in Bohemia against Prussia, and likewise unfavorable, she was compelled to yield. As a result, Venice had to be ceded, and was united with Italy. Thus the watchword of the Italian wars of the liberation "Free to the Adria," was at last made a reality.

This happy unification of Italy ran about parallel in point of time with that of Germany which had, practically, begun in the same year, 1866, with the reconstructed North-German "Bund." In the course of their subsequent development, after 1871, many reciprocal political and economic interests and cultural sympathies sprang up between these two countries. Germany, by its new political position, greater size and industrial activity the leader, invited Italy to join her—with Austria—to form the historic "Dreibund," or Triple Alliance, one of Bismarck's great diplomatic designs and triumphs. Nothing speaks more for his skill and broad-minded outlook than this success to conciliate Austria with Germany and also with Italy only a few years after wars of the most bitter enmity had been fought between them. In return for the security which this political alliance guaranteed to Germany, Bismarck was able to extend Germany's fostering and protecting hand over Italy in the years of her development to a first-class power. More than once the gathering clouds of jealousy and enmity that rose from other

countries, particularly France and England, and foreboded danger to Italy's adventures of foreign acquisition in Tunis, Tripoli and Abyssinia **were thus held aloof and dissipated by Germany's powerful arm.** In the industrial and economic sense, also, this same combination of helpful and stimulating effects which flowed from the Triple Alliance can be said to have been "the making of modern Italy," the upbuilding of her material progress.

This propitious relationship **was violently torn asunder** by Italy's perfidious course of selfishness in aligning herself with the Entente allies in the war **and against Germany** in the face of her binding treaty obligations. While Italy's action was not a direct contributary cause of the war, it had an important effect on its course and final outcome. One can venture the statement without much uncertainty that, with Italy remaining neutral, Germany and her allies would have won the war. The details of Italy's faithlessness and ingratitude for the benefits received from Germany's friendship and protection form one of the most drepressing chapters of the war. This topic will be further pursued in its proper connection in a later article.

C. GERMANY'S PHENOMENAL RISE TO WORLD POWER

Her Oriental Expansion Policy

The rise of the German Empire after the war of 1870-71 was like that of a phoenix; at her height, in the years just preceding 1914, Germany was the cynosure of all eyes! This astounding success was due to the wise and solid foundation from which the German State had been developed—unification not merely physical and external but organic and internal. In nothing else has the versatile genius of her great statesman—Otto von Bismarck—shown more brilliantly than in this work of **organizing the country for attaining a solid future.** The dominating ability of his external diplomatic policy was even surpassed by the penetrating intelligence of his internal policy: In the amalgamation of the many differing elements of administration and public life of what had formerly been some thirty or more separate German States **into one harmonious whole;** in the conversion of the thirty different standards of

money, weights and measures, judicial procedure, police laws, post-office service, railroads and other public transportation factors, etc., **into one national standard in each class.** With all this went the complete unification of the military service, financial and banking laws, public and higher education. Having the common language, the addition of this standardizing and unifying of all the elements of public administration, intercourse and business agencies made the people and the country a homogeneous whole. The task of accommodation required on the part of the people to take up all these changes was a tremendous one, but the intelligence and patience of the Germans were equal to the demand!

In the economic field Bismarck's policy was built upon the basis of a stimulating protective tariff and favorable commercial treaties; by fostering and protecting ship-building, mining, forestry and agriculture by state subsidies; by creating facilities for obtaining working capital through establishing of banks and co-operative loan societies; by a well-balanced system of taxation, etc., **all of which combined started the wheels of industry a-humming in Germany at undreamed-of speed.** Two agencies were the special fertilizers of this program: The first, the five billions of francs of French war-indemnity gold which poured into the country in a steady stream like a blessing from heaven; the second, the establishment of a chain of the most highly organized commercial, industrial and higher technical schools spread throughout the country, and also of such for agriculture, mining and forestry, thus harnessing every phase of science, investigation and practical experience to the chariot of industry. Under this combination **opportunity, the golden,** was laid at the feet of the German people in boundless profusion and was seized by them with an energy, intelligence, systematic application and solidity of business methods which achieved a success to astonish the world!

In its train immense manufacturing establishments arose in all parts of the country; steamships and sailing vessels, counting thousands of the finest ships afloat, plied from the North Sea and Baltic ports to every part of the world; a net of railroad lines of the highest class of construction and equip-

ment was spread over the empire; macadamized highways linked together the cities and towns, and canal systems between the rivers made cheap transportation to tide water possible. As a result production, exports and imports increased from year to year to prodigious figures comparable only to those of England or the United States. All energies were strained to the utmost and brought prosperity to all and untold national wealth.

The entire internal life of the nation shared in this progress. Magnificent cities arose, adorned by grand public buildings, monuments, parks and boulevards; the medium-sized and smaller towns shared proportionately in this wave of improvement and enjoyed, down to the smallest villages, the triumphs of modern science as applied in sanitary drainage, waterworks, electric lighting systems, telegraph and telephone service, public-health regulations and hospitals, fire departments, etc. The educational system of Germany and her universities, famed since the Middle Ages, were brought to that highest degree of theoretical and practical instruction which made them the pinnacles of learning and the Mecca to which students came by the tens of thousands annually from every part of the globe. German research in history, archeology, natural sciences, biology, chemistry, electricity, abstract and applied philosophy achieved a position of world renown and musters the names of many of the most famous men in these studies. In literature, music and the drama, art and architecture works of great force and originality were produced that excited universal admiration. And not least was the practical sociological development which took place in the new Germany. The physical and moral well-being of the working population was safeguarded by wise and just laws which recognized its importance to the State, and **the standard of living of the entire people** was raised from one of severe frugality to one of greater variety and plenty.

This sociological side of the modern State received in no other country—monarchy or republic—such wide recognition and effect as in Germany; nor were these progressive measures of social justice entirely the result of socialistic agitation, but largely **the voluntary acts of an enlightened administration and**

public opinion. The institutions for the sick, the needy, the criminal, the imbecile and entirely demented were raised to the highest grade of efficient and economical service. By the introduction of wise factory and labor-protective laws, of the workmen's compensation act, compulsory life insurance of the employee by the employer and a system of old-age pensioning of the workers **that great scourge of humanity, breeder of sickness, vice and crime—POVERTY—was practically abolished in Germany!** All-in-all and everything was done with the well-known German qualities of thoroughness, attention to detail, honesty and faithfulness to duty!

It fairly baffles the imagination to form a complete mental picture of this highly educated German people throbbing and seething with life-activities of every kind—65 millions crowded together in a territory only a little larger than the State of Texas—when we consider their many-sided and intensely social, emotional and sentimental character; their deep interest in all the arts and sciences; in music, literature and advanced philosophy, all deployed and enjoyed in the self-consciousness of complete political and material success! Such a mental picture would be that of the much named, little understood and foolishly derided "German Kultur"! **And this is the country which had to be destroyed by envious greed and stupid hatreds born of pride and lust of power; this the country which is accused to have plotted the destruction of civilization!**

Politically, the growth of Germany's position and influence was developed by her ruler and statesmen apace with her internal and commercial progress. Her political position was to be not merely a part of the great work but, in fact, its basis, **its necessary basis of peace.** Only upon a basis of secure and long-continued peace could Germany grow and prosper to her ligitimate national greatness. But within that seething caldron—Europe—it was possible only by the creation of a strong army and navy, ready to strike at a day's notice—and a resolute foreign policy to indicate that this force would be used without hesitation when necessary to guard her security—to attain the desired condition, **the continued peace of Europe!** The military readiness of Germany was, thus, a blessing to all nations; it was not at all a matter

of free choice by Germany but **imposed upon her by her vulnerable geographical position in the center of Europe, surrounded by hereditary foes.** A country so located cannot begin to **prepare** for war when war from without is actually upon her, and one or more enemies are ready to invade her territory from land or sea, or both. Thus this Germany, in all its desire for and necessity of peace, was secretly ever trembling beneath its success and outward serenity **in the certain expectation of war, sooner or later,** of war of revenge, envy and hate; she knew at all times that her enemies were but waiting for their opportunity! Yet, any such war in which Germany might have at any time become involved could, on her part, **only have been a defensive war.** The self-evident truth of this statement is proven by the forty-three years of uninterrupted European peace, 1871-1914, during which time difficult political situations had arisen on several occasions which brought war perilously near, but the outbreak of which was prevented, each time, by Germany's resolute attitude and military preparedness, **based on her determined policy to preserve the peace in her own interest and in that of all Europe!**

This great and splendid German Empire was in very large measure the work of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who followed upon the foundation builders—Bismarck and the aged emperor Wilhelm I—and the galaxy of able and devoted men who worked with them. He succeeded his father, the ill-starred and beloved Frederick III, who at the death of William I was in the grip of a fatal illness and died after but a few months of reign. The success of William II was not due to any striking qualities of statesmanship akin to genius, but to his broad general purpose and liberal progressive attitude on all questions concerning the welfare and reunion of the country and its people; **to his confident, joyous, exuberant enthusiasm for the empire!** When the present wave of abuse will have disappeared, history will undoubtedly give him much credit; rational Germany does it ungrudgingly even to-day. In judging Wilhelm II it may be overlooked that in a monarchy of the semi-autocratic constitution of Germany the head, king or emperor, is the source from which must flow a large share of the initiative and directing inspiration, and which may—

as such—prove either the life-giving impetus or the death-dealing blight for the national destiny. Emperor William proved himself, in this sense, a true leader of his State and Country, and in all situations a man of very high intelligence and political insight, of firmness of purpose and noble patriotic ambition. And he fully realized, up to the very outbreak of the war, the spiritual and material object of his reign: **To achieve by a policy of uninterrupted peace and ready strong defense the upbuilding of the German nation to a foremost position in the world!** A man of high moral character and true Prussian unbending righteousness, of profound religious feeling, possessed of fine judgment and enthusiastic instincts for the arts and sciences and all the beautifying and stimulating influences of life Kaiser Wilhelm—leaving aside a few minor vagaries and weaknesses of character—was a man and emperor of whom the German nation has reason to be proud, to whom the German nation should be deeply grateful even in the hour of his fall! The unmerited abuse, the infamy of every species which has been heaped upon his head by the enemy nations and many neutrals and—saddest of all—by the blind and vulgar of his own people are an arraignment of the fairness, moral decency and sense of justice of our time. He is accused of heinous, impossible crimes; but impartial history will say **that his crime consisted merely in his audacity to stand up in defiance, backed by his people, against the Entente plot to subdue and humiliate and, if necessary, crush and break up the German empire!**

The fame of Germany's internal institutions, like that of her manufactures and business methods, went abroad everywhere and, in return, attracted visitors to the country from all parts. And while that which they saw elicited unstinted praise, these evidences of the working of a truly "mutualized State"—mutualized between the citizen and his government, between his obligations and the returns received in practical benefits—these evidences of an elevated national consciousness nevertheless excited envy and jealousy in many. Here was a country in which public administration was not only capable and economical but also **strictly honest**; the taxpayer's dollar went further than anywhere else; the whole "reciprocal con-

ception of "the State" as an entity was on a higher plane. Americans, particularly, who went to Germany in thousands "to see" **were disagreeably touched in their political prejudices** to find that so ideal a State, so efficient an administration had been attained under a monarchy, a semi-autocracy in fact, while at home in their own country, under democratic institutions and the aegis of "liberty" they beheld everywhere **the curse of incapacity, extravagance, graft and open bribery undermining the public service, all of which—while fully recognized and aired in the public press—is condoned by a humdrum, selfsatisfied political attitude by and on behalf of the citizen.** The French Republic, likewise, in the looseness and corruption of its internal administration, had its ire aroused by the precision, smoothness and completeness of the German public service. Political scholars who had asserted the superiority of democratic institutions over monarchical ones saw in Germany an irksome contradiction of their arguments, in many respects. All the same, many of the practical administrative methods and humanitarian socialistic innovations of Germany for the greater efficiency, protection and contentment of the great body of the people were diligently copied in England, America and other countries.

OF the details of the formation of Germany's famous political association—the Triple Alliance—in support of the empire's consolidation and development, we shall speak later. This alliance, and its later extensions, was the foundation of her **Oriental Expansion Policy** which was one of the foremost causes of the war. The industrial and shipping competition of Germany was felt and resented more keenly by England than any other country. Germany's leading productions interfered less with the trade of France, Belgium and the United States than with that of Great Britain and, as to shipping, the bulk of the freight and passenger service of the world was in the hands of Germany and England. This threat to the supremacy of the latter in manufacturing, commerce and shipping, or at least the serious encroachment upon these, challenged England to the depths of her national pride.

Never before had she countenanced a rival, nor would she do so now! She had defeated the rivalry of Spain, of Holland and of France, one by one, and would likewise crush the rivalry of Germany, cost what may! This was the feeling in England—as attested by the utterances in the press, in books, in parliamentary debates—even before the **Berlin-Bagdad Railroad Scheme** was launched by Germany; but when that project came into the open and, in spite of England's and France's stubborn opposition during a tortuous course of negotiation, left no further doubt of its being executed, together with all the attendant changes of "political balance" in the near-Orient, **the die was cast!**

The general idea of the Berlin-Bagdad railroad was simple enough. The increasing industrial production of Germany made the question of raw materials, new markets and security from interference acute. The near East and further Orient—Mesopotamia, Persia, India, China, Japan, the Dutch and British possessions and the east coast of Africa, where Germany had an important colony—**offered sources of supply and markets as well.** If a railroad line could be arranged through Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey and Mesopotamia to Bagdad and the Persian gulf, with a water-link through the Black Sea and one down the Tigris river, together with all the necessary economic and fiscal conventions with the countries along the route, **the problem would be solved!**

This plan promised not only to meet the direct economic need from which it sprang but would have opened to Germany **a shorter and safer route to the Orient than that from the Baltic and North Sea through the English Channel, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and Suez Canal**—or that around the Continent of Africa—with all the possibilities of sudden interruption by the ever-present danger of a European war. In brilliancy and boldness of conception this Berlin-Bagdad railroad plan far exceeded the Cape-to-Cairo plan of Cecil Rhodes, the British South-African Premier, or the Panama-Canal Scheme. In revolutionary consequences to commerce and the political and industrial alignment of the world there is no comparison possible with any other similar enterprise excepting that of the Suez Canal. The map and a little

imagination will show the reader what all this would have meant **for Germany** and **against England,** and in a lesser degree also against Russia, France, America and every country having Oriental commercial interests. It was easy, also, to foresee that this scheme would lead to political influence of Germany in Persia. The railroad, once opened to Bagdad, would soon be extended to the open Arabian Sea and by its connections through Asia Minor would reach the Mediterranean ports of Smyrna, Beirut, Jaffa, and future ports to be established on the Arabian side of the Red Sea! A train from any of these ports could have reached Vienna, Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg before the fastest ship would have passed Gibraltar.

This Berlin-Bagdad route and its branches would have increased Germany's commercial opportunities **ten-fold in a few years' time;** from the Arabian Gulf and the Persian Sea shipping lines would have been established to every point of Asia, Africa and the rich islands of the Indian Ocean, to Australia and New Zealand. A truly gigantic superman conception and ambition! Such a consummation in the hands of an unscrupulous power desiring world-power and dominion would have been capable of upsetting the political balance and all the geographies; **it would have to be stifled, killed!** Was Germany such a power? The answer to this question it was scarcely necessary to determine accurately; it was only necessary, under the influence of jealousy, **to spread the suspicion thereof**—and that and the positive commercial advantages laid into her hands by that scheme were sufficient to unite all the natural antagonists of this proposition—some of them already filled with other grievances—to a combination for thwarting these ambitious plans of this presumptuous newcomer among the nations!

Looking at this matter dispassionately we may well ask this question: "Wherein was the moral or political wrong in Germany's plans in as much as her enterprise was merely commercial and economic and **did not emanate from any design of conquest and annexation?** Have not other nations carried out similar schemes of commercial extension or improved transit facilities: Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Cape-to-Cairo railroad plan, and others, all of which carried with them

political measures and re-arrangements? Why is that which is approved and accepted when done by England, France or America wrong when done by Germany? Why should a nation so fit not aspire to its fullest development, to an equal position and facilities with the others? She had offered financial participation in the Bagdad scheme to all the world; she had agreed **to allow England to establish her own port on the Arabian Sea and use of the railroad on equal terms,** a candid offer which was frustrated only **by England's evident design to obtain control of the road for herself by insisting upon political rights for France and Russia as well.** (See Lord Haldane's Memoirs.) Germany had even agreed to concede to England exclusive shipping rights upon the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and the establishment of irrigation works.

The plain truth behind all the political charges and manoeuvres of England, France and Russia in connection with Germany's undertaking is that they—and particularly England —were envious of the material gain and incidental political prestige which would flow to her from it, and were determined to break it up—**somehow, as opportunity would present**—rather than share in the enterprise under Germany's control! Theirs was a simple rule-or-ruin policy!

Thus what Germany had achieved and wanted to continue in legitimate ways opened the evil eye of jealousy and greed in other nations! Malicious insinuations as to her real purposes and policy, once she should be big enough to throw off the mask of peaceful objects, were invented and spread about. This false pretense of apprehension as to the future received, unfortunately for Germany, some countenance from the imprudent utterances of a small band of impulsive so-called **pan-German** or **all-German** writers and speakers who talked in a boastful and presumptive way about "Germany's greatness," the "Imperial power," "the invincible army," of "wanting a place in the sun," of "extending German culture over the World," and made other similar aggressive-sounding declarations which all were more in the nature of **super-patriotic ebulitions** by a small minority than the expression of a definite national purpose. These vaporings were never

the voice of the Kaiser, the Government or the serious part of the German people, and were denounced in all responsible circles. Nevertheless, they were skilfully exploited by the enemy, and during the war made much of by the propaganda **and magnified beyond recognition.** Similarly the occasional outbreaks of patriotic fervor by the Emperor or the Government—unnecessary attitudes of provocation, shaking of the mailed fist and a certain brusqueness of language—a temperamental failing of the Germans more in the nature of noise than real menace—were elaborated and published everywhere **as evidences of Germany's designs of domination and world conquest! Nothing even remotely setting forth proof or even reasonable probability of any such designs has ever been produced**—for good and sufficient reasons!

But with all this false pretense of alarm, these manufactured motives, these slanderous insinuations on the part of the enemy countries, the real nature and intent of the policy of England, France and Russia was never for a moment obscure or left in doubt. The solid facts underlying their design were too plainly in view to be disguised except for the most ignorant. The effect upon Germany was exasperating and depressing at the same time, as well as eloquently informing. It brought the realization to the rulers and the people **that they were not to be left to enjoy the fruits of their efforts** and that their further normal progress on the lines of the past and of the proposed near-east extension project were to be blocked—by diplomacy if possible, by force if necessary!

Lord Haldane's Memoirs. As minister of war of Great Britain, Lord Haldane had conversations with the Kaiser at Berlin, in 1906, and at Windsor Castle, in 1907, relative to the Kaiser's desire to find a common ground on which England could corroborate with Germany in a peaceable execution of Germany's Bagdad plans. There was good prospect of these negotiations ending successfully, till England, through her foreign minister, Earl Grey, raised the question of the political rights of France and Russia to participate in the contemplated arrangements. This immediately aroused the suspicions of Germany and indicated to her, even at that time, the existence of the Triple Entente "in embryo" as a coming active combina-

tion against the Triple Alliance and its specific near-east policy. Why did England not conclude this "Separate Understanding" with Germany? It is plain; she was even then planning to bring in these two countries, with their distinct individual animosities and ambitions against Germany, **to work up a bellicose situation on the continent and a threat to Germany**—conveniently hinged on the real and artificial opposition to the Berlin-Bagdad railroad scheme—from which she—England—would profit by the thwarting of Germany's near-oriental scheme and the substitution of her own ambition in the same premises. As Germany became more and more convinced that the inclusion of France and Russia into the negotiations with England would produce dangerous complications against her, she declined to proceed with England along these lines and ended the solicitations. They were resumed later, however, and practically concluded to a favorable finish by the early spring of 1914. (See also the later explanatory paragraph "The Asia-Minor Question.")

D. AUSTRIA'S POLITICAL CHARACTER AND DESTINY

The beginning of Austria's modern history has been indicated in the description of the war with Prussia, in 1866, in consequence of which she was pushed outside the German Confederation, and by her contemporaneous war with Italy by which Venice was separated from her rule. By these events Austria was left composed of the following parts of originally and preponderatingly German population: Upper and Lower Austria, the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia and Moravia. In the North the province of Bohemia was inhabited to a preponderating percentage by Czechs (a branch of the Slavic family of nations); the semi-independent kingdom of Hungary was partly Magyar (Slavic) and partly German; the southern provinces of Croatia and Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dalmatia) were preponderatingly Slavic, with a small admixture of Italians along the seacoast; Galicia, north of Hungary, was of mixed stock, about one-half Slavic and one-half Polish. In the southeastern part of Galicia, the Buckovina, and in Transylvania the native Slavic and Hungarian populations, respectively, had admixtures of Roumanians and Ruthenians. (All these peoples are "fragmentary wreckage" from by-gone civilizations or from Nomadic tribes, like the

Huns, similar to those of the Balkan States proper and of Albania and Greece, as we have defined it in a previous Article.) These several non-Germanic sections of Austria had, however, **a very large proportion of German population who were the ruling class in government and business.** Many almost entirely German cities and districts were scattered throughout this heterogeneous empire, as indicated by their names as given on any good map of Austria-Hungary. Mixed in with this strangely conglomerate population there were several millions of Jews, distributed throughout the country but prevalent particularly in the eastern parts. Of religious creeds and sects there were about as many as there were languages and dialects, but the catholic faith predominated largely.

The kingdom of Hungary had, after a nationalistic revolution and war for independence, under Kossuth, been accorded a separate Constitution and parliament and limited internal self-government. All the other states, or rather provinces, were governed directly from Vienna by the national imperial government and parliament, the **Reichsrath.** The official government language, and of public instruction, was **German,** but no restrictions were imposed upon the use of the Slavic languages in speech, publications, political debate or religious worship. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were formerly independent Balkan principalities, but had, in consequence of continual agitations and disorders, been made semi-autonomous states by the Peace of Berlin, 1878 (after the Russo-Turkish war), and placed under the administration of Austria under a secret understanding that after the lapse of a reasonable number of years of gradual amalgamation she might, if found necessary, take complete possession of these countries. This plan was carried out by Austria in 1909, as the autonomous arrangement had not brought the hoped-for contentment of the population. The signatory powers of the Peace of Berlin acquiesced reluctantly in the "accomplished fact," instituted by Austria by the military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, being disinclined to face the risk of precipitating a dispute and renewal of war over the question. Austria agreed to certain

political guarantees and qualifications, and Germany supported her policy firmly as being a move **for orderly conditions and progress under a state of peace.**

Such, in rapid outline, was the political constitution of Austria-Hungary in the decade preceding 1914. We have thought it desirable to state them because of their important connection with the beginning and also with the ending of the great war. It must be evident to the reader that a country composed of so many different nationalities and with so many different languages and traditions was not an easy one to govern successfully and lead in the ways of peace, progress and prosperity, and so as to realize some sort of a united sovereignty, a national identity. There were perpetual rivalries between the different nationalistic "Parties" of Austria in the **Reichsrath,** and continued aspirations for independence by the Hungarians and the Czechs of Bohemia. Austria was, in a large measure, held together by a genuine, almost reverential loyalty for the ancient dynasty of the Hapsburgs and particularly for the old emperor, Francis Joseph. This influence, reinforced by a firm military police administration and joined to a liberal attitude towards the different racial and tribal customs and languages enabled Austria to succeed fairly well as an imperial government. Yet it was a current prediction in the political world that this conglomerate and polyglot empire would break up into its separate parts at the death of Francis Joseph.

By entering the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy, the political position of Austria-Hungary was strengthened greatly, internally and externally, and by her trade and financial relations with Germany the country prospered exceedingly. Industry, commerce and wealth grew rapidly. Her military organization and navy were brought to considerable strength and efficiency under Germany's influence. As to the difficult matter of the racial diversity in the monarchy, the historic policy of Austria up to about 1908 had ever, except as to Hungary, been one of **"benevolent absorption,"** of amalgamation with the dominant race, the German people of Austria proper. She did not countenance a permanent continuation and fostering of Slavic culture and separatism;

she looked upon these sturdy but undeveloped races (except for a small minority) mostly as excellent physical and cultural **"fertilizing stock"** but never as being entitled to become a leading influence in the empire's affairs, except as to **individuals** of ability in important positions. German methods and culture were to be the directing forces of the country; and for this reason those all-German cities and districts had been placed throughout the provinces **as outposts of amalgamation and leavening dough among the Slavic people.**

When the semi-autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was abolished, 1909, Austria at first encountered much difficulty in the pacification of certain political elements which stood under hostile foreign influence. Bosnia particularly was closely related in race and traditions to Serbia, adjoining. But Serbia was Russia's secret seat of action; it was easy from there to foment demonstrations of racial kinship, of political union, of independence from Austria; but these agitations were not for their own intrinsic sake **but for much larger purposes,** primarily for keeping up the general turbulence, to prevent Bosnia settling down and following the lines of development and adaptation mapped out for her. The main purpose was to keep friction alive between Austria and the Balkan States and Russia, and to maintain the latter's influence in these countries till the propitious hour for inaugurating the larger aims and policy should strike! For the termination of this intolerable state of cabal and intrigue, Austria began to plan a policy of "union of interests" towards Serbia whose ultimate result should be the elimination of the latter as an hostile State continually agitating on her borders and interfering with her rule in Bosnia. This was the situation and "policy" up to 1910.

At this time a man of distinguished character and political ability came to the front—**Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria**—nephew of the emperor and heir to the throne. He had written books and delivered addresses of importance in which he still further advanced the new ideas for the solution of the problem of the Slavic peoples of Austria, Serbia and adjoining Balkan districts. Seeing the difficulties of the old policy of "benevolent assimilation" in its uphill work against

the tenacity of national, or rather tribal, characteristics and aspirations, and their jealousies and enmities as long as they were in **political opposition** to each other, he advocated making of the several slavic peoples **a united and autonomous country,** similar to Hungary, thereby giving them racial recognition and virtual independence in their domestic affairs, yet tying them to Austria with the stronger bonds of a loyalty based on practical freedom than on the old principle of submissive amalgamation. Above all it was advanced that such an autonomous and united Slavic State would exclude the continuation of the insidiously patronizing "interest" of Russia and all her self-seeking machinations. The comparative question was submitted to the consideration of Austrian statesmen and the leaders of all the various peoples: "Why should it not be possible to unite these separate Slavic peoples, who were not radically different races at all but only different branches or groups of the same general stock, into a united whole?" The differences between them were not greater than those which had formerly existed, or were still existing, between the different race-groups of Germans: Bavarians, Wurttembergers, Badeners, Prussians, Hanoverians, Hessians, Saxons.

And also, considered in a larger view, was there not at bottom something incongruous and contrary to the modern spirit of business organization in these "separatist" and "nationalistic" political tendencies in Austria? Everywhere we find **concentration of related factors to united effort**—combination in short—to be the keynote of modern political success as well as of business success. Was not the German empire, the British empire, Italy, the United States of America evidence of the value of this principle? Was it not better to be **an active and appreciated part of a successful whole than an unknown nonentity of independence, incapable to achieve anything noteworthy?** Was it not a fact that the agencies of modern political action and existence, as of business life, are so manifold and extensive in scope that a small independent state has no chance whatever to accomplish anything in competition with the larger powers, to cut any figure in the life of the world? These "practical considerations" as to independent political success are such as should not only

have been preached in Austria but **written in letters of flame on the walls of the peace-conference room at Paris!** These ideas seem to have been overlooked during the late war when **impulsive sentimentalists raised visions of "liberty and independence" in every handful of people whose mustachios hung a little different from those of their neighbors!** This "self-determination of nations" idea—meaning so-called political freedom and independence from others—will turn out, as applied to Austria, a fatal delusion that will make for war and not for peace. There is more required to make a nation, one able to stand up and live, than the semblance of an ethnographical pedigree! To the one people which has every factor of nationality and independence—physical, racial, ethnographical—Ireland—this principle is to be denied!

These views of Prince Ferdinand and the associates who thought with him attracted wide attention because of their drift and because they were expressed by the future ruler of Austria. They were received with distrust by the people of the states concerned through general ignorance and lack of sufficient political insight to absorb so broad a conception—much in the same way as Bismarck's first North-German confederation was distrusted by the South-German states. Ferdinand's propositions were, in fact, by many regarded as a hidden scheme for complete annexation to Austria of the Slavic southeastern peoples, a view derived from Austria's political spirit in these respects up to 1910. These fears were busily spread among the people by agents of outside hostile powers. To Russia, the chief agitator in this work, the advent of this man and his policy meant the opening of a new perspective full of apprehensions. Russia had watched with glee all the signs of an early dissolution of the Austrian monarchy; she, also, had a scheme of combination of the Slavic Austrian and Balkan states, when the breakup should come, but it was to be under **her** domination and for the realization of **her** national ambitions on the Aegean and Adriatic coasts. If this Prince Ferdinand's idea should take root and he should soon become emperor of Austria, that state's expected dissolution might, instead of becoming the long-awaited opportunity for Russia, be **transformed into a**

reorganization to new life of the Austrian empire. That, together with Germany's powerful support, from her new eastern interests, would mean the permanent defeat of Russia's aspirations—her flag would never float from Constantinople's minarets!!

E. THE ENSUING COMBINATIONS OF THE POWERS

The Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, Italy
The Triple Entente—England, France, Russia

The various motives from which Germany had become the object of the intense jealousy, envy and hate of the three other leading nations of Europe—England, France and Russia —should now be clear to the American reader. In order to safeguard her power and secure the peace she needed for her development, Bismarck had formed the Triple Alliance, previously mentioned, a strong central-European wedge,— **Germany, Austria, Italy.** The offensive and defensive compact between Germany and Austria was general and mutually binding in all emergencies. It included intimate trade and fiscal arrangements, also agreements for the remodeling of the military system of Austria in some important respects on the Prussian plan. The agreement with Italy was somewhat more limited and conditional, especially as between Austria and Italy; but it was also **at least a defensive alliance** in case of attack of Germany or Austria by more than one power, and an offensive alliance, as regarded Italy, in any circumstances; and, as with the other two powers, it carried important reciprocal trade and fiscal provisions, preponderatingly in favor of Italy. Italy received **immeasurably more** than she gave during the many years of this arrangement; she basked and grew in the protection and stimulation that came to her from the Triple Alliance. When **the test** came, in 1914, instead of remaining staunch, she listened to the seducer and briber and **stabbed her partners in the back in true blackhand style.** The Triple Alliance was a secret pact, and its exact terms were known only to few, but the general trend of the agree-

ments was public knowledge. It is generally believed that a similar secret defensive "understanding"—if not full alliance —was concluded at about the same time (1895) with the kingdom of Roumania.

As the years rolled on and the German near-east aims began to develop, negotiations were taken up by her with the countries whose assent and facilities were required for the Berlin-Bagdad railroad plans—Turkey and Bulgaria **directly,** Roumania and Greece **indirectly**—and intimate conventions were concluded to secure their authorization, cooperation and the rights-of-way and fiscal measures necessary for the undertaking. The exchange consisted of liberal money considerations, valuable trade concessions, floating of national loans for internal improvements, and included, also, political alliance and offensive and defensive military obligations on a mutual basis. When we join these new eastern arrangements which Germany negotiated to those of the Triple Alliance already existing, we can see **what a formidable combination it made!** For and by Germany and her associates it was a combination for and of peace; but in the view of the three enemy powers it was a challenge to war for the reason that the commercial objects sought and the increased political influence gained by Germany **were regarded as aggressively competitive to their own material interests and political spheres of influence.** And, equally, the wonderful brilliancy and promising grand success of the scheme had excited their deep nationalistic envy and resentment! It was intolerable to them to see Germany gain all these material advantages and this additional prestige and power, no matter what explanations and guaranties she might vouchsafe. To them it had, therefore, become necessary to oppose this Triple Alliance and eastern combination with a counter alliance and plot—**the Triple Entente** and the design to thwart Germany's plans at any cost—after it should have become apparent that she could not be diverted from her purposes.

It is credibly reported that King Edward VII, who was not only a most gracious *bon-vivant* but a very sagacious diplomat and king, seeing the dangerous drift of things, made a final effort early in his reign at a personal meeting between

himself and Emperor William of Germany, said to have taken place in Buckingham palace gardens, to influence the latter to modify the German aims and policy in the near East, her naval program of construction, etc., in appeasement of England's opposition and apprehensions, national prejudices and **assumed prerogatives** in connection. The interview was without result and the two monarchs parted in anger. This clean-cut mutual avowal of the opposing purposes of England and Germany became the starting point for the formation of the Triple-Entente—England, France, Russia—to check the Triple Alliance. But previous to this final consolidation of opposition to Germany, important **political events** had taken place. In 1890, soon after the retirement of Bismarck, the former good relations between Germany and Russia had become loosened, and the existing "mutual protective convention" between the two countries was not renewed. Immediately a close approachment between **France and Russia** was solicited by France and received enthusiastic response from Russia, resulting in an intimate political alliance which, even in the nineties, constituted a two-power coalition danger against Germany. England still kept quietly in the background, suspicious of Russia, and because of the irritation then existing in France against England on account of Fashoda (1898). But soon a new political atmosphere arose. Queen Victoria had died and was succeeded, in 1901, by Edward VII, and about at the same time the irritating **African Colonial questions** arose, particularly that of Morocco, which were managed with exceeding skill and tact by Delcassé in the interest of inaugurating a close approachment with England for the purpose of isolating Germany.

The determined protest of the latter and her insistence on a mutual and joint settlement of these ascending colonial questions and on the recognition, by the other powers, of Germany's legitimate interests in Africa led to the Algeciras conference and to the victory of Germany on these points. But this success, or concession, only served to draw England closer to France and to open the door for the gradual reconciliation between England and Russia and the formation of the complete Triple Alliance. From all sides the opposing

interests, the joint interests as well as the separate interests, of the three powers against Germany and the Triple Alliance had become consolidated and clarified for a definite policy and plan of action. England's interest lay chiefly in the curtailing of Germany's commercial competition, of her naval growth and of her Turkey-Persia scheme; in France the perpetual irritation between the two countries on account of the Morocco question, which had spread over a period of ten years, culminated in the violent outbreak of the Delcassé Alsace-Lorraine fever of revenge and raised plans for the crushing of Germany; in Russia, which had seen her Constantinople ambitions, to which Turkey and Austria were the natural obstacles, permanently jeopardized by Germany's political and military support of these countries, new visions arose of ultimate success.

She, Russia, was furthermore, bound to France by the financial debt she had contracted, to the amount of **some twenty billions of Francs,** for assistance in floating national loans, for railroad construction, including strategical railroads throughout Poland and the building of a line of fortresses along Poland's eastern frontier, all in preparation for war, also for industrial plants, etc., France thus virtually had become a partner in Russia's own southern policy; and in order to thoroughly disarm Russia's traditional opposition to England, and vice-versa in regard to these objects, it was agreed between the three powers that, in case of success in the war to come, **Russia was to be free to take Constantinople,** the navigation of the Dardanelles was to be open to the world, and all other measures necessary were to be taken to secure to Russia the coveted southern-seas outlet. To this general ground plan of opposition to Germany there were now added diplomatic efforts to undermine the relations between Germany and her allies by estranging Austria, by drawing away Italy, by shaking the faith of the others. In Austria, especially, the various nationalities were encouraged to strike out for independence and "republican freedom" so as to accelerate the breakup of the old monarchy and rob Germany of her chief ally. As early as 1913 a French book was circulated in Bohemia, Hungary and other disaffected parts of Austria containing a map of the central empires showing "how they would

be after the next war" and **representing Austria dismembered into separate sections** and **Germany shorn of Alsace-Lorraine!**

From the above recital we see that Russia quickly became the most active and most dangerous member of the Entente because, from her geographical position and the nature of her objects, she would prove the most readily provocative and aggressive. It was in the East, without question, where the conflagration would begin! In addition to what we have said, there were other considerations which had great weight with Russia in becoming an active member of the Entente. She had come out of the war with Japan defeated, her military and naval reputation discredited. It was necessary to rehabilitate these for the Czar's regime to be able to retain its hold upon the country; for, internally, **Russia had arrived at a condition of supreme discontent by the toiling masses—to the point of revolution.** The government of oppression, corruption and licentiousness was exasperating to the people, the revelations of life at Court and in the higher circles of Russian society were humiliating to their sense of decency and religious feeling. But above all, the country had for years been saturated with socialistic and anarchistic doctrines of reform, **of liberty, equality and "natural rights" for the plain man.** The ruling classes well knew the country to be seething with the revolutionary spirit (at least in the large centers) and ready to start an outbreak at the first provocation. **It was imperative to forestall this:** A successful war of conquest, in combination with the Triple Entente, for attaining Russia's southern policy, and directed against Turkey or the obstreperous Balkan States, or directly against Austria and Germany, would reestablish Russia's military prestige, be popular with the people and lull them back to loyalty to the Czar and dynasty and away from their dangerous democratic and socialistic dreams. Hence, the policy of irritation against Austria was at work all the time and intensified; the diabolical intrigues carried on in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro could not do other than lead to some terrible plot of violence before long which would precipitate a war! Who, then, can fail to see that it was **not Germany who was the plotter for the war but the Triple Entente** in the intensity and complexity of its three-cornered designs against her and her allies!

Additional strength accrued to the Entente by the secret accession to it of **Japan** through her alliance with England. Japan had emerged from her war with Russia, and the previous one with China, with great distinction and success; she had come to the front rank as **the dictating mistress of China and the Orient.** England, with her wide-open eye, hastened to make an offensive and defensive treaty with Japan, after her successful wars, before any other power should have the foresight and opportunity to do so. The idea was simple and reciprocal. The revolution in China and, in consequence, the jeopardized "vested interests" of the leading commercial nations in that country, had brought the whole **European Concert** into the Chinese internal conflict and had set up that "open-door policy" to prevent the powers being drawn into a war among themselves over their respective political and trade rights in China. But Japan, ambitious to control China altogether in order to bind her to herself as a source of raw materials and food stuffs and a ready great market for her manufactures, seeing **that she could not possibly rule alone in this matter without a contest at arms,** shrewdly allied herself with England, as the strongest of her competitors in this game, in a policy of gradually forcing out the other nations!

Hence, Japan was quite ready to secretly pledge her support to England in **any European complications which might arise,** as this would open up an opportunity of **ousting from Asiatic influence and Asiatic possessions** such of the European nations (enemies of England) as might become involved in such a complication—and might be defeated in consequence. Furthermore, Japan unquestionably realized that an alliance with England **would be a valuable support to her against the United States of America** in the latter's policy of racial discrimination and exclusion of her people, which policy had already produced a serious state of friction between the two countries. As for England, her alliance with Japan was a master stroke of political foresight; it cleared the Asiatic situation by creating a definite political status, backed by strong forces, in place of a chaotic "free-for-all" scramble full of danger. It secured Japan as an ally in Europe; finally,

nothing could have so neatly **taken the edge off America's policy against Japan** as the knowledge of this alliance in Washington; it could have no other effect than to protect Japan against America and thus secure amicable relations all around and particularly in England's interest! Her professed friendship for the United States had, for the time, laid the spectre of the Japanese danger.

This favorable Anglo-Japanese alliance was at the opportune time deftly employed by England in her European war policy to find an additional support for the Triple Entente **in the United States of America.** There was this wonderful and aspiring young giant of the western hemisphere—the United States—big, alert, generous, whole-souled, and possessed of boundless resources in food and materials and men! And, while it was realized that our country could not be so readily drawn into a definite entangling alliance with a European power at that time, England, even then, began her subtle plans of molding public opinion here in favor of her policies, to arouse jealousy of Germany commercially, and prejudice politically; to misrepresent to this people—**an easy task**—what was happening in European political developments and thus to lay the foundation for future help and common action. With this preparation made by careful propaganda, assisted by officious adulation, flattery, social ties, it needed—when the time of action had come—but the careful handling of **episodes and details,** as they might present themselves, to win this country for the Entente.

What the purpose of the Triple Entente was, individually and collectively, we know beyond doubt, but what its plan of execution was, we can but surmise. With two such gigantic combinations facing each other, with the ever-changing political chessboard of Europe before them subject to sudden disturbances, it is most presumable **that there was no definite plan,** that no very definite plan could have been made. There can only have been the general plan to shape policy, mold events, design intrigues—and watch for the opportunity and seize it when it should present itself with a promise of success. The manner of action, in detail, would have to depend on the circumstances of the ostensible *casus belli.* Herein lay

the great risk, the hidden danger, the perplexing uncertainty of the calculation! For, that a war such as actually happened, a world-war of unprecedented proportions and brutality, was designedly **foreseen or foreplanned** we cannot, we dare not assume! It would be too monstrous, too diabolical for human beings to evolve and countenance such a design! Mankind would have to creep under the crust of the earth and forever disappear in shame and remorse if it were capable of evolving and harboring such a conception! Let us take refuge in the historical fact that nations often drift on gropingly under the spell of evil desires and without clearly knowing their way and end, much like individuals.

And yet! so thoroughly depraved did the human conscience become in this war that the Germans were openly and without scruples charged by the Entente allies **with this very crime of having purposely provoked this war from motives of world conquest, and that upon this monstrous charge the peace terms of diabolical cynicism were based which are crushing Europe to atoms!** The author believes it rather to be reasonable to assume that the Entente, instead of planning deliberately to let loose this awful war, counted to prevail over their adversary by the sheer weight of their preponderating strength and the agency of skilful diplomacy, or, at the worst, by a continental war of limited proportions, the combined effect of such action to bring about **the defeat and political humiliation of Germany** and the abandonment of her program of ambition! How this calculation was upset, and the position England occupied in connection therewith, will be related in the following article.

How strong the German Triple Alliance would prove in the crucible of war no one was able to predict, nor was there anything certain about the durability and extent of the alliance with Turkey and Bulgaria or the friendly pledges of the kings of Greece and Roumania. The military assistance which Turkey and Bulgaria would be able to render to Germany was not to be despised, and its certainty or uncertainty was a matter of moment. The three doubtful countries—Italy, Greece and Roumania—were well known to be ambitious for possessing sundry neighboring territories. Under cover of their

"irredenta agitations" they were planning to reach out for **valuable lands and peoples, ports, fortresses and other strategic factors.** Might they, perhaps, be induced by guaranties in these directions to **violate their honor and break their definite agreements and implied promises** with Germany and the Triple Alliance? These disquieting questions would only be answered under the stress and temptations of actual war!

Before proceeding to the detailed summary of the "war conditions" in the spring of 1914, it becomes interesting and useful to state certain facts, political relations and opinions which were **not heard or thought of as war motives at its outbreak** but were fabricated into such some months later only, after and because the war had developed **contrary to calculations.** They are:

1. **England** was not opposed to Germany because of her form of semi-autocratic government or because of the personality of the Kaiser; she is a monarchy also, although of a more liberal character; King Edward VII was the Kaiser's uncle, the Kaiser's mother was the Princess Royal of England, daughter of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert; every branch of the English Royal family is intimately related with the German reigning houses and nobility, especially of Hannover, Brunswick and Hessia.

2. **France,** although a republic, had no animosity towards Germany because of her monarchical form of government or because of the Kaiser personally, and neither of these conditions were in any way linked with the question of *"revanche"* and Alsace-Lorraine. Culturally there existed the most intimate and sympathetic intercourse between France, Germany and Austria before the war, more so than with any other countries.

3. **Russia** was more autocratic in political form than Germany and governed by a Czar; **Italy, Greece, Roumania and Serbia** were kingdoms, also, and therefore none of these had any objections to Germany and Austria because of being empires with a Kaiser for a nominal ruler, nor did this prevent England, France and the United States to work with them in war alliance.

4. All these countries were on a basis of so-called "militarism," i.e., had standing armies and compulsory military conscription. None of them ever objected to Germany's militarism **on principle,** at most only to its numbers and efficiency. The political conditions in Europe had made standing armies and service by conscription "a necessity" for over a century, especially for Germany and Austria.
5. **The peace footing of the French army,** in 1914, was larger than that of the German army, not only relatively but absolutely by nearly 100,000 men of all arms, although the population of Germany exceeded that of France by nearly twenty millions. These additional French soldiers were drafted from her African and Asiatic colonies.
6. **Kaiser Wilhelm** was, in the last decade of his reign, the most prominent political personage in Europe, perhaps in the world, acclaimed as a wise and just ruler and a man of great intelligence and ability and of the highest character, liberal in thought, progressive, intensely occupied with every need and legitimate aspiration of the German people, and working only for their welfare and **for peace and contentment among all the nations.** He was worthy, conscientious, honest, no plotter; but, unfortunately he was not possessed of the superlative political genius required to guide the German ship of State safely through the "Cillis and Charibdis" of European politics and the great crisis of the war. He neither made nor wanted the war. **No man in history has ever been more coarsely and shockingly slandered and abused than the German emperor,** especially in America—in America afflicted with deplorable ignorance of European history and conditions—be it said to our great shame! The fact that Germany has, since, deposed the Kaiser and established a republic has, of itself, no connection with either the rule or the character of William II.
7. **Not until some months** after the outbreak of the war, and in some respects not until the entry of America, were the subjects of autocracy, democracy, liberty, humanity, kaiserism, militarism, Junker tyranny, self-determination of nations, etc., **advanced anywhere as directly connected with**

the motives and objects of the war. All of these have been subjects of international discussion for years, but had absolutely **no direct bearing** on the causes of the war; as "war motives" they were the artificial product of a **deceiving, conniving, slanderous and corrupting war propaganda inaugurated by England and blindly outdone by America!**

The author has made the above grouping with the particular purpose of impressing the American reader with the **totally erroneous ground** of seven-tenths of the motives upon which the war is popularly assumed to rest and upon which we finally went to war with Germany; also with the realization of the political ignorance, gullibility, blind passion and bad taste which we exhibited to the world. It seems desirable that these impressions in regard to ourselves be made ahead of the material and drift of the following articles of this book. The opinion here expressed of our unsound war atmosphere and attitude is that held not only by the intelligent part of **the world outside of America but by the best informed, most sane, just-minded and truly patriotic of our own people.**

The Asia Minor Question. In view of its important bearing on the war it may be well to add more specific details on some points. The country in question is Turkish territory, and stretches from the Agean Sea to the Arabian gulf. Persia is its eastern border, and along that is situated the ancient district of Mesopotamia, watered by the great rivers Euphrates and Tigris. They join some fifty to sixty miles north of the end of the Arabian gulf, and discharge into that through several branches, similarly to the Danube, Nile, etc. This country is famous since Biblical times for its general fertility, and is also rich in petroleum wells. For this reason it had for some years even before 1900 attracted the attention of England and France, and later of Germany, for railroad projects, river steamboat traffic and water-irrigation schemes to develop its natural riches and bring them to Europe. All these schemes, naturally, had to be planned under "concessions" from Turkey and compensatory fiscal arrangements with that power. The rights obtained in this way and the projects launched by the above nations, including also Russia and Italy in a lesser degree, **badly criss-crossed each other.**

To Germany the great point of attraction lay less in the local economic opportunities than in the possibilities of securing by a great railroad scheme—the Berlin-Bagdad railroad—quick and secure communication with the Orient, Asia, etc., and with her own African colonies. She nursed her plans very carefully and secretly, secured liberal concessions from Turkey and made liberal financial arrangements in return; and when the project could not longer be hidden and its real purpose became apparent, **was already in a position of controlling advantage** as compared with England and France. From that moment there was open opposition from those countries to her plans. (See also a preceding explanatory paragraph entitled: Lord Haldane's Memoirs.) She tried to placate them in every way and made many concessions of rights in order to attain at least her main purpose—as stated above, under absolutely secure political conditions. The negotiations with France proceeded favorably and reached an amicable understanding towards 1912. Even with England, her most stubborn opponent, a point was finally reached where a peaceful agreement seemed possible.

Germany had agreed to give to both England and France important participation in the capitalization of the German company and seats in its directorate; she agreed that Bagdad, on the Tigris river, should be the end of the German railroad, and thus relinquished her original plans and rights to continue the railroad to the deep-water port of Basra, on the lower Tigris, close to the head of the gulf; she conceded the navigation rights on the Tigris from Basra to Bagdad to the British, also navigation rights on the Euphrates river, irrigation waterworks rights, etc.; she agreed to build the port works, docks, etc., at Basra and Bagdad with her own capital, as owner, but conceded to England a 40 per cent privilege of participation in the investments. Finally, there was a general agreement that all the interested countries should have equal rights and rates of shipment on all the Asia-Minor railroads and the Berlin-Bagdad line and on all the river transportation lines.

On these terms England, at last, agreed to offer no further opposition to the construction of the railroad by Germany and to the latter's preponderating rights of ownership and direction of the enterprise. **It seemed thus** as if the laborious and difficult negotiations of many years (in which Germany had shown persistent good will under most galling aggravation) were to be crowned with success. But this favorable prospect had scarcely opened **when the ominous shot at Serajevo rang out** and threw the gloom of doubt over all these propositions.

Succeeding Developments. It is peculiarly illustrative of England's intense jealousy of her commercial and shipping supremacy in the world that she should have thrown all this opposition in Germany's path—which, she knew very well, had no side issues of political influence or territorial aggression, while she herself—England—was in possession **of numerous similar trade routes and special privileges in every part of the world,** the most of them acquired by forceful conquest or arbitrary political measures and not by peaceful diplomacy and equitable agreements as in the case of Germany in her Asia-Minor project. In view of all the facts, a serious doubt arises as to whether England's final apparent acquiescence in the German Berlin-Bagdad scheme was sincere and actuated by genuine desire to secure world peace by removal of the acute friction over that question? As to Germany, her sincerity cannot be doubted; her objects were clear and plainly stated; the detailed history of the Berlin-Bagdad railroad negotiations as given by Carl Helfferich, ex-German imperial vice-chancellor, in the first volume of his famous work "Der Weltkrieg" (The World War), and whose character for honesty and veracity cannot be impugned, proves the assertion. But as to England and France the case is different! Even while England was officiously pretending to give Germany the right of way in her enterprise, **Earl Grey was busy with his letters to M. Cambon, French Foreign Minister, on the provisional military convention pledges between England and France, and soon thereafter entered, together with France, into definite marine-policy agreements with Russia, for the case of a European war.**

These negotiations were carried on in the early spring of 1914—and were, therefore, eloquent of coming events! In order to deceive Germany as to the real strength of these Triple-Entente military and naval **understandings,** no real conventions were concluded; the agreements were verbal, in secret notes and memoranda—the word was to be represented by the spirit. It appears from this that, no matter with what pretended sincerity England's negotiations with Germany as to peace in Asia Minor had been carried on, her greater political object—the crippling of Germany's further growth—which she had cautiously nursed since the Algeciras conference, **was not to be relinquished!** Germany was deceived for a short time; but from the day of the visit of King Edward VII to President Poincaré of France, in Paris, on April 21st, 1914 (accompanied by Earl Grey), the real situation became quickly revealed—**the cards were on the table**—and the French, Belgian and Russian press could no longer restrain its open exultation and demand for an early war with Germany.

It was thus **for her own purposes entirely** that England encouraged an early military embroilment between France and

Russia, on one side, and Germany and Austria, on the other, to bring to a settlement the many questions of political antagonism, jealousy, hate and revenge pending between them; she counted that Germany would emerge humiliated out of such a conflict and ready to submit to England's dictation when the latter would declare her solidarity with these powers. This policy of England resulted less from the designs of the British statesmen of the hour, or from any specific political or economic necessities, than from her **traditional policy of centuries which had made England great and which greatness and supremacy were to be maintained!** Her power was now to be turned against Germany, as her present greatest political, industrial, naval and shipping competitor. The astute Bismarck expressed the situation tersely, as early as 1887, when he said, in a speech in the Reichstag: "The only way for us to guarantee good relations with England would be **to restrict our economic and national development,** and that, of course, we cannot do."

The Kaiser's League of Nations. To many readers the preceding articles may furnish ground for the belief that Germany was the main obstacle to the introduction of freer political methods and relations into world politics because of being the most pronounced "militarist" power and because of having refused to join in the Hague arbitration and reduction-of-armament proposals. To disprove such conclusions, we must understand that the Morocco disputes and the near-Oriental question thoroughly convinced Germany that the Triple Entente meant **war** sooner or later, and that all these Hague proposals **were insincere and nothing less than traps set to beguile her.** They wanted to "down" Germany well enough but would have preferred to accomplish this without the uncertain means of an appeal to arms. The great Bismarck said, soon after the war of 1870-71, that "Germany would have to fight for what she had achieved within one or two generations, as the envy of her neighbors would never allow her to enjoy the fruits of her victory and her new prosperity without challenge."

We have shown in our articles that Germany's necessity and aim was **peace** and that it was because of that aim that she had to be armed to the teeth. A corroboration of the Kaiser's constant peace policy has recently come to light through the memoirs of Count Witte, the prominent Russian statesman. It appears that in 1905, while on a visit to the Czar, the Kaiser proposed a "League of Nations" offensive and defensive, between the Triple Alliance and Russia and France to secure peace on the Continent, and that **France was to be prevailed upon by Russia to join in this league.** This entire proposition was arranged secretly between the Kaiser and Czar and at

first even kept from the knowledge of the Russian Prime Minister of the day, Count Lamsdorff, presumably to facilitate confidential pourparlers being begun with France. When the two Russian statesmen named above became aware of these private plans of the two monarchs, they announced at once that "this proposition was an affront to France and would upset the aggressive policy of the Franco-Russian alliance"—already formed at that time—against Germany's African and near-Oriental policy, and for nearer-home reasons. This proposition then quickly died of inanition due to the lack of energetic power on the part of Czar Nicholas and the determined opposition of the pro-French war party at his Court. From all the circumstances of the situation it is evident that Russia was to be the moving spirit in this plan because of her intimate relation with France; she failing, Germany could go no further. Emperor William was deeply disappointed by the fiasco of his well-intentioned *demarche*.

VII. MORAL DELINQUENCY AND SPIRITUAL INERTIA AS ESSENTIAL FACTORS OF THE WAR

In the Introduction the author indicates the breakup of the moral and ethical systems of our times, due to their irrational foundation, as essential causes of the war. These views are elaborated in the articles mentioned, and it would not be amiss to read them in connection with the present article. To these causes we must add one closely related to them and no less important: **It is the unfortunate spiritual inertia in which mankind has been held within its stupendous technical and material progress and which prevented a political organization of the world in harmony therewith, and the timely removal of causes of war.** We refer here to the brilliant ideas of Dr. Alfred E. Fried, a holder of the Nobel peace prize, as expressed in his magazine articles on the war and the League of Nations. Among the voluminous literary material which the author has read in his studies on the war, nothing more able, broad and fundamentally true has been presented, especially as applicable to the possibility of a successful League of Nations in the present conditions of the world. The

author's own views singularly cover, include and indorse those of Dr. Fried, although presented in a different form. It is highly desirable that the philosophical foundations of the war be submitted to the reader **at this stage of this book's argument** in order that he may become imbued with a clear impression that below historical and political developments, as given in the succeeding chapters, there are deeper causes—the ethical and spiritual conditions of the great tragedy.

In the article "The Summit" the author has drawn a picture of the phenomenal progress of mankind in scientific, technical —purely material—directions during the nineteenth century and up to the outbreak of the war. In the course of this progress—particularly in the means of inter-communication for business, research, pleasure—the world has figuratively become smaller, as pointed out by Fried and by the author in his "National Evolution," published in 1908; peoples and countries have been drawn closely together, intercourse has been extended, differences have been leveled and prejudices softened, dark continents and semi-savage races have been brought into the fold of civilization. As a result, a contiguity of interest and aspiration began to embrace the entire world; the events and trend in each individual country immediately became the common knowledge and property of all others, the world was approaching the status of **an international community.** But such a condition plainly demanded a corresponding widening of sentiment and method in the regulation of political matters—**an internationalized type of political view, diplomacy and action.**

While this was recognized by leaders of thought and a sentiment in this direction was developing and the first tentative steps were actually being taken (Hague Peace conferences and Tribunal, the Kaiser's League of Nations of 1905, International rules on the High seas, belligerency regulations, etc.), not sufficient progress and harmony of purpose had been attained by 1914 to make it possible to resolve the elements of a threatening world conflagration into a judicial argument at the Hague Peace Palace. Philosophy, which in the wider sense includes religion, had remained stagnant; man continued in this respect, in the confining swaddling clothes of his infancy, which

left his spiritual horizon far behind his material plane. The political leaders of the time had one foot upon the bridge of progress but the other was restrained by the evil memories and practices of the past; in other words: **Spiritual progress** had lagged behind, had been outrun by the different factors of material progress, had not been able to change its feeling and perspective and obtain **intellectual control** over the new conditions in the world. In final analysis this must be recognized as one of the most important indirect causes of the war through its failure to substitute counsel for force. The new conditions of intercourse, assimilation, and material advance of every kind had **come too rapidly for man himself to comprehend fully the process of change which was overtaking him** and to devise the ajustments required by it.

This dangerous conflict between material achievement and lack of philosophical outlook was bound, sooner or later, to bring the world to a crash. For, the new conditions while increasing contact and domains of mutual interest between all the nations of the world, leveling inequalities and prejudices, **also increased opposition of interests and general friction, leading to jealousy and envy between them.** Conflicting spheres of interests of the different nations **crossed each other in every corner of the world,** and instead of leading the statesmen to the road of "intelligent understandings," the old policies of secret diplomacy, combinations and appeal to force were left to deal with the questions. Instead of "regulation" becoming the means of adjustment, force, imperialism and militarism retained their sway. Thus, instead of man's material advance leading to his continued progress and ever greater happiness, **all was pulled down by the very breadth and depth of his achievements in scientific and general progress when these became applied to the gruesome tasks of war!**

The war has now fully taught us that the new "intimacy" of all parts of the world, the internationality of sentiment and feeling which exists in many directions, demands a new order of political philosophy and world organization for regulating the intercourse among the nations. This conviction has found expression in the "League of Nations." But those very conditions of intimacy and unity which existed before the war

and made the ground so favorable for the forming of such a league and new system of arriving at political adjustments **have been destroyed by the war and are now missing.** Instead of free intercourse, confidence, friendship, we now have repression, distrust, hate and wilful crippling of the defeated nations. The borders are closed, travel is impeded, famine and political ferment hold hundreds of millions by the throat, business is depressed to the minimum of absolute necessity, enterprise is dead, every country is bankrupt and its money almost without value. (The author is speaking of Central Europe, particularly.) Hunger, dismay and hopelessness have paralyzed all energies and cast a pall over Continental Europe. How can such conditions be favorable for the erection of a successful League of Nations at this time? The very elements required—broad international sympathy and unity of interest and outlook—are missing. We now realize with pain and remorse **what it was that we possessed before the war, what we failed to see and do, the great opportunity we lost!** As Dr. Fried says: "The structure of a real league of nations cannot be erected ere these lost foundations are regained." We must first win back the pre-war conditions of international freedom, opportunity and prosperity, and the spiritual buoyancy which comes of peace before we can hope to apply to politics the new thought of counsel, compromise and co-operation in place of sinister selfishness and the use of material force!

We have called the defect under consideration "spiritual inertia," but what, at bottom, was its nature? The great achievements of our age certainly do not indicate any **intellectual** disability or decay in man; never did intelligence, the power of thought, ingenuity, imagination shine forth brighter than in the nineteenth century. Why, then, did this "intellectual strength" not assert itself in the domain of political philosophy? Why did vision remain unclear? **What was it that put "the spirit"** in chains? Here we have to leave Dr. Fried and take up the author's more objective and fundamental explanation of the whole phenomenon. Where, we ask, is the distinct line between spirit, morals and ethics? The author asserts that human nature is **one and undivided**

and cannot be precisely separated into its constituent factors. There is but one system or function of thought, and it includes feeling, spirit, morals and ethics; and the conclusion is inevitable that this "spiritual inertia" which held the world in bondage was but the applied expression of the **philosophical inertia and delinquency** of our day, as analyzed in the parts of this book mentioned. It was the lack of strong moral convictions, **of full confidence in the basis of our moral and ethical system** that delivered man over to the rule of coarse selfishness, greed for power and possessions, jealousy and envy of the brother-man and brother-nation; that filled his mind **with the oppression of these dark impulses to the exclusion of a free and liberal perception of the new world conditions** and of the new political atmosphere required for their peaceable solution! Thus, whichever way we argue the point, we are brought to the author's declaration **that a new philosophy of life is needed in the world** freed from the cobwebs brought over from the infancy of man in order to bring real truth, candor, seriousness and sympathy into men's character, their motives and actions in all the avenues of human demonstration.

B. OUTBREAK AND COURSE OF THE WAR

VIII. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR

The Great Conspiracy. The British Propaganda

As stated in the "Introduction" this book is not a history of the events of the war in the usual sense but an examination, rather, of the inner forces—political, social, moral—that made the war. Our object is to free the colossal occurrence from the atmosphere of ignorance, deceit and calumny in which it has been enveloped and to reveal the great wrongs of motive, errors of calculation and judgment which precipitated the war and maintained it during four long years of terror.

With the view to focus the individual and joint responsibility of the powers for the war we will briefly restate the objects of each thus:

1. **Germany had no schemes of vengeance or conquest** against any of the opposing powers, and there were no acute political disputes arising from active aggression or direct threat pending with any one of them in the spring of 1914. The Morocco question had practically been disposed of through the final agreements with France made in 1911-12, except that a state of mutual irritation was left behind. This question unfortunately had, in its long course of friction, greatly stimulated **the French agitation for revenge for 1870** and for regaining Alsace and Lorraine. The effect of this open determination of an influential section in France to bring these questions to a military decision at the first favorable opportunity was, naturally, very disquieting and exasperating to Germany and caused deep political apprehension in that country. As to other "war" subjects, Germany had determined on the immediate execution of her eastern commercial expansion policy and the Bagdad railroad single-handed, practically, as participation by other nations, mainly England and France, did not appear possible **without surrendering her supreme rights in the undertaking.** She was also carrying out a gradual increase of her naval strength in proportion to the increase of her mercantile shipping and colonial possessions and in line with England's policy in this respect. For the success of her internal and external policy **Germany needed evidently nothing so much as peace;** she was fully aware of the growing enmity of England and the United States because of jealousy of her steadily expanding trade and shipping, but she claimed the right to look upon the world as an open market and free-for-all field of competition in which merit and price of wares and efficiency of service should be the only privileges of competition.

2. **France,** always enmious to Germany in her subconscious self, had been defeated in her plan (with England) to humiliate Germany in the Morocco question—by ignoring her rights as a member of the Madrid Colonial conference—and had, instead, been compelled by Germany to come into the Algericas conference and, later, settle the Morocco and related colonial disputes by agreements with her, **recognizing Germany's rights and sphere of interest in Africa.** This result had left a sharp

sting of resentment in the breast of France, which found its vent in the renewed and **virulent** revenge and Alsace-Lorraine agitation under Delcassé's lead, purposely calculated to irritate Germany to some open act of hostile rejoinder leading to war. Knowing England's fear of Germany's growth, and Russia's precarious internal situation and Constantinople ambitions, **France found it easy to approach them both with suggestions for a combination.** This insidious work culminated in the Triple Entente to block Germany's plans, bring on her submission—defeat in war, if necessary—and compel the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine.

3. **Russia was determined,** from the variety of motives previously explained, to provoke war with Turkey, the Balkan States, Austria and even Germany—one or more or all of them—to set the ball a-rolling to win Constantinople and the freedom of the southern seas, already pledged to her by England and France as the prize for entering the *Entente.*

4. **Austria** was resolved to put down the plotting of Russia and Serbia against her rule in Bosnia and Dalmatia, and the plotting of Russia in Serbia and Montenegro against her traditional political consolidation policy towards these countries.

5. **England** was determined to check Germany's further encroachment upon her industrial, commercial-shipping and naval supremacy and to definitely prevent the execution of her eastern-extension program unless she could obtain a controlling hand therein. Such was the relative situation.

We see from this summary that **the three Entente nations and Austria were the bellicose factors;** they each had definite "grievances and objects" involving aggression. Germany, on the contrary, **had none such;** there were no plans of territorial aggression against either France, Belgium or Holland, nor against any eastern country; if there had been anything of this kind in secret preparation **it would surely have come to light by this time** through the war "revelations" in the different countries. The irritation of Germany against France was a "reflex" irritation; the protective position she had to assume towards Austria was obligatory under the Triple-Alliance treaty and a matter of honor with her, but it was "indirect" as far as she herself was concerned. The above statement is funda-

mental for the correct understanding of the war development; it is incontrovertible; it leaves it impossible for anyone to continue to believe the infamous manufactured propaganda charge **"that Germany purposely plotted the war from motives of conquest."** It was the result of the determined aggressive Entente designs against the stubborn defensive Alliance designs! The responsibility is well divided between them and **must be shared by all of the five original war powers;** if anything—Germany was the least responsible of all!! It defies all understanding that the people of the United States, so able and intelligent in business matters, **could not see through this entanglement** and fell an easy victim to English wiles and French ebullitions and plunged pell mell into this hotbed of hate and intrigue—European politics!

The nations of the Triple Entente—France, England and Russia—knew very well that neither of them could fight for their objects single-handed against the Triple-Alliance—Germany, Austria, Italy—with any chance of success, hence the combination; and the motive of this combination rested in first line upon their respective particular objects and interests, in lesser degree upon their common jealousy of Germany's political and industrial position and **in the least degree of all upon natural sympathy for each other.** As between England and Russia, there was no natural sympathy at all—quite the contrary; as between England and France there had been a sympathetic understanding about their colonial policies since the beginning of the Morocco contention, but even in this the common tie was a material one—the exclusion of Germany from further colonial extension in Africa and the checking of any plans on her part for acquiring new colonies in other parts of the world. England would never have gone to war with Germany merely for the sentimental object of helping France win back Alsace-Lorraine, and surely not to help Russia win Constantinople, and the same reasoning applies to the other two powers in regard to each other.

We see from the above that the separate self-interests of the three powers were beyond doubt the main impelling force of the Entente; the other factors were of greatly inferior moment. Had America ever comprehended this—that sordid

selfish aims—**jealousy, greed, and vainglorious revenge**—were at the bottom of the combination against Germany, **she would never have reached the point of entering the war, she would have remained strictly neutral and would have taken her unavoidable shipping losses and restrictions philosophically like the other neutrals did—as inevitable incidents of war—and would have prevented all avoidable losses by proper shipping regulations.** We have already said that the war came as the joint result of the entire situation, and that no war of the fierce character and unprecedented extent of the past conflict was consciously planned by the Entente. The calculation was that whenever by any acute political provocation a dangerous crisis should arise which would furnish **a plausible pretext for aggressive threats** against the Triple Alliance **or any individual member thereof, the Entente combination should quickly reveal itself as of such strength and determination that Germany would not dare take up the sword in defence, that she would be overawed and compelled to submit to her political humiliation and the retrenchment of her ambitions to save herself from annihilation.** Failing this immediate outcome by political pressure, the most that was contemplated and expected was a limited war with the same final effect.

THIS ENTIRE CALCULATION MISCARRIED!

On the afternoon of June 28th, 1914, Europe was thrown into consternation by the catastrophe at **Serajevo, Bosnia.** Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria, and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, while on an official visit and representing the Emperor of Austria, **were assassinated while riding in a carriage through the streets of that city.** The terrible event had come without an inkling of the plot having penetrated to the authorities or the public ear. Suddenly, without warning, **the electric spark had been flashed into the European powder magazine.** The public was stunned, fearful of the dread consequences which were sure to follow. Immediately there occurred that rapid exchange of diplomatic "notes" between the powers, accusations, explanations, frantic efforts to preserve the peace, during which the world lived in suspense. All was in vain; it ended in little more than a month with the outbreak of the war. A few days' investigation had

established the fact that, although the deed had been committed in Bosnia, the murder was, on its surface appearance, a Serbian plot, the work of a **wide-spread Serbian secret conspiracy!** Austria, the injured and attacked country, demanded at once not only the admission of guilt from Serbia but full information about the conspiracy, also the adequate punishment of the assassins and all concerned in the devilish act, and **such guaranties and control over Serbian affairs as would almost have annulled that country's sovereign independence.**

The Serbian government met these demands as fully as it could possibly do without abdicating its sovereignty. But Austria, in her exasperation, was unbending; the moment and opportunity had now arrived, in a manner quite unexpected, **for eradicating once for all that hotbed of native and foreign intrigue which had been gnawing at her flanks for twenty years,** and of instituting that regime of closer association and control of which we have previously spoken. She demanded the right **herself** to examine all the secret police records on the plot, and in future to exercise **control over the Serbian police department;** she insisted on the severe physical punishment of Serbia by military occupation and practical subjection of the country for a stipulated duration. This was the famous "Ultimatum" to Serbia, most ominous demand of political coercion of modern history. All attempts at compromise failed; Germany's pleas with her ally for moderation were unavailing until later, when the favorable time for its exercise had passed. Austria finally ended the tension by declaring war on Serbia and preparing to invade that country, July 28th, 1914, one month after the Serajevo crime. This was **the first great error committed that precipitated the general war,** an error of over-haste and passion for revenge, by Austria.

Meanwhile **Russia** had secretly begun to mobilize her army, ostensibly in protection of her semi-ward Serbia, but in reality to bring on a conflict with Austria, for reasons which we have amply set forth. She answered Austria's declaration of war on Serbia by a partial mobilization of reservists, July 29th, 1914, and by a general mobilization order, July 30th, 1914. Germany, on her part, having done all she possibly

could to influence Austria to moderation, gave the powers to understand **that the Triple Alliance was a binding compact none the less,** made on the honor of her sword, and that she would stand by Austria to the end, as the assaulted country, even though her demands for retribution might be excessive. Germany demanded **the immediate cessation of mobilization by Russia** as the *sine qua non* condition of avoiding a greater war complication, and called upon England and France to use their influence and all necessary pressure upon Russia to effect this. Diplomatic notes passed between the powers hourly for three to four days on **this main bone of contention and crux of the dangerous situation**—Russia's mobilization. Personal letters, telegrams and telephone communications were exchanged between the Kaiser and the Czar and King George of England with the object of avoiding the catastrophe that drew visibly near. Helas! nothing availed; the terrible passions of distrust, hate and strife were fully aroused! **France,** lying low like a tiger ready to spring, secretly assured Russia of her unflinching support as her Entente ally, no matter what might develop. **England,** in the background, scheming, conniving—now pushing, now halting—played a double-faced game of vacillating "note writing," of impossible propositions for a "conference," and of ostensible working for delay and peace but, meantime, hoping secretly that the continental powers **would become** irretrievably embroiled and all but committed to war. This would leave her free to step in **at the last critical moment** to reveal and impress upon Germany and Austria the crushing fact that the Entente was a full offensive and defensive alliance and **that she, England, was committed to stand by France and Russia in the case of war.** Then should come her supreme hour of diplomatic triumph by the unconditional backdown of Germany! Never was there a more cunning and unscrupulous fox in control of the diplomatic moves of a great country in a dangerous crisis than Earl Grey, England's Foreign Minister in those fatal days, proved himself to be!

In that hard-headed country—**Germany**—however, neither the Kaiser and his advisers nor the people were for a moment given to any delusions as to all this "public play of pretenses";

they knew, they felt **that that which had long been prepared against them was now about to come:** they knew that if England were sincere, she would but need to speak to Russia the one plain bold word: **"DEMOBILIZE! or we will be against you,** and that the air would in a moment have been cleared of danger. **THAT WORD WAS NEVER SPOKEN!** Well may the reader imagine the feelings of outraged national dignity, of unspeakable wrath against their enemies that pervaded the German people when they thus saw themselves face to face with being torn from their path of peace and plunged into a desperate war in defense of their existence against an overwhelming enemy, into a struggle behind which there stood no honorable justifiable cause, nothing but the lowest motives of greed, jealousy, revenge and the purpose to dominate over them! When Germany's patience was exhausted **with the whole disgusting play of falsehood and chicanery among the powers** to the point that her self-respect and courage demanded action and she was convinced that war had become inevitable, she took the bit in her grim mouth and ran away with it: **On August first, 1914, Germany formally declared war upon Russia.**

For days during the passage of these events the world dared scarcely breathe, in mortal anxiety over the outcome; when that declaration of Germany fell, the heart of the world stood still! **Something awful, something immeasurably terrible had happened!** Civilization was now to be torn asunder and the nations of Europe were to fly at each other's throats like wild beasts! The blood of the brothers of men was to flow in rivers and soak into the ground to make the mother-earth shudder in horror! The fruits of decades of upbuilding and vaunted progress were to be dissipated like sands before a windblast! Death, mutilation, destruction, desecration, suffering and want were to displace peace and happiness on earth!

The declaration of war on Russia had opened the eyes of the Entente to the ominous reality **that they had miscalculated the temper and resolution of Germany.** The latter, now fully aroused to her perilous position, immediately called upon France for definite assurances as to her intentions in regard

to Russia. The answer was a defiant and curt reply, followed by an order for partial mobilization. Evidently, there was no desire to maintain peace with Germany and to restrict the conflict; evidently the obligations of the Entente powers to each other were as strong as those which compelled Germany to fight for Austria. **Seeing herself open to immediate attack from two sides,** Germany could not hesitate long, but resolving to be first in the field, **declared war on France, August 2d, 1914.** Meanwhile Russia had not received that word, or demand, from England which alone could have saved the situation at the eleventh hour. She continued her mobilization at top speed and began to move troops upon the Austrian and German frontiers. Thereupon Austria ordered full mobilization against Russia, in agreement with Germany; and after England had made her all-deciding move, on August 4th, Austria formally **declared war upon Russia, August 6th, 1914.** Thus the dial of war moved forward with the relentless precision of fate! Mankind stood aghast, trembling, at the thought of the events to come!

Upon England the declarations of war by Germany had fallen like a thunderbolt! The nation was stunned at first—then awoke to the terrible realization that her design had failed. Instead of a backdown, **Germany,** girded to the loins and ready, was resolved to face the world! No cringeing there, abject submission before the superior power of her enemies! The structure of Anglo-Saxon cunning was brought to collapse by the blunt honesty and self-reliance of German character! England now saw herself drawn into the **maelstrom** against her will, into a war which she had hoped **others would fight for her** and for which she was not prepared. She was thus brought face to face with two alternatives: To fight, or to go down in dishonor, relinquishing all the objects for which she had planned for years. There could be no doubt about the decision: **England could neither abandon her allies nor her own purposes.** Further attempts at temporizing and dissimulating on her part had now become useless and would have looked cowardly in face of the resolute stand which the continental powers had taken. The drama was ready to be unrolled! On August 4, 1914, England declared war on Germany.

From the foregoing it is evident that each of the six nations—Germany, Austria, Serbia, Russia, France and England—has its share in the responsibility for the war, but there must certainly be one to whom attaches the chief responsibility for its actual consummation. **That nation is England, unquestionably.** Austria created a belligerent condition by exacting almost impossible terms of satisfaction from Serbia —which is only another name for Russia—and the latter was only too ready to seize the carefully prepared opportunity **to come to an immediate contest with Austria for supremacy in the Balkans.** Germany was drawn in on the one side by her obligations to Austria, on the other by the expressed revenge attitude of France, allied with Russia, and on general grounds by the plain purpose of the combined Entente to thwart her further political and industrial progress. **But England held the balance of power and the deciding word.** Without her, the Triple Entente was incomplete in action and scarcely sufficiently preponderating in strength against Germany and Austria. When England saw the political drama develop quite contrary to her intentions and calculations, and was fully aware of the coming of the titanic world war **she should have wielded the controlling power and position which she held to arrest the catastrophe,** or at least to reduce its proportions. A bold and open stand for peace on her part from the beginning, instead of an attitude of connivance and hesitation, a decisive word to Russia and France instead of the ambiguous one given, could have prevented war even after the German war declarations had been made, or at least confined it to a limited continental conflict. **To England, therefore, belongs the ultimate greatest responsibility for the world war's character and proportions** and least of all to Germany who, without intent, became the center of the tornado whose forces had gathered outside of her!

It is the prevalent opinion that Germany erred in her haste of declaring war on Russia and France while propositions for a conference of the powers were being considered. She may, however, have been in possession of information, in addition to the impression of years of a settled design against her, which deprecated all hope of favorable results from a

conference. As a matter of fact we know to-day—and Germany knows it—that the whole of the diplomatic moves of those days were a clever trap to manoeuvre her into a position where she could do no other than **make the first war declaration** and thus lay herself open to the charge of provoking and "wanting" the war. As to what might have been the effect of her waiting a week more before declaring war is, of course, pure speculation; it might have revealed more clearly to all the powers the abyss towards which they were trending. According to our best information today, war would have come in any case; but by greater self-restraint on Germany's part, England and, perhaps, Italy—later—might have been kept out of the contest and consequently no food blockade been instituted. Germany and Austria would, in these circumstances, probably have defeated Russia and France. **In such a case would England have been content to let them carry off the victory without action on her part?** Scarcely! This reflection reveals the intricate difficulties of the situation. The war spirit was up; for fifteen years previous, Europe had been at the "breaking point"; only the most insistent and persistent efforts had been able to preserve the peace; the pent-up feelings had now been aroused to fever heat and cried for action, not for conferences. Germany, having lost all confidence in the possibility of avoiding war, rushed ahead **to gain the military advantage of being first in the field and enabled thereby to throw the war into the enemy's country.** She won this advantage (except in East Prussia and a small section of Alsace) and was able to maintain it to the last, but she may have paid an incalculable penalty for her precipitate action made possible by her preparedness. Who could venture to say how matters would have gone if Germany had waited? But as we can hardly assume that a short delay would have greatly jeopardized her military advantage, yet might have minimized the war and given it a different character, we cannot escape the conclusion that Germany's haste **was a great error, the second committed that launched the war into action.**

Immediately following upon her declaration of war, Germany opened the campaign against France by invading Belgium **to gain a short through-route for her northern armies**

into France. This unprovoked and to all outward appearance **unwarranted invasion of Belgium** was probably Germany's greatest mistake and wrong in the war, politically, militarily and morally. Of this important event and all its sad consequences we shall speak in detail in a special article. It was **the third great error committed in the war and is largely chargeable to Germany alone.** These events—the hasty declarations of war on Russia and France and the invasion of Belgium—have been the mainstays of the charge that Germany purposely plotted to bring on the war to realize aims of aggression against other nations, even world conquest! After all the arguments we have made in previous references to this subject, it should not be necessary to point out **the total absence of relevance or connection** between this charge and the occurrences in question. As to her "preparedness," Germany was ready for defensive action at a few days' notice ever since 1871; it was an outcome of her political and geographical situation—a necessity—as acknowledged by Lloyd George himself in a famous Guild-Hall speech. We have shown that Germany's prime need was **PEACE** for her internal consolidation and industrial development. As for the invasion of Belgium, it was not political or with the definite first object of conquest, but purely military—to afford a through-passage into France—and, beyond that, at most **to keep England and France out of that country by her presence there.** Germany was reasonably sure of Holland's neutrality in the war but not of that of Belgium, for reasons which we shall argue in detail later. **The clashing difference between Germany's real objects in the steps she took and the wild charges thrown at her in blind hate and cunning self-defense by her enemies should now be apparent to the reader.**

ENGLAND, having taken her decision, turned with savage rage upon her enemy, that enemy who had already, in a sense, defeated her by upsetting her entire chessboard. Not only upon the battlefield was this enemy to be beaten by shot and sword, but even more so **in the subtler fields of diplomacy and publicity by a propaganda of "inuendo and suggestion"**

to fasten upon him the odium and responsibility for the war! The real causes and issues of the war were to be buried under an avalanche of misrepresentation, deliberate lies—artful or coarse, and inflaming accusations: "**Not** for the supremacy of her political position, industry, shipping trade, commerce and navy, **not** for the defeat of Germany's eastern policy and the Berlin-Bagdad railroad had England formed the Entente alliance and stimulated France and Russia to bring their own individual ambitions to realization, but to eradicate this enslaving curse of "Prussian militarism," this odious government of "German autocracy" that was an eyesore to the other nations and an offense to their superior sense of rights; to unmask this arrogant braggart Kaiser-tyrant, with his audacity to defy England, France and Russia together; to defeat these preposterous designs of "world conquest" which were to subject all the nations and about which these Germans had been writing and talking since years with their **"Deutschland Ueber Alles,"** and to execute which **they had purposely planned and precipitated the war!** This hated rival was not only to be beaten in the war but discredited before the world forever, his culture and achievements derided, his character defamed; the whole German nation was to be **struck upon the cross of infamy and left to die the death of a moral criminal against mankind!**

Such was the program of English revenge against Germany —the most colossal scheme of blackmail ever floated upon the world—such the diabolical conspiracy for the deliberate murder of a great nation! France and Russia were impressed into this scheme; all other allied peoples were to be inveigled into this network of lies, befogment and abuse. It was launched in the early period of the war and was in full dissemination by the spring of 1915. (The reader should glance again at the concluding **resumé** of the preceding article and the one at the opening of this article.) Especially **those "far-away" nations whose general unacquaintance with European politics would make it impossible for them to properly distinguish between truth and falsehood in the statements made** were to be enlisted in this "campaign in the service of humanity." The constant iteration of these charges, to which soon those

of "atrocities" in Belgium were added, and the continuous hypnotic influence of this appeal to "high ideals of government, morals and human sympathy" **were trusted to obliterate in the minds of the people of all nations the original impressions as to the causes and objects of the war.** The English laid their plans with that unmatched skill in diplomacy, Machiavellan cold-blooded cunning and marvelous depth of design which belong to them above all other peoples. With their consummate knowledge of human nature and of the particular leanings, foibles and general characteristics of other races, they spread **this new view of the war** over Europe, the British possessions and the United States with an assurance and infallibility of method that brought immediate and complete success. No means that could contribute to the planned result were neglected, from speeches of Prime Ministers to editorials in country papers. The leading foreign-nations daily press and magazines were bought or subsidized for this propaganda, and in England itself special publications were selected "to give the key note" in this campaign. Over all these activities was spread the control of a scrupulous censorship. Books, pamphlets, public addresses by paid speakers, posters with harrowing pictorial appeals to the emotions, inspired indignation meetings, anything and everything possible was employed to maintain the pressure of this **phantom** upon the public mind. Unlimited funds were available. Nothing more thorough in method in the "publicity" line has ever been organized and carried out. Such was the English propaganda **to fasten the war-guilt exclusively on Germany,** such the campaign for "saving civilization from the Hun"!

The result was inevitable: The victory was easy, the effect prodigious. The stoppage of mail service to and from Germany to all countries of the Entente and to all overseas countries made effective reply in protest and explanation almost impossible; the proscription as "disloyal and traitorous" of any utterances in speech or print in opposition to the "official fabricated diagnosis of the war" which had been attained by this propaganda in most countries, particularly in the United States of America, silenced even the spasmodic protests of just-minded and truth-loving men. By skilful and

unscrupulous interpretation and elaboration of every circumstance, occurrence, parliamentary declaration, speech by Prime Ministers or the Kaiser, that came from Germany—even of the several tentative German peace offers—all such were twisted into evidence in support of that dastardly accusation. Every contumely that could be manufactured was heaped upon the head of that country and the Kaiser until the public mind reached a state of insane frenzy, intensified to the danger point by ever more weird and horrifying reports of "barbarities and devastation" in Belgium, France and elsewhere. In America there was added to all this the inflaming recital of the anti-American official propaganda by Germany and of that by Germany-born citizens. **This combination swept public reason off its feet in this country, and produced a state of hysterical morbid fury that vented itself in deplorable exhibitions of hate and violence.** (This particular subject will be discussed in detail in a later article.) Germany, in short, was painted as a decadent, inhuman people of perverted feeling, of a peculiar and irrational psychology, of untrustworthy character and unfit for association with other nations; she was loudly called **to confession, contrition and repentance of her crime,** before she could again be considered a member of the family of civilized peoples! The extravagance of language used, of malicious insinuation and accusation, of disdainful attitude passed the bounds of common decency. By continued repetition and elaboration of this whole disgusting fabric of slander and unreasoning hate it grew **to an impenetrable maze of iniquity** of which even its authors lost the tracks and which defied every attempt at unraveling. Yet, gradually the time came around for the truth to be revealed and recognized even by the most obdurate. As the peace conference at Paris drew along its tortuous course, the real motives of the war reappeared; as the fruits of victory were sought to be gathered in, **the selfish objects of the different nations and the indescribable meanness and bestiality of the Entente's spirit towards their adversary stood forth in glaring nakedness.** The low conspiracy of the British propaganda was unmasked and stands revealed!

To fully assay the moral decrepity of this British propa-

ganda of false charges and defamation of every species we must never lose sight of this illuminating fact, already stated or intimated: That neither England, nor the Entente as a whole, expected Germany to stay long in the conflict, once she had become fully conscious of the overwhelming array of force against her. It was, therefore, through Germany's heroic persistence in the war that the Entente powers were, likewise, compelled to continue in a struggle such as they never had anticipated and which taxed and wrecked them almost as much as it did their foe. It was this condition which raised their hate to a state of malicious rage and projected forth this ignoble propaganda of calumny as **an act of savage revenge. They conspired to roll off their own share of war responsibility upon their enemy and to heap upon him all the fault and all the ignominy!**

The Serbian Ultimatum, etc. The Serbian government took no active steps to disclose the Serajevo murder conspiracy until it realized Austria's determination to take stern measures. From the first it was evident **that all would depend on Russia's attitude**—whether she would stand aside, or come forward in her old role of champion of plan-slavism and the Greater Serbia movement. She took the latter course—her historic course—as given in previous explanations. It is revealed now that Serbia received assurances of positive support from Russia as early as July 24th, 1914, soon after the presentation of the Ultimatum from Austria. **Germany** hoped for a peaceable outcome and worked towards that end to the last; her pressure upon Austria for moderating her terms to Serbia went to the limit of what was possible between two allied powers. She finally succeeded to induce Austria and Russia to take up direct negotiations between themselves as to all the questions of the dangerous entanglement. All this was frustrated and all promises of "direct conversations" in St. Petersburg and of rescinding mobilization orders **were broken by the trickery of Russian diplomacy**—even to countermanding the Czar's own orders. This Russian diplomacy was under the direction of M. Sazonoff, Foreign Minister, who was in close relations with the French chauvinistic party, led by President Poincaré himself.

Simultaneously France, conspiring with Russia instead of helping to work for peace by pressure upon her, **was busily engaged in soliciting positive pledges of support from England.** In the latter the war spirit had meantime risen perceptibly;

the war party came out in the open; the Bank of England raised its discount rate to 8 per cent—an infallible barometer on the general trend! England, by her marine strength, wealth and resources, held the balance of power—and the decision for peace or war lay in her hands. By her failure to restrain Russia and France, she **incurred the chief responsibility for the war!** (The oft-repeated story of a "*Kronrath*" (Crown Council) in Potsdam, by the Kaiser, his ministers and generals purported to have been held as early as July 5th, 1914, and in which the attitude of Austria towards Serbia, the terms of the ultimatum, and all military measures were asserted to have been discussed on the basis of a full determination for war, has long been disproven a pure myth.)

The Final Agony. It was proven later, in the Szukomlinoff trial, that those circles who were in control in Russia at the time **were absolutely determined for war** and acted to destroy all bridges which could possibly have led to a peaceful solution. This attitude was due not only to the support of France but to the fact that England made no representations to Russia and that the latter felt herself absolutely sure of England's acquiescence in war and probable active support, all as expressed by Earl Grey to M. Cambon, Ambassador of France on July 29th, 1914. The situation as here presented was established at the time by the diplomatic correspondence of the Ambasador of Belgium at St. Petersburg, and has since been corroborated by all the accumulated war revelations and publications of the several countries. When the entanglement between Germany, Austria, France and Russia had become acute, Earl Grey adroitly brought up the subject of "Belgian neutrality" to gain a good pretext for England's participation in the coming events—one **which would placate the British public.** The Serbian plot of assassination was too far removed for this purpose—and it is doubtful whether England would have entered a conflict confined to Germany, Austria and Russia. It required the addition of France and the raising of the question of "the balance of power" on the Continent, together with that of Belgian neutrality, to furnish England with her desired "*casus belli.*" Accordingly, all the diplomatic moves of the Entente were planned so as **to entrap Germany into a position from which she would not be able to escape without either declaring war or submitting in humiliation.**

From this trap Germany, contrary to calculation, declared war on Russia and France; and when this terrible consummation had been reached, England, seeing no escape from her participation and seeking for a plausible war pretext,

raised the question of Belgian neutrality! This opened Germany's eyes as to England's position and intentions, and thenceforth Germany made frantic efforts to obtain England's pledge of neutrality. It was all futile, however. Germany offered to respect Belgian neutrality; she offered to guarantee the integrity of France and of her colonies in case she should win the war; she offered to abstain from all action by her fleet against the coast of France and against French commercial shipping—all in vain: England's purpose was plainly revealed **by her failure to state conditions to Germany on which she would remain neutral** and by Sir Edward Grey's final avowal that "England desires to keep her hands free."

This ultra-tense situation had been reached by forenoon of August 1st. Meanwhile, the time limit to Russia had expired without an answer having been received in Berlin. Then followed the declaration of war on Russia by Germany and the request to France "to declare her attitude." At this moment a ray of hope seemed to break through the gathering storm in the inquiry by Earl Grey "whether Germany would guarantee not to attack France if the latter remained neutral." This inquiry, however, proved quickly to have been entirely insincere and was smothered in a maze of contradictions and denials. Instead, France answered Germany's "inquiry" **by an order of mobilization.** August 2nd, Germany answered this by her declaration of war on France, and began moving troops towards the Belgian border. On the following day England sent the sly inquiry to Germany "whether, or on what conditions, she would respect the neutrality of Belgium"—knowing well that German troops were already crossing the Belgian line. This gave to England **her hypocritical excuse for war,** which she followed with her declaration of August 4th, 1914. We see plainly from the foregoing that instead of restraining Russia and France, England's diplomacy was solely occupied with manoeuvering Germany into a position from which there would be no escape but humble submission. Instead, Germany decided to defend her honor and security with her blood and treasure, as any self-respecting nation would do in like circumstances—and refused to submit to such brutal and unparalleled coercion!

That England would have entered the war just the same if there had been no false-pretense case of Belgian neutrality has since been fully made clear. She was, practically, **the bounden ally of France and Russia** (for the complicated purposes we have explained) ever since the first definite proposals for forming the Triple Entente were made, in 1911. Her guarantee to France, of August 2nd, 1914, "to protect the French coast and shipping against attack by Germany, in case of hostilities breaking out," **antedates her Belgian neu-**

trality anxieties by two days!! Strange, indeed is the Anglo-Saxon character in its mixture of honesty and mental sturdiness with a studied hypocrisy of motives and the moral cowardice to avow its real purposes.

Germany's Relative Modernity. The golden age of Germany, politically and before 1871, was in the Middle Ages, up to the Reformation. That religious turmoil, which brought on the terrible thirty-years' war of 1618-1648, also divided Germany more sharply than ever into a number of politically separate "states" under the leadership of Austria, a leadership more a traditional compliment than an effective actuality. It was strictly confined to matters of external politics, the term "Germany" being really comprised in the identity of language, race traits and customs, territorial and ethnological rather than political. As times advanced, these independent German States became more numerous and more clearly defined in their separate territories and other interests towards each other; and after the defeat of Napoleon and the peace congress of Vienna, some thirty-seven large and small States were recognized as independent "countries," the total making up the limited political entity of "Germany" as it still lingered from the Middle Ages. The largest separate State was the Kingdom of Prussia, followed by German Austria, the Kingdoms of Hannover, Saxonia, Bavaria and Wurttemberg; the Grandduchies of Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and a number of smaller Duchies and Principalities. Out of this indefinite and conglomerate national existence the sentiment for a "unitel fatherland," as of old, gradually revived and became the poetic dream of the German people. How all this developed slowly—through the tortuous paths of revolution, reaction, and internal antagonisms—up to the time of the great test-war between Austria and Prussia (1866) and the Franco-German war of 1870-71, and establishment of the new German empire, has been related in some detail.

We see, therefore, that from the end of the seventeenth century to the year 1871 Germany was an insignificant country politically, compared with France, England, Russia, Turkey, Spain, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian States; she was devoid of any large-scale manufacturing industries, foreign commerce, a navy or colonies. The army establishments of the different German States were distinctly separate and without any "national" basis. Thus, in the historical view, the modern German empire was an **innovation,** regarded by the older countries with surprise, at first, later with apprehension —as an usurper, a pretender without legitimacy. This feeling

accounts for much of the jealousy which was at the bottom of the war, independently of the specific factors of power and numbers, commercial and naval competition, etc. But going back, again, to our historical thread, we must note the fact that this condition of national German disruption—up to 1864—and the constant fear of aggression from their powerful neighbors produced that character **of craintiveness, submissiveness, timidity and racial dejection** for which the German people were known for two-hundred years.

That year of 1864 was the turning point, not only in the political life of Germany but also in the people's character; it had come with the success of Prussia in the war with Denmark and the new inspiration which flowed from it. Thence, it was a steady march forward to 1871—and with the new united empire came Germany's **second golden age.** There were 43 years of brilliant national life which brought great transformations, material and psychological. But while the German character became changed with this new atmosphere—became bolder, more self-reliant and aggressive—the old attributes were not fully eradicated; it would require a hundred years of five generations to accomplish that, in any people. And when the disaster of the great war broke over them, much the old traits of fear, lack of confidence, ready submissiveness and tribal antagonisms reappeared! No people **fully possessed by a strong sense of national identity, national pride, self-esteem and determination**—France, England, the United States, Japan, and others—**would in similar circumstances have submitted to the terms of a peace like that of Versailles;** they would have defied the enemy to do his worst, to invade and occupy the whole country, rather than selling themselves into virtual slavery for three generations voluntarily! By their lack of internal unity, and by moral cowardice at the end, the German people have not only lost the war **but all the prestige of character which they had acquired from 1864 to 1914!** These reflections are in line with similar opinions arrived at from other viewpoints, as expressed in different parts of this book, and are a condemnation of the "fatalistic" leanings of German thought, of the many strange weaknesses which accompany the many excellent traits of German character.

IX. THE FOOD BLOCKADE

Its After-War Effects

Of the military measures taken by England to win the war and crush Germany, the blockade of the German North-sea coast, intended to operate particularly against importation

of food materials, must be given a position of prime importance. With a thorough understanding of Germany's economic situation as created by the war, England was certain from the beginning **that a rigid food blockade** might be the means of bringing Germany to her knees ultimately by producing exhaustion and starvation of the entire people, a condition against which no nation could fight indefinitely. The Entente expected to win the war **by that means** if a military victory should not be achieved at an earlier time. If England could but succeed by her policy of alternate persuasion and cajolence to bring all the great food-producing countries—America, Argentina, Brazil, etc., to the support of the Entente countries for food and war materials, and, at the same time, practically prevent all food importation into Germany **the war was won from the start** providing, always, that Germany and her allies could be kept from achieving a decisive military victory before reaching the fatal stage of their material exhaustion. Why this military victory was not attained in time, after Germany's brilliant deeds of arms, will be argued in a later article, but the final outcome of the war proved that the food blockade was without question **the greatest single factor** that defeated Germany. When the breakdown came she still had a formidable army and navy, but **food supplies were nearly exhausted;** the people had reached **the lowest endurable point of physical deprivation!** The blockade also brought on deficiency in metals, leather, rubber, woolen and cotton cloth, silk, paper, chemicals required in metallurgy and for explosives, etc.—and the collapse had to come. This silent and relentless pressure of the blockade was comparable to the steady closing of the jaws of a giant steam vise operated by an infallible mechanism. It took English cold-blooded perseverance **to see it through to the end**—to watch and wait with set teeth for four long years and observe it slowly fulfilling its ghastly purpose: THE STARVING OF AN ENTIRE PEOPLE as a military measure. No other nation we know would have been able to stand the strain of **such an act of deliberate, calculated, cynical cruelty so long!**

This blockade was carried on in violation of international law as established by the Hague conference, and of recognized

international rights of neutral shipping upon the High Seas, but its moral wrong overshadows every other consideration. Was there, perhaps, a special significance in the fact that so little information about the working of the blockade, so few references to it appeared in the public press during the war? Was England, with her constant declaration about "humanitarian warfare" and "inviolability of non-combatants" perhaps conscious of the incompatibility of her blockade action with these declarations; was she, perhaps, inwardly **ashamed of this incomparable war crime** of starving the civilian population of Germany, of inflicting upon millions of aged and infirm men, upon women and tender children the tortures of hunger, slow decline, general want of physical comforts, clothing, fuel, linen, etc.---ending in sickness, physical collapse—death?! This most cruel, contemptible and cowardly measure was only **indirectly** a war measure; England knew well enough, from the exigencies of war, that neither the German armies nor the navy would suffer for want of food through the blockade, that the fighting men would be kept in trim above all other considerations. The purpose was more insidious in its nature; it was to exert a "strong moral pressure" upon the government through the sufferings of the people, and to break down the latter's resolution to fight the war through to the end! And even while this horror was proceeding and detailed news of its deadly effect was being carefully kept from the Entente peoples and America, the world was filled with strenuous appeals for pity and help for peoples in other parts of the world, suffering—no doubt—but in a much lesser degree. "Help! help! lest they starve and die!"—but the German non-combatants might starve and suffer and die without so much **as a thought being given to their undeserved fate**—because they were of the **ENEMY!** Oh! shame and execration not only upon the British food blockade but upon this sickening "mock-humanitarianism" which was being paraded with so much blatant ostentation in this war—conduct which justifies fully the arraignment made and conclusions drawn by the author in the article, "The Summit."

The awful effects of the blockade upon Germany became fully known only after the armistice; and the latter did not

abrogate it till many months later, after the signing of the peace treaty, and then only partly, so that its operation and consequences are felt even today, two years after the armistice. Its effect during the war was that all stocks of food in granaries, warehouses, farms and mills, hotels, public institutions and large private estates gradually became exhausted and the entire public, rich and poor alike, were brought to a hand-to-mouth existence of meagre "government rations" doled out from the national depots. These rations of the absolute necessaries for life became smaller and smaller as the war continued, and only the young and vigorous were able to support life adequately upon them. Coarse, indigestible bread, only partly made of grain, a minimum of potatoes, beans and peas were the monotonous staples upon which the great body of the people were forced to live—and even that in very small quantities only—with a meat allowance of a few ounces only per week during the last year of the war! Coffee, tea and sugar, eggs and butter and other fats were inprocurable except by the rich; babies and young children dropped into early graves by tens of thousands above the normal rate from lack of mother's milk and cow's milk, both, and the women bore dead or puny children. Cows, chickens and goats found no fodder on the untilled fields.

Since the close of the war, the meagre harvests of 1919 and 1920 and the restriction on food importation, which continued for a year after the armistice, **have made it impossible to accumulate stocks of food sufficient for the normal feeding** of the population of Germany and Austria. Poland, Russia, Hungary all shared proportionately in the awful conditions of misery which flowed from the British food blockade because of their economic interrelation with Germany. And these conditions continue to exist today as far as the great masses of the people are concerned; only the very rich are able to buy a sufficiency, because of the high prices. Speculation and profiteering have added their share to the general consequences of the blockade, and over all is cast the gloom of political and social demoralization and hopelessness. In Vienna, former capital of music, mirth and humor, **the conditions are the most pathetic**—a real tragedy, the poor and

middle classes starving and dying, the children being sent away to Switzerland, Italy, Holland, Sweden to save their young lives for the nation.

What a spectacle for mankind to reflect upon, to shudder at,—to be ashamed of! What a horrible aftermath of this horrible war! **The reproach and ignominy of this is England's for the ages to come!** Let her bow her head to the earth in shame and remorse! Let France and the United States hide their faces in disgrace as accomplices in this crime against the species! What must not be the dream visions of that man in Washington, one corner of his mouth still filled with abuse of Germany and the other with "humanity" talk; who had the war decision in his hands through the irresistible power of this nation and who failed to demand the abrogation or amelioration of the food blockade from England in return for Germany's offer to stop the U-boat war, and in return for our assistance to the Entente Allies. May the haggard faces of the starving people of Europe rise up before him out of the dark with the accusing stare of: 'Thou! thou! thou!' **Let the world now swear solemnly that never again in any future war shall a food blockade be enacted against the civil population of an enemy!**

Germany's answer to England's measure was the inauguration of the U-boat war and the Zeppelin raids. Thus one act of brutality begets another till reason and moral feeling are lost in the reign of revengeful violence! Where do they—reason and sense of right—flee to and hide themselves in the terrible times of war passion when man abandons all his graces and returns to the status of a mad beast infuriated by a red rag? Have "religion" and "civilization" achieved a real and durable advance and refinement of the species "man"? These questions will be seriously discussed in the later articles on the ethical aspect of the war.

X. ITALY, GREECE AND ROUMANIA IN THE WAR

Those Irredentas

In Article VI we described the relations which existed between Italy, Germany and Austria through the compact of the Triple Alliance. While there is some ambiguity as to the exact extent in which Italy was bound to the other two powers, offensively and defensively in the case of a European war, there is no doubt that she was bound in any circumstances which might occur **at least to the extent of maintaining a position of benevolent neutrality.** After the declarations of war had been made, Germany and Austria hastened to assure themselves of Italy's attitude and to exact her cooperation to the fullest degree possible under the existing agreements. Italy, in reply, immediately advanced a treaty interpretation which relieved her of giving her active assistance to the other two powers. The Entente allies approached Italy at the same time with the same object of ascertaining her position and, if possible, **severing her from the Triple Alliance.** Much preliminary work had already been done in this direction, as indicated in preceding Articles. In this endeavor, therefore, they knew themselves not only possessed of excellent chances of success, but that the advantages they would derive therefrom for themselves warranted the utmost efforts. Prince von Buelow, ex-Chancellor of Germany, and credited with being her foremost diplomatist, was entrusted with the mission of guarding Germany's and Austria's interests at Rome. Between him and the ablest diplomats of the Entente a battle royal was fought for about eighteen months at the court of Rome with the king and ministers of Italy in the effort to retain their adherence to the Triple Alliance compact. Von Buelow succumbed at the end, due to the ascendency of the "greater Italy" party in the parliament and the King's council—and Italy joined the Entente allies in the war **from pure motives of gain.**

These are the bare outward facts. Behind them lies **the tragedy of Italy's broken word and sullied honor.** While she

may have had the right to wriggle out of "offensive and defensive obligations" towards the Triple Alliance by a literal interpretation of the agreements, she was bound to them by stronger ties—**moral obligations**—and should at least have remained **benevolently neutral.** But the advent of the world war had stirred up powerful forces of national ambition in Italy which, under cover of the **"irredentist agitation"** conceived the execution of designs of territorial annexation, along the eastern shore of the Adriatic, which had long been entertained. The old enmity against Austria, the former dictator of Italy, was fanned to new flame by this advanced "patriotic" party. It was not so much the racial animosity against these Austrian "tedescos" (Teutons) that worked as the incentive, but they, Austria, were in possession of the **Trentino and Trieste districts** and the entire upper end of the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, as far down as Montenegro. These were the very sections which Italy had coveted since decades and set her heart upon to acquire. In these border districts and seacoast strips, of preponderatingly Slavic and German-Austrian population, there lived also some 75,000 to 80,000 Italians, or **half-Italians,** partly disseminated and partly in scattered concentrated settlements, the remainder of the "Italia Irredenta" which had not been "redeemed" or joined to Italy when Venice was won from Austria and the last peace settlement and border delineations made between the two countries, in 1866. This cry of "Italia Irredenta" had been smothered during the years of the Triple Alliance, from which Italy enjoyed so many advantages while engaged with her work of internal consolidation and African adventures of colonial conquest. In those days **the friendship and protection of Austria and Germany far outweighed to her the possession of these few hundred square miles of Adriatic territory** and the accession of this comparatively small number of semi-nationalists. That slogan was, indeed, a "fake" cry: It was not these few people and these small strips of land—as such—which animated Italy's ambition; for these alone she would never have violated her honor and undertaken the sacrifices of war on the side of the Entente. The real "Italia Irredenta" upon which patriotic and ambitious Italy had set

its mind since years, awaiting only the favorable opportunity, was **the possession of the Austrian ports and cities on the Adriatic—Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Zara and all the minor ones down to and including Cattaro—and, with it, the control of that entire sea.**

A study of the map will elucidate the geographical elements of the question and explain this perfectly natural object of Italy. The Adriatic Sea is a long-stretched bay, some 525 miles in length by an average width of a little over a hundred miles, but narrowing at the southern entrance into it from the Mediterranean to a width of only about fifty miles between **Otranto** in Italy and the harbor of **Avlona** in Albania opposite, and to about sixty-five miles between the important Italian port of **Brindisi** (situated less than fifty miles north of Otranto) and the above-named port of Avlona. From Brindisi northward the entire west coast of the Adriatic is more or less shallow and barren of first-class harbors for deep-draught naval or mercantile vessels, whereas **the east coast is a rocky and deep-harbor coast,** with the fine Austrian harbors already mentioned. Additional ones, not to be overlooked in the calculation, are those of **Antivari and Scutari** in Montenegro, and of **Durazzo,** in Albania, including the afore-mentioned one of **Avlona** at the mouth of the bay. It is apparent that with modern far-carrying artillery, and Italy in possession or control of Avlona, **she could easily and entirely dominate the entrance to the Adriatic from the Mediterranean Sea.** The value of this bay to Italy for naval stations and commercial shipping is, therefore, beyond measure and was well worth securing by a country looking forward to political and industrial expansion. And, as we said above, as long as peace reigned in Europe and the Triple Alliance remained unchallenged, these aspirations of Italy had to remain *sub rosa;* they were, then, represented as the "dreams" of an extreme nationalistic faction only; but as soon as the great war had opened **there arose a new political perspective which brought them within the range of practical realization** and made them the debatable objects of diplomatic negotiations. The Entente fully understood this; and by exploiting the situation and pledging the satisfaction of Italy's Adriatic aims, as far as

compatible with other interests in that sphere which they were bound to consider, they slowly turned Italy in their favor against the voice of right and conscience. When, in addition, they promised the settlement of the dispute with Turkey over the "Dodekanese" (the twelve Ionian islands situated along the coast of Asia Minor and which Italy claimed as a promised "compensatory concession" by Turkey arising out of the war with Tunis) in Italy's favor, **the latter's nationalistic frenzy turned her head** and threw her into the arms of the Entente as an ally, forgetful of her obligations to the Triple Alliance.

Previous to this final outcome there had been protracted negotiations, conducted by Prince von Buelow from Rome, between Italy and Austria in an endeavor to prevent this result through the agency of Austrian concessions to Italy; but with every offer made by Austria, **Italy's demands expanded until it became clear that she was only playing for time and the ultimate of pledges obtainable from the Entente before avowing her long-determined course.** Austria had offered the limit of concessions which she could make in due justice to the Slavonic and German peoples of the districts involved. The rights of these, Italy did not consider in the least in her ambitious course. Low and sordid motives won the victory over honor, decency and moral obligations! This "winning-over of Italy" was a great triumph for the Entente powers and helped much to decide the war in their favor; but whether Italy, after all, made a good bargain is very doubtful from the present situation of the question. Had she remained faithful to the Triple Alliance, at least to the extent of remaining neutral, it is probable that she would have obtained as much compensation, even under the defeat of the Central powers, as she is to obtain now under the treaty of Versailles and the private "London pact" **after having made all her sacrifices in blood and treasure and borne the sufferings** of her population through the war. The adjustment of Italy's Adriatic and other claims was one of the most difficult problems for the Paris peace conference, and the final disposition has only recently been arrived at after d'Annuncio's spectacular exit from his Fiume dictatorship, nearly two years after the

signing of peace, and is likely to be a source of further trouble in the future. The creation of the new **State of Jugo-Slavia** introduced an element into this problem **which had not been foreseen when the Entente made its liberal pledges to Italy in the secret pact of London!** Whatever Italy may achieve in the future, politically or otherwise, it will never be forgotten that **she sullied her honor in this war and proved herself a low calculating bargainer and a traitor to the two nations under whose protecting wing she grew to power and prosperity!** This verdict will be Italy's just punishment for her perfidy! Her defection is **the fourth great error committed in the war;** it complicated the issues and extended its duration, and is solely chargeable to Italy!

THE story of Greece and Roumania is much like that of Italy. While neither of these two countries was openly known as an **active member** of the Triple Alliance, there is authentic reason to believe that treaties of "material and moral obligation" existed to cover possible political emergencies, and which bound them to the Alliance and to Germany particularly as a necessity of her near-east extension plans. In both cases there were also **personal relationships** which were expected to prove helpful to the joint political interests. The former Queen of Greece is a sister of Emperor William, and the King of Roumania was originally a Prince of a branch of the house of Hohenzollern. Greece and Roumania also had "irredentist movements" for the acquisition of adjoining territories populated in part by their respective "nationalists" or by related stock. In Greece there had been going on for some years a strong agitation for establishing a republic and abrogating the monarchy.

The position and purpose of the Entente towards both these countries were, therefore, the same as in the case of Italy: **To tempt them to break their engagements by pledging to them the realization of their nationalistic ambitions in exchange for their support in the war against the Triple Alliance.** As in Italy, these advances, naturally, had to be made through the political party representing these policies and against the

conservative elements who placed honor above mere gain and political feeling. King George of Greece made a noble fight for the principles for which he stood and the policies to which he had committed Greece and himself personally—adherence to Germany by observing strict neutrality in the war. But, largely through the internal strife and disorganization produced by the "republican" movement, the King succumbed ultimately and was compelled to resign the throne for himself and his direct heir, the crown prince. After a short regime by the second son of King George, the provisional **Greek Republic** was definitely established, under President Venizelos, and recognized by the allies, and **quickly joined the Entente side in the war.** The shameful cajoling of Greece by the Entente, the hounding of the king, the high-handed duress exercised over the country, its partial occupation by Entente troops, seizure of arms, blockade of ports and other acts of brutal coercion and dictation **is one of the darkest pages of the Entente's record and makes up an international crime of usurpation seldom exceeded!**

As to Roumania, her action, from the moral point of view, is probably the meanest deed of the entire war, exceeding in wanton faithlessness that of Italy. There had been absolutely no friction between Germany and Roumania; there was no strong movement in that country for a republican form of government and overthrow of the monarchy to complicate the difficulties of a consistent and honorable policy towards Germany and Austria. There was but **the reign of wild and unprincipled lust for advantage and power**—from the highest bidder—using the feeble slogan of "Transylvanian irredentism" as the club upon Austria for concessions and guaranties, coupled with the scarcely veiled threat to join her enemies in the war. How could Austria be expected to pledge the turning-over of peoples and districts which had belonged to her empire since ages simply because there was a certain small proportion of Roumanians—semi-Roumanians—living in these parts? Above all, how could this have been done in the midst of war and without being able to ascertain the preferences of this population by popular vote or majority sentiment of their representatives? All offers of concessions and conditional promises

on the part of Austria were futile in the face of the set design of pelf by Roumania. The Entente's promises and guaranties again carried the day! Roumania joined the allies and **declared war on Austria, and by implication on Germany. She opened hostilities by the invasion of Transylvania.**

But the hand of swift and terrible retribution overtook her in the campaign of Field Marshal Mackensen and his Austro-German armies. He quickly crumpled up the Roumanian troops of invasion, forced them back through the Carpathian mountain passes, after stubborn fighting, entered their own territory, won battle after battle, took city after city and conquered the whole country, as in triumphal march, in a period of less than three weeks, all excepting a small section in the north-eastern mountain district. This Austro-German campaign **to repel** the Roumanian invasion of Hungary—in the total absence of any hostile provocation—this campaign of self-defense and just punishment of a treacherous government, was later heralded to the world by the British propaganda **as the unprovoked invasion by the Central powers of heroic Roumania fighting for liberty and civilization!**

In the cases of Greece and Roumania we may freely continue the parallel with Italy as regards the ultimate permanent fruitfulness and success of the course of these countries in listening to the seductive pleas of the Entente powers. It is doubtful whether their expectations will ultimately be realized more than, or as fully as, the Triple Alliance would have been able to realize them, even if only partly victorious. Hungary has made a strenuous protest that must be, will be heard, **against being robbed of her choicest eastern section, parts of her territory since centuries and populated to 70 per cent by Hungarians.** Russia, when she reaches settled conditions, will want to know who had the right to take Bessarabia from her and turn it over to Roumania without asking so much as a question about it. By these outrageous "allotments" of the Paris peace conference, without ethnological investigation, plebiscites, mutual agreement and compensations the seeds for more wars have been sown!

The details of the course of war between the Triple Alliance and the "three perfidious nations" are matters of the

regular history of the war, and will not be pursued here further. We are chiefly interested in the **moral delinquencies** exhibited in these cases, in connection with the views expressed in the later articles of the book on **the ethical aspect of the war.**

King Constantine's Return. The return of the Greek King to his throne recently, following **an overwhelming popular demand,** brings the fullest corroboration of the above presentation of Greece as an "Entente ally." Next to the Kaiser, King Constantine was the most outrageously maligned ruler in Europe. The complete reversal of minister Venizelos's "entente-financed" republic by the Greek people is an eloquent testimony of the nefarious work done in Greece by France and England! But nothing was able to wipe out the impression of capability, honesty, fairness to all political parties and enlightened patriotism which the King had secured among the Greek people of all classes; and when the Entente, at Paris, proved the utter hollowness of the extravagant promises made to Greece, **the reaction of justice and repentance came quickly.** It is peculiarly interesting that in this country the reversal of Greek political sentiment and policy was given only **the slightest possible notice in the public press,** with studied avoidance of all critical comment. This transformation and avowal of error, naturally, did not "fit in" with America's artificial and nebulous conception of the European war and the noisy "liberty and democracy" doctrines of universal salvation injected into it—backed up with guns and sabres!

XI. AMERICA IN THE WAR

A. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY. SENTIMENTAL INFLUENCES. INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ON THE HIGH SEAS. THE U-BOAT WARFARE. SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT NEGLECTED

The active entrance of the United States of America into the war was the startling sensation of the European conflict, so unexpected, so entirely opposed to the traditions of American foreign policy. How America came to be drawn into the war,

the tremendous and successful preparations made, the patriotic fervor aroused, and the details of our participation and victory are familiar to all in their outward course. But below that there lie hidden the secret and complicated motives, the powerful extraneous influences and the artificial emotional appeals made which are not so readily discernible. It is these which are the burden of inquiry in this article.

At the outbreak of the war America declared that its policy was to be one of **strict neutrality.** It required but a little time, however, for **conditions and influences** to become operative which affected that resolution of principle and transformed our attitude to one of **benevolent neutrality towards the Entente powers.** As the war in Europe progressed on its terrible course of violence, American sympathies and interests experienced a gradual transformation to an attitude of outspoken enmity towards Germany and Austria, ultimately culminating in the declaration of war on Germany by the American Congress, on April 6th, 1917. The factors which brought about this change of sentiment were both political and material, but also sentimental and of such intricate interrelation as to make it difficult for the plain patriotic American, standing within this turmoil of forces as a spectator and participant at the same time, to form a clear and correct estimate of the great drama which was taking place.

The first direct friction with Germany arose over the interference with American merchant shipping. **Germany, in answer to the British blockade of her coast,** had established a freight and passenger-boat prescribed zone against enemy shipping, covering strips along the British, Dutch, Belgian and French coasts and along the Mediterranean enemy coasts. Within these prescribed "zones" such enemy vessels became subject to immediate destruction by German regular warships or her submarine boats, without previous warning, as seizure was not practicable for German warships to make under the British blockade, and entirely out of the question for submarines. At once the question arose of Germany's right, under the recognized code of **International Law on the High Seas** to establish such prescribed zones and use of the new submarine power as announced. Germany's assumptions were

denounced by the enemy powers as illegal under their interpretation of the said code. These new regulations held great dangers for all neutral merchant shipping, as mistakes in identification—through bad light, change in rigging, etc.—were sure to follow. The United States, as well as **the European neutrals,** suffered such accidental depredations repeatedly, each individual case leading to diplomatic remonstrances, claims for indemnities, demands for apologies. Naturally there were contradictory accounts and contentions in each case, exaggeration by the injured party, belittlement by the offenders; but each case ended with an increase of acrimony and resentment in the United States against Germany.

On her part the latter set up the plausible defence that the British blockade was the original offender in the matter and cause of these extraordinary measures; that she had the right to protect herself with all means at her disposal, having been challenged (according to her conception) **to a war in defense of her existence,** for which she had given no hostile cause, and that the new weapon of the submarine was as legal as any other agent of destruction in such an unjustified and unequal contest; furthermore, that she had the right to establish such new rules of sea-warfare as the peculiar character of the submarine torpedo boat—its vulnerability and other limitations—together with the British blockade of her coast, demanded. Pursuant to these arguments, Germany asserted that **neutrals should realize and acknowledge by their attitude** that a new kind of war on the High seas had come, different from those of former wars, and that it was their duty and their interest to submit to these new conditions by willingly observing the established zones in order to avoid accidents. She held herself **ready and accountable for damages and indemnities** in cases of accidents, damage and loss of life occurring through mistakes of officers, illegibility of signs and code signals or any other uncontrollable causes. All the European **truly neutral** countries accepted the reasonableness of Germany's explanations and guaranties in view of her geographical position, the unwarranted blockade of her coast, and her naval inferiority which made the raising of this blockade by force almost impossible. Hence, the **European neutrals,** holding,

also, a local and rational view of the real war motives and objects and of the unequal contest forced upon Germany by the Entente, were prepared to acquiesce to her rulings, confining themselves to protests and presentation of claims arising out of individual cases of accidental violation, **but conceding Germany's title to her sea policy.**

Not so the United States of America. In this country, unfortunately, the original official intention of observing a strict neutrality in the war, and of judging all political and technical questions which might arise with absolute impartiality and reasonableness, came to grief in the first few months of the war and was transformed, as we have said before, into a state of **benevolent neutrality towards the Triple Entente.** This change had not come from any act of enmity by Germany or Austria but **from the steady and subtle process of social and sentimental amalgamation with England which had been going on for forty years and which might well be designated as "the bloodless re-conquest of the United States by Great Britain."** There is nothing reprehensible *per se* in this drawing-together of mother country and daughter. Our culture-civilization, if you prefer—is essentially English in character, language, political ideas, law structure, social customs, etc., in spite of the strong admixture of German, Scandinavian, Italian and other races of different language in the present makeup of the American people. Time had softened the once bitter feeling against England dating from the war of the revolution, the war of 1812, and from England's attitude in our Civil War. The hundreds of marriages concluded between the scions of important English and American families have drawn the two countries together, racially and socially. Important busines and financial associations sprang up in the course of time. In this way English tact and patience accomplished a remarkable transformation in the relations between the two countries; it built up an international Anglo-American exclusive social caste and **created a pro-English party—for peace or for war—in the United States** long before the great European war was thought of as an acute possibility. In consequence of this intimate relationship, a strong pro-English war feeling asserted itself in this country

immediately after the war had broken out, and, inferentially, a feeling of distrust and enmity towards Germany.

This favorable sentiment here was skilfully worked up to full activity and expression **by the British war propaganda,** as described in all its aims and methods in Article VIII, which utilized every means possible to disseminate **false impressions** in the United States about the events transpiring in Europe—**the causes of the war, the motives of Germany, the invasions of Belgium and France, the reported atrocities, the excesses of the U-boats**—and to exasperate this country by similar exaggerated "inventions" about the diabolical schemes of German propaganda in America. The object was plainly to work in every way possible upon the racial sympathy of this country with England, upon its political predilections, its humanitarian instincts and, proportionately, to feed its irritation and animosity against Germany and Austria, whose every act and motive were distorted and painted in the blackest colors. The English censorship and the isolated, defenseless position of Germany made this scheme of attack and conquest a complete success!

To this American pro-English sentiment there became adroitly joined a parallel **pro-French sentiment** by a propaganda of re-awakening and strengthening of the sympathetic ties long existent between America and France in a latent state, and of now vitalizing them to a keen reality by the recalling of **Lafayette's and Rochambeau's heroic devotion to the cause of American liberty,** and of France's generous diplomatic and financial aid and inspiring sympathy in the years of the bitter struggle for our independence from England and the founding of this republic. There was nothing *per se* reprehensible in this agitation either; the sentiment in both was good, but **the motives of the leaders who aroused them were thoroughly bad because intended for a purpose of hate and war!** Once started on their insincere and enmious course, the entire press of the country, practically, was impressed into the service of nourishing these sentimental predispositions. Additional support accrued to this campaign of creating anti-German feeling —the British propaganda of hate and defamation working all the time meanwhile—by the awakening of the American manu-

facturer, speculator and financier to the "business aspect" of the European war, the commercial possibilities of a liberal application of "benevolent neutrality" towards the Entente allies in the enormous struggle which was developing abroad. And, still more, the American army and navy organizations began to see in a possible participation of America in the war a grand opportunity for honors in the service, promotion and emoluments which made an enticing vision. All these factors combined worked to transform the British propaganda in America into **a genuine native American propaganda with new features and objects added,** and with the distinct purpose of familiarizing the public mind with the thought of war.

The author, at this point, emphatically disclaims any idea of wishing to imply that America had no genuine war motives, that Germany committed no acts of hostile provocation; but he does believe that under the combined stimulus of the two propagandas—the false information spread, the sentimental factors brought into play—the aggressions of Germany looked to us in the superheated state of our feelings out of all proportion to what they really were and appear to us to-day. Except for a small but influential war clique of the most varied composition, **the war motives of the American people were absolutely honest;** we believed what we were told —and went ahead! In the feverish circumstances which we have analyzed above it needed, at the height of tension, but the injection of **some grand motive, some inspiring unselfish thought to lift the growing war feeling out of its false and restricted foundation into a higher plane of disinterested idealism from which war might be contemplated without a shudder!** A commanding war cry had to be found, though it be invented, to which would fit those terrifying words: Enlistment, conscription, the blood sacrifice of thousands, agonies of soul for loved ones, suffering untold on beds of mutilation, enormous loans and the depletion of the public wealth, complete disorganization of the country's normal life of peace!

But the master minds at Washington were equal to the occasion. Our great mesmeric war President issued the call: **"To Arms! for Liberty and Democracy; To Arms! for Universal Justice and the Freedom of the World! To Arms! to crush**

German Autocracy, Kaiserdom, Militarism and World Conquest!" And behold, the miracle was done; as simple as all miracles: Ye must believe, if ye would be saved; ye must have a faith if ye would go to war with a good conscience! The country now had its "crusader" war cry; but alas! the noblest of all sentiments—patriotism and love of liberty—had been invoked and violated to the service of a false and ephemeral issue! The public did not know this, and the enthusiasm was now unbounded; the inspiring war slogan was flung to all the breezes and trumpeted from all the house tops; the conscience of millions of the more sober and peaceable was lulled or cajoled to silence—**but truth lay strangled on the ground!! It was not true,** as then represented, that Germany or the Kaiser had wanted and plotted the war for world conquest or any other motive; that her government had been oppressive under a tyrant autocrat; that the German people were thirsting for the blessings of a republic; that unusual atrocities and destruction had been committed by Germany in the war.

The practical effect of this evolution of our war attitude was that every accident which happened to any of our vessels in consequence of the German zone regulation was enlarged to an acute "casus belli" which no explanations from the German side was allowed to appease. America refused to accede to the German contention that the old International Code had become obsolete, and broadly claimed the right for her citizens to travel unmolested, zone or no zone, anywhere they pleased on regular passenger ships of neutral or enemy nationality. Meanwhile the export of American war materials of every kind and of food to the Entente countries, which had begun as soon as the war had started, assumed larger and larger proportions and had taken place in ships of all nationalities. It led to energetic protests from Germany **as being in violation of our neutrality,** especially when taking place in passenger vessels, in which cases **the presence, on board, of American passengers was intended to form a "protection" to such vessels against challenge and search** in passing through the zones. The question was argued at length in the American press and in the Congress. The view finally taken was that

such exportation of arms, etc., was not against American rights as a neutral as long as it was done without discrimination against German purchasers in our market, and that it was not the fault of America **if Germany could not purchase and import our arms and food because of the British blockade of her coast.**

As to this traffic taking place in passenger vessels, this country denied knowledge of such practice and threw the burden of proof upon Germany. In answer, the latter claimed that it was the duty of this government and of the different shipping and harbor authorities to see to it that passenger ships observe the international rules on cargo and that none carrying "contraband-of-war" be given port clearances, be they freight or passenger vessels. As to the great volume of this traffic carried on in enemy bottoms and neutral ships, Germany contended that exportation of food and war materials by a neutral country to an enemy of another country **to such an extent as to practically constitute that enemy's ability to carry on his side of the respective war** and also supply many of his general necessities, while the opposing enemy was prevented receiving similar support—particularly food—by an illegal blockade of his coast, was an action by a neutral so **overwhelmingly prejudicial to one side of a conflict as to constitute a flagrant breach of neutrality,** being a measure of assistance so decisive as never to have been contemplated by international law as permissible—and that there was no record of any such practice in any previous war.

IN course of time the German government claimed to have received positive information from its agents in America that the large and swift passenger vessels of the English Cunard and White Star lines—the Adriatic, Celtic, Mauritania, Lusitania—were engaged regularly in this illegal traffic and **that these vessels were being armed with six-inch afore and aft guns for attack against U-boats, in case of pursuit.** The German government made an insistent protest against this practice and threatened measures of a serious kind in self-defense and reprisal. For several weeks spirited "notes" were being

exchanged between the two governments on this dangerous controversy. The German position was very clear, much more so than the American: "The vessels used in this way and particularly complained against were **enemy bottoms**—British chartered and owned; they were regular passenger boats, not freighters; they solicited to carry American-citizen passengers —for their protection in the illegal traffic of conveying arms and ammunition to the enemies of Germany. The American government was asked tersely to use its power over the English companies and its own citizens to eliminate the illegal and intolerable features of this traffic which, in the German view, **were acts of open hostility in which the American government was participating, failing repressive action.**

Nothing came of these diplomatic exchanges except more distrust and irritation on both sides; our government took no steps to prevent a catastrophe. Finally the German government, seeing the futility of its endeavors, and being advised that the steamship **Lusitania** was being thus illegally prepared and loaded to sail from the port of New York with a considerable cargo of small arms and shells, and a large passenger list of distinguished Americans, **losing all self-control in the face of this exasperating and open defiance by the United States,** issued public warnings for two weeks before the sailing date **that the safe passage of the Lusitania through the war zone could not be guaranteed by the German government** under the new instructions recently issued to U-boat commanders in regard to this hostile passenger-steamer traffic. These notices were posted up in all steamship agencies and railroad offices and were published conspicuously in a large number of the leading newspapers of the country, at an outlay, it was said, of over $30,000. There is absolutely no question **of the warning having been given in an explicit and extensive manner.** Still our government took no steps to avert a catastrophe; no warnings to the public were issued; the British line was not called upon to halt their plan; the port authorities received no orders to refuse clearance papers. There were misgivings in many quarters, as revealed by letters to the papers and other evidences of anxiety, but on the whole there was a disposition **"to call Germany's bluff"**—and take the

risk! On the morning of her sailing the passengers of the ship were made fully aware of all the circumstances; a very few canceled passage; the majority indulged themselves in unseemly hilarious gibes and tirades against German "boasts and frightfulness." The witty and famous "Fra Elbertus" (Elbert Hubbard of Aurora) was a passenger and was reported to have exclaimed: "I will sail on this ship to interview the Kaiser if I will have to go to hell to do it." Whether he went to hell the author cannot say—probably not, but he went to the bottom of the sea—**the Lusitania was sunk!!**

A shriek of horror rang through the world; America was struck dumb in rage and grief! It had not been thought possible! We, in America, were too far removed from the pressure of the war in Europe to understand the grim earnestness of Germany to stop these ships, each one of which carried enough ammunition on each trip to kill fifty thousand German soldiers! And, while it is true that more stringent U-boat instructions had been issued, and had to be issued ahead of time, it was confidently expected in Berlin **that the final remonstrances made in Washington and the issuing of the "warning" notice** would have their effect and cancel the Lusitania's sailing and stop the nefarious traffic. This awful catastrophe, which occurred on May 7th, 1915, preceded our declaration of war by almost two years, yet it wrought up public feeling to such a pitch and reacted so irresistibly upon Congress and the President that it undoubtedly made one of the final deciding factors for our participation in the war—although we **clearly felt our share of responsibility in the awful occurrence.** In saying this, the writer has not the slightest intention to excuse or belittle this wanton act by Germany of sinking the Lusitania; **we condemn it unreservedly.** But whether this act was a deliberate one, done under definite instructions, or an accident, or due to misinterpretation of orders by the U-boat commander is not fully established even to-day. The most reasonable explanation is that the German representatives here waited till the last moment, hoping that this government would take expected repressive action, and that when this hope was disappearing it was too late under the difficulties of war com-

munication in Europe, **to arrest previously given orders to the U-boats.**

The sinking of the Lusitania, with its appalling loss of life and scenes of terror, caused as profound an impresion of sorrow in Germany as in this country; it was deeply regretted in German official circles and sincerely deplored by all sections of the German people despite their well-grounded wrath against the United States in this matter! The guilt of Germany for this disaster is great, possibly **the greatest** as between the three countries concerned, but we cannot escape the conclusion **that America and England must share heavily in the responsibility.** It was the consciousness of this in the popular mind of this country which accounted for the absence of violent outbreaks of feeling, at the time, in proportion to the immensity of the horrible occurrence—**we knew that we were guilty in part.** It was the consciousness of this which also accounted for the lame-footed "investigation" into the disaster by the English Admiralty Court and the silence of the British people—**they also knew that they were guilty in part.** The following conclusions are incontrovertible: Either England should have ordered the canceling of the passenger list of the Lusitania, in face of Germany's incontrovertible declaration, or America should have publicly prohibited the booking of American passengers and, failing compliance, have refused issuance of the necessary port-clearance papers. **We had no right to send out that ship;** she was illegal, internationally and morally. These acts of callous indifference and defiance **in a situation of so much risk make England and America jointly guilty with Germany for the sinking of the Lusitania.** There is no question that this is the sentiment today both in England and in this country. This crime is the fifth great error committed in the war and is jointly chargeable to the three powers involved in the case.

THE diplomatic representations which followed, demanding on the part of the United States admission of guilt and disavowal by Germany (at that time there was no open thought of guilt on our part) and reparation resulted after various

minor concessions, at the end of about a year, in the offer by Germany **to modify her U-boat warfare** in deference to our remonstrance and the President's clear and positive warning to restrict it to the cruiser-type of "conditional attack" after previous warning. With her offer Germany coupled **the implied expectation** that America shall, in return, use her good offices and, if necessary, pressure with England **to have the food blockade raised or at least favorably modified** in the interest of her civilian population. This offer and return action might have proven the happy turning point in the war towards its restriction to more reasonable and humane lines than those into which it had fallen. In expectation of responsive action by our President, Germany left the U-boat war in practical abeyance during the summer and autumn of 1916. Germany's contention had always been that her U-boat warfare against merchant vessels of every kind and nationality **was her answer to England's indefensible blockade of her coast,** her object being to cripple England's commerce and to prevent her receiving supplies of food and other materials—**it was a straight policy of retaliation.** England had been the challenger in these unnatural and inhuman measures used by both sides!

Was the grand opportunity for turning events into a better channel seized, was there a "humanitarian response" by President Wilson, the American people or England to Germany's offer after all their loud protests against the cruel innovations of the war—poison-gas, dum-dum balls, submarine torpedo boats, air-craft, etc.? No! there was no prompt response; the precious opportunity was allowed to pass the door uncalled! President Wilson took no notice of the implied reciprocity which the Germans had asked for, or claimed, **in their truly conciliatory note** except to say, very formally, that "his protestations on the U-boat warfare, if met by Germany, carried no return obligations by the United States; that compliance was a matter of abstract justice on Germany's part!" There was no sense, as yet, of divided guilt and responsibility for the coming of the war, no recognition of the illegality of the food blockade and North Sea war-zone order by England, **all and everything connected with the war was Germany's fault exclusively!** The attitude of the President

was one of negation and inaction which he must have difficulty today to reconcile with his conscience, and which impartial history will set down as a proof of his insincerity and commitment to the cause of the Entente. The indifference by the public will, likewise, be set down against the honor and good faith of the American people, **except that we may urge that the people were at the time too much in the throes of a wild war passion to be able to comprehend the deep import of each passing event.** The whole matter of Germany's offer was smothered in silence in press and speech by order and example of our government! A prompt and energetic responsive action at that **psychological moment** might have turned the whole history of the war; the frightful spirit of hate, revenge and savage violence which had settled upon the world might have been turned back!

This inaction was **the sixth great error of the war,** second in importance to none, and **is wholly chargeable to the United States.** Not until December 22, 1916, after the German peace offer and its rejection by the Entente, did the President come forward with a proposal for a "conference of neutrals" with the object of securing bases for peace. In midst of the terrible turmoil and stress in which Europe was trembling, it took the President from September, 1915, to November, 1916, to decide to make this peace move. (See below.)

It may be urged, as a matter of argument, that this country had no power to dictate the policy of England in the premises, and might have been unsuccessful in the attempt. But there can be no doubt whatever that the energetic intercession of the President in London would have carried the day. The war had already lasted about two years; its exhausting drain upon the nations, its disrupting effect upon civilization, its total uncertainty of outcome were being felt by all. England was at that time—fall of 1915 to end of summer 1916—not yet on her full industrial war footing and **largely dependent on this country for arms, ammunition and food,** and could not have repelled our solicitations. But in the absence of pressure being put upon her by America, she determined to pursue other plans than those of compromise and reconciliation; for the achievement of her purposes she had already, by the

agency of her aggressive propaganda and other influences we have described, fastened her claws upon this government and country in an unshakable grip! We were in her power—committed to be the tool of her international crime! Nothing proves this so fully as the **dead silence and submission** with which the President took the curt rebuff by the Entente allies of his belated peace offer. To rebel, we had already gone too far, we should have had to stultify ourselves—admit that we had allowed ourselves to be deceived and imposed upon on the war issues! This was not possible to do at that time; **only few saw it;** we were not even in the war as yet but were running around like a mad bull smelling blood, and furious for a fight!

After this unequivocal revelation of mind and **shackled position** on the part of America there followed in Germany the coldness of disillusionment as to the real value and meaning of President Wilson's generous phrases on political morality, disinterestedness and international justice. It was seen plainly that he either lacked the will or the power to influence the policy of England and that nothing that Germany might offer **short of complete submission** would be considered by America and the Entente. Thus, thrown back upon herself and into a struggle of desperation for her life, Germany, on January 29, 1917, gave notice that the U-boat campaign would be resumed at the end of that month. In this second, unrestricted, phase of this sinister warfare, a still greater zone restriction was instituted, accompanied by the assignment to the United States **of a definite sea lane to a port in Wales, with a one-boat schedule per week, to and fro.**

This extreme step of resentment and retaliation on the part of Germany was equivalent to "throwing down the gauntlet"—and the gauntlet was taken up—gladly in fact! For, in America also there had been a recoil effect from Germany's expectation of reciprocity—an inverse effect of disillusionment which crystalized the issue. Had we acted favorably on Germany's peace offers, **it might have meant the avoidance of our entering the war**—a result not at all desired by the political war conspirators, the profiteers, the army of officials, the sentimentalists and an increasing section of the general

public in America, aroused to a high degree of unthinking patriotism. Thus it was felt that we were at last committed! Our failure to act for improved understanding at the opportune moment had revealed our cards, and there was no further dissembling possible of our real purpose. Diplomatic relations with Germany were severed on February 3, 1917, on the ground that the new U-boat war was in violation of the pledge of May 4, 1916, "not to sink merchant vessels without warning." With the new U-boat war additional cases of **depredation upon our shipping by Germany** now occurred; then came the revelation of **the Mexico plot of conditional alliance against us** —and our cup was now full with many imaginary and a few real aggressions by Germany and her allies. **On April 6, 1917, this country declared war on Germany!** It was the **seventh great error committed in the war** and the second by the United States, one which cooler judgment could easily have avoided!

Germany took no official notice of our declaration of war, made no reply whatever! Nothing could have intensified the war feeling in this country more than this contemptuous silence and defiance of America! Our pride and vanity were stung to the quick! **It made us feel that we must win against her at all costs!** There had been those who up to the last moment had hoped that Germany would recede before us; now all this hesitation was swept away and we stood united for victory!

May 7, 1915, to February 1, 1917. Following the Lusitania sinking and the exchange of a number of "Notes" between the United States and Germany on the U-boat warfare, an acceptable basis of concessions by Germany and acquiescence by America had finally been reached by the summer of 1916. From this time on Germany looked forward anxiously to the **reciprocal steps** expected to be taken by President Wilson in respect to the English blockade of her coast. Under the terriffic stress of the war and the belief by many of her ablest leaders **that the U-boat weapon was her only way to a quick and sure victory,** Germany's patience had already been sorely tried by President Wilson's dilatorious course in the "note" exchanges and by his general studied "doctrinariness" and evasiveness in a question entirely practical and requiring quick

action. (We must, perforce, put ourselves in the place of Germany to be able to understand her attitude and action.) When, therefore, after the above juncture had been reached, no better progress was made by America in putting pressure upon England, Germany became not only exasperated but **greatly alarmed by the military setback** which the practical stoppage **of the U-boat warfare had entailed upon her.** It began to look to her now that the whole of the dilatorious proceedings by the President were merely a play to gain time for the allies and to curtail the submarine damages she might have been able to inflict upon England. This explains the renewed pressure upon the German government by the U-boat partisans and many sections of the people for the resumption of the U-boat war—in June, 1916, and thenceforth. Reference to this is made in Count Bernstorff's book on the war "My Three Years in America." He advised his government that such resumption **would mean war with this country,** and worked strenuously for peace; but his attitude and opinion plainly show that he failed to realize the pressing military necessity of Germany and allowed himself to be influenced too much by that mysterious advisor to the President, Colonel House.

As time advanced and no action came from America, Germany lost all hope and confidence and finally, in the beginning of December, launched her first peace move, of her own initiative, and addressed directly to the war powers. This move failed completely of any sympathetic response. Germany's independent peace action had stung the President's ego-centric nature to the quick as he saw its threat to defeat his great ambition of acting as "the savior of the world" in a "peace without victory"! Thereupon he launched his tardy peace move, of December 18th to 22nd, addressed to the neutrals to "discuss disarmament and the freedom of the seas, and finding bases for peace between the belligerents." We need not be astonished, from the frame of mind into which the German government and people had drifted through the depressing course of events from September to the end of the year 1916, that this late peace move of our President found no confidence in that country and that Foreign Secretary Zimmermann could cable to Von Bernstoff, on January 7, 1917, that "American intervention for definite peace negotiations is entirely undesirable to us owing to public opinion here." On January 9th, the Entente's crushing rejection of President Wilson's peace move was published, together with their own irreconcilable terms to Germany **which plainly proclaimed war to the finish!** The increasing effect of the British blockade had, meantime, made the resumption of aggressive and "unrestricted" submarine war against England absolutely necessary to Germany, now that hope of peace by any move was gone. This resumption was decided upon on January 10, 1917, after

the receipt of the Entente's answer to the President's note, but for obvious reasons it was only published on January 29th, and set in action on February 1st.

B. THE AMERICAN ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA. THE GERMAN ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA. OUR DISINTERESTED MOTIVES. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON AMERICA

The hostile developments and exasperated state of feeling just related were followed immediately by a virulent campaign of American propaganda against Germany, German residents in this country and German-born citizens, which exceeded anything previously done in this direction by the British propaganda. In order to inflame the public mind to the utmost and win the people's full support for the war, three American themes of attack were marshalled to the front by the administration leaders of this propaganda, in addition to the British propaganda's European stock of themes. They were, **first,** the assertion that it was Germany who **wanted and forced** war with the United States; **second,** the so-called German propaganda of disaffection and terrorism in this country; **third,** the alleged German plans of "world conquest" as applied to America. These charges must be examined in detail to show that our violence of feeling and apprehension were without foundation of facts of sufficient importance to warrant the rabid enmity we had assumed. Regarding the first charge, it is almost too silly to be seriously discussed but for the fact **that in the existing state of public prejudice there were many here ready to believe anything said against Germany** without further question or reasoning! But why should Germany have wanted war with the United States? Her every interest commanded her to remain at peace with this country, the great source of supply of food and other materials necessary in war and of which she still was receiving at least a small share via the northern neutrals; the country where she might float war loans; where millions of Germans were living

and many millions more of German descendants whose natural sympathies with "the fatherland" in its hour of distress would be a welcome moral and financial support; the country in which German business interests directly and indirectly reached into the thousands of millions of dollars and the protection of which demanded a condition of peace. To reverse the question: "How, in what direct and indirect way could Germany have profited by a war with the United States"? The question is unanswerable except for those who firmly believed in the "world conquest" scare. There were no pending diplomatic matters of irritation or dispute between this country and Germany when the war broke out in 1914; the relations were normal and peaceful.

As to those which arose during the war up to the time of our entry, Germany had, at all times, scouted the idea of war with America as something **quite impossible;** she may have been flippant in regard to the dangers of our attitude, believing that the distance across the ocean, the lack of our military preparedness, the traditional policy of this country not to be drawn into European quarrels, the long and cordial friendship existing between the two peoples **would make all subjects of irritation, which might be unavoidably produced by her war of self-defense against numerous enemies, amenable to diplomatic adjustment without doubt.** The German "notes" in connection with the various incidents with American vessels, which had started the "acute" friction in this country—even to the Lusitania sinking—claimed (and proved in most instances) that **her dire war necessity alone** had occasioned these violations. Some of them had been mere unavoidable accidents. In each case she expressed her sincere regret and declared herself ready to make liberal adjustment for damage and loss of life. **Many more such "incidents" had occurred with the vessels of other neutrals**—Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, etc.—without having produced more than temporary irritation. As stated before, these countries were disposed to recognize the stern necessities of Germany's terrible situation and **to meet them in a spirit of true neutrality.** America, on the contrary, was unbending in her demand for unabridged rights for her citizen-passengers and, in some

cases, advanced unwarranted insinuations **that her vessels were being singled out specially** by Germany for attack by her U-boats.

The second theme of attack was the charge of "German propaganda" in America to spread disloyalty and terror through the country. Resting upon a minimum of facts and the policy **to stamp as "propaganda" every legitimate act and inquiry of self-protection on the part of the German government,** this subject was inflated to enormous proportions to hide from view the multifarious workings of the American and British propagandas of deceiving the public on the real issues of the war. The people were to be whipped into a state of war fury by being filled with the idea of a Germany bent upon defying and humiliating us, of the Germans as a people base, cruel, irresponsible and undesirable for association with us. The tales of the German plotting, disloyalty and "frightfulness" were to be constantly droned into the people's ear to fire and sustain their idea **that we were disinterestedly fighting for a righteous and justified cause and for those high ideals which had been so adroitly put forward to cover up the morbid and materialistic motives of the American war party.** This German propaganda was charged with maintaining an elaborate system of espionage on American political and industrial doings, of attempting to bribe officials to divulge war secrets, of buying or controlling newspapers to influence public opinion in favor of the German view of the war, of maintaing a campaign by paid agents (like Dernburg) in the same interest, of plotting and executing terrorizing demonstrations of violence by blowing-up of munition factories, warehouses, vessels loading cargoes for the allies, public buildings and bridges.

We will concede without question that Germany maintained in this country (as every country does even in times of peace in foreign lands) **a secret information service** to report to her on the state of public opinion on pending political questions, on industrial and commercial activities of special significance, etc., and that these agencies were probably under the general direction of the embassy in Washington. When the "special situation" due to the outbreak of the European war arose, it became necessary for the German government,

in its desire to secure the full neutrality of this country, **to increase this information service and to employ it in all legitimate ways to influence American public opinion in favor of Germany's interpretation of the war.** There was nothing wrong about this; it was perfectly proper self-interest and self-defense; the same was done by every country in every other country, belligerent or neutral. This activity was, in fact, made imperative upon Germany because England had on the very **first day of the war cut the German transatlantic cables** and begun the censoring of all news items from Germany for transmission to America—and vice-versa. Thus America received all German news, and Germany all American news (excepting direct government cipher communications), **only as arranged and interpreted for each by the British propaganda for its war purposes.**

A little later, when American neutrality had assumed a very ambiguous character in favor of England and France, making it necessary for the German government to take official notice thereof, when munition factories on a large scale began to spring up all over this country to furnish war materials to the enemies of Germany, it was surely not anything **out of the way** that so-called "German spies" should be found prowling around these factories and around docks where ships were loading up with these supplies, in order to gather exact information about what was going on for their government. This "spying" was absolutely legitimate, we must admit, in a country pretendedly neutral. It took much German money to carry on this service, considering the extent of the United States; and, consequently, the German government had to send over **those large sums of money** of which so much was made in the investigation of these so-called spy activities. There was absolutely no "criminal espionage and conspiracy" in these German inquiries into what we were doing, as was daily being charged in the newspapers to keep the public mind a-boiling. This German propaganda work, naturally, became more extensive and determined after our declaration of war and, in consequence, the U. S. Secret Service charged with its investigation and the running-down of actual and threatened plots of violence, presently unearthed a perfect crop of

such "plots and conspiracies" of violence in all parts of the country. Some few of these proved to be genuine; the majority were revealed as spurious rumors. Every explosion in a manufacturing plant or on a ship, every unexplained outbreak of fire in such localities, every wreck of a freight train carrying munitions or food for the allies, every "strike" of munition-factory workers anywhere were promptly charged to the "German propaganda" without waiting for an investigation of the facts. Numbers of men were arrested all over the country and imprisoned, of whom only a few were convicted of any offense. Offices were raided and papers seized on the most trivial suspicions, newspapers suppressed, the secrecy of the U. S. mail invaded, and a general hubbub kept up to hold the public in a state of frenzy against everything German.

All this activity was out of proportion with the revelations of fact which followed. The majority of the "cases" were made up of gross exaggeration, absolute fabrications, false swearing and but a modicum of actual deeds or intentions of a "criminal" character. There was, undeniably, some hot-headed plotting; there were a number of cases of positive and serious crime; but these deeds were committed by super-patriotic individuals or small bands of German nationality and not traceable to the German government's agents here. It was but natural that in the heated atmosphere which prevailed at the time such "outbursts" should occur; observance of the law is but a step removed from crime when passions run high! In our own domestic disturbances of the peace by strikes in the mines, building trades, printing trade, on railroads, etc., **we have had bomb plots, incendiarism, assassination, open rifle battles between State police and troops and strikers.** On the whole we must admit today, under the calmer view now prevailing, that the total amount of proven criminal German propaganda, by private persons or government instigation, was in **ludicrous disproportion** to the public fear and sweeping charges made, to the flaming headlines in the newspapers, to the general attitude of enmity, abuse and insult dealt out to Germans and German-American citizens in every part of the country.

The third theme of the American propaganda against Germany was the charge of that country's alleged plans of "world conquest and dominion," as spread about from the beginning of the war by the British propaganda. We have before intimated that this is about **the most absurd** of all the charges made against Germany. Many books have been written—English, American, French, Italian—with wonderful maps attached, in which **this Cæsarian course of the terrible Germans** is described as completely as if it were a finished piece of history! The foundation of much of this charge is undoubtedly to be found in those sadly misinterpreted pan-German writings and demonstrations to which we have previously referred—a kind of super-patriotic university-professors' conquest of the world—on paper! Doubtless, also, the Berlin-Bagdad railroad scheme, the large increase of Germany's commercial fleet and navy, the acquisition of colonies, the rapid growth of her wealth and population were factors from which such a suspicion **might be evolved by those interested to do so.** But if there ever was a "bogyman" of the nations invented, here he surely was in the character of the "German conquest of the world"! In some inexplicable manner, Germany had evidently succeeded to thoroughly scare the whole world! But did not, perhaps, that famous English art of hypnotic suggestion have something to do with the spread of this artificial apprehension? In the book by a Mr. Wellman on the world war it is plainly stated "that the German rulers promised the German people the conquest of the world." Similar statements are made in the book by a Mr. Smith, entitled "What Germany Thinks"; many other books and many speakers indulged in these irresponsible assertions. This representation of Germany's policy **was not due to a sincere conviction; it was a false pretense only,** made in the interest of the general policy of the two propagandas of creating distrust of Germany's diplomacy and declared aims.

Why should Germany have wanted to harbor such designs; what did she actually do to give color to these charges? The plan to reach the Persian gulf for legitimate trade extensions; to try to acquire more colonies; to increase her shipping fleet in proportion with her rapidly expanding industries and com-

merce; to extend her intercourse and intellectual relations with all the world for mutual benefit **were steps far removed from designs of territorial aggression or political domination over other peoples.** Have not England, Holland, France, Spain done these same things; and why is that which is accepted in their case as "legitimate extension" turned into charges of usurpation and conquest when done by Germany? The charge is nothing more or less than a **malicious suggestion** under the spell of which England hoped to hide her plan of crushing Germany's political rise and trade competition and with which she attempted to fasten upon that country alone the guilt of provoking the great war! It has always seemed incomprehensible that this intelligent American people should have taken "this play of England" as seriously as they did, unless, in fact, **they shared in England's deeper motives!** But it is a fact gathered from the newspaper expressions of that time that the ordinary public in its imagination actually saw the Kaiser march up Broadway in New York at the head of his army!

This state of mind was at its height at the time of the arrival of the first German merchant submarine, and the wonderful escape of that boat, under command of her famous captain Koenig, from Chesapeake bay, with a dozen British and French warships at the three-mile limit line watching to take or sink her! But America has proven in many other ways—slavery and emancipation question; Cuban independence movement, woman suffrage, temperance movement ending in compulsory prohibition, in our Presidential-elections excesses of lies and slander—that we are a highly emotional and impressionable people, given to **sudden lurches all in one direction, with temporary loss of balanced judgment.** The directors of the American propaganda seized upon this German-conquest scare, these startling incidents and this national disposition as welcome fuel with which to feed the fires of patriotism and war enthusiasm. They represented the German propaganda as undermining the security of our democratic institutions by its preaching of monarchical doctrines and by exposing the weaknesses of our political system and methods. They accused the German government of fostering the existing

enmity of Mexico, Argentina and other South-American states against us; and when, soon after the severance of diplomatic relations, political correspondence between Germany and Mexico was intercepted which **indicated a tentative proposition for a defensive alliance with that country in case of war between the United States and Germany,** not only did feeling run in the highest key but the intrigue was represented as giving **direct proof of Germany's world-conquest plans.**

To these three themes of American propaganda were added the specifically British ones of Germany's exclusive war guilt, of the cruelties committed in Belgium and Serbia and of the devastation wrought in Belgium and France. To the latter two subjects we have devoted a special article because of the large place they occupy in the public mind of America to this day and **the strong obligation the author feels in the service of absolute justice** to remove as much as possible the accusing but largely exaggerated and erroneous impressions which they have created. These two subjects, which touched so deeply the springs of human sympathy in the heart of America—a heart ever responsive to suffering and misfortune —contributed almost more than any others—rightfully or wrongly—to fill the measure of American wrath against Germany!

THE combined effect of the two propagandas was to produce an abnormal mental and moral condition of the American public mind, approaching a state of acute hysteria. All classes were seized by the war spirit; all opposition was shouted down! A majestic wave of patriotism swept over the country, a readiness for unlimited sacrifice! It was an inspiring sight; but to the few who realized that this splendid enthusiasm was **founded on error,** that this ideal spirit of devotion of a generous and impulsive people to what was **honestly believed to be a great and righteous cause** was the result of excusable ignorance and of the heartless exploitation by an interested and unscrupulous war clique of these noble qualities of this people—**it was, on the contrary, a most depressing sight!** But the conflagration which had been started could no longer

be arrested. Like a hurricane **it overwhelmed the Germans and German-Americans in the country.** The violence to which it rose exceeded the bounds of all reason and decency and is scarcely comprehensible as we look back! Immediately the strictest police measures were inaugurated against German aliens, men and women. German-Americans (German-born American citizens) who were known or assumed to have strong German sympathies were closely watched. The slightest word made a man a suspect. **Thousands of loyal citizens, men and women, were arrested and "interned," torn away from their families and business interests on the flimsiest of charges. Societies of hysterical women were formed to ostracize German-Americans socially, to boycott them in business, to have the German professors in the universities dismissed, the German teachers in the public schools,** and others, who expressed German sympathies **expelled. The teaching of the German language in the public schools was prohibited, the reading of German newspapers in public—street cars, trains, restaurants, etc.— attacked as "disloyal," the sale of German-language papers interfered with and their publication denounced as an insult to Americans. Boycotts were instituted against German music, opera, art and artists!** In Washington the statue of Frederick the Great, presented by the Kaiser to the American people as a token of friendship, was pulled off its pedestal by an infuriated mob and thrown into some public cellar. Today, after the lapse of four years, it sounds like some story from the Spanish Inquisition! Is it possible for man to become more narrow and befuddled in his normal view and feelings by the reign of unreasoning war passion?

We will cite in detail just one case of persecution, that of **Dr. Karl Muck, director of the Boston Symphony Orchestra,** because of the gentleman's prominence. He was subjected to the humiliation of public odium, the indignities of arrest and imprisonment in Boston, and was **interned for nearly two years as a dangerous alien enemy!** He was torn out of his artistic career in a vulgar and violent manner. His alleged crime consisted in refusing to have his orchestra play the national anthem at the opening of his concerts. His principal reason was that he did not consider it correct musical taste and tradition to open concerts of the class he conducted with a piece of music of that description. (This objection is

probably incomprehensible to all but those of high musical training and feeling.) After a violent agitation in the papers, and pressure brought upon him by Col. Higginson (Prest. of the B. S. Co., and a noble American) in the interest of the orchestra organization, Dr. Muck consented to have the anthem played. But this came too late to soften the public attitude, and the persecution went its course! Was this man in any sense an active enemy of the United States? After the most diligent inquiry into his social relations and private correspondence **absolutely nothing incriminating** was found against him except the general fact that, as a born German and a German citizen—he being only an occasional professional visitor to this country—his war sympathies, naturally, were with his own country and that he held the German conception of the war. Could this man do otherwise, honorably? No American in like circumstances in a foreign country would do differently. There was no crime, no serious provocation even! He was just **one of the other thousands more who had to be thrown into the maw of the great man-eating moloch of American patriotic fury!** Probably his physical and mental buyoancy and career as a musician have been ruined by his terrible experiences.

Daily the most absurd statements and tirades appeared in print and speech about "the **seditious** sympathies of the German-Americans with their fatherland," taunts about their being only **"hyphenated Americans,"** about their questionable loyalty to this country. Yet it still remains to be shown that there is any wrong in a man clinging to his kindred race and to the place where his cradle stood, **even though he be a citizen of a new, adopted, country;** to be shown that the one sentiment is not compatible with the conviction and duty of the other! In times when men are in their right senses such feelings are taken as indicating a man of good character and healthy natural instincts. Can a man who is a man **ever forget his native country and language, the lyric masterpieces of his people, its songs, its history and deeds of glory, its sufferings, his own family's story of achievements?!** Do other races who immigrate to our country forget these things? Does a foreigner change his flesh and blood and "racial" traits by becoming an American citizen? Are not the Germans, next to the Irish, the most determined and permanent of our settlers, the most faithful of all to their new country? And is it unnatural **for any of these immigrant peoples** to feel a keen

interest in a war in which their homeland may be involved, and, perhaps, **to take sides with their countrymen** if they do not think them at fault? But the passions of war corrupt reason and feeling alike! The German-born men and women who only yesterday were our friends well met, our business associates, our faithful industrial helpers, our intelligent and devoted fellow-citizens, always found on the right side of every movement for political and social betterment, whose domestic felicity and sociable qualities made them a valuable asset in our national life **were suddenly transformed into unwelcome, disliked and distrusted strangers! Everything of sentiment, appreciation, justice was forgotten; everything that Germans had been and done for America—even the men "who went mit Sigel," Burnside and McClellan—forgotten the people who above all others had brought joviality, kindliness, humor, music and song into the stern and crude realities of American pioneer life!**

The degree of abuse meted out defies adequate description; it is a page of shame to bring a blush to American cheeks! Where England was malicious, destructive and unspeakably cruel, where France was savagely vengeful and hurled her unmeasured scorn and disdain at Germany **it remained for the United States to be coarsely insulting and vulgar in all her anti-German war manifestations!** We exposed therewith the superficiality of our culture to the view of the whole world! That lack of "decent respect for an adversary" which is so deplorable a feature of our politics and election campaigns was outdone a hundred-fold. Newspapers and magazines vied with each other in the boldness of their misrepresentations and the virulence of their abuse. The few who strove to maintain at least a semblance of reason in this pandemonium of hate, and to uphold the torch of American chivalry and fairness, were cried down as being "pro-German, unpatriotic, seditious!" Think again of those shameful newspaper headlines: **"The Huns! the Barbarians! the Outlaws! the Savages! the Murderers!; those insulting illustrations in the press and in war posters!; those rabid expressions of hate and contempt in public addresses, books, from the pulpit even!; those despicable books of manufactured "revelations" about German po-**

litical and social conditions or the personality of the Kaiser in the style of that venomous book by former Ambassador Gerard!; those scandalous plays like "The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin"!; the whole monstrous structure of lies, insults and hate makes an exhibition of abandoned passion the parallel of which has not been seen in the world before! No such revolting expression of war hate was shown in any country of Europe; the American pupil had far outdone their British and French masters! It was comparable to a tempest of the cosmic elements let loose over the land and which nothing could arrest till its fury was appeased by **a brute-force victory—right or wrong!** Blood! Blood! Blood! was wanted; this peaceable nation had become a ferocious monster thirsting for the life of a fellow-people—**one who had done America no intentional and ill-willed wrong such as might have justified the drawing of the sword!**

WE have previously expressed the conviction that 95 per cent of the American people were perfectly honest—though misguided—in their war motives and beliefs. Even in a republic the majority is **led by a minority ruling element** which shapes policy and imposes its will. What this element lacks in numbers, it more than makes up in power—ability and education, social position, international connections, wealth, financial influence, business interests and connections, material ambition to make money, to direct affairs, to acquire distinction! We have already indicated that there was a war clique, or party, **a minority directorate** of the above character in America which stood behind the general public, more or less hidden, and directed this country intentionally towards war. The motives which animated them were not in all respects the same ones which were advanced to the general public; some were of a kind **not to be publicly acknowledged** amidst the thunder of our high-flown program of fighting for liberty and universal justice. In a previous article the author drew attention to the envy and jealousy aroused in American visitors to Germany by the exemplary progressive institutions, the capability and honesty of administration of that country. These

achievements were felt to be **a reproach to our country, in which under free democratic government there were, by comparison, most glaring deficiencies.** Nor were we untouched by a sense of envy and resentment at Germany's growing commercial position in the world, at her keen competition with us, **at her magnificent shipping fleet and great transatlantic liners,** as fine as any in the world, second in size only to that of England and built completely in her own yards—at the powerful hold she had on Mexican, Argentinian, and other South-American trade while we went almost empty-handed! **These Germans had to be downed; they were too clever and too enterprising!** Did, perhaps, English and American business men "put their heads together" in those pleasant after-lunch confabs in the Pall Mall club houses and London city cafés? And was there not something very tangible behind this jealous feeling close at home? There was, unquestionably!

After the enactment of the Dingley Protective Tariff, the German manufacturers found themselves hard hit; importation into the United States of many of their products had been made almost impossible by the high duties. But there was a way open. They were in possession of many valuable patented processes and special machinery for such, against the products of which competition would be almost impossible **if they could manufacture these goods in the United States and thereby save paying those tariff duties.** The American public wanted these goods, without doubt. After investigating all the legal and material difficulties in the way of such a plan, they found that it could be carried out and made a success—and they went right to work to do it. Thus, during nearly twenty years before our entry into the European war, a considerable number of large German manufacturing concerns established branch factories in this country, under American incorporations, in such protected special-process lines. These establishments were backed up by effective selling agencies and banking resources. They did a large and profitable business, were capitalized at nearly a billion dollars, and cut a great swath into native American business in some lines. Naturally they engendered envy and stiff opposition.

When we declared war on Germany this jealous and of-

fended American business sense came to the front immediately and **found ways and means of making itself felt.** Here was a grand opportunity to get rid of a troublesome competition in business and get possession of a fine line of factories and a fleet of fine ships at one stroke! Accordingly, one of the first acts of the government to prove our "material disinterestedness" in the war was **to seize the entire fleet of German ships in the United States ports at the time,** amounting to a very large tonnage and comprising many of the finest and largest ships afloat, of a value of over two hundred million dollars. America thus acquired over night a fleet which twenty years of ship-building under unlimited subsidies could not have produced! The second practical war act of the same "disinterested" class was to establish the office of the **"Alien Property Custodian,"** whose duty it became to ferret out, investigate, seize, dissolve and acquire **for American owners and operation** the entire number of those German manufacturing and commercial branch establishments of which we have spoken, including all patents, royalty rights, machinery, equipment, stock and real estate. This second acquisition represented over 750 million dollars' worth of property. It eliminated the offensive competition, at least to the extent **that the money to be made out of these establishments in the future would be for Americans and not for Germans!** In these measures of "alien-enemy" control were, furthermore, included German shipping lines from American ports to South America and other parts of the world, financial institutions; life, accident and fire-insurance companies; metal-mining and development syndicates. These seizures were possible to be made with great assurance because the degree in which Germany might be able to "retaliate in kind" upon American establishments in Germany was trifling in comparison. What a spectacle of sordid, narrow-minded rivalry and jealousy the world presents! What a hollow mockery our high-pitched speeches! While with the mouth we talk "ideals," we draw the dagger of selfishness from our breast and strike our fellow-man helpless to the ground!

That business interests were the real motives behind these seizures was publicly admitted by A. Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian at the time, in a statement made

before the N. Y. City Bar Association on the evening of December 10, 1918. He also furnished the information that of chemical-dye patents some 4,500 were seized and the establishments which owned them organizd into a million-dollar American trust for their further exploitation for American benefit. The large hold which German firms had obtained over certain lines of the American metal trade and mining operations was similarly broken up by the seizure of the stock and properties and their organization into American controlling syndicates. At Paris, in the financial and economic commissions of the peace conference, similar "disinterested" ideas were at work in making it a part of the peace settlement **to cancel all the German pre-war contracts for raw materials from other countries, amounting to the sum of one billion dollars annually, the object being to throttle the revival of German manufacturing and trade after the war, and for years to come!** The shortsightedness of this policy of greed and vengeance has since been proven, to the detriment of all, in the present condition of Europe. With one hand we deprived the stricken peoples **of the means with which to work and live** and drove them into total helplessness, with the other we dole out to them pittances of assistance to keep them from actual annihilation—and **we take great credit for our show of generosity and human sympathy!** The open exultation of the American press at these "successful business reprisals" against Germany was general; its joy refused longer to be suppressed when it was believed that she had been **downed for good** and would be unable ever to retaliate for our acts in the future. This "superior efficiency" and "super-man business" was at last out of the way!

We must not neglect to speak of the ten or more billions of dollars of money loans—war credits—we made to our allies in Europe—who never really were our allies or, rather, to whom we never were properly "allied" for the full interests to be won out of the war—only for the obligations to be shouldered! All of these countries have accumulated enormous war debts; all of them, with the exception of England, are **practically bankrupt.** For many years to come their entire prospective surplus incomes are pre-empted to pay the in-

terest on their own war-loan issues; the principal will probably run on for a long period of years and may even be repudiated in some cases. **What are our chances of having the loans repaid?** There is an insidious insinuation being spread, in fact, that **we should cancel these loans** out of the fulness of our generosity. It is even hinted that—really—we owe this amount—or more—for an advance of money made by Louis XVI of France to the revolutionary government. The whole matter is a strange entanglement! First we sold to these war nations large supplies of food and war material; when orders came from them mounting into the hundreds of millions, we were obliged to lend them billions to enable them to continue their war expenditures at home and their purchases in this and other foreign countries; we were obliged to protect our manufacturers and merchants in these transactions **by paying them out of our own treasury** and charging the amounts off against the loans, so that, out of the fulness of our strict neutrality, **we furnished them with both arms and the money wherewith to get them.** When these allies were on the point of losing the war—**and would have surely lost it without our help**—we were compelled to go on in this endless-chain treadmill and lend them more billions, and go into debt ourselves for about twenty billions of dollars **to raise an army and go to war to save these our pseudo-allies from defeat and ruin.** Had we not done this, all our loans and investments would probably have been worth as little as any other scrap of paper. We do not mean to say that this was the only or the chief reason why we went to war with Germany, but that **our deep financial entanglement with Europe** doubtlessly was a powerful factor for war! The interesting question arises: Did investments and other material considerations on our part **precede** the idealistic views we advanced—or did these ideals **dictate them?** In other words, did investments and other cold facts dictate **pretended ideals,** and did these, later, furnish the grounds for more investments and even terrible war? From the chronological dates of events we can gather that we had sold our friends enormous bills of supplies and lent them over three billion dollars before any one had heard of "liberty and democracy" having been a leading factor in the origin of the Euro-

pean war. From these tantalizing propositions we may draw the deduction that the exact determination of **our true or pretended idealism** in our war actions, and of our disinterestedness of motives, will be a problem of nice balance between material and moral values for the future historians of the war to determine, when the lapse of time will have laid all the facts bare beyond the possibility of a doubt!

THE political measures which our entry into the war made necessary, and the effects which they will produce upon our future, are matters of the utmost importance. We have spoken of the objectionable steps taken to regulate and suppress alien enemies, German-American "sympathizers," agitators and native "pacifists," but these measures were, after all, more in the nature of political police regulations. Of much more sweeping nature and far-reaching consequence were the restrictions imposed upon the guaranteed personal liberties of the people—**the freedom of speech, of publication, of public assembly and open discussion of the war issues and actions.** Through these stringent measures any and every expression of opinion in criticism of our entry into the war and of the steps taken by the government in its prosecution, whether uttered in private conversation, public address or by publication were declared to be **treasonable and seditious practices,** subject to a heavy punishment. Sundry zealot organizations were formed, local and national, to spy out and accuse of disloyalty business men and political men who refused to subscribe to an unconditional endorsement of the war. The most notorious of these was the **National Security League** whose illegal activities of blackmail, financial election-pressure, etc., were exposed and denounced in the Congress. This submersion—perhaps permanent abrogation—of the liberties guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution to every citizen is the denial and violation of the most fundamental principle of popular government which affirms **that there shall be no arbitrary power reposing at any point in any department of the government, in peace or war, capable of depriving the people of these rights.** The declaration of the Constitution is emphatic and beyond qualification

that the citizens of this republic shall have the right of "free deliberation" and "expression of their opinion" in any situation whatever affecting the national welfare or their individual happiness.

By these measures of suppression the spirit of "freedom" of our institutions was ignored and the country forced **into submissive silence, into docile acquiescense to whatever steps the administration pro tem deemed proper to take.** It was the substitution of the imperial one-man principle for the democratic one of the popular will. These measures of repression were not confined to the people at large but were imposed upon the work of political clubs, associations of progressive citizens, **upon the U. S. Senate itself,** which, being opposed to the war administration on party-majority lines, **was practically ignored in the conduct of the war.** The President took no counsel with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in regard to the war policy to be pursued, and no consideration in the makeup of the numerous American peace commissions for the Paris Conference was given to the senators individually, of either party. The public press, being in the power of the war propaganda and censorship, completely lost its former position as the vehicle for the free expression of popular opinion except such as was in laudation of the war. In this way enlistment, conscription, war loans, high taxes, rise in the cost of living, disruption of business and income all went down the country's throat without resistance. **No such strangling of free opinion had been enacted in England or France, nor even in autocratic Germany or Russia.** The American people was completely "gagged"; it was, furthermore, "goaded" daily to greater war fury by the ranting calls: "Stand behind the President"; "follow the President"; the country, right or wrong! Can there be anything more presumptive? The moral law must ever be the highest guide for nations as well as individuals! The country was not only prevented but prohibited forming a calm, rational opinion about the events going on; those who attempted **to steer the way to reason** were arrested as "traitors" and sent to prison; the country's opinions were officially supplied to it from Washington in the ingenious and resounding text: "Liberty and Justice"; "Make the World

Safe for Democracy"; "Down with Militarism and the Kaiser"; etc. **But all the while liberty was being struck down at home!** To this degree had the American people allowed itself to be abashed, schoolmastered and commandeered!

Many of our foremost and patriotic men are deeply alarmed about the inevitable consequences of these arbitrary departures from correct constitutional practice. But another kind of error was committed, one not specifically a violation of any written rights of the Constitution but of an essential "implied right" of popular government—the right of the people to **be directly heard** in special cases—a right now embodied in many State Constitutions under the name of the **"Initiative and Referendum."** This error, or fault, was **the refusal of the government to submit the question of our declaring war on Germany to the judgment and direct decision of the people** after insistent demand for this had arisen in all parts of the country. If there is one thing which should favorably distinguish a republic from a monarchy **it is the right of the people to be directly heard** on questions of great weight, such as a declaration of war—in which they will be called upon to do the fighting and bring the sacrifices. It is precisely this autocratic power in the hands of a King or Kaiser and his immediate advisers—the right to declare war— that has brought on many a revolution. In our case, moreover, the European war had gathered in so short a space of time **that our representatives and senators cannot be said to have held "a mandate" from the people on the issue,** nor even the President himself. The situation at the time of the fall election of 1916, as to war, while dangerous was not yet acute and still in the stage of negotiations as to our expected "responsive action" on the U-boat warfare. The President had, in fact, been largely re-elected on the point of "having kept us out of war with Mexico" and as being a man committed to maintaing peace.

Therefore, when the situation had rapidly changed for the worse and war seemed imminent, there arose a loud call from all sections of the public that the question be submitted to a direct majority vote of the people. Apprehension was felt that the extra "war powers" which the President had already

obtained and which would be greatly augmented by actual war, together with his studied disregard of the Congress (Republican) and dictatorial attitude, which limited the proper functioning of that body as the representative of the people, **would create a situation of peril to the nation**—an unconstitutional extension of the executive power. Hence it was felt that **a free popular discussion of the war issues was the only way to bring the light of truth and reason upon the complicated problem, and a popular majority vote the only method of decision which would carry with it the authority of the whole people's right and might!** But the powers and interests behind the scenes, who wanted war and directed events, did not wish—did not dare—to submit the question to a popular discussion and vote; they knew very well **that they would be overwhelmingly defeated!** There was, without doubt, a growing feeling for war, a strong resentment against Germany, seemingly justified; yet, as we have argued at length, much of this was built up on misinformation and artificial pressure which, under a full discussion might have been dissipated and changed to calmer views and saner counsels! There might—probably would—have been **a reaction for remaining at peace with Germany and confining ourselves to a stricter neutrality observance and the resolution to keep to an equable position amidst the great storm!**

To summarize this topic, the following facts are apparent: The people of the United States, either directly or indirectly through their representatives in Congress, practically had no voice in the decision for war or in its measures; the Congress had been reduced through the President's authoritative methods, and its own lack of initiative and sense of responsibility, to the position of a complaisant "recording body"; the war was "wanted" and decided upon by a composite war party of American "jingoes," Anglophiles and Francophiles, political and humanitarian "sentimentalists," our military and naval cliques, American and international financiers, and last, but not least, by a covetous horde of "business interests" of every description which scented the great fortunes which might be made out of such a conflict. The war was directed and the country governed **by the President and his cabinet of appointed**

chiefs and by the various special administration boards, the directors of which were appointees of the President. The President thus practically was "the country"—much more so than the Kaiser ever was Germany or the Czar Russia! Thus the President's almost unlimited authority and personal power **can only be compared to that assumed by Emperor Napoleon the Great!** Special enactments were passed by the Congress to convey these powers upon him, not willingly, but because he demanded them and continued to demand them until the Congress acquiesced, the President claiming "war necessity" for his justification. By these concessions the divided constitutional duties of the legislative and executive departments were in many instances "rolled into one." Just where we stand exactly in regard to these matters or how they will be "unrolled" is not easy to say.

Another serious violation of the national Constitution and infringement of the people's "personal liberty" has been the enactment of **national prohibition,** under the guise of a war measure. It represents the imposition of the will of a fanatical but powerful minority upon a helpless majority, made impotent through the cupidity, or personal leanings in a matter of social habit, of the members of Congress and State legislatures. These remarks are made without any relation to the merits of the subject of "temperance" or "total abstinence." The legislative and popular-rights aspect of this question and the "social or moral aspect" thereof are two distinct matters but **not incapable of solution with full satisfaction to each** if the perversion of view caused by an attitude of selfish fanaticism and ignorance were eliminated. All we are concerned with, in this place, in connection with this act is its character of usurpation, intolerance, ruthless domination of a limited section of the people over the whole body, and with the plain infringement of the Constitution as understood by the people. This question, like that of peace or war, is one that the people should have the right **to decide for themselves by popular majority vote,** either by national or state referendum.

The great uncertainty in all these infringements and innovations is this: Where are we going?; where will we finish

up? To what extent are these matters chargeable to faults and derelictions of individuals—egotism, personal ambitions, perverted views, disturbing theories—and to what extent to fundamental defects in our political system? Has the democratic form of government revealed weaknesses through the war previously not suspected? Must we acknowledge that in times of great stress—war—when events crowd each other with lightning rapidity, when often great risk would attend the submitting of delicate matters of diplomacy to deliberative bodies, when quick decisions must be taken which leave no time for long debates with "ayes and noes," when the "large view" must prevail and quibbles over details are insufferable—**popular representative institutions without an independent executive head** (as the King in England or in any liberal monarchy) **break down and the one-man principle must step in and take the helm to secure efficiency?** This is what really happened in the late war; it has happened before in history. What a strange irony of fate has overtaken us! While claiming to be engaged in a holy crusade against monarchy and autocracy and for extending the blessings of popular democratic government to other peoples, we were compelled, in order to be able to carry out this policy, **to employ that very system and power of one-man concentrated government!** How strange, furthermore, that while we were in the midst of our exasperated denunciation of our German fellow-citizens' sentimental interest in their native land, our own President should arise and proclaim **the principle of "race nationality"**—the unconquerable tenacity of racial feeling and character—**as the corner-stone of a new era of peace in the world!** Thus does war make strange bed-fellows of man's so-called convictions, aspirations and inconsistencies!

The Madcap of War. One of the instances of the "temporary insanity" which possessed this country during the war was the prosecution and imprisonment of **Eugene V. Debs,** Socialist leader and Presidential candidate of his party, for **disloyalty** in opposing the selective draft for compulsory military service in the war. He held it to be unconstitutional or, rather, opposed to **the democratic principle of our form of**

government, as the question of peace or war had not been submitted to a vote by the people at large. There were millions of rational and well-informed men in the country who held the same opinion, not referring to men of German nationality or descent nor to the so-called "conscientious objectors" on moral or religious grounds. Nor did Mr. Debs' opinion have anything to do with his Socialistic convictions as such. But being a Socialist, a "radical" and agitator for reform, progress and improvement in all social and political matters, he was made a "war victim" and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, and is still in prison to-day. He is a man of remarkable intelligence, clearness of view, sincerity and honesty of character, and is of unquestioned American ancestry.

The Reign of Blind Hate. The author herewith desires to pay his compliments to those five distinguished ultra-rabid Anglophiles and Francophiles and haters of Germans, individually and collectively—William M. Evarts, Joseph H. Choate, Paul D. Cravath, Frederic R. Coudert and Martin W. Littleton—all distinguished lawyers and men of the highest intellectual and educational attributes. Mr. Choate had also been our Ambassador to England, and American chief delegate to the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. Mr. Evarts had been a U. S. Senator from New York, U. S. Attorney-General, U. S. Secretary of State, and counsel in national and international affairs. How men of such equipment and position for obtaining correct information can hold **the passionately and blindly biased opinions about Germany and the causes of the war,** as expressed by them on numerous occasions and in language devoid of all restraint, passes comprehension! Their utterances are on record in the files of the public press and magazines and are, doubtless familiar to most readers of this book. We cannot give the space to quote them here fully, but must utter our abhorrent protest. As to Mr. Evarts and Mr. Choate, the author refers particularly to the virulently abusive anti-German sentiments expressed by them as given in the communication to the New York Herald of October 31, 1920, by Mr. William V. Rowe, on the hopes of these two men for a "World Peace" plan through the agency of the Hague International Tribunal. Mr. Littleton capped his many impassioned anti-German war utterances by his scurrilous speech at the late "Rhine Horror" meeting in Madison Square Garden, New York.

But the above men are not singled out for arraignment for any personal reason but because of their professional occupation as practicing lawyers, from whose habits of thought a **more judicial, objective and logical treatment of the case of Germany** might have been expected! Other distinguished and

intellectual men of prominence—President Wilson, Charles E. Hughes, ex-President Taft, Elihu Root, Senator Lodge, President Butler of Columbia University, ex-Attorney-General Wickersham, Henry P. Davison, Red-Cross chairman and many more —uttered the same opinions in at least parallel terms of vehemence. Meanwhile thousands and thousands of Americans of equal intellectuality who differed from these views **felt themselves committed to silence** from patriotic motives. How can we explain this violently unbalanced state of mind in these extreme "American patriots" against a country and people which have never done America any harm? For, it must be understood **that these sentiments were avowed and nurtured in America for twenty years before the outbreak of the war,** while we were at peace with Germany and professed friendship for her and admiration for her achievements. We cannot but reiterate our previous statement of the silent building up of pro-British and pro-French—and anti-German—feeling by the British propaganda ever since about 1880, by which time the empire-consolidation of Germany had been accomplished and the policy of industrial and political expansion of that country had become plainly evident to England. In her far-seeing political view, England **felt the arising of a formidable rival** to her power and position within a measurable distance of time; and it behooved her not only to lay plans for combining with France and Russia in a concerted policy against Germany in every field where she might be encountered, but also to **win America to her support because of her physical resources.**

Hence the fostering of these international American marriages, this coddling of Americans in London and Paris society, this fulsome flattery and petting which was showered upon them. In every avenue of private, political and business intercourse the British and French object was to impress their point of view of "Germany's upstart rivalry," of her "crime against France in 1871," of her "dangerous militarism," of her "oppressive autocratic political system," etc., upon Americans who, in their innocence of European political affairs, believed whatever they were told. In this way a strong prejudice grew up in high American circles against Germany and was ready to assert itself openly when the war broke out. A sense was bred among Americans of position that by their kinship with England and their social and sympathetic relations with France they were to become members of a "triumvirate of superior nations"—England, France, America—which were destined to lead the world and which stood heads above Germany and the other continental peoples!

This is the amazing presumption and conceit which was nurtured in Americans and which is eloquently summed up

in the above-quoted Herald article giving the political international views of Mr. Evarts and Mr. Choate. It pictures Germany as an intractable, recalcitrant political brute among the nations, the Germans as barbarians and huns, still in "a low animal state of civilization," efficient in many ways but yet "brutish" and incapable of understanding **the superior moral nature and principle** of the three elect nations—England, France, and America! The Germans and the other nations are "not in a class" with the three anointed of the Lord, cannot comprehend "their disinterested world views"; you "cannot make world peace with such a lot of unrefined, undeveloped brute nations." And more: "England, France and America understand each other"; they have the sense of "moral obligation" and could conclude a world peace treaty, but "Germany could never be brought into such a treaty" because "what does she care or know about morals or moral obligations **as we understand them?**" And more: "The German people are now (1889) back in the dark ages, in a class by themselves; they are a shocking menace to the good order of the world—**like any other beast in cultivated surroundings**—and cannot be trusted." Mr. Choate, who, at the Hague in 1907, was particularly incensed against Germany because she would not agree to the proposed arbitration and partial disarmament proposals, is reported, in this Herald article by Mr. Rowe, as having said: "Arbitration and peace do not fall in with her (Germany's) views at all. She is a tough one! We must shut her out." Also: "The Prussians are the world's barbarians, utterly **lacking in any understanding of or capacity for spiritual development!"**

The author submits that this is the summit of unreasoning, ignorant, hateful abuse and cannot be characterized! Such utterances can only be treated with contempt. They are quoted only as part of the author's argument. As we have pointed out before, the reason for Germany's opposition to the arbitration proposals of "these three moral nations," in 1907, was that Germany had ground **to distrust the motive in these proposals** in view of the envious stand of England, France and Russia against her in the Morocco question, in African colonization plans and in the Asia-Minor development and transportation schemes. In her geographical position, agreement would have made her helpless against a sudden combination of these three powers against her—which she had every reason to fear at no very distant day! If we grant that modern Germany (since 1871) compared with England and France, was a young and upstart nation and that the encroachments threatened through Germany's policy were, in a sense, invasions upon the privileged domains claimed by the older nations, **this in itself does not constitute a charge against Germany.** Her enhanced

position and growing necessities clearly entitled her to the right of instituting her policy of material expansion, and the opposition to it was dictated not because "there was not enough to go around" but by jealousy against a newcomer and mean greed by England and France to have all the world advantages to themselves (leaving special political motives out of the consideration). **Germany's attitude in the prosecution of her policies was always conciliatory and accommodating, with the object of preserving the peace of the world.**

At all events, we can say quite positively that the growth of American sentiment against Germany before the war **was not due to any specific hostile act or intention on her part aimed against this country,** so that, beyond a certain feeling of political and business jealousy (as pointed out in the article on Germany) **there remains only the influence exerted by the British and French social and political propagandas operating since 1880, to account for this general enmity and acute race prejudice.** To this influence must be added a certain superficiality in American political and general education which, unfortunately, **stops short of thorough study and investigation** and makes us deficient in the valuable habit of ethical analysis of opinion and conduct.

XII. THE INVASION OF BELGIUM AND THE ENEMY COUNTRIES

The Belgian Atrocities—The Devastation Charge

The so-called "invasions" of Russia, France, Serbia, Roumania and Italy by the German and Austrian armies were natural and legitimate operations of war. There having been in all these cases a regular declaration of war previous to these military moves, there can be no question of "invasion" about them in the correct meaning of that term, i.e., an "unexpected and unprovoked incursion" of an enemy force into another country for conquest or plunder. The right of a "declared" enemy to throw the fight into the other's country for the obvious advantages which this gives has never been questioned in military practice. We draw attention to this merely for the reason that, in consequence of **the systematic intent of the Entente allies to be unfair to Germany and Austria in everything they did in the war,** these entries of their armies into their enemies' countries were stigmatized to an uninformed

public as unwarranted acts and as **examples of their wanton methods of warfare.** This construction was especially applied to the case of France. But if Germany had not invaded France, the latter would have invaded Germany; in that case it would have been German towns, villages and cathedrals which would have suffered destruction (see the historical Articles) as it cannot be assumed that French shells would have been any more clever or sympathetic than German shells to evade churches, cathedral spires and similar high objects in the flight to their intended military targets beyond.

The invasion of Belgium by the German armies, however, appears on the surface at least **as a real, unprovoked and entirely unwarranted invasion of a neutral country,** of a neutrality guaranteed to be respected by all the joint signatory powers of the treaty of London, of 1832, by which Belgium was created a separate Kingdom after her successful revolution for independence from Holland. Prussia was a party to that covenant, and the late German empire unquestionably took over this obligation; in fact, no attempt to repudiate it has ever been made by Germany. This charge of the invasion of Belgium, against Germany, has been so assiduously exploited by the propagandas by the careful exclusion of all explanatory and extenuating facts that it will be difficult to change the prevailing opinion that Germany's act **was a deliberate violation of Belgian neutrality.** But there are qualifying circumstances in the case which it is no more than just to state in order to throw an impartial light upon every phase of this question. In the first place, it cannot be contended that Germany entered Belgium as a wilful enemy to make war upon her; there was no definite reason for such an action. Her sole object was to obtain through-passage into France; and she opened peaceable negotiations with Belgium to obtain this. She offered full pay for everything that would be requisitioned for the army in its passage, and for all damage that would unavoidably be done. But it is clear that Belgium's consent to this request would have been an **un-neutral act on her part towards France.** It can hardly be assumed that the German statesmen could take any other view of this matter, **provided they believed in Belgium's honest intention to remain**

strictly neutral in respect of the Entente allies; and in this case Germany's insistence can only be explained as a presumption that her power would overawe Belgium and compel her to yield—an act of forceful coercion! But—if Germany had reason to doubt the reliability of Belgium's neutrality in respect of the Entente powers, **the entire case obtains a different aspect!** Whichever may be the correct hypothesis, the unexpected happened—Belgium refused to yield and threatened to resist! When Germany was face-to-face with this dilemma she should have renounced her object and retired—**unless she had absolute proof of Belgium's unreliability.** There were other ways open for her to get into France, and she cannot plead the justification of that extreme physical necessity which in war supplants all rights, agreements and other considerations. And, while these delicate and dangerous negotiations for this desired through-passage were in progress, the Germans, **confident that Belgium would ultimately yield,** advanced steadily and crossed the border for a few miles in a few spots, and slight skirmishes occurred with the Belgian soldiery and civilians. **Suddenly a Niagara was reached:** As the Germans emerged in front of the outlying forts of Liege—only a few miles from the German frontier—they were met by a rain of shells and bullets. That ended all further negotiations.

But behind the surface course and meaning of these events, there was, without doubt, a deeper significance, as we have already hinted. Diplomacy is a very secret business, and many of its most intricate schemes are not put down on paper; they are in the form of verbal understandings the existence of which can only be surmised from circumstantial evidence. Quite apart from the exact value of the assertion that the Germans, on reaching Brussels, **found accusing documents in the government's archives pointing to secret agreements between Belgium and England** in favor and support of the latter in the case of a European war, we know that from the very time of her erection to an independent power **Belgium had been the advance agent and listening post on the continent for England's international politics.** An intimate friendship had existed for years between King Leopold and Queen Victoria. England

backed Belgium's conquest in the African Congo and shared the riches drawn from there with her. Similarly the affiliation of Belgium with France had been close through race relationship, language and historical traditions. In times of political troubles in France, Belgium had been the principal haven for her refugees and emigrants. Newspapers and books were issued from there which could not have been produced in France. It appears therefore not only reasonable but irresistible to draw the inference that Germany had excellent general reasons to assume and believe that Belgium would be on the side of the Triple Entente in the war—and against her; **that she would, inevitably, become their helpmate and—tool; and that her neutrality would become "a scrap of paper" in any case, the matter depending merely upon which of the great powers would be the first to succeed to lay her hand upon her!** A truly horrible revelation of the "inwardness" of European politics, but absolutely true!! Full proof that this was the position of Belgium—that she was destined to be a helpless victim in either case—may be disclosed before very long.

Viewed in this light, Germany's action obtains a different appearance. In entering Belgium to march through it into France, she may have seen the opportunity—without creating hostilities—**of keeping her enemies out,** of laying her hand quietly upon a nest of dangerous intrigue against her of which she may have had some proof, in short, of compelling Belgium to disclose her exact position. That the existence of such secret understandings between the Entente and Belgium should be strenuously denied by them was to be expected. For Germany it was absolutely necessary, from the military point of view, **to know Belgium's political position;** invasion of German territory from there by France or England, under a false pretended violation of neutrality by Belgium towards them, was a danger of greatest importance to Germany. Of Holland she felt reasonably sure; her own French border she could protect, having only an open enemy to face; **in Belgium there lay the danger of intrigue and surprise!** In such situations of perplexity—particularly in war—the strong man takes the bull by the horns to prevent him goring him!

THE charges of inhuman outrages against civilians in Belgium by the German soldiers and military authorities, and of wanton destruction of public and private property in Belgium and France were responsible more than anything else almost, after the war had well begun, for the intense feeling manifested against the Germans in this country. We cannot go into details of individual occurrences because even today reliable and unexaggerated accounts of these are impossible to obtain. To be able to appraise the whole matter at an equitable valuation, it is necessary, first, to acquire accurate conception **of what war really is in idea and practice,** and, second, to form a just appreciation of the psychological attitude of the Germans in regard to this war in general. War is a step of desperation—the final appeal to material force and challenge to mutual destruction! In that grim purpose of violence for violence is, unfortunately, associated every other excess and crime of war—destruction of property, theft, desecration, rape of women, outrage and killing of innocents and the helpless old alike. Not that these excesses are sanctioned by the army chiefs, officers and public opinion, but they are the unavoidable accompanying results of the brutal atmosphere of war. **It is an unleashing of all the instincts of vengeance and injury in the most morbid individual soldiers and officers, in the one savage purpose to defeat and ruin the enemy.** Inferentially, therefore, the more terrible war is made, the sooner it may end! This analysis applies with especial force to a war of unjust aggression which puts in danger the national existence of a people. There have been set up humanitarian agreements as to many details of warfare, institutions to ameliorate its horrors of suffering of every kind, also rules for the treatment of the non-combatant people of an enemy country and against the needless destruction of their private property; yet those of us **who believe it possible to make war, in a sense, "civilized," to prevent excesses of passion under all circumstances, to confine its operation and effects strictly to the military forces and to prohibit the employment of new means of destruction or exclusive forms of weapons are certain to be disappointed!** The development of modern war, in scope

and purpose, has made such views untenable. Looking back, even in the great Napoleon's time, war was confined to relatively small armies of professional soldiers, but since the advent of popular intelligence and interest in national political affairs—a result of the French revolution—and the introduction of compulsory military service, started by Prussia, the whole aspect of war has become changed.

Today, war is no longer merely a challenge of the "German army" to the French army," etc., as of old; the armies today are the people and the people are the armies, the challenge is **from one nation to another and its entire man-power and resources** for a desperate combat to annihilation of either—or both. Any means which contribute to that purpose are regarded as legitimate. Implements of appalling power have been created; every resource of science and ingenuity is enlisted to the end of killing, maiming, destroying! The stakes are so great, the methods so gigantic, the developments of action in the field so rapid and terrible that "incidental excesses," **important enough in the subjective view,** are ignored and swallowed up in the grand, overwhelming awful objective of the whole. In the late war there were the new terrors of the deadly machine gun, of poison gas, of artillery of increased caliber and amazing carrying power, of the "tank" monsters, the birdlike aero-planes and the wonderful "Zeppelin" airships, of the sinister submarine torpedo boats, of fixed and floating mines, of grand battleships of wonderful design and destructive equipment—all added to the improved weapons of former wars. In the midst of the employment, on both sides, of such colossal means of life-destruction or mutilation, and with millions of men to operate them, **how can there be left any niceties of consideration or application in isolated cases of individual provocation?** It is beyond the power of human nature to give!

Modern war is like a great cosmic visitation—tidal wave, tornado, conflagration, volcanic eruption—that stop for nothing in their path! In such elemental commotion **the psychological condition of "the human war machine"**—the individual soldier or officer—becomes a factor of great moment. In the

horrible scenes and situations of actual battle he is not any more a human being of normal feeling and thought but **an insensible, irresponsible mechanism** like the machine gun which he turns! His eye is dulled by the sight of blood, of frightful injuries and ghastly death; his ear to the cry of pain and the appeal for help; his whole sensibilities are blunted and drowned in the reign of wild excitement and confusion all about him: Thousands of dead lying on the ground with an accusing stare to heaven; the wounded in every stage of mutilation and suffering, scenes to turn a stone to tears—heads blown off, legs and arms torn out, jagged bones protruding through the bleeding flesh, breasts cut open and abdomens disemboweled, dismembered hands and feet strewn over the ground—all around the roar of a thousand cannon mouths belching forth shells and shrapnel and tens of thousands of machine guns rattling amidst the detonations of exploding bombs and shells, the whole a deafening, suffocating, bewildering turmoil that makes it impossible to speak a word of comfort or a sad adieu to the comrade falling at your side! Add to this the life of exposure in the open or in the trenches, the dangers of the dugouts, the living hell inside the "tanks," add hunger and thirst and superhuman physical exertions—and we may realize how impossible it is for the soldier to remain a human being of normal mind and feeling and rational judgment in the grasp of such a cataclysm!!

That men so placed and affected will, at times, commit excesses of unthinking rage and revenge under special provocations, of desperate protest against their hard lot, deeds at times inhuman and brutal is comprehensible; that officers even, whose higher intelligence and training should tend to fortify their characters, should lose their self-control and sense of responsibility and order or condone such acts of brutality is also comprehensible. Not even the high degree of discipline which has ever distinguished the German army and been its proudest record was able to guard entirely against such excesses. The charge, however, that the responsible German army command and its sub-officers **had instigated, countenanced or condoned a spirit of vengeful violence against Belgian and**

French civilians, to be given free vent irrespective of special provocation, must be dismissed as pure and unsupported slander! As to the charges of wanton devastation of Belgian and French cities, private estates, churches, factories, mines, etc., there was, with rare exceptions, no other motive than that of justified military action or military necessity. It is not to be denied here, that there were a number of cases of such depredation which cannot be excused. One matter which was assiduously worked up by the propagandas to evoke a great deal of acute sympathy and indignation in this country was the so-called "wholesale deportation of Belgian workmen" to work in German factories, etc. Information since released on this subject shows that this deportation was fully **warranted on moral and social grounds;** the men, and women as well, in their idleness, mental suffering from the war and half-starved condition **were falling into sloth and vice from which regular occupation alone was able to rescue them.** Such facts the British censorship never allowed to come to America; there was no limit to its capacity for spiteful calumny, either by commission or by omission.

To all the preceding explanatory and extenuating statements to weaken the charges under consideration we must add **the psychological factor,** the mental attitude of the German soldier and officer, of the whole army, of the whole German people towards the war, as repeatedly described, to enable us to comprehend **the point of view from which they regarded the enemy in France and Belgium, his country and cities, the non-combatant inhabitants, the very ground upon which the war was fought!!** They saw their fatherland suddenly arrested in its path of progress and challenged to a war of life and death, their enemy avowedly bent upon its destruction; they heard false and ignoble motives invented to charge upon themselves the guilt for the terrible war; they were outraged and insulted by false or exaggerated charges of inhumanity, while their own civilian non-combatant people at home **were being subjected to the greatest inhumanity perpetrated in the war**— slow but certain physical attrition, starvation and finally collapse through the working of the British blockade! What a

proposition—all this together—to put before a people of sixty-five millions, one of the leading nations of the world! Under such unbearable provocation—**unparalleled in all history**—could there be expected from the Germans a punctilious weighing of minor facts and considerations; could men and officers be expected to exercise strict self-control and impartial judgment in all situations in the face of the **exasperating provocations offered them by the enemy civilians and the town administrations,** amidst all the bewildering circumstances of the war that moved along from day to day with lightning rapidity? Under this perspective, were these occasional isolated outbreaks of cruel violence and revenge against the people of Belgium, France and England **for bringing this trial and injustice upon the German nation** anything so very remarkable and inexcusable? What were the few deaths caused by the Zeppelins in England and in Paris, those in the proven cases of "atrocities," the deaths by submarines, by the 70-mile cannon in Paris, by military executions **compared with the four-hundred thousand deaths of civilians in Germany by slow starvation and the physical breakdown of several millions of them by the operation of the British blockade**—a measure of silent but sure annihilation, and which was continued for six months after the signing of the armistice by these allies of pretended "humanitarianism"?

The preceding is **the broad view** to bring upon these much-exploited charges against Germany. There were, admittedly, many proven cases of violence and outrage and wanton destruction which served no military purpose or necessity. It could not have been otherwise with an army of from four to five million men. On the other hand it is undeniable that over the actual facts there was spread a network of **malicious and gross exaggeration as to the number and character of these cases,** as a part of the general program of defamation by the British propaganda, and particularly to inflame **the imagination of the American public.** It should be allowed that no war has ever been fought by any nation without many incidents of violence and brutality having occurred apart from the regular actions of war. Alas! human life, suffering, rights

are cheaply held among the torrent of passions which war lets loose and which **shame those boasts of "sentiments and sympathies" which we so loudly make in times of peace—and even in the midst of cruel war!** History only will be able to weigh this charge against Germany with accuracy! It will require the lapse of ten years more before the true facts and the proper perspective on these events will be obtained, but it may be confidently predicted now that the present judgment thereon will not be sustained!

XIII. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES

A. STRAIN UPON GERMANY. DEMOCRACY'S OPPORTUNITY. THE WILSON GOSPEL. MILITARY PUZZLES EXPLAINED. AMERICA TURNS THE TIDE TO VICTORY. THE AFTERMATH.

In our previous article on Germany we drew attention to the many measures of social amelioration for the benefit and security of the working classes which had been inaugurated by the German government. Although a semi-autocratic monarchy, Germany had really become **the most advanced socialistic State in the world,** not excepting any of the republics. To some extent, however, this socialist progress had the character of "patronizing class legislation"; it was not the result of the evolution of the State as a whole to political freedom, and not due to the full recognition of the rights of the individual on **principle.** The German worker was subject to "class limitations" beyond which it was difficult for him to reach and rise, and his political freedom and equality were restricted, especially in Prussia proper. A similar limitation prevailed in the sections of the people just above the working classes in the social scale. It is not easy for the American reader, reared in complete freedom of personal recognition and opportunity, to realize to how great an extent "class spirit, limitations, prerogatives, animosities" were still prevalent in the German empire in spite of the advanced institutions previously described. Similar conditions exist, in the other countries of Europe, even

in democratic England and republican France; they represent the **tenacious spirit of the past still active in the changing progressive present.** Yet Germany had, as much as France, been for many years back the fighting ground for progress towards the democratic ideal of freedom, for establishing the republican form of government. We have in previous articles spoken of these successive periods of republican attempts and subsequent reactions in France and Germany and other countries of Europe. With the advent of the German empire—in 1871—and its political and material success, these strivings of many sections of the people for greater political liberty became somewhat submerged in the general satisfaction with the new conditions, and were at least partially disarmed by the practical socialistic concessions of which we have spoken.

For, in Germany, as much as in France, the development of thought towards political democracy was paralleled by **a movement even deeper and more powerful**—because more directly personal—**this humanitarian movement of "socialism" as pertaining to increased individual rights and consideration in all the material matters of life affecting individual and collective wellbeing, satisfaction and security of physical existence.** The beginnings of this movement reach back to the writers who preceded the French Revolution, and were augmented, later, by the systems of practical application as evolved, step by step, by such men as Proudhon, Louis Blanc, Fourier, Lasalle, Engels and finally **Karl Marx,** with his famous book **"Das Kapital,"** the corner-stone of modern co-operative socialistic theory. Marx was followed by Bebel and other German, Russian, French and English social writers who modernized some of his theories about capital, labor and property. The ideas of this school of thought were spread among the German people under the empire (not without official opposition) by books, newspapers, societies, addresses, and reached all classes. The propaganda resulted in the formation of "the socialistic-political party"—of various groups of opinion—which finally grew to such numbers that it secured representation in the "Reichstag," the German national parliament. It was in a large measure through the agitation of this party that the socialistic enactments for the working classes were secured.

From the above explanation, therefore, the American reader will understand that socialism is, in a measure, a movement independent from that for political democracy. A man may be a staunch democrat—strong for representative popular government and personal rights and freedom—and yet opposed to even moderate socialistic views on property, co-operative working of industries, public ownership and working of public utilities, etc. This condition of opinion is illustrated by all the existing republics, none of which are distinctly or in equal degree socialistic, and most of which **have less of such legislation than Germany possessed under the empire.** In the United States, for instance, up to 1885, all socialistic propositions were denounced as being "paternal legislation" and politically objectionable. On the other hand, however, all socialists are, in the nature of things, democrats and in favor of representative government; but with them the socialistic side usually dominates the political side; if their aim is a republic it is **the socialistic republic,** and the precise ideas as to such a republic may differ as widely as do their socialistic leanings. This accounts for the fact that in the new German-republic Reichstag of today (since the revolution) there are three **democratic-socialistic groups** (with minor divisions) and several democratic anti-socialistic groups, all of which together make up the "republican-majority party" opposed by the conservative monarchical minority party. Quite similar was the character of the various groups of "socialists" and "liberals" in the old imperial Reichstag, except that **the spell of the empire** lay upon the former almost as much as upon the latter and the conservatives, and confined their activities to the framing of additional enactments for the social betterment of the dependent working classes of all degrees. While all was well and went well, and sentiments of appreciation of the Imperial government's attitude and efforts for the welfare of the country as a whole pervaded all classes of society and all political parties (excepting the very extreme wing of the socialistic "radicals") **plans for attempting more radical reforms affecting the fundamental political constitution of Germany and carrying these democratic and socialistic aspirations to their logical conclusion** had to be deferred to a later and more opportune day—a day that has now come.

The government ruled with a strong hand and had a working majority of conservatives and allied groups **of monarchical convictions;** yet the combined vote of the democratic liberals and socialists of the 1914 Reichstag represented a formidable opposition. The propaganda of the socialists was by no means confined to the lower working people but had entered the middle classes of society, the army, the navy and the civil service. Only the deeply religious sections and the agricultural population had not become much affected by it. In the cities, factories and among the industrial workers generally, socialism was strongly prevalent. This situation ran strangely parallel with that in the larger political life of the nation: While all seemed secure externally, on the surface, yet there was the ever-present, ever-growing threat of war; while all seemed serene internally, yet there was the ever-present spread of social discontent and socialistic and democratic-political agitation.

The preceding recital, or sketch, may seem uninteresting and irrelevant to some readers, but the author must ask for their kind attention as this sketch is of vital consequences to the development of the main argument of this article, to wit: That Germany was defeated more by her internal political schism and its harassing effect upon the government leaders, the military chiefs and the fighting forces than by her external enemies! When the war broke out, the first, the only apprehension felt by the ruling classes of Germany and the government was in regard to the attitude which these very political parties —the democratic liberals and socialists—would take in regard to the war. The Kaiser and his "cabinet" held the prerogative right to declare war, but the financial measures necessary to carry on a war required, under the German constitution, to be approved by the Reichstag; the latter, by refusing to vote the budget had it in its power to frustrate the war and defeat the government policy. But no such show of unpatriotic vacillation occurred at the opening of the war, in spite of socialistic and democratic rumblings. When the moment came for the Reichstag to sustain the government, after the declarations of war had been made, and to vote the needed supplies and extraordinary powers asked, **patriotism won the day easily** over

the separate and specific interests of these parties, and they rallied to the support of Kaiser, government and fatherland with splendid unity and enthusiasm! This spirit would, no doubt, have continued, had the war brought an early victory; but under the long-continued strain which ensued and the vision of ultimate defeat it was gradually swept aside.

After a brilliant opening by Germany, followed by the check at the Marne, the war proceeded on its exhausting course without decisive results despite the remarkable deeds of German arms. Russia had been defeated and Poland and the eastern provinces occupied, November, 1916; England had been forced to retire from the Dardanelles campaign by the splendid defense made by the Turks under German leadership; Roumania had been punished, conquered and overrun, December, 1916; Serbia was prostrate, September, 1915, and in the possession of Austria, her army and government driven out. Bulgaria and Turkey were holding well in Macedonia, Mesopotamia and Palestine; the submarines were sweeping the seas; France had been checked and held steadily after the first repulse of Germany at the Marne and varying successes on both sides in the different positions between the Moselle and the Somme; England, in the northern war sector, had been repulsed and driven west after her two successful advances towards Bapaume; Belgium was completely in the power of Germany except for a small area in the neighborhood of Nieuport. Yet, there was neither a real victory for Germany nor a real defeat for the enemy; the latter was hard-pressed but stubborn and defiant; in military achievement the central allies were easily in the lead **but in power of further and long-continued resistance** the Entente allies held the advantage. Meantime the strain upon Germany had been terrific; the losses in casualties were colossal; the cost of the war had mounted into many billions of marks; under the relentless pressure of the blockade, the extra hardship of two meagre harvests and but scant relief from the stocks of food captured in Russia and Roumania **the shoe was beginning to pinch.** The civil population was not only living on starvation rations but suffering the most intense mental distress. Stocks of metals, leather, rubber, nitrate and other materials needed for war were running low. It was the beginning of

being ground to pieces between the upper and nether millstone if a quick military decision could not be brought about or an acceptable peace obtained by negotiation.

Germany and Austria, individually, had made several overtures for peace, but without success. President Wilson, also, tardily made a move for peace. All this has been related. The effort of the Pope of Rome had found no response, either. It was quite plain: **The allies did not want peace;** it was not a question, so much, of the bases of negotiation which Germany had offered as of the growing conviction that they—the Entente allies—**had a strong chance to win in spite of their precarious military position**—win by endurance! This was the situation from the fall of 1917 to the spring of 1918, before the opening of the great German drive towards Amiens and Ypres from their positions on the St. Quentin-La Fere line. The allies understood correctly the coming economic exhaustion of Germany and Austria and the political tribulations which were brewing for the undoing of both. America's entry into the war had not yet begun to count **actively,** but the most gigantic preparations were being made. Material and men were arriving; depots and camps had been constructed, training was in progress; there could now be no further doubt that the magnificent promise made was being carried out. **Why make peace when the sun of victory was about to rise?** Germany was in a trap from which, though still strong, she had but small chance to escape, with this new, unlimited, help from America added to the allies' strength and all the other influences for her defeat.

THESE increasing difficulties began to overwhelm Germany, but not militarily at first, but politically and morally. The people began to lose heart; they were tired of the war! Malnutrition was sapping their moral stamina; hope for relief of their physical suffering was waning; confidence in the ability of the government to win the war was tottering; the belief in the "invincibility" of the German army and the unquestioning devotion of the people and soldiers "for god and king" was breaking up. This popular frame of mind found political expression

and sent increased democratic and socialistic representation to the Reichstag; under the constant urging of these leaders it demanded the reform of the Prussian electoral system to a more extended and "undirected" declaration of the popular will through the introduction of **the secret ballot** and the re-apportionment of voting districts so as to produce increased popular representation; above all it demanded **the speedy conclusion of the war.** Thus the time had arrived when the combination of discontent and anxiety in the country, together with moral depression due to hunger, offered a great opportunity to the progressive parties to pluck **a political victory from the tree of perplexities with which the Imperial government was beset.** It appeared to them clearly necessary that an acknowledgement of the war situation be made, that the same be frankly and resolutely met by a policy working for peace, that pressure—of an extreme kind, if necessary—be brought upon the imperial government to follow this line of action.

In July, 1917, the famous Reichstag peace resolution of **"no indemnities and no annexations,"** as a basis of peace offers, had been adopted. Insistent demand was now made that effect be given to this resolution by more liberal peace terms to the allies; the immediate enactment of the Prussian electoral-reform bill was demanded as an implied condition of further war credits being voted by the Reichstag. The government, however, pursued a policy of indecision, of hesitation between one of peace and one of determined war resistance, alternately allowing itself to be swayed by each of these opposing political currents. The conservative parties in the Reichstag, the government, the military and navy were unfalteringly in favor of unbending resistance unless peace terms in proportion to Germany's position in the field, and in agreement with her conception of the war, could be obtained; **yet they lacked unity of view and effort and, above all, unity of determination against the onslaught of the social-democratic peace parties.** Thus the necessity to act was more and more put before the latter, both in their own interest as well as in that of the entire German nation. (See the explanatory notes—"The Chancellor Crisis and New Peace Moves.")

This progress of sentiment in Germany for peace and for a change to a democratic form of government was powerfully stimulated by **the Wilsonian propaganda,** the seductive American war calls of "liberty and justice to all the world" which the western breezes wafted across the ocean. The simple-minded German people, in their state of suffering and deep disappointment over the war situation, received these alluring sentiments with open hearts, as a word of hope and help. The many declarations of President Wilson had found entrance into Germany in various ways and had been eagerly read in wide circles; they came to their distracted ears like a new gospel: "Peace without victory, no peace with any autocratic Hohenzollern ruler! No war upon the German people! only upon their arbitrary government; peace with a duly authorized government representing the German people!" In these commanding words, added to those others of "liberty, democracy and justice for all" **there was contained the promise of a speedy, an honorable, a fair peace, an end to their misery, the promise of the political reorganization of the fatherland to a new future!** They took it all in real earnest—people and leaders alike; they little dreamt how cruelly, how shamefully they were to be deceived! **But the armistice terms** opened their eyes to the awful reality.

Towards the fall of 1917 the Imperial government, the conservatives and the military party were beginning to be overawed and harassed by these developments—the spectre of a revolution rose before their eyes. The various peace overtures to the Entente had brought no results; it was useless to go further upon that road in spite of the pressure, the threats of the political opposition and the popular clamor. It had become demonstrated beyond a question **that the allies were resolved to continue the conflict**—and the government now turned with renewed determination to military resistance. A victory in the field—or a defeat—was the only way to end the war and, equally, the only means of regaining public confidence at home. In pursuance of this new determination for aggression, the Germans and Austrians undertook early in November, 1917, the great advance movement against the Italians who had, so far, been victorious against Austria, had advanced into the

Trentino, captured Goritzia, in the east, and pushed forward to within fifteen miles of Trieste. The campaign of the combined Austro-German armies against the Italians was one of the most brilliant operations of the great war. The enemy was rapidly thrown back across the three main rivers in the province of Venice—the Tagliamento, Livenza and Piave—and dislodged from his Trentino Alpine heights, all within the time of about one month. Then, however, came a draw and standstill—**the first of the military puzzles.** The Teutonic allies had the Italian plains before them; the cities of Vicenza, Verona, Padua, Venice were seemingly at their mercy; the Italians were utterly routed and demoralized and had suffered heavy losses in killed, in prisoners and artillery captured by the enemy. **Why was this victory not pressed home?** From December, 1917, to June, 1918, there was, unexplained, next to total inactivity on this battle front. This great "drive" had cost the Teuton Allies heavily, no doubt; the winter season in the Tyrolean Alps was unfavorable for active operations. Yet, it was plain that the victory was not exploited; even a small additional army, operating from the south, would have dislodged the Italians in the passes and compelled them to seek a new stand in the Lombardian plains.

Again, in the spring of 1918, Germany prepared to launch her great offensive—from about the middle of March to the end of April—against the French and English in the advance from the St. Quentin-La Fere line. In a stupendous campaign, in three separate onslaughts, her armies swept everything before them, from Ypres to Montdidier, on a front of a hundred-and-fifty miles, and had arrived to within nine miles of the city of Amiens. The defense and retreat of the French and British had been skilful and tenacious, yet they were steadily driven back with heavy losses in men and cannon. The cost to the Germans had been even heavier; still it was a great victory for them and a wonderful military feat that stirred up afresh, for the moment, the moral courage of the nation and faith in the final outcome. The enemy was not only driven back but badly demoralized and thrown into consternation lest their military calculations should, after all, be defeated. Then, however, instead of a decisive blow and victory at one of the main

fronts by the German armies—there came another draw and stillstand—**the second of the military puzzles.** With the full advantage in their hands, and ample reinforcements available, within sight of the spires of Amiens cathedral and scarcely more than twenty-five miles away from Dunkirk in the North—**why was this victory not pressed home,** at least at one or two of the most important points? Instead, there was practical inactivity for many weeks. In this case, also, the exhaustion of the Germans, their losses and other difficulties do not seem to fully explain their failure.

Again—at the end of May—the Germans began an offensive of the most determined character between Rheims and Soissons. They stormed the Chemin-des Dames successfully and pushed across the Aisne and drove the French out of the Northern part of Chateau-Thierry. This was followed by a movement between Nôyon and Montdidier, extending as far south as Compiègne, by June 15th. The initial success had been rapid and decisive. Then came another halt and stillstand of a full month —**the third of the military puzzles.** In these later actions the German forces encountered stiff resistance by the French at Noyon and by the Americans at Belleau Wood, June 12th. The American effective help in France had now reached some 600,000 men, and they showed a fair degree of training, and unlimited courage. They had come in the very nick of time to rescue the French and British from their desperate situation. The German armies suffered proportionately greater casualites than those of the enemy in these campaigns; yet, there was no actual defeat of the Germans at any point, no rout or surrender. The entire series of negative campaigns, since the fall of 1917, cannot be explained on military grounds alone. **What was going on?**

A fourth great offensive was launched by the German command on July 15th, a forward movement southeast and southwest of Rheims in the Marne and St. Mihiel salients. They crossed the river with masses of artillery at several points and turned westward—to Paris perhaps. But now a new kind of stillstand and hesitation occurred—**they met a superior enemy and were checked!** The French and Americans had been organizing for weeks for determined resistance—and succeeded.

It turned out to be **the beginning of the German Armageddon!** Indeed, the most important effect of the German series of attacks had been to rouse the Entente powers to the utmost exertions, backed by America's promise and new British contingents and stimulated by the new unified command under General Foch. The check was the more remarkable as subsequent discoveries revealed that this campaign had been equipped with very large supplies for artillery and machine guns, distributed in reserve depots along the line and indicating that large bodies of troops were to follow the advance army. Why was this strong attack not properly supported, as planned, and allowed, instead, to be checked, driven back across the Marne, the Aisne, the Vesle, the Chemin-des-Dames and all the way to the Hindenburg line? What had happened to the German army?

For the full answer to these military puzzles we must turn to Berlin. The political battle raging there had assumed greater intensity and importance even than the military moves in France. It was the battle between the confident and aggressive social-democratic forces and the disconcerted and vacillating forces of the government. The elements of this struggle have been outlined above. The demand was for immediate peace, for stopping the war **at almost any price.** The call was loud for no more bloodshed; enough men had been sacrificed in battle; enough had died from starvation; enough public and private wealth had been wasted; the cup of the German people was full! There was no permanent "responsive elation" over the brilliant deeds of the armies in these campaigns, from the fall of 1917 to July 1918. The struggle in France was looked upon as a useless sacrifice of lives and treasure; the war was believed to be lost beyond retrieve; the people seemed to realize better than the government and military leaders that the combination of forces against them was insurmountable! To these general motives of the ascending popular parties for ending the war by a peace "without indemnities and annexations"—even by one of humiliation—must be added their selfish political motives, the political opportunity it brought to them: **The charging of the loss of the war upon the Kaiser and his government, and their consequent disgrace and overthrow; they did not want them to win a victory in the field because that**

would have rehabilitated them with the people. They had sufficiently demonstrated their incapacity to conduct the war to success in the diplomatic line, and almost equally so in the field and on the sea. The German people had brought the sacrifice of sacrifices in vain; the time had arrived for a new government to take charge—**a government of the people!**

For, had it been merely for obtaining an occasional enactment, by grace and concession, of socialistic measures for the benefit of the toiling masses that they had striven and battled these many years in the political arena? By no means! The object had been a wider and greater one. They were convinced not only **of the obsoleteness of form and idea of an autocratic monarchy but of the natural right of the German people to freer institutions;** they were convinced of their fitness for a republican form of government, **for a socialistic republic even.** And here was the opportunity spread before them—strangely enough—by the lamentable disaster of the war—an opportunity which they were justified to seize (from their political point of view) **to achieve in six months of a parliamentary revolution what, under the empire, might not have been achieved in sixty years!** Hence, even a mediocre military victory under the auspices of the Imperial government and its supporters was to be deprecated because of its political effect and the possibility of its leading to a passably favorable peace under their direction and prestige. Therefore, from the time that these bold views and conclusions had penetrated to the **clear consciousness of a political program**—from the summer of 1917—the Reichstag majority rose in loud and angry protest at every new military move, at every partial success in the field, at the U-boat warfare, and cried: "Halt!, halt!, peace!, peace! No more bloodshed; we cannot win!, and held up the military arm with the threatening spectre of revolution and the demand for the Kaiser's abdication. This was the conflict of the Kaiser, the government and the military party with the Reichstag majority and the people at large who stood behind it. It accounts for the many changes of policy, of Chancellors and Foreign secretaries, and of the several instances of puzzling hesitation in the field, as above recounted, at the very moment of successes which should have led to victory if pushed home with unity and

confidence! That this was not the attitude of the influential and wealthy social and business classes of Germany, of the aristocracy, the military and government circles need hardly be stated, but it was the majority attitude of the great masses of the people who were in political ascendency by and through their representatives in the Reichstag and ultimately carried the day.

The demoralizing effect upon the German troops in the field of this policy of alternate advance and hesitation, of this callous wasting of their lives and strength, may be easily imagined! Was the soldier no more than a block of wood to be thrust into the fire, pulled out of it and thrust back by the necessities or the caprice of political machinations? The influence of this feeling upon the men must have been more disastrous than a defeat by the enemy! It ruined their morale, sapped their courage, weakened their discipline, took the heart out of their fighting, after four years of battling and trench life. The troops which had been withdrawn from the Russian front and sent west and the new recruits from Germany brought no increase of moral fibre to the veterans of the western front. These soldiers were in touch with the political drama developing at home and knew of the disruption going on there; they felt that their efforts and sacrifices were useless, that any day might bring a political storm which would lead to an ignominious peace. **They, too, had heard the Wilson gospel,** and had been similarly affected like the people at home. No particular propaganda for democracy was necessary among them, and they were 60 per cent socialists before they had been called to the war. All this made them, from the summer of 1918 on, a different body of troops for a determined enemy to meet. **At this favorable conjunction the Americans entered the conflict!**

THE entry of the United States into the war, April 6th, 1917, had been received by Germany with sullen silence and outward indifference. She did not expect much practical effect to come from this decision. One reason for this opinion was the lack of military preparedness by America, and the other the great distance across the sea. That an army of a million or more of

ready fighting men could be raised, trained, equipped and transported across the ocean, with cannon, aeroplanes, and all other necessities **in time to become a real factor in the conflict** was not thought possible. Yet it was seen that the unbounded resources of America, which now would be put at the allies' call without reserve, would play an important part in the final result. It was a great surprise to the German commanders, therefore, when they finally realized that a magnificent fighting force, splendidly equipped and supplied, was coming in large numbers from America to help the French and British. And these husky Yankee boys—the pick of the prime manhood of a physically strong nation of a hundred million people—were, many of them, filled with the ideal and ambition **that they were to fight for freedom, justice and democracy, that they were to beat the Germans and to end the war.** When they struck the discouraged German troops in Belleau Wood, at Chateau Thierry and in the St. Mihiel salient, there was no giving way on their part! With all-defying recklessness and unshakable determination—in true football style—they threw themselves into the fight and by the impetus of their enthusiasm **turned the tide to victory!**

Their glorious example inspired the French and British with new courage and resolution to win. They too, like the Germans, had begun to feel the reducing effect of four years of terrible warfare. With the beginning made by the Americans and French in the Marne Salient, which was soon followed by a French and American offensive in the Amiens sector and by British movements north of Arras, **Marshal Foch,** the new Generalissimo of the allies, attacking and pushing at different positions of the battle lines—now here, now there—incessantly driving and tearing, **gave the surprised and dejected enemy no chance to draw his breath, to pull himself together, to concentrate for a determined stand.** The fighting, thenceforth, became one continuous push-back and retreat, one long-drawn rear-guard action, from Lorraine to the Belgian coast, with heavy losses to the German armies in men and guns. Line after line, army after army fell and retired before the unceasing hammering of the allied troops! The vaunted Hindenburg and Wotan lines of trench fortifications melted away before the withering fire of the British artillery, and the fleeing Ger-

mans crossed the border at various points to prevent capture. Political events had, meantime, moved apace and the armistice commission was in session during the last actions of the military struggle. **All was ended with the signing of the armistice on November 11th, 1918.**

While these disasters to the German arms were taking place in France and Belgium, England was defeating Turkey in Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, and the French and Serbians were driving the Bulgarians in front of Salonica to surrender, after which they quickly reconquered Serbia. In the middle of June, 1918, the Austrian forces began to move down from their Tyrolean mountain fastness and to drive the Italians westward across the Piave river. The latter, however, rallied quickly and **reversed the action,** pushing the Austrians back eastward and across the several rivers, exactly as they had come in the preceding November, and soon to final defeat. **All the allies of Germany were completely exhausted, and Germany herself was unable to render them any further assistance.** Armistice agreements, involving complete submission, were concluded with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey in the first days of November. These depressing events greatly hastened the German collapse in France and ended the war with the defeat of the Central powers on all fronts.

Whether the Entente powers could have won the war without the dash and inspiration of the Americans to fire them to new life is a question difficult to answer positively; they would probably have succeeded to do so in a somewhat longer space of time **provided that America's material aid had continued.** The greatest help, therefore, of America to the Allies was **the material help with money, food and war supplies.** Had this fallen out at any time, France and England and Italy must have succumbed unquestionably! With the full recognition of this fact, and adding thereto the brilliant direct military help and inspiration given by us, it must be conceded that **to America must be accorded the ultimate credit of having won the war!** What a stain it is for all time to come upon England's proud escutcheon to be compelled to admit that she could not beat her hated rival militarily, not even with the aid of France, Russia, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, Greece, Roumania, and of her

colonial troops from Canada, Australia, Africa and India! Of Japan and China and the South American republics we will not speak at all in this sense. She was compelled to resort to the ignominious blockade of the German coast, and even with that far-reaching aid was saved from utter defeat only by **America's timely and powerful arm!** This brings us to the startling conclusion that it is the **United States of America who, first, by her open unneutrality and, second, by her active entrance into the war has deprived Germany of the victory which belonged to her both by force of might and force of right.** No matter what our explanations and excuses may be, this verdict is an unalterable historical fact which cannot be without deplorable consequences **unless America will do the act of admission and redress called for in this book.**

HAD Germany suffered a real, a complete **military defeat?** This can scarcely be said; there was no surrender, no rout at any point. Considered only militarily, the end was more a sullen retreat under the conviction that they could not cope offensively with the overwhelming forces of their enemies along the entire battle front. Had this enemy been concentrated at one or two points, the Germans, also concentrated, might have risked a great battle, but with a long drawn-out line it was impossible for them to resist effectively against his superior forces. Their problem was to prevent an encircling movement and surrender, at any point, in great numbers and—for political reasons—**to save as much as possible of the army, while, in the meantime, armistice negotiations were being carried on with the object of definite peace.** The German generals accomplished this defensive slow retreat movement with admirable skill. The military movement to save the army, the political movement for a revolution and republican form of government and the movement for securing peace all went hand in hand.

The march of political events in Germany in the last few weeks of the war was startling and gigantic. Chancellor Hertling had resigned and Prince Max, of Baden, had taken his place, late in October, 1918. New peace overtures with Washington now followed, and President Wilson's "fourteen-points

program" was accepted by Germany as the basis for negotiations. While *pourparlers* were being carried on by America with the Entente Allies to obtain their agreement to the peace request by Germany, the revolutionary committee of the social-democratic forces—**now resolved to seize power**—imposed upon Prince Max not only the demand for the immediate conclusion of an armistice—on almost any terms—**but also for the addication of the Kaiser.** To exert additional pressure upon him on the armistice count, a report was secured from General Headquarters declaring **that the position of the armies was most precarious** and that an immediate armistice must be concluded to prevent a surrender disaster. This report, frequently demented at the time, has since been affirmed by General Ludendorff; it was made for reasons which are explained in Article XVI. As to the Kaiser's abdication, the imminence of a bloody revolution was held before the Prince-Chancellor in case of refusal.

But the sinister forces of open revolt, nurtured for so many months, no longer could be restrained, no matter how the Kaiser would act. The revolution actually broke out in Berlin on November ninth, accompanied by acts of great violence and intensely hostile demonstrations against the Kaiser and his government. Other leading cities followed suit. The insurrection of the naval forces at the port of Kiel had preceded the outbreaks in the cities, and similar demonstrations occurred at the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Stettin and others. The granting of an armistice to Germany had, meantime, been agreed to by the powers; commissioners were appointed and deliberations held, under the presidency of Marshall Foch. An agreement on the conditions was reached in about a week's negotiations and signed by the German representatives in spite of their strong protest **against the unprecedented harshness of the terms and the total disregard of the Wilson'an fourteen points** which were to be the basis of the peace. The Germans were helpless; under the political and military situation which prevailed, acceptance was imperative; they would have signed almost any terms! This armistice was one of the most important compacts ever concluded in history, as it ended, provisionally at least, the greatest war of history. **It was signed on the**

morning of November eleventh, 1918. By that day Germany was in the full grip of the revolution; bloodshed, destruction and terror were reigning in all parts of the country.

Under the joint pressure of these tragic events the Kaiser had abdicated his throne, November ninth, and seeing the futility of returning to Germany, (he was at military headquarters at Spa at the time) and the danger of his capture by the enemy, fled to Holland. Army and navy chiefs and government heads likewise scattered in all directions; the military caste, the nobility and the monarchical and conservative business classes sank into obscurity and inactive resignation to the cataclysm which had broken over Germany. Political and social chaos settled upon the country. What an incomprehensible transformation in four short years! From the heights of renown, power and adulation fallen to the depths of misery and contempt! Poor old Germany! bled to death on the battlefield, starved to death at home and now groaning in the throes of a revolution! Her people were called to the apotheosis of suffering and sacrifice for their country!

This unparalleled national disaster had been brought about, as we have shown, by three agencies: The weakened condition and moral depression of the troops in the field; the economic and moral pressure of the food blockade; the political pressure of the revolutionary parties who saw their opportunity for breaking the imperial government in the hour of defeat and establishing a republic amidst the existing resentment and consternation. **And it is quite certain that, but for the latter cause, Germany need not have fallen!** This conclusion bears a terrible complexion, carries a terrible accusation, but it is irresistible. The internal strife had broken up the moral coherence of the empire and the determination to resist to the last; the Wilsonian call to political freedom had borne terrible fruit in Germany at a time when the nation needed **internal unity to devolop its strength in adversity! . . But for this political and** moral disintegration there would have been a united parliamentary and military direction; the magnificent army and navy would have been confident and irresistible; successes would have come and been driven home. There were still nearly four million soldiers under arms at the breakup, and abundant equip-

ment; Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey could have been effectively supported and their collapse prevented. And, if, under all the conditions, a sweeping victory by Germany was scarcely possible, the final outcome of the war might have been such as to leave her at least partly victor and greater and stronger than before.

Under such an outcome the empire would have been politically regenerated and preserved. What a vision of magnificence this calls up! A great, powerful central-European state —firm, enlightened and liberal—to impress its authority, principles of order, system, honesty, efficiency and general spirit of progress, of wise and safe social-justice legislation **upon all the neighboring continental nations east of the Rhine to an orderly and rational development!** Instead we have chaos and disintegration in all these countries. Two splendid empires are broken up, ruined politically and economically, liberated to violence and anarchy by suffering, exasperation and remorse. The newly formed states are floundering helplessly in a fierce wrangle of factions, their political character a blank, their economic organization a zero, their whole future as independent "nations" as uncertain as a lottery! It is a grand achievement for the allies, with their professions of lofty purposes! And yet, it would not be just to ascribe all of this *debacle* to the political factors of the war and the exorbitant and impractical peace terms. A considerable measure of it attaches to the growth of extreme socialistic and disintegrating ethical ideas which, while resting upon sound premises, are, as yet, deficient in clarity of thought and firmness of system. While the old codes and moral guides are disregarded because unconvincing, no new satisfactory ones have been perfected for practical application. This important topic, so intimately connected with the war, will be discussed in the succeeding articles.

Before leaving the subject of Germany's spectacular political and military collapse, it may be well to focus once more the interrelation of the events of the last months of the war—so incomprehensible at the time and so unclear to many even today. We have explained the meaning of the unfruitful campaigns of the fall of 1917 and the spring and summer of 1918. At this time, seeing the coming of the political storm, it was, no doubt, the purpose of the Kaiser and his advisers to check-

mate the rising revolution by a military victory. They failed in this; but not so much because the armies failed but because they, the leaders, lacked the resolution to bring their military work to a successful finish and **to challenge therewith the political forces, which were opposed to these campaigns and a possible success in the field, to an issue.** For, it must be recognized that the object of the army leaders and the government party was not only to achieve a victory of arms to save Germany politically but, equally, to save the **monarchy!** That, however, was the exact opposite of the object of the revolutionary parties at Berlin. After timidly relinquishing their military plan of aggressive action from fear of the political consequences, the government leaders veered around once more to the "peace movement" method of attaining their object. In Austria the political and military situation was exactly parallel to that of Germany. From both governments, from late in August to middle of October, new "feelers" and suggestions for peace were now issued, addressed to America and Belgium. Germany declared herself willing to accept the "fourteen points" of President Wilson as the basis of the negotiations and to meet the President's dictum against the Kaiser and any government "not the expression of the will of the German people"; they indicated a liberal reform of the Imperial Constitution. This, together with the pronounced social-democratic majority just then returned to the Reichstag, the ending of the Hertling chancellorship and appointment of the liberal Prince Max in his stead, was hoped would be accepted by the President and the Entente as a government not only having the support of but being "of the people," and that an acceptable peace would be concluded with it **and the monarchy saved from destruction.**

Part of the plan of the defensive retreat on all fronts in France was to save the army for Germany—and particularly for the support of the monarchy. It was in pursuance of this general object that the strong representations were made by the High Army Command to Chancellor Prince Max of the supposedly "imminent peril of the armies"—foreshadowing a possible surrender to eclipse that of Sedan—and pressing him to bring about the armistice (in the interest of the monarchy) as speedily as possible. But the governmental plan was doomed.

Early in the first week of November—when the armistice negotiations were already assured—the startling information came to headquarters from Berlin **that the moves for a republic and the deposition of the Kaiser and imperial government could no longer be arrested.** At the same time sufficient had become known from the preliminary negotiations for the armistice to indicate what those terms would be and, also, that the revolutionary parties were prepared to accept almost any conditions in order to prevent interference with their planned political coup. Upon this the military and government party reversed their policy once more at the eleventh hour, and the generals called upon Germany and the army **to make a last determined effort in the field to wrest sufficient of a victory from the enemy to defeat the imposing of onerous terms of armistice and peace, to save the monarchy and stifle the revolution!**

But these efforts came to naught by the rapid march of events; the floodgates of Germany's destiny were wide open and nothing could retard the rush of the Niagara of destruction! While the army chiefs were issuing their call and making preparations for a last great stand, the armistice commission had begun its sessions. The insurrection at Kiel and other ports was already under way, and on November 9th the revolution actually broke out in Berlin. **That ended all for the Kaiser and his government.** He abdicated on the same day. Two days later the armistice was signed. The author holds that no other explanation than the above is possible of the strange and contradictory events of the closing months of the war. His views have since been fully confirmed by the publications quoted in Article XVI "After-Peace Conclusions."

The Chancellor Crisis, New Peace Moves and Reichstag Resolution of July 17, 1917. These events are of such importance in the German war story and so closely interrelated that a short detail sketch seems desirable for the better understanding of the great diplomatic year of the war—1917. After the failure of the German peace overture at the end of 1916, as related in the preceding text, and of President Wilson's procrastinated move of December, 1916, to January, 1917—followed by the new submarine campaign of February 1, 1917—there ensued a series of new essays for peace, beginning in April and extending into August. In this series of peace

essays must be included the German Reichstag peace resolution of July 17th because it was, in its essential character, a new **indirect** peace bid by Germany through the Reichstag and its inherent pressure upon the government. At the time these various peace overtures appeared as disconnected, separate and even "secret" moves and were only obscurely understood, but today we know that a connecting thread of agreement in aim ran through them all. The first of this series was the attempt made by Austria, early in April, 1917, to approach France **through Prince Sixtus of Bourbon Parma,** brother-in-law of Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. It was a very guarded venture, knowledge of which was confined to the emperor's most immediate circle, to President Poincaré of France and Premier Ribot and a confidential officer of the French war bureau. It is possible that Germany was in ignorance of this move in its inception. These negotiations soon came to a deadlock. (See below.)

The second overture directly from Austria was that conducted **through Count Revertera of Austria, and Count Armand of France,** an officer of the second bureau of the French war office. The first phase of this second approachment occurred early in June, but was soon discontinued, probably through pressure from Germany. It was resumed at the end of July, after the fall of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, and this time secured the sympathetic attention of France and also the approval of Prime Minister Lloyd George of England. The King of Spain was favorable to the move and offered to act as mediator, if required. It really looked, for a time, as if a favorable result might be achieved. The sincerity of Austria's desire for peace was not questioned and evidence was abundant of her growing internal political difficulties, her economic pinch and the stress of her association with Germany. In judging these "separate peace" moves of Austria it must not be forgotten that, while she was an ally of Germany under the Triple Alliances, she was still an independent political entity with conditions and problems of her own. On the part of France the general uncertainty of the war and the defection of Russia as an active ally, through the outbreak of the revolution against the Czar's government in March of the same year, made the moment opportune for a separate peace with Austria to relieve the general tension of the war and weaken the chief enemy, Germany, at the same time. Meanwhile, Germany had become fully informed about Austria's move; and when the final interviews between the intermediaries took place in Switzerland all these fine schemes—which had even contemplated **a fake Austrian defeat in the field** to give countenance to her separate peace efforts (towards Germany)—came to naught through Austria's definite refusal to surrender Trieste and a section of the Trentino to Italy, as part of the peace price, and through

Germany's positive assurances of being able to achieve a military victory in a short time.

While this **démarche** towards France was proceeding, Austria was also devising means to influence Germany. This step was in connection with a highly confidential report made by Count Czernin, Austrian Premier, to Emperor Charles, setting forth the exhausted condition of the country and the progress of political disaffection; and urging him to press upon Emperor William of Germany the advisability of a **free surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France** as the prime requisite to secure the peace which was so badly needed by both countries! It was an appeal to Emperor William against the policies of the German militarist and annexationist parties, whose objects Count Czernin felt to be the great obstacle to a "joint peace" and even to a separate peace for Austria. This important representation, made April 12th to 14th, was intended solely for the two emperors and the German chancellor; yet, this **secret report** came purposely into the possession of **Mathias Erzberger,** prominent member of the German Center or Clerical (Catholic) party in the Reichstag, through a **confidential intermediary representing Emperor Charles himself.** Of this secret "leak" Count Czernin was not advised at the time. The evident intention was for Herr Erzberger to use this report in Germany in the most effective manner in the interest of peace, guarding only the secret of its high origin. In fulfillment of this intention Herr Erzberger read the report to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Center party of the Reichstag, in a secret session held at Frankfurt during the Bethmann-Hollweg Chancellor crisis, and under injunctions of the strictest secrecy. The high and confidential character of the report, and its exact wording, were guarded for a long time, but **the essence of the communication** soon became known in the higher political circles in Germany and also in the Entente countries.

The effect of this revelation of Austria's condition and "frame of mind" was tremendous! In Germany it achieved its object; it powerfully influenced the passage of the "July peace resolution" of the Reichstag. To the Entente, however, **it was a stimulant for war and not for peace.** It was to them a revelation of major import; taken together with the Chancellor crisis and the fight for the Prussian electoral reforms bill, it disclosed to them "the Achilles heel" of the Central powers—internal political dissentions and growing physical exhaustion—at a time when they, the allies, were at a disadvantage militarily, were being closely pressed by the U-boats and were fast drifting into a disposition to make peace. These revelations put new courage into them—and this effect upon the Entente was immediately demonstrated by its defiant answer to the suggestions of the Reichstag peace resolution—its bid was disdainfully rejected. It need scarcely be pointed out that

these several peace efforts by Austria, more or less secret and "separate," were very irritating and depressing to the German government, especially the suggestion for the voluntary surrender of Alsace-Lorraine to France, which was indignantly rejected.

Even while all the above related peace manoeuvres were proceeding, the **Pope of Rome** was actively preparing his peace appeal to the powers, issued August 1, 1917, in the name of humanity, mercy, religion and sound reason. Its arguments were worded with force and lofty dignity of language and contained practical proposals for opening negotiations between the belligerents. Alas! it mostly fell on deaf ears, on minds filled only with war passions! Germany and Austria were the only countries which made prompt, polite and sympathetic reply to the Pope's entreaty. Of the Entente countries, President Wilson alone replied—at the end of a month of waiting—in a violent tirade against Germany "that this usurping power must give much more definite declarations than were contained in her answer to the Papal note" before overtures of peace could be considered. The other Entente powers merely made a short acknowledgment of the Pope's note and concurrence in Mr. Wilson's reply. The reaction of hope and defiance which resulted from the July Reichstag resolution, etc., was already at work! We may safely add that Mr. Erzberger's action in Germany, as related above, was largely inspired **by private knowledge of the Pope's proposed peace move** (in addition to the Emperor Charles' secret step) and the desire to make it successful and win the glory of this achievement for the Catholic party and church and for the Pope personally. He probably had no idea of the "contrary effect" upon the Entente which followed upon the damaging disclosures; he shared with his party and the majority social-democrats **the fatal illusion that it was the aggressive aims of the German government and the so-called military party which were the obstacles to all the peace proposals which had emanated from Germany and Austria and the Pope of Rome, instead of the determination of the Allies to fight the war to a victorious finish, to beat and humiliate Germany and attain all the sundry selfish objects for which they had set out.**

From all this it is apparent that the famous Reichstag resolution of July 17, 1917, was a fatal mistake. **It probably cost Germany the war!** It was preceded by, and was partly the cause of the von Bethmann-Hollweg Chancellor crisis. His fall was brought about by a coalition of parties against him from contrary motives, and accellerated by the opposition of the military leaders who suspected his willingness to accept "the resolution," and justly feared a weakening influence from this upon the spirit of the army. The Kaiser and conservative parties did all they could to hold him, being convinced of his ability, but the Chancellor himself was persistent to leave,

weary of the unreasoning opposition against him. The depths of political passions which had been stirred up in this complicated crisis may be gauged from the fact that the famous resolution **was prematurely published in the press as a "fait accompli" before its actual adoption.** The crisis had come at a moment when it was particularly necessary for Germany "to keep its nerves" in order to reap the benefits available from the favorable external situation: The U-boat war had begun to tell seriously upon England; the British and French offensives were being resisted successfully; the progress of the campaign in Poland against the Kerensky government of Russia was rapidly putting that country out of the war. **It behooved Germany and Austria now to hide their internal troubles, economic and political, and to deceive the enemy by a confident attitude.** Instead there came this resolution of self-abnegation —and all the attendant revelations—which disclosed to the enemy the real situation and steeled him to renewed resistance! And while the July crisis ended with the adoption of this resolution by a large majority and brought a new chancellor and the Kaiser's definite pledge for the Prussian electoral reform, **it proved a failure, internally also;** it did not achieve the political party harmony and firmness of purpose so badly needed, nor a smooth working between the new chancellor and the military chiefs. Chancellor Michaelis, who had, confessedly, accepted the results of the July crisis with "a reservation of his own," being a thoroughly honest man and at heart a "Conservative," soon felt the untenability of his position and resigned—and was compelled to resign for other reasons also—on October 7, 1917. He was followed by Count Hertling, former Bavarian Premier. His advent signaled the change from the German Constitutional to the "parliamentary" system of government.

The Entente's Persistence in War. That the Entente Powers were resolved to continue the struggle to victory is further attested by their haughty declination to participate in the "Conference of peace and disarmament" which the Russian Bolshevist government proposed to the war nations at the end of December, 1917, after their success in the November revolution. They had no interest in the lofty altruistic proposals issued by the Russian dreamers. Russia was now lost to the Entente as a war ally, but the nose ring and chain of the Russian bear were tightly fixed on the American people, with a tenfold compensation. The reigning harmony was sublime! The utterances of President Wilson for the necessary "democratization of Germany and against the Hohenzollern monarchy, as **the source of all evil,** were seconded by similar speeches by Prime Minister Lloyd George in December, 1917, and notably by his important speech of January 5, 1918, in answer to the above Russian peace conference proposal. This

speech, in its turn, was seconded and emphasized in all essentials by President Wilson's speech to the American Congress, a few days later, supplemented by the famous "fourteen points" of peace settlement which were given out as the final answer of the Entente, through its American spokesman, to all peace overtures which had preceded. It was these "fourteen points," together with many others, which were strangely lost when the Allies had won a military victory. In France the declaration of policy by Premier Clemenceau and President Poincaré ran in perfect unison with those of England and America. Thus one buoyed the other, and the result was a "confidence in victory" which was in reality not warranted by the situation in the field before the failure of the great German spring offensive of 1918.

B. THE ARMISTICE. ABDICATION OF KAISER WILHELM II. THE REACTION OF DESPAIR. A NEW GERMANY REVEALED. THE MODERN DRIFT. A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE NEEDED. THE GERMAN STATE.

As the author's concern is more with the ideas underlying the historical happenings than with the occurrences themselves, he will now endeavor to analyze the ideas and the spirit revealed by the armistice terms. We have already spoken of the humiliation, chagrin and poignant disappointment felt by the German people at these terms in view of what they had been led to expect from President Wilson's declarations. Were these the terms of "justice," of "a peace without victory" after a war "not waged against the German people"; were they the terms of a war fought "for political and social ideals" on the part of America? Were these terms of armistice fair to a valiant foe who was not even fully beaten on the battlefield but was compelled to give up the struggle because a political revolution had gripped his country and because the non-combatants at home were being starved to death by a cruel food blockade? No, the truth about the war was at last revealed! These were not terms to **a foe merely political,** but such as are imposed upon **a hated rival, a feared race, feared because of their great qualities,** to a people that is to be destroyed, annihilatd utterly!! These terms of armistice—the essence of the prospective peace terms—were not such as properly arise out

of a military victory or surrender, with its justifiable exultation and reasonable self-interest on the part of the victors, but were the consummation of a deep and detestable plot—Kaiser or no Kaiser, autocracy or republic—**to despoil another nation from motives of envy, jealousy, revenge, greed for territory and domination!** These terms of armistice left no further doubt as to the real objects of the war as far as England and America were concerned; there never were any as regards Russia, France, Italy, Greece and Roumania.

When the truth became known to the people of Germany the shock was cruel beyond description, stunning, paralyzing. It followed upon the tremendous nervous tension of that memorable week of intense excitement—from November 4th to November 11th—of those momentous rapid developments—revolution, formation of a provisional government, abdication of the Kaiser, armistice and end of the war. Then, at the end, came those outrageous terms to grip the heart of the people in awe. They had hoped for a peace of honor and possible recuperation; instead they were given this sentence of death! It seemed beyond the power of belief: "Was it really true or merely a nightmare?" And now the question arose with a terrible accusation: **"Why were such terms accepted?"** This question has continued to be asked with pressing insistence in Germany ever since, and gradually the answer is beginning to be understood. We have partly given it; while the military situation had made peace necessary (ostensibly, as we have explained, to prevent a disaster to the army and the invasion of the country), while peace was urgently required to save the imperial government and the monarchy, **it was even more indispensable to the working-out of the political transformation in Berlin.** The consummation of the revolution in government absolutely demanded peace and, above all, avoidance of invasion, because that would have precipitated an eruption of popular rage and violence of such magnitude that the orderly establishment of the republic might have been defeated thereby. Any armistice terms, therefore, short of absolute surrender of the country **were ordered to be accepted by the revolutionary executive committee** which had the fate of Germany in its hands! From the point of view of the new government to be, this was effective and justified policy—and

it achieved success. Had the armistice been rejected—with revolution spreading over the country and the Kaiser and his government dethroned—the dejected armies in the field would in all probability have been routed and driven to surrender, and Germany would have been invaded. Beyond that point all else that would then have happened is beyond the power of conjecture.

We are now enabled to see fully—in connection with the concluding paragraph of the preceding article—that the sinking Imperial Government as well as the rising republic both strenuously desired and worked for armistice **but from opposing motives** (in the purely political sense) and that it was in fact **a race between them** as to which would be the recognized power and government in Berlin at the consummation of the great event. The republic won the race; the Kaiser and his government were dethroned on November 9th, the armistice was signed by the republic on November 11th, 1918!

There are those who insist, with a cynical smile, that the rulers of Germany were in their inmost heart glad rather than otherwise to see the venturesome republic step in and take upon itself the odium and dangers of the acceptance of the armistice and, later, of the signing of the degrading peace of Versailles; to assume the difficult and thankless task of leading Germany out of the mire upon a new and clean road; that they, perhaps, hoped then to step in and take possession by the instigation of a strong monarchical reaction, assisted by the usual military *coup*. If this insinuation is correct, it would, nevertheless, be no more ignoble for honest and sincere monarchists or imperialists to strive for the restoration of the monarchy than it is for honest and sincere republicans to strive for the establishment of a republic. These political endeavors, provided they be not merely vehicles for personal ambitions, are matters of vital convictions, surely, but in regard to which **the absolutely right and best has not yet been fully determined by experience**—the verdict is still in the making. But in saying this, the author has in view, only the most advanced form of constitutional monarchy. It, therefore, remains for the uncertain future to determine whether the German republic will prove wise, strong, popular and successful enough to withstand the attacks of the monarchical reaction which will surely

be directed against it sooner or later. But we may dismiss without further thought the above insinuation that the Kaiser and monarchical parties would not have been willing to assume the making of the armistice and peace and the reconstruction of Germany **if this had seemed possible without causing a great civil strife that would have torn the country to shreds internally and delivered it into the complete dictation of the enemy.**

THE abdication and flight of Wilhelm II to Holland has been termed ignominious and the act of a coward. It is, certainly, difficult, from the popular-hero point of view, to condone his act and appreciate his self-restraint and self-sacrifice in the proper light and not with a sense of pity. But all information on the situation in Germany at the time showed the uselessness, the criminality of resistance to the popular trend. The forces which worked for the republic—the inroads of democratic and socialistic propaganda during decades, the sacrifices and suffering of the war, the lack of real ability in the war crisis on the part of the government, the final inglorious defeat, the Wilsonian message of freedom, the whole terrible situation of Germany at the brink of an abyss for which the government was held responsible—were too much to overcome! We should consider, also, that the Kaiser was informed about all the slanderous accusations which had been made about him by the British and American propagandas and even in his own Germany. It had produced its effect upon a sensitive man who had for years become used mostly to praise, who had at all times tried to do his duty and felt himself innocent of those heinous charges. The Kaiser undoubtedly had the moral right to save himself in order **to see himself and his government and people vindicated in time** and the ocean of abuse rolled back upon the foreign and native enemy after the subsidence of the storm.

Under this viewpoint it was both wise and patriotic for the Kaiser to efface himself from the political strife and avoid complicating the troubles of Germany by a challenge to a contest—involving invasion and civil war—but it may not have been very heroic in the popular view to thus retire in grief and without protest. Any one of the great heroes of old, and some

modern ones, including his eminent ancestor, Frederick the Great, would probably have acted differently. To die at the head of your army in defeat, to throw yourself upon your sword no doubt appeals to the imagination more than to choose self-sacrifice, to take your cross upon your shoulders and walk away with bowed head! But there has always seemed to the writer something selfish, bombastic and arbitrary about the heroes of history, a disposition (in most cases) not so much to sacrifice themselves as their armies, their people, their country, their friends for their own advantage and glory. **Wilhelm II chose renunciation and martyrdom for the love of his native country and people whose emperor he had been.** He failed to prove himself a truly great man and ruler in a great crisis; he made serious mistakes of judgment and showed fatal weakness at important situations in the war; he carries a heavy responsibility for Germany's **debacle,** but he was honest and devoted through it all, a man of high moral honor—**and no coward!** The whole world has sinned against this man, but America has surpassed every other country in venomous, insane, ignorant and most brutal abuse of him. This wrong will, no doubt, be seen by the American people in time; but volumes of retraction and decades of regret will not wipe out the reproach!

As to the Kaiser's attitude within the German tragedy, his earnest desire to preserve the peace at all times, before the war, and at its beginning and during its course, is indisputably established. And in regard to his future policy—in case of a German victory—we are assured by Karl Helfferich, ex-German vice-chancellor and a man of unquestioned probity, who had extended conversations with the Kaiser in November, 1914, when all indications pointed to an early German victory, that the Kaiser saw the happiest outcome to flow from the war in **the establishment of a strong practical continental union of countries** having the sole object of securing mutual development within peace by a rational removal of all points of friction. Especially towards France the Kaiser hoped to see all misunderstandings and distrust removed and sincere friendly relations established. This is the man who has been painted in America as a blood-thirsty tyrant, arbitrary autocrat, usurper, oppressor of his own and other peoples and bent upon unscru-

pulous world conquest. What a blessing it would be if **his victory and his program** were established facts today instead of the chaos of misery and doubt in which the world is floundering!

THE collapse of Germany leads to strange revelations and painful reflections. With all her great military machine of finest equipment and discipline and the splendid deeds of this army and its generals, success was, after all, not attained. Considering her dominating position in the field on all fronts, including Italy and Macedonia, in the spring of 1918, before the great offensive, the reversal which followed seems almost incomprehensible! We have pointed out the causes in part, as they operated towards such an ending. To those described must be added many diplomatic weaknesses and absolute blunders committed in all the various acute situations of the war, particularly with America and in connection with the peace overtures of the last two years of the war. The diplomatic side in a conflict of such ramifications almost surpasses in importance the military side. Clearly, there was **a lack of commanding ability in the diplomatic direction of Germany's course in the war.** The remarkable fact is revealed that this highly intellectual country, occupying the topmost position in human achievement in every field, did not, under all the prodding stress of war upon her, produce a single truly great man of superlative ability, of penetrating insight to direct with a clear and firm purpose the conduct of Germany's affairs. **No Bismarck arose as a statesman, no Moltke as a strategist; the Kaiser himself did not develop into the leader that had been expected of him!** There was ordinary ability of the highest quality, marvelous organizing and general executive talent shown—but no genius! But this—**real genius**—is what the situation required, demanded! Never before in the history of the world, not in Greece, not in Rome, not in France under the great Napoleon was there ever a country with but few allies engaged in a struggle of such magnitude and intensity, against such powerful and numerous adversaries of equal technical equipment and more abundant material resources. Such a situa-

tion demanded higher degrees of capacity, steadiness of purpose and diplomatic *finesse* of direction than Germany's leaders displayed.

But the people itself as a whole, as expressed in the Reichstag representation with its one-sided warring "parties" and innumerable "groups" and also in the public press showed similar deficiencies in character and political ability. Starvation had done its share to undermine the steadiness of opinion and purpose of the German people, but there was also something else at work. The thousands of individuals who were doubtless an exception to this criticism were lost in the millions and were unable to penetrate to the front! The fall of von Bethmann-Hollweg, under the pressure of surging internal politics was not only a serious blow to Germany's success but furnished an early proof, and at a most inopportune time, of the author's contention **that the restless ambition of the social-democratic parties, their lack of broad vision and self-control, lie at the bottom of Germany's defeat.** But—with more ability and courage—the government, after first making the Prussian electoral concessions, might have defied these disruptive political forces at their first determined stand and challenged them to the utmost—to revolution even in the midst of war—instead of placating them by promises of still more concessions. Not that their demands were not justified and long due; but domestic legislation of that class was **inopportune in the midst of war** and could have waited! What was needed was unity of front and burying of all factional strife. A strong hand would have re-established confidence at home and in the ranks of the army and navy, and the elation of ensuing military success would have swept all difficulties of Germany aside and brought a final satisfactory peace, with or without full victory.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg, while not a brilliant man, was the ablest and firmest of the chancellors; had he been allowed to continue to the end, Germany would probably not have ended with the suicide of November 11, 1918. His successor, von Michaelis, was a man of record as a bureaucrat, of proven ability and character, devotion and sterling honesty of convictions, but was in no sense a "diplomatist" and leader of thought in the foreign-affairs department of Germany, and his appointment

as chancellor has remained somewhat of a puzzle to this day. We have, in the preceding text, briefly indicated the reason for his early exit from power. **Chancellor Hertling,** his successor, was a man of the highest ability and of wide political experience in internal and external affairs, but perhaps too advanced in years and conservative in his sympathies to be able to fully estimate the strength and purpose of the social-democratic movement and check it in its gravitation towards revolution. He was very ably seconded by his Foreign Secretary, **von Kühlmann,** who directed the difficult work of the Brest-Litowsk peace treaty with Soviet Russia and the treaty with Roumania. In the end, however, he fell a victim to the growing friction with the military chiefs and to his statement in his Reichstag speech of June 24, 1918, "that victory by Germany was no longer possible by the military forces of the government alone," that it would largely have to be "a victory of negotiation." Von Hertling soon followed him in retirement, unable to stem the increasing pressure for exclusive power by the social-democratic majority party.

Prince Max, of Baden, was likewise a man of ability and highest culture, and much more sympathetic to the progressive tendencies of the day than Count Hertling, but lacked initiative and daring in circumstances which precisely demanded these qualities. Instead of acting promptly and **secretly** upon his alleged plan—of early November, 1918—to go to headquarters and discuss the dangerous situation directly with the Kaiser and the military chiefs to ascertain with certainty the position of the armies and their chances to win or, at least, to hold out till the political storm had been firmly taken in hand, **and thereupon formulating a definite and concerted plan of action,** he allowed himself to be kept in Berlin, and proceeded to discuss his plans with Representative Ebert and his party associates—**the very men who at that very hour were plotting the fall of the government.** On the evening of the same day of his intended departure for Francø, he was tendered the ultimatum from these same men demanding the immediate abdication of the Kaiser and retirement of the Imperial government!

The history of these successive chancellorships shows the insufficiency of these men to firmly direct the German ship of State

in these turbulent currents of internal factional politics added to all the external problems of the war and, instead, to drift along with them to the common cataract! In the military line, also, there is evidence in abundance, lately supplemented by the personal opinions of Marshal Foch, that, while technical, organizing and executive ability of the highest order were shown in every German campaign and battle, be it in attack or in retreat, real far-seeing strategical capacity was wanting. There was a lack of comprehensive objective plan, a want of co-operation of the separate units, a lack of intimate direction by headquarters. Too much was left to chance and to planning "in the field" according to the momentary situation. These defects in broad plan and definite military object—beyond the general one of beating the enemy somehow—faults of general-staff leadership and of over-confidence—were responsible for the occurence and loss of the first battle of the Marne and for the negative results which ensued from the brilliant attack campaign of the 1918 spring offensives, as far as the latter were not influenced by the political schisms at home. In the press in Germany during the war the wrangle in the Reichstag was not only reflected and repeated but enlarged. Popular sentiment on the war situation, on the submarine campaign, on the peace overtures was one continued gamut of change from the highest pitch of elation to the lowest depths of depression. There seemed to be a lamentable absence of strong confidence, firm self-reliance, settled opinion of the people as a whole as to the reason, nature and objects of the war and its conduct by the government.

Towards the end of the year 1917, the increasing disappointment and fear of ultimate defeat opened up the floodgates of **unrestrained criticism of everything and everybody** actively connected with the war and the government from the Kaiser to the last official, and even the "particularism" of the original German states—long believed buried—raised its head again. Into the midst of this raging sea of dissention and dejection, broke the voices of a number of miscreants, traitors and spite dogs, the like of which no country of the Entente allies had produced! That deceitful, conniving, calculating Erzberger; that abject, pitiable, traitorous Maximilian Harden; that

string of venomous "authors" and "journalists" who did not hesitate to use the country's dire war situation as an occasion to vent their personal spite and revenge for past injuries done them by the Kaiser or the government and to exasperate still more the maddened public; that horde of radical socialist agitators who had no scruples to exploit the government's difficulties and the discontent of the people in the interest of their own political creed and policy of surrender; those minority socialists--Haase, Dittmann and Vogtherr—who were disclosed as connected with the revolt of sailors in Kiel harbor, early in October, 1917, having the object of making the navy ineffective for the remainder of the war through the refusal of obedience; that band of radical cynics, devoid of ethics or religion, who openly counseled the people in the large cities **to abandon honor and honesty, to defy law and authority, to go profiteering, stealing, robbing, repudiating contracts, murdering even for gain and in "resentment" against the government for its inability to conclude the war and relieve the people's hardships!** This condition appeared in the early fall months of 1918. The moral fibre of the lower classes of the population of Germany **literally went to pieces** under this combined onslaught; it made a ghastly exhibition of the union of empty heads, empty hearts and empty stomachs!

When we take together all the facts in regard to Germany's conduct **of the war and in the war,** from her leaders down to the body of the people—the absence of **really great** capacity, unselfish patriotism, unity of purpose, stamina, steadfastness in adversity, all joined to a certain haughty attitude and overconfidence—even those who are sympathetic with the German people in their great failure and plight and willing to allow fully for all adverse circumstances are tempted to say "that **Germany deserved to lose the war"!** There is an unavoidable reflex of great sadness, of deep disappointment—of disdain even—from all this lamentable story of collapse of a great empire, government and people! But this conclusion does not justify—**nor even excuse**—the frightful treatment, the unheard-of punishment meted out to Germany by the Entente allies in the armistice and the treaty of Versailles—**that instrument of political and economic greed** inspired by race **hate and jealousy**

that stands unapproached in the world's long list of political wrongs! But most monstrous of all and least justified by Germany's true measure of guilt and mistakes **is the crime of heaping upon her the odium of alone bearing the responsibility for the great war!** This wrong at least—this moral wrong of the Entente allies—must be righted, even if the material punishment should finally be left but little altered from the present demands.

The Kaiser's Failure. It was not merely the want of commanding ability and force of character which prevented William II to rise to the height of the war situation but also the constitutional limitations of his position which made of him more the "representative figure head" of his country than its actual political ruler, this in spite of his many "autocratic" prerogatives. This explains that during the war we heard of the Kaiser only occasionally when making a patriotic speech in some city or to the army, or when he was called upon in some political crisis in which his prerogatives were involved—as with the chancellor changes and the Prussian electoral reform measures. The chancellor was the active and responsible political head in Germany, and in formulating his policy he stood between the ideas and wishes of the Kaiser and the ruling Reichstag majority. A stronger man than Wilhelm II would have swept these political limitations aside and assumed full power and responsibility. Thus the Kaiser's attitude in the various chancellor crises was not that of "directing and insisting" but rather of "conciliating" the contending factions. He endeavored honestly to produce harmony between the Reichstag majority, the chancellor and the military direction of the war, but failed to see the futility of his endeavors and the real political objects of the parties opposed to the government. Instead of arresting the stream, he drifted with it as much as his chancellors did!

The determined design to seize power by the majority socialists was clearly revealed (in our present view) at the moment when Count Hertling had finally decided, after much hesitation, to assume the chancellorship on the condition that before doing so "direct pourparlers shall take place between himself and the majority parties' representatives **in order to arrive at a full understanding on all questions and thus secure future unity of parliamentary action.** This "condition" was contrary to German constitutional practice but had been willingly conceded by the Kaiser. When the moment for these preliminary conferences had arrived, these majority representatives were not to be found; in the midst of this acute crisis they had left Berlin and were only recalled with difficulty to incomplete

conferences! What is the explanation? None other than that, at the last moment of the full acceptance of their own conditions by the Kaiser and the prospective chancellor, **these party leaders lost heart in their own proposals,** fearful lest they might bind themselves thereby to a "too intimate working agreement with the new chancellor" which might—later—**jeopardize** their freedom of action in those ulterior revolutionary purposes which were being harbored even at that time—fall of 1917! In the light of to-day, no other explanation is possible. Evidently, the Kaiser's policy of conciliation was destined to fail; with every concession new demands were presented. The Kaiser yielded at every step, fearing for the existence of his government and hesitating before the threat of a revolution. This was the moment for establishing a "military dictatorship" and handing the definite challenge to the obstructive Reichstag majority—but again hesitation shut the door to possible safety!

The recent publication of the third volume of the memoirs of Prince Bismarck (heretofore suppressed by the former Imperial government) has again opened the painful subject of Bismarck's dismissal by the young emperor William, in 1891. Never in the history of the world has the failure of grateful recognition by a ruler of the merits of a great national statesman borne more terrible fruit! It is not possible here to enter into the details of that political and personal cabal. That the Kaiser has long and sincerely regretted his action cannot be doubted from his public and private declarations! Had he allowed himself to be **tutored and guided** by that genius in penetrative diplomacy and constructive statesmanship, Germany, today, might not merely "have a place in the sun" but "**be the sun itself**" in the constellation of prosperous and peaceful European States! That his genius and its influence upon the Kaiser—had he permitted it—during the remaining decade of Bismarck's life would have made the occurrence of the great war **impossible** may be asserted without fear of challenge!

The Kaiser has written a book on the war, giving his conception of the causes, his own aims and attitude in the great crisis of July-August, 1914, and thereafter. A short reference to this book appears in Article XVI.

The Prussian Electoral Reform Measure. The battle for this measure in the Reichstag—a measure for the introduction of the **secret ballot** and full male suffrage in the Prussian agricultural electoral districts, from which it had been heretofore excluded—illustrates more than anything else the stubborn obstinacy of the Prussian conservative agrarian parties against any progress in the line of modern political thought. This measure had been demanded for years by the liberal parties in the Reichstag as one due to the spirit of advancing political freedom. **Why had it not been passed?** Not so much through

the Kaiser's opposition as through that of the conservative parties who saw in it a curtailment of their ancient "rights." Yet it was fully in the Kaiser's power to declare for the justice of this measure and press its adoption.

When this proposition was again brought forward, with increased insistence by the liberal parties during the war, the Kaiser seeing in the demand no wrong and only the threat of additional parliamentary friction and popular protest against his rule, **promptly ordered its early adoption** as the policy of his government. Yet the struggle for the measure in the Reichstag was a tremendous one. It was an essential part of every chancellor crisis! Had this measure been passed in the times of peace, it could not have arisen as a "terrible nemesis" in the crucial days of the war and at that especially critical conjunction of events of the summer of 1917! This electoral struggle sharpened the opposition of the Reichstag majority to the Kaiser's government along the entire line. The great session of October 6th, 1918, showed fully the depth of grim determination of the various opposing political parties and the hopelessness of united action on the war problems. In the sessions of October 9th, it became plain that the majority social-democrats were resolved to prosecute their "peace-at-any-price" policy against the "All-German" or "Fatherland" party at all hazards as proven by the revelation of the Kiel insurrection plot!

AT THE root of these weaknesses exhibited by Germany there lies the material and moral transformation of large sections of the "masses" of the people, which had been going on for forty years in the evolution of Germany to a great "industrial" state; and this change had not taken place without a corresponding effect upon the highly educated, the wealthy and business sections of the population. The war alone was not responsible for this change, or influence; **it only accelerated and intensified its consequences.** The Germany of 1914 was not that of 1870! A different spirit had taken possession of the majority of those who may be broadly called "the workers," all those in the industries and living in the large cities. The consequences of modern industrialism and commercialism had spread the doctrines of socialism and democracy among them and, together with the growth of atheism and general irreligion and a crop of negative "philosophies of irresponsibility," had changed the modern German of those classes to a different

character of man from that of 1848 and 1870. Gradual departures in the former educational system in favor of "practical studies" at the expense of the classical, the sentimental, ideal, at the expense of the study of history and literature contributed much towards the transformation.

The increased well-being and consequent diminished necessity of constant frugality, humility and self-discipline transformed a people once peculiarly sentimental and sensitive to one more "practical" but also more materialistic, more callous of restraint, more aggressive. The old German modesty of bearing and timidity of expression and the contentment with humble life expectations had largely disappeared. **A fatal disillusionment had taken place** (not yet replaced fully and in all cases by a new perspective) so that Schiller's grand poem of *"Die Ideale sind zerronnen"* had come true for much of latter-day Germany. Under the empire the sentiment for national growth, big activities, wealth, power, life enjoyment had gradually supplanted that for abstract study, contemplation, "the humanities," etc., formerly so all-pervading. These changes in the fundamental bases of character among a large proportion of the German people—excepting the aristocracy, the very wealthy and the agricultural class—had occurred parallel with each other and worked together hand-in-hand at the same time —general materialism, skepticism, socialism and republicanism —all permeated by a general "pessimism" as to the value of effort or virtue, of life itself—**it is the modern drift everywhere.** For the masses of the people, those whose education is confined to the practical essentials of information, the loosening of their former moral basis—doctrinal supernatural religion—was particularly disastrous in the absence of an effective substitute; they were deficient in that deeper philosophical perception and firm ethical conviction which are the possession of the thinker and the highly educated man and supply to these **that confidence and serenity** of view which it has heretofore been the great practical office of religion to supply to all, particularly to the man of lower endowment—**an office and power now rapidly waning!**

Considering socialism singly and without its association with morals or political thought, the unfortunate result of its doc-

trine and promises upon those of only medium mental and educational equipment **consists in its disintegrating effect upon their sense of personal independence and responsibility, and upon the moral quality of self-reliance,** by producing an abnormal, unbalanced perception of human society as a whole and an exaggerated idea of dependence from and upon others. Their understanding of socialism is narrow, subjective, one-sided; they expect of it immediate rectification of all their grievances, real and imaginary. It seems to them that the introduction of the more equitable distribution of property, of the co-operative working of industry and commerce, and all other parts of the complete program, **should be simple of accomplishment.** These high expectations produce a state of exasperation against society in general, of morbid impatience of restraint, of revolt against every kind of authority—all culminating in periodical outbreaks of violence—**because of the long-continued strain of seeing these promises and expectations unfulfilled.** While Socialism is a plan of reform for all classes of society and all activities, it finds its largest field and support in modern industrialism, in the abnormal life of millions of the workers in the crowded cities and depressing manufacturing towns where the months and years roll by in the dreary, soul-killing thud of monotonous work for mere existence! Next to these, socialism finds its field among those of particularly hard and hazardous occupations—the miners, transportation men, chemical factory men, plumbers, excavators, etc. The conditions of living and working in these occupations are clearly abnormal and a getting-away from nature, and must bring their penalties!

But socialism, the promised remedy, is itself largely a getting away from nature, a denial and defiance of her laws, and also an ignoring of human-nature traits. Before it can become a rational guide in public life, society and business it must be purified to a doctrine of broader reason, self-restraint and equal justice to all interests. As now mostly taught and understood, socialism contravenes in many respects those laws of order, of subdivision in graded ascendency from the lower to the higher endowed, of authority and submission which we find throughout in the operations of nature and which are reflected in the char-

acteristics of human nature. Neither seems capable of any fundamental change in scope and character, as demonstrated by nature and man throughout the recorded historical centuries. The same inequalities and imperfections of endowment, the same passions, impulses, caprices which are illustrated in the history of the earliest peoples prevail and rule to-day. This contradiction in the theory of socialism to that which is inborn by nature and unalterable is emphatic and an elementary defect in the system which will make it a failure in practice. Unless changed in idea and aim in the direction here indicated, socialism can only be **a force which will tear down, divide and scatter instead of unite and build up to a successful whole. The** present result in Russia, as far as it is not produced by other causes, is an object lesson. The possible spread of this "ultimate expression" of the socialistic thought to the other countries of Europe, particularly Germany, is filling the world with keenest apprehension.

This Russian "Bolshevism" is socialism **expanded to a complete and radical social-political plan; it means the full program of a communistic state** in all the relations of life and work, combined with **"internationalism"**—being the deprecating of narrow nationalism and race patriotism and the merging of all the peoples of the world into **one brotherhood of the ruling proletariat.** The basis of this idea, naturally, is the fact, that the dependent workers and the discontents—all those who gravitate towards socialism—outnumber overwhelmingly the aristocratic, rich, independent and so-called "privileged" classes in every country of the world—that they are the vast **majority of mankind.** This bolshevist idea (meaning, from its origin in Russia, the full radical program to its last conclusions) has not yet taken political form anywhere except in Russia, but its gospel is fast being spread to all the European nations and America by aggressive and extended propaganda. It is finding in **organized labor, everywhere, already permeated by socialism, not only its easy converts but its agent and active partner.** Labor, by its restless agitation for ever more rights and more pay and shorter hours of work, by its strikes and boycotts to obtain by intimidation, threat of financial loss and physical violence what equity, the general interest and cool reason must

reject **is the most active international bolshevist co-worker. Together they will soon uproot society, governments and peoples in a world-wide compound cataclysm** if more "natural and rational" conceptions are not grafted upon this socialistic labor movement.

The steps necessary for curbing and purifying the socialistic communism known as "bolshevism" will be discussed in detail in a later article. As to the arbitrary material demands of labor, the problem is really more difficult—there is no visible end to its extravagant aspirations. The final step may not only take the form of **a general reluctance to work,** already much in evidence, but of a revolt against **the unequal apportionment of occupations, especially of such of a dangerous, injurious and disagreeable character.** The point taken is the query: Why should it be the lot of some men, their sons and sons' sons for generations to come to be coal and mineral miners, sewer diggers, sailors, freight-car couplers, plumbers, sulphur or arsenic workers, ship-boiler stokers or workers in any others of the many low-grade occupations—not so much because of these being particularly **hard work** but because of their being **dangerous to life and health, unclean and offensive to the senses** —while other men and their descendants are privileged to follow occupations of comparative ease, security and cleanliness? The fundamental justice of this question and protest cannot be denied, yet any attempt at solving it by means of the current socialistic ideas will destroy civilization and send man back to the caves. Supernatural religion has a ready and effective answer to the conundrum, and as long as it held implicit power over men's minds was able to discourage this inquiry, but philosophies of **mere negation** cannot answer it.

In **rationalistic thought,** as we hope to explain it later, with its positive moral foundation in nature and purely mundane conceptions, relations and objects, an answer will also be found; a force of restraint and willing acquiescence as strong as that of religion was but more effective and permanent because more convincing! **It is this philosophy which must be grafted upon labor aspirations and socialistic doctrine for their purification.** But in regard to the coming socialistic political democracy this rational life philosophy will also be the agency capable of sup-

plying that stability and rectitude which have so far been wanting in republics; it will furnish an ethical foundation which will be harmonious with free political institutions—the untrameled exercise of the intelligence and personal will, in opposition to the spirit of autocracy and dictation which animates religions and their monarchical associates.

The changes of character and outlook described in the foregoing study of Germany in the war apply with no less pertinacity to the other modern nations—they are the universal attributes of our materialistic, iconoclastic and conceited age; but they are so much more conspicuous in the case of Germany because of the stronger contrast there with conditions of former times. The statements made were painfully illustrated by many features of the conduct of the war by Germany, but especially by the opportunistic selfishness of the motives which dictated the conclusion of a precipitate armistice at any price, **and later by the rabid radicalism and shocking violence which accompanied the German revolution.** The deeds of fanatical fury, of moral degradation, of defiant, exultant disregard of all the fundamentals of civilized human society which occurred in the German revolution at the end of the war approach closely to the wildest excesses of the great French revolution of 1789-1793 and of the Bolshevist revolutions in Russia, in March and November, 1917. A thoroughly depraved state of the perceptions and emotions only can explain these insane excesses. **None of these aberrations and brutalities of conduct would have been possible in Germany forty years ago;** the fact of their occurrence is proof of that demoralization (in the literal sense of the word) which we have described.

But this denunciation of the rough outward effects of the imperfect understanding of the ideas of the new drift, moral and social, must not be interpreted as a condemnation of the great thoughts of progressive social and ethical philosophy which underlie these conditions, nor of the natural and logical principle of modern democracy. Our strictures **are against the methods of propaganda, argument, teaching by which these programs are put before the ordinary man and woman of only partial education,** resulting in the deplorable effects upon them

which we have stated. What they understand and expect is quite a different thing from that which the great thinkers who have launched these systems expect from them in their practical application. The mischief is done by the professional and "interested" propagandists, interpreters, proselyters and political party leaders who bring the message from the fountain heads to the people—but instead of instructing succeed, in most cases, only to confound and corrupt. It is probably the greatest of all problems before the world—for the orderly development and direction of the stream now running—**to so devise the methods of propagation and amalgamation of modern political and sociological thought that its rising flood may not overwhelm us!** This subject will be pursued to a fuller conclusion in the article "The Summit.'

In the case of the German people's lunatic and repulsive revolutionary violence, it should be allowed, in fairness, that the psychological change we have described **was accentuated by their fury at the loss of the war and their chagrin at realizing how they had been coldly deceived and their trust abused by the sonorous and assuring declarations of President Wilson which had been so flagrantly disregarded in the armistice terms.** To their understanding the policy of the social-democratic leaders to conclude the armistice at all hazards, in their political interest, had no connection with the plainly expressed moral obligation of the Entente countries, particularly of America, to keep the promises given!

IN Germany, as an empire, there had arisen and been practiced the ideal of the individual citizen merging himself and his all in "the State," and the State, in return, existing for the best interests and advancement of the individual. It was the greatest cooperative society yet devised, in idea and numbers concerned! This political ideal has been applied to a similar degree and result by no other people so far, ancient or modern. In Germany it was at the bottom of the empire's development, **it was its ethical foundation and the complexion of its internal administration.** This principle produced a distinctive kind of civilization or "Kultur," based on a definite thought which per-

vaded all relations and activities and lent its tone even to private life. Its results were so remarkable, considering the comparatively short period of its reign—about forty years—that the German empire **as a State of a distinctive character** will be a source of study for the political philosopher for many years to come; it may in future times be the inspiration to similar endeavors by other peoples. The outward political form of this State, a semi-autocratic monarchy of much demonstrative pomp and circumstance, was but a conventional garb, a traditional embodiment. As the heart of the German empire's political life **was the thought of the intimate and confidential inter-relationship of all its parts and people to the whole**—it was, in reality a true democracy, in principle at least if not in details and external form. Thus in fighting, or pretending to fight, German "autocracy," President Wilson and the Entente allies fought a Quixotian windmill! We are quite sure that the Kaiser and the leaders of the government and of political thought considered Germany to be, in idea and objects, **a democracy**—a conservative one, certainly—**but no autocracy.** There was no such thing in the real sense in Germany; all that we have said above and in article VI and elsewhere proves this abundantly. The political contention in Germany was not about the democratic idea, as such, but about its shade and degree of application. The color of German democracy, however, was always more socialistic than purely political.

When this peculiar partnership between government and people was put to the test in the great war it produced, in the beginning, an exhibition of harmonious action and wonderful power which challenged the admiration of the world; but when the government, as the executive head of the State, failed to win victory, and the war in its terriffic strain brought physical exhaustion and moral despair, it was but natural that the political partnership should suffer and finally collapse, and lead to the collapse of the country itself. The tie was preponderatingly political and materialistic, voluntary but not deeply sentimental nor unselfishly patriotic, and **could not withstand the strain of external defeat!** Like a partnership in business is chiefly for making money and a reputation, the German partnership between government and people was for building up

prosperity and national success. All this is now changed under the new republic; instead of two positive agencies working hand-in-hand we have that peculiar "looseness and uncertainty" which has so far been the curse of full popular government.

It remains now to be seen what **Germany** will do with her real, complete democratic republic. She is in many respects better equipped for this form of government than most other countries through her experience in cooperation under the empire. Will she succeed where so many have failed; will she be able to overcome by her preparation, the intelligence of her people and their better-balanced education, their natural honesty of purpose and thoroughness of method those obstacles and human deficiencies because of which so many republics, ancient and modern, have run to seed and final dissolution? But whatever may happen in the future, and with full appreciation of what the empire stood for and accomplished, we may be sure of one thing, and rejoice in it: **The old idea of the monarchy "by the grace of God" is dead and will nevermore be resurrected!** The connection with the people having been violently rent asunder, the spell of tradition and outward success broken and the *nimbus* of a ruler "by divine mission and unction" dissipated, Germany will never again return to the monarchy and imperialism of the former empire. If monarchy is again to come, **it will require to be of the most advanced, liberal and fully representative form.** Any other would be an offense to common sense and the healthy instincts of our times of personal rights, political freedom and responsibility of the individual citizen.

The idea of the "Prussian" and "Bourbon" monarchy is obsolete, childish, ludicrous for our day and temper! President Wilson spoke a true word when he held up to ridicule and scorn "the mediaeval pomp and trappings and pretense of divine sanction" of the orthodox conception of monarchy as illustrated before the war in Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, Russia and Spain. There is **more than enough** of these unwarranted pretensions and silly court practices left in the monarchies of England, Belgium, Holland, etc., of today! It would seem to require the atmosphere of the Middle Ages for monarchy "*von Gottes Gnaden*" to be sustained by genuine conviction on the

part of the people. The return of the old monarchy in Germany would plainly be in contradiction with the advance to those freer and bolder ethical conceptions, at the expense of supernatural religions, which we have indicated, a movement of which we shall speak more fully later and in which Germany will be a foremost leader.

MORE LIGHT ON SUNDRY TOPICS OF PRECEDING ARTICLES.

A. **World Conquest and German Jingoism.** The political parties which are credited with being the so-called "militarists" and "jingoes" of Germany are variously known as the Conservatives, Junkers, Fatherland party, All-German party, government party, in opposition to five or six groups of Liberals, Socialists, Democrats, People's parties. Much was made during the war of this German "World Conquest" charge without it having had any real foundation in fact, as we have shown. Granted that there was such an element of national ambitionists in Germany, they were only **a small minority of the German people** and their aims did not emanate from the Imperial government nor represent its policy. As a matter of fact, the designs of these parties were not at all for the **ruthless conquest of any other people's territories,** but merely for friendly arrangements by treaties and compensation, purchase, etc., to extend Germany's economic and commercial facilities, made necessary by the rapid growth of the country. No **specific** charges of world conquest policy, plots of annexation, etc., have ever been brought forward by the Allies against Germany; the charge has been nothing more than an **artificial manoeuvre** of the war! **Nowhere in the world is the German known as particularly aggressive, quarrelsome, pugnacious, selfish and unkind to others.** And where, in the past and in the present, has there ever been a worthwhile nation which has not had its "expansionists" and "Jingo" parties and policies? Today the French are openly charged with following such militarist and annexationist ambitions to a dangerous degree—even by President Wilson. With the British they have been "second nature" since centuries and account for their world empire. They have been the mainspring of the policies of Russia, Italy, Greece and Roumania in the war. The activities of these aggressive parties of the different nations made the history of the European wars! **Why is Germany thus singled out for condemnation in a trait which is a part of every nation?** Even this country was seized by a jingo spirit which swept us into the great war against our better judgment; be-

cause, no matter how we may justify this trend from other points of view, **it was largely a yielding to the temptation of taking an important position in international affairs**—if not for great material or territorial gain, then, at least, for national pride and distinction!

As for the German nation as a whole—from this world-conquest point of view—a very large section thereof were already too much "socialistic" and even "internationalistic" in feeling—altruistic if you will—to be selfishly ambitious for territories and domination at the expense of others. This is a **great truth** the realization of which should open the minds of Americans now filled with prejudice against Germany on this topic. When the war began to go against her, the conquest visions of her limited jingo parties vanished faster than they had come because they were unnatural to the psychology of the race, to the majority sentiment of the nation. It was really due in a good measure **to the weakness of German world ambitions,** to the pessimistic mental habit of a considerable part of the people and their leaning to "fatalism" that Germany lost the war. The shortcomings of which we have spoken in detail are largely traceable to the German's habit of taking the **"objective view"** of things, of philosophical analysis and ethical casuistry—all points to his credit generally, but opposed to the requirements of political leadership in a world of overwhelmingly unscrupulous selfishness.

The Germans are a nation of thinkers, investigators, organizers and administrators, students in every branch, ardent and thorough workers—but **no politicians or diplomatists;** they are great theorists on principles of government and society, intense partisans and earnest debaters but unable to negotiate and compromise for the obtainable practical result! Their method of "directness" in thought, repugnance at sham and subterfuge in argument, temperamental impatience and impetuosity unfit them, in a measure, for exhibiting the highest skill in diplomacy. This we know very well in America from their record in party politics. For their number, intelligence, degree of education, wealth and business position they have achieved only a mediocre position in our national politics and furnished a surprisingly small proportion of men of prominence and influence, although their sincere devotion to the welfare of the country cannot be questioned.

B. **The Relative Responsibility of Peoples and Their Rulers.** In political discussion, whether it concern the problems of war or peace, there is no subject of greater import and perplexity than that of the relation of a country's "people" to its "rulers" and of the degree of responsibility of each for any political action taken—particularly in a decision for war—be these rulers emperors or kings, autocratic or liberal, a con-

stitutional Prime Minister and his parliamentary majority or the President and Congress of a republic. Volumes have been written on this topic; it is the corner-stone of rational political doctrine and success, especially in a republic! These questions ever and ever recur: What is really understood by the expression "the country," and who really are "the people"; which section of the population is "the people" **truly representative of the essence, character and will** of their country? And this other question occurs, independently of who the "rulers" may be: Are "the people" willing victims of their "ruler's" personal opinions, objects and decisions and without responsibility in their acts?

This assumption, the author believes, **must be entirely rejected.** It could only be the case in an absolute monarchy of the oldest type, without any popular representation, in a people uneducated, stupid, in the bonds of fear and superstition. Leaving aside the conditions under the republics of Greece and Rome we must, at least since the time of the French revolution, assign to the people of a country a share in formulation of the opinions and aims of their rulers and the responsibility for their acts. In England since Cromwell, in America since 1776, on the Continent of Europe since the French revolution, "the people" have been advanced enough in intelligence and self-confidence of thought to have acquired this influence and responsibility in greater or lesser measure according to their degree of modern enlightenment. This interest and influence has, however, not been strong enough to impress its view decisively upon the rulers until the more recent times; but in proportion as it developed in strength, the "rulers" have gradually become less independent and more nearly the figureheads and spokesmen only of the nations whom they represent; their "personal" opinions and objects have become merged into the national aim and will, and "the people's" share of responsibility in its government's policies fully established and recognized.

It is this point which interests us in connection with the war, as the "responsibility" of the German people for the acts of their rulers and government, of the French, English, American and other peoples for their respective rulers and governments have been frequent points of debate and difference of opinion. As indicated, the author holds the view **that the people share in the responsibility for their government's acts.** Neither should they, in defeat, hide themselves behind their ruler's faults, nor, in victory, be denied their proper share in its attainment. This said, we have still not established who "the **responsible people**" are or, properly, should be. In a republic the "majority" rule must prevail in order that political action be effected, as it would be impossible to expect absolute agreement on any question by all those entitled to vote. But who are they who constitute this voting majority? Naturally, it is the large body of **the ordinary working population**

of a country, the lowest section in the social scale, who predominate decisively over all the other sections or "classes" in every country. These, also called the "higher classes," are such not entirely by higher natural intelligence and education but mostly by the possession of wealth and the power it gives, and by social position derived from meritorious ancestry, distinguished public service, etc. Thus the ruling majority, while not necessarily stupid and uneducated as individuals, does include, from the natural circumstance of its social and material position **the largest percentage of the stupid, ignorant, uneducated of a nation**—which also carries with it other well-known delinquencies.

We can say, therefore, that in a republic "the people" is the aggregate of the voters who possess the right to exert political power by voting and the "ruling majority" of these voters are preponderatingly those of the lowest social, intellectual, educational and moral standard. Their time is mainly occupied with the business of making a living; they are the least "responsible" of the citizens because they have the least to lose in any policies involving sacrifices; they are the most dangerous to the commonwealth, internally, because the most open to the harangue of the agitator trying to make them see their lowly position as a **just grievance and onerous burden** in comparison with that of the better situated man.

The above would make **a rather sad picture for a republic** if these majority voters were left to themselves and thrown entirely upon their own resources (intellectual, educational and moral) to decide political issues. No matter how bright their natural intelligence, it could not in all questions overcome the handicap of insufficient special information and the prejudices attached to ignorance. In practice they are guided by their party leaders, the opposition speakers and independent thinkers to find the light and the right way "by having the questions at issue explained to them and their feeling and judgment clarified. It is for this reason that the decisions by vote of "the majority of the lowest classes" (for the "majority" necessarily **always includes** these lowest classes) in many instances makes the decision which agrees with the intelligence, education and sense of moral responsibility of the classes of higher position and endowment.

Two pointed exhibitions of the working of this principle occurred in the history of the United States of recent years; one in the "Bryan" free-silver campaign of 1896, the other in the last election on the war issues. In both these elections "popular opinion" was at first **strongly opposed to the final verdict rendered by it,** but was successfully convinced of its error by the literature and oratory of the campaigns. The danger of a possible mistake of decision roused the clearer thinking and more "responsible" element of the voters to unusual efforts to "lead the blind numerical majority" out of the woods of igno-

rance and prejudice. But this method involves enormous labor and outlay and **carries great risks to the nation,** as there is no possible guaranty of its successful working in all cases. A better method is imperatively demanded to give to the "people's majority" **a higher character of intelligence and reliability.**

Reasoning merely from points of ordinary common sense and observation, it cannot be gainsaid that the part of a population most broadly representative of a country's character and aims are the educated middle classes—all those of a more settled existence than the mere workingmen, those possessed of some means and homes of their own, of at least a grammar-school education, and including also the intellectual and professional classes generally. Numerically, this class is the largest in any nation, above the level of the ordinary workingmen (laborers, factory employees, farm and mine workers, menial servants, etc.), and this "middle class" joined to the uppermost section of society and business would appear to be really the representative and responsible "people" of a nation. The above division, however, is largely "theoretical," in practice and fact **no hard-and-fast rule of class separation can be drawn.** The only way to effect this desirable—necessary—separation is by a **qualification test** (educational and character) of men and women voters—by limited qualified suffrage—as advocated by the writer in his book "National Evolution," and sustained by facts and logic not easily controverted. Such a process of selection would give to any nation based on suffrage by men and women its **"real, responsible people."** There can be no question that political power and responsibility of a people should attach to a majority of **qualified voters only** and not to the numerical majority of all those who under the present laws are entitled to vote, and who may, in any election, reduce this **qualified majority** to a minority by the mere force of their numbers.

From this argument we see "who properly should be **the people** in any country," and also that in constitutional monarchies, in which suffrage is restricted to householders and men of a certain minimum income, settled occupation of an advanced class and some personal proven character and responsibility, **this principle is much better realized than in republics of unqualified suffrage.** Were it not for the fact that other conditions and influences which obtain in monarchies prevent the full and just application of the principle of qualified suffrage, they would possess a certain degree of political superiority over republics in regard to this question as to "who the responsible people of a country are or should be." For this reason, every existing republic which desires to advance on the road of purifying and fortifying its political representative system **should,** in the writer's opinion, **embody in its electoral practice the principle of limited and qualified suffrage.**

C. AUSTRIA, TURKEY AND BULGARIA IN THE WAR, SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS. POLAND. OPPORTUNITIES FOR RETALIATION.

The political and economic relations established by Germany with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey have been sketched in connection with the story of Germany's eastern extension plans. The Triple Alliance had previously drawn intimate bonds between Germany, Austria and Italy. As to Turkey, from the time of the treaty of Berlin, after the Russo-Turkish was (1878), she looked to Germany for her economic, financial and military reorganization; similarly with Bulgaria. This relationship was a natural result of mutual interests. It brought political security, commercial enterprise and prosperity to Turkey, Bulgaria and Austria, and in return Germany obtained those concessions and guarantees which allowed her to plan and float her Berlin-Bagdad railroad scheme. How great the benefits from the success of that scheme would have been to these three countries can easily be imagined; Germany's success would have been their success! **There was never the least question or suspicion of political subjugation of these countries by Germany,** and the attempt of the Entente to represent them as vassals of Germany was but one of its many deceiving war inventions. In fact, the development of the war showed that in the case of Turkey and Bulgaria the political bonds tying them to Germany were anything but categorical in case of war, and both countries took some time to consider their course before they reached the voluntary conclusion that their moral obligations as much as their best interests dictated their entry into the war on the side of Germany. Turkey's decision was announced several months after the opening of the war, while that of Bulgaria did not follow until the beginning of October, 1915.

The military operations of these three powers are on record and do not concern us much in detail. Austria's offensives were specially directed against Russia and Italy; those of Bulgaria against Serbia, in the beginning, and later against the combined French and other Entente troops in Macedonia, in front of Salonica. Upon Turkey fell the heavy task of defending Constantinople, which had been threatened by a combined

Entente land and sea attack upon the forts on the peninsula of Gallipoli. Turkey also had to defend her vast territories in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt against the British, and the Caucasus and Armenia against the Russians. The military assistance which Germany derived from Austria in the first two years of the war in the campaigns against Russia was considerable. As to Bulgaria and Turkey, they needed Germany's help, rather than otherwise, in the prosecution of their own immediate tasks. As Austria grew weaker, she, also, became more of a strain upon Germany than a support. But it must be acknowledged, as a matter of moral credit due to them, **that all three allies of Germany displayed splendid loyalty and faithfulness to Germany in her great struggle; they fought by her side valiantly and to the limit of their resources and to the very last until complete exhaustion compelled them to give up.** As to Germany's faithfulness to her ally Austria from the very inception of the Entente conspiracy and beginning of the war, as well as to Turkey and Bulgaria, in spite of all the sacrifices they brought upon her, **it is a monument to her character!**

For the general purpose of this book the interest of this article centers in the breakup of the Austrian monarchy as a result of her defeat. Austria's defeat was similar in all respects to that of Germany—military discouragement and slacking of discipline in the armies, economic exhaustion, starvation of the civil population and political disruption—all working together. The latter was, in the case of Austria, not only socialistic and democratic but **ultra-Wilsonian on the subject of the issue of racial self-determination of peoples** which had been injected into the European peace-and-war turmoil. In the earlier article on Austria we explained the conglomerate racial composition of the country and the troubles which this had given the Hapsburg monarchy to govern over these antagonistic interests, nourished continually by intriguing outside agitators. To this condition must be added the spread of the socialistic doctrine and the general trend towards democracy. In consequence of this co-working of disrupting influences, the dissolution of Austria had been freely predicted for years to occur soon after the death of the old and venerated emperor

Francis Joseph. But in the last decade before the war new constructive ideas had come to the front, represented by Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was assassinated at Serajevo. (All this is partly recapitulation, due to the author's purpose to present a rounded narrative or argument in each article.)

This outward cause of the war—the Serajevo plot—cannot be stated too often because it reveals the complicated and determined motives behind the war. No misrepresentations made by the Entente nations in their intent of fastening the guilt of the war upon Germany exclusively will avail over these plain facts: First, that the character of the Serbian conspiracy and the refusal of that government to allow Austria herself to examine into the secret police records prove conclusively that that country **could not face the revelation of the facts** because she had given herself up as a willing tool into the hands of Russia for the furtherance of the latter's political designs; second, that imperial Russia had, from compound reasons which we have previously examined, arrived at a stage of **such pressing political necessity that she did not hesitate to use desperate means** to precipitate a war with Austria; third, that this entire situation was well known in England, France, Germany and Austria. There was no mystery about the outbreak of the great war; neither in its long-view motives nor in its short-view provocation! All those "exchanges of notes" and "conference propositions" were mere diplomatic play to gain time, to perfect the moves, to put one of the powers,—Germany—the intended victim— in the position of being first in declaring war!

The dissolution of Austria in the whirlwind of the war, snatched away, as she was, from the opportunity of her regeneration to an enlarged political destiny, is even a greater tragedy than the fall of Germany because it seems definite and irremediable, whereas Germany will rise again and continue to live as a national entity. Austria has been roughly torn asunder by the application of this "self-determination of nations" idea which fell upon particularly fertile ground, in her case. This principle is theoretically rational and just, provided all the conditions for success in its application be present; if

not, then this principle may block real national progresss and work injustice to its adherents and opponents alike. To be successful the "nationality" concerned must be real and developed to full consciousness of racial character and aspirations, unity of sentiment and absence of strong religious dissensions. This feeling and complexion must not be confined to a limited number of the most advanced classes of a people but should be shared by a good majority of the population. There should also be present in such embryo states such physical and climatic conformation as to provide a diversified agricultural and industrial activity in order to insure to the nation "a living" and a fair degree of material independence. Without these guarantees no modern independent country can thrive in the vortex of present-day necessities and competition for existence.

Are the Czecho-Slovacs, the Hungarians, the Jugo-Slavs and the German-Austrians so situated? We think not; the latter are the best equipped of them, except economically. They could, however, **by their natural and strongly desired union with the Greater German Republic** as one of its members have arranged for themselves very favorable conditions of economic life, **combined with necessary national attributes and practical political independence.** The denial of this desire of German-Austria by the peace conference, lashed by French jealousy, speaks volumes for the lack of political capacity and the narrowness of motives of that body. Of the other three embryo states not one possesses the conditions we have named as necessary for the promise of permanence and success; each carries, even now, in the circumtances of their formation the seeds of dissension and failure which no League of Nations or other artificial agency will be able to control. As we expressed it before: "An ethnological pedigree alone is not a sufficient basis for erecting in security an independent national state. These three peoples have for many years indulged in dreams of independence, inspired by advanced patriots, without having had a very clear perception of the how or the wherefor, or any real unity of effort; nor have they shown any decided ideas as to the political form, whether monarchy or republic. Their strongest animating impulse had been **to be free from Austria** chiefly because professional agitators and outside interested

plotters had made them believe that they were being oppressed, that they were being hindered in attaining their national destiny, that they were being "bossed" by their German-race rulers.

By thus having distrust, jealousy and enmity planted into their hearts, they were blinded to the substantial benefits which they were receiving in education and general wellbeing; **they totally missed the rational point of view of their position and opportunities** as members of a well-ordered and important State. Upon their distracted state of mind the Wilsonian doctrines fell like a fructifying shower of rain and quickly confirmed these peoples in their phantastic fervor for freedom and political independence. Similarly to the case of the German people, the strain and suffering of war, the mental agony ever present and the increasing hunger were the ready handmaids of the whole process of revolution. Now it is done; and left to themselves these misguided peoples will soon discover how much they have lost, how little they have gained; how much they are still in the age of tutelage and how little they are fit for independence, especially for a republic. **To tear down is easy, but to build up from the ruins created is quite another matter.** Never before have any "aspiring nationalities" started out on their pilgrimage to independence with a more uncertain step and dubious prospect!

REGARDING **Poland** a situation exists of similar characteristics but of even greater perplexity. Not only has the central province of the former Russian Poland proper, with about 60 per cent of real Polish people, been erected into an independent State by the peace settlement, but also all those parts of the old kingdom of Poland which were separated from it in the first and second partition of Poland (1750-60) and were joined, respectively, to Russia, Prussia and Austria. This old Kingdom of the 18th century had at no time been a real homogeneous State as to race and language, and had for decades been a country of dissensions and strife. It was this disorder and lack of political ability which brought on the wars of conquest and annexation by Prussia, Russia and Austria and the

partition of the country by these neighboring states in order to obtain settled political conditions. These three parts, of mixed population even at the time of the partition, have in the many decades which have since elapsed become so thoroughly transfused by the people of the respective ruling nations, and by the all-permeating Jews, that they are today Polish only to the extent of from 25 to 40 per cent of the total inhabitants. This remnant of original Polish stock now left in the former Russian, Prussian and Austrian provinces belongs **in overwhelming proportion to the lower classes of the people.** The Polish middle class had died out, leaving only the poor peasants and the land-owning nobility. The business life and progress of these provinces and all the activities of education and refinement were in the hands of the respective Russian, Prussian and Austrian nationals and of the upper "mixed classes" of the native population, who were not more than 15 per cent of the total. The idea that these provinces were "conquered sections" and still in a state of amalgamation had almost disappeared, especially in the large cities, except in the joint use of the Polish language together with German, Russian and Yiddish.

In spite of these indisputable facts, the Entente allies have not hesitated, **under the impulse for a free and independent Poland,** to sanction the Polish claims to the German province of Posen, to parts of German Silesia, to a large part of former Austrian Galicia and to the outlying Russo-Polish sections and to include all this territory, with Old-Poland, in the new State. All these parts had become thoroughly amalgamated with the countries to which they belonged in 1914. **This disposition was particularly unjust to Germany.** Not only had the province of Posen been entirely Germanized, but all the large manufacturing cities of Old-Poland—Plock, Lodz, Lublin, Warsaw itself—were almost wholly German cities in all their business and social activities. Granting fully the justice of creating a free and independent Poland, the **preponderatingly German province of Posen should have been left to Germany,** providing for liberal expropriation by purchase for such of the Poles as would not have cared to remain. For identical and equally

strong reasons, **the section of Silesia which has (subject to a plebiscite) been awarded to Poland,** should have been left to Germany. Every consideration of equity, political wisdom and stability of the peace should have dictated such a decision. But, not enough with this high-handed imposition of the arrogant will of the victor, it was further decided at Paris to take from Germany **a strip of land cut out of the heart of her own country,** and separating thereby East Prussia from West Prussia, to provide a sea-coast continuity for this greater Poland to the Baltic Sea, with the fine sea-port city of Dantzig at the end thereof, a city German to the core back to the Middle Ages. A truly wise and noble scheme it is— this Polish settlement— one that does honor to the Paris conference of justice and enlightened action for the prevention of future wars! The bold outstanding fact of the arrangement is this: **The cupidity of motives of the Entente nations was so great and their political density so deep that it appeared fair and proper to them to rob and dismember Germany to make the "sentimental experiment" of setting up as a nation this half-developed people**— mixture of Poles, Russians, Czechs, Ruthenians, Slovacs and Jews—**which makes up the geographical term of the new greater Poland!**

What has this Polish people ever been and done to deserve all this consideration? The true explanation is simple: In the case of Poland as in that of the four new states carved out of former Austria, **independence was literally thrown at them** by the victorious Allies because the defeat of Germany and Austria and the existing impotence of Russia made it possible for them to give ostentatious application thereby to two of their much-advertised "idealistic war principles" without risk of opposition, the principles of the protection of small nationalities and that of the right of self-determination of peoples. But in the case of **Ireland**—an island nation, racially clean-cut, able, virile, complete, advanced, the mother of a good share of England's greatness in every direction, **the case is different** because her liberation is opposed by one of the Entente partner nations —a powerful one, ready to make opposition—**England.** She

needs but to say: "Hands off; this is a domestic question and our own private affair"—and, behold, the "self-determination-of-nations" call is smothered and buried in a maze of explanations, accusations and exceptions!

IN view of the fact that whatever there is, today, of wealth, established business enterprise, public improvements, commerce, education and culture in these countries of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Jugo-Slavia is due to the extent of fully 75 per cent **to the direct work or inspiration of Germany and German-Austria,** respectively, and considerably also to Russia, these countries would be justified to bring every possible reprisal upon these ungrateful and treacherous peoples who forsook their benefactors in their great hour of need. This stricture applies much less to German-Austria and Hungary than to Bohemia, Poland and Jugo-Slavia. These perfidious would-be nations deserve nothing but cold indifference and contempt from Germany and Austria in their struggle to stay on their feet. But measures of practical retaliation are also justified to be undertaken and are, in fact, partly under way: **Retirement from these countries by the German forces of energy and advance, and carrying away of their capital, business organizations, machinery and other transportable equipment and property to their own home lands.** This done, signs might se set up along the highways of these countries reading: "If you fall behind and need any help, apply to the Entente nations."

This sentiment of retaliation might also very properly be the attitude of Germany and German-Austria towards their Entente enemies,—England, France, Italy, America and Japan —in protest of the shocking abuse and wrong inflicted upon them,—**if a juster attitude towards them will not soon be inaugurated.** The threatened English and American boycott of German and Austrian manufactures may very readily be made a "two-edged sword of Damocles." If a change of feeling will not soon take place, business men and manufacturers, financial men, scientists and artists, technical experts and helpers, teachers, linguists, artisans, commercial clerks and high-class

mechanics, men and women, citizens and aliens will be **justified to pull up stakes,** and with their families, money and belongings leave these countries and return to their native peoples. This would apply especially **to the United States of America where the character and qualities of Germans have been assailed and defiled in a manner to bring the fire of rage and scorn and eternal hatred to every German and Austrian who has been a witness of this abuse.** With the coming political and commercial amalgamation between Germany, German-Austria and Russia, and not unlikely Hungary, into a territory of over two-hundred millions of people, commanding untold natural resources in coal, oil, wood; iron and other metals; clay, building stone, minerals and chemicals; with unlimited and diversified agricultural lands, a great railroad, river and canal system of transportation; with sea-coast front in the North, on the Pacific and in the Black Sea (now with unrestricted passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles)—and the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Spain, Bulgaria, Turkey, China, Mexico and Argentina friendly—**this "continental economic union" would be big and self-supporting enough to be able to live and prosper without the favor of the Entente countries, and could dispense with it if conditions of mutual respect and a remodeled peace of Versailles of honor and fairness cannot be obtained from them.**

Influence of the Russian Revolution on the Course of the War and on Germany's Defeat. This influence was twofold, military and social, through the revolution and the subsequent regime of "bolshevist" communism. The first Russian revolution broke out against the government of the Czar early in March, 1917, and led in the course of a few days to the abdication and imprisonment of the Czar and his family and the complete overthrow of the Imperial Government. The forces in this first rising included all shades of liberal democratic opinion, from Constitutional republicanism to extreme radicalism. The general aim was to found a liberal republic of, as yet, indeterminate shade of principles; to do away definitely with monarchy, autocracy and Court rule; to continue cautiously the agreements with the Entente and participation in the war. The latter had been one strictly of the aristocratic ruling classes and government circles and was very unpopular with the people at large, as may be inferred from the previous articles of this book on the subject.

Professor **Miliukoff,** as President of the Conservative Constitutional Ministry, was in sympathy with popular feeling on the war, but Entente influence gradually obtained control, and under the leadership of the talented **Kerensky,** as Minister of War, **a new offensive against Germany was begun in June, 1917.** This was of a desultory character, however, the Russian troops having been demoralized by the advent of the revolution. Political sentiment meanwhile drifted gradually towards the radical parties, largely due to the popular discontent with the war, and on November 8th-9th, the second revolution broke out, directed against the Kerensky Constitutional Republic and placing power into the hands of the extreme socialist wing, represented by **Trotzki and Lenine** as heads of the **Congress of Workmen and Soldiers.** They assumed, or were given, the name of "Bolshevists," meaning those ready to occupy the extreme position on socialism and ready to apply the measures requisite to establish the radical communistic republic and the rule of the "proletariat." The movement was an aggressive one, realizing that it would have to combat strong internal and external opposition. It prepared for this struggle by measures and methods of great energy and authority in order to achieve success. This revolution was accompanied by much violence and bloodshed and wholesale arrests of the nobility and adherents of the former Czar's government. Many executions took place and a reign of terror prevailed for about two weeks.

As this book is not a history of the war, we cannot go much into details of events, and the reader is assumed to be informed on the political and socialistic character of the bolshevist movement. Reference has been made to its general scope and aim and important "world interest" at several points in our text. The first act of the Soviet government which affected the course of the war and the position of Germany was **its immediate call for a three months' armistice and an invitation to all the war nations to meet in a general peace conference.** All former secret agreements between the Czar's government and the other allied nations were now made public and repudiated on the part of Russia. Germany and her allies accepted the proposal for an armistice and peace conference, and entered upon the negotiations at **Brest-Litowsk** on December 3rd, 1917, but the Entente powers declined to participate, refusing to recognize the authority of the Soviets as representing the Russian people. (As we have shown in the text, they had at that time fully determined on **a peace by victory only.)** On December 12th, 1917, the Russian Government issued its famous proclamation for "a peace without indemnities and annexations" (adopting the wording and spirit of the German Reichstag resolution of July of the same year) and throwing the responsibility for the limited efforts at Brest Litowsk **upon the En-**

tente powers who had ignored Russia's call. The peace was to be one of honor, by the people themselves, concluded in fraternity and justice and the right of "self-determination" for all individual countries. It called this **the hour for the proletariat of all countries to come together,** and for the beginning of a new and true liberty! It was an appeal over the heads of the existing governments to the people of the world at large, especially to the socialist masses and the labor class, **to rise in protest and insist on the termination of the cruel war.** But the appeal failed: the people in all countries were under military domination and themselves affected and divided by their war sympathies; moreover, the tenure of power by the Soviets was arbitrary and uncertain, was itself sustained by "force" and not by the free voice of the Russian people as expressed in a representative elected body like the former "Duma" had been. This discouraged confidence in Russia's appeal. In consequences of the above proclamation, the Ukraine and the former Russian Baltic States and, later, Siberia declared themselves as independent republics.

On December 17th, 1917, the armistice between Russia and the Central Powers was concluded, and a few days later peace sessions began. They were stormy meetings full of friction between all the participants. On February 9th, 1918, the first peace of the war was concluded at Brest-Litowsk, that between the Central Powers and the new independent Russian republic of the **Ukraine.** On the day following, Trotzki announced that on account of the inability to agree on peace terms between the Central Powers and Russia, **the latter considered the war as ended between them even without a formal peace being signed,** and would withdraw her troops from the fronts into Russia and begin their complete demobilization. This conclusion was not agreed to by Germany and Austria, as being in no sense a settlement of the many complicated territorial, racial and economic questions which had divided the peace conference; they construed it, on the contrary, merely as the termination of the armistice. Accordingly, the German armies, on February 17th, 1918, began to advance upon Petrograd, and Austro-German forces prepared to move into the Ukraine to help that new State to defend its independence against the bolshevist attack which was being planned. This combination brought the Soviet government to surrender, and to accept the terms of the Central Powers as laid down in Germany's ultimatum of February 28th. Peace was definitely concluded on March 3rd, 1918. The peace was accepted by Russia under protest as "not one of understanding but of force," and in a proclamation the Bolshevist Republic called upon German labor and the soldiers in the armies **"to rise in condemnation and defiance against this strangulation of their Russian brothers.** But as in the former case, the call failed of response—not for

lack of agreement and sympathy but because of the iron exigencies of the war. In the meantime peace negotiations had also been proceeding between the Central Powers and Roumania, and ended in peace being concluded on May 7th. On the same date a separate peace was signed with the independent Russian State of Finland, which had taken position against the Soviet Government and in favor of supporting the Entente. This ended the war on all the eastern fronts of the Central Powers.

Of this eastern peace, however, neither the political nor the military results came up to the high expectations which had been entertained in Germany and Austria in regard to it. **Politically,** it hurt Germany in the eyes of the Entente and the world in general by the harshness of the methods and the severity of the terms imposed upon Russia, and it may be said **that at Brest-Litowsk Germany laid the foundation of much of the hard treatment she herself later received at Paris.** Also, by negotiating with Russia (after the conclusion of the general peace with the four Central powers) a **separate supplementary convention** in her exclusive interest, and in which Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey were ignored, she **affronted them sharply,** especially Austria, and with it laid the foundation for the diplomatic estrangement with her allies which, later, bore such disastrous fruit in their disposition to try separate peace overtures and act independently for peace at the end. These political currents developed apace while the German March offensive in France had already spent its initial force and was in process of being arrested and turned into a reverse. Had the Central Powers held together politically and presented **a united entity in defeat,** their position at the Paris conference would have been very different, and no such armistice and peace terms would have been written as were dealt out to them separately. The spirit of the negotiations at Brest-Litowsk and the succeeding steps were **a great diplomatic blunder on the part of Germany of wide consequences.** We can only understand these mistakes of Germany by putting ourselves in her position and realizing the feeling of resentment and vengeance which pervaded the whole nation for having the cruel war thrust upon her.

Militarily, the peace in the East freed considerable masses of troops, ultimately, for use on the French fronts, but on account of the unsettled situation in Russia, the Ukraine and the new Baltic States, and in Poland, this retirement had to be made slowly; and these German eastern forces had become somewhat demoralized by their long-continued idleness and were filled with radical socialistic ideas by the bolshevist propaganda carried on among them. Hence, the gain to the exhausted troops in France was not as large numerically and as

stimulating morally as had been anticipated. The final result in France was scarcely affected by the additional strength they lent; but **if these troops had been divided between the Turco-Bulgarian forces in front of Salonica and the Austro-German forces in the Trentino,** the military result in these two theatres of the war might have been entirely different!

While the peace with Russia had, truly, removed her as a military enemy of the Central Powers, a greater enemy to Germany has arisen thereby in **Bolshevism** to undermine the moral courage of the German people and armies and break their resistance. Pursuant to the peace, the Russian Soviet Minister Joffe arrived in Berlin in the late summer of 1918, ostensibly sent to pave the way for the resumption of diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany. He established himself in the sumptuous former Russian embassy, with a retinue of secretaries and servants. The German government received him cordially and extended to him all desired facilities for his mission of peace and rapprochement. But this same Minister Joffe was later disclosed to have been the head and front of an **official bolshevist mission** to disseminate these doctrines throughout Germany and in the armies by a flood of "literature," personal proselyters, bribes and promises of political reward. The embassy quickly became the headquarters of the advanced groups of the German socialist parties, who were in sympathy with Joffe's work; they were then plotting the fall of the Imperial government and the establishment of a socialistic republic by revolution. This nefarious activity was finally discovered by the German government and eradicated, but not before much undermining work had been done by it which told its disastrous story on the battlefields of France, in the disrupting parliamentary battles in the Reichstag, in the armistice conspiracy, the degrading peace, the bloody revolution and ignominious collapse of the German nation!

Materially, the results of the eastern peace were also very disappointing. The hoped-for stocks of food, materials, oil, coal, etc., which Germany and Austria had expected to find in Roumania, the Ukraine and Central Russia were not considerable, and their ready transportation was made almost impossible by the complete breakdown of the railroad systems in these countries. Thus the expected relief from the pressure of the English Food Blockade did not materialize and the hopes of the suffering German people were dashed to the ground.

There was also a dramatic sequel of intense hate, leading to assassination, to the eastern peace "by force." It had left a feeling of bitter resentment in Russia against Germany, which found vent in many demonstrations of violence in Moscow, Petrograd and other cities. It culminated in the brutal

murder of Count Mirbach, German envoy in Moscow, and of General Eichhorn, in the Ukraine. And when, in August, 1918, in consequences of these occurrences, and to settle many details of the peace agreement, Karl Helfferich was sent to Moscow on a mission by the German government, he had a narrow escape of being overtaken by a like fate!

XIV. PEACE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A. THE PEACE AND LEAGUE OF FALSEHOOD. THE FUTURE ARMIES AND DISARMAMENT. THE WAR A FIASCO. IRELAND'S TITLE TO INDEPENDENCE. AMERICA'S DISAPPOINTMENT AND AWAKENING.

In taking up this subject we shall approach and discuss it from an entirely different point of view than that which prevailed in the peace conference at Paris, in the newspaper treatment of it and which colors the past and present debate of this subject in America, in and out of Congress. The question whether or not the United States should shoulder the obligation of this league, and whether or not it was wise to include this league in the peace terms do not interest us so much at the outset. For the purpose of this book this subject must first be investigated ethically before we can enter into the manner of its disposition.

Peace and peace terms are obviously interdependent, almost synonymous conceptions. Peace is a state of agreement among a number of contestants who have been in a strife—and may be again arrayed against each other—to live together without open enmity on a basis of terms freely, if humbly, accepted by the party which lost the fight **as a fair settlement which can and is intended to be carried out.** The terms must be in accordance with this fundamental idea. Any such rational peace will be a "peace of justice," any other which does not fulfill this condition is merely a settlement **accepted under duress at the point of the victor's sword.** From the information presented in the preceding articles it should appear quite clear that the position occupied by the peace-dictating side at Paris was **not only one of error of fact but of inescapable and forcible decep-**

tion in consequence of the web of hypocrisy, lies and slander which had been woven around the war. The victors were compelled to maintain, or to pretend to maintain, this position to the end; they were caught in their own net of falsehood as to the origin and objects of the war, and in the false accusations which they had made against the Germans and their allies, and **could not now easily disembarrass themselves of these and reach a basis of truth and equity.** In consequence, the peace discussions were rooted in false pretenses and had to proceed in wrong and deception; **there was no one there—not even President Wilson, with all his avowed idealism—who had the moral grandeur to rise up and demand recognition of the truth and nothing but the truth, and thus prevent the colossal wrong, the monumental fraud of the deliberations at Paris and their final embodiment in the Peace of Versailles.** Yet this truth was well known; the totally mendacious position of the Entente allies in the war and at Paris, as explained in a previous article of this book, was known to the Entente allies themselves, to President Wilson, to every diplomatist, to every well-educated man in Europe of any political acumen. It was due to the failure of England's calculations, the Allies' wrath at the unexpected defiance by Germany, and their determination to throw the responsibility for the war upon her shoulders alone and, in revenge, **to ruin that country for all time through the terms of the armistice and peace!**

What a horrible situation; how could a peace of justice come out of a situation so thoroughly perverted! The allies were strangled by their own deceptions, and the whole world—poisonously inoculated against Germany —had to follow suit upon this path of infamy! Such was the psychological character of the peace conference; and it would have taken a miracle to change it. This **miracle** might have, possibly, happened at the last moment when the time had arrived for the presentation of **concrete demands,** for the revelation of **the secret agreements,** for the disclosing of **inmost policies**—to some extent at least. But it was right at this point that the **League of Nations** proposition stepped in and prevented a tense situation of threatening avowal of the truth **by offering a refuge under the shelter of which secrecy and deception could be maintained to the end and public revelation delayed till the to-morrow.**

Under cover of the League, with its plausible plan of peaceful world regulation without war——which the four European Entente nations and Japan assiduously acclaimed—these five powers saw that their real war motives and future schemes might very conveniently and safely remain unconfessed a little longer under the cloak of these sanctimonious pretensions **till the overshadowing purpose of their deliberations had been accomplished**—a crushing peace for Germany, the complete destruction of Austria, reduction of Turkish sovereignty to a name only—and the exclusion of all these from the League (also Russia), in order to leave themselves free to exercise their domination over the smaller nations. Meanwhile they would be able to pursue their separate interests in individual alliances, but under the cover of this "league-of-peace" of merely complimentary functions! Of the impracticability of the League they were quite convinced, and for its altruistic purposes they felt nothing but supreme contempt. Thus was the humanitarian thought of the League of Nations, sponsored so enthusiastically and disinterestedly by our President and the American people, quickly reduced at Paris **to a proposition of false pretenses under which every iniquity of the war and every selfish design of future activity could be ignored with a brazen face and hidden!**

That the peace terms imposed upon Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey cannot endure has been abundantly demonstrated since their enactment. They were accepted only as a matter of physical necessity, absolute helplessness, after violent struggles to obtain conditions more within reason, honor and ability of being fulfilled. No matter what the final, definite settlement with all of them shall be, **the terms will be observed only, in spite of "guarantees" and "sanctions," so long as the strongest compunction to do so shall exist.** Can anything else be expected? This compunction is not at all one of "moral responsibility" on the part of the vanquished; moral responsibility does not apply when imposed under a threat of death by violence on a foundation of unreason! Individuals and nations so placed **have the moral right to promise the impossible in order to save their existence!** This being our conclusions on the peace which has been made and on the League "to pre-

vent future wars," it follows that the latter can, at best, only be a means of enforcing this onerous peace. Moreover, the enemy countries and Russia being excluded, this League will be an anomaly from the beginning and merely an association of the great powers to impose their will upon the others. But even for this purpose the League, having no definite and ready power for enforcement of its decisions, will be merely a formidable threat, capable of being defied for a long time, even by a small nation; for history proves abundantly that when great passions or ambitions are aroused, the mere size of a nation is no limit to action. In such a case much disturbing work might be set in motion—starting of a revolution, invasion of another country—before the cumbersome machinery of the executive military forces of the League (formed by proportional contribution) could be set in motion.

But such "disturbances" are precisely what we must expect in Europe under the present settlement. Is there anyone innocent enough to assume that the geographical boundaries of the old and new states, as settled at Paris, will be maintained for any great length of time; that the penalties exacted and the injuries inflicted will be accepted as binding forever; that the hindrances imposed will be submitted to without protest, as soon as protest can be made **with confidence?** On the contrary, the world and the League of Nations must be prepared for all of this! The consciousness of these uncertainties of the peace settlement was one of the secret reasons which commended the idea of the League to the Entente governments **as an instrument with which to enforce the peace of duress upon the overpowered peoples and discourage dissatisfaction among the new nationalities!** That the League—which is themselves—would also prove an effective instrument to prevent war among themselves is a paradox; for, who should decide and enforce? The perception of these points, together with the growing impression that the peace of Versailles is a wrongful and stupid settlement (although this impression is as yet admitted only tacitly), all added **to our general distrust of European diplomacy** as the result of our war experiences, were no doubt an important part of the reasons why the United States Senate refused to sanction the League pact without important modifi-

cations being made. It must be apparent to all who have succeeded to grasp the great breadth and depth of this subject that the present constitution of the League is too imperfect in foundation and scope, and too indefinite in its manner of action to lead successfully to the contemplated object. To become a real power for good the League must rest upon three propositions, **now disregarded: 1. The free acknowledgment that the responsibility for the war must be borne jointly by all the six nations originally involved; 2. Upon such a revision of the peace terms to the Triple Alliance nations as will be in accordance with the acceptance of the first proposition; 3. It must include the defeated nations as full and free members. In addition, the League must have a more definite organization of its police power than at present proposed, and the manner of participation therein must be made fully acceptable to the member nations.** Without such a constitution of the League, Europe cannot reduce its armaments! This entire question, in its American and European aspect, has received more attention than any other part of the peace terms, both by the Senate debates and President Wilson's speeches. As it has since become the main subject of a great Presidential election and of discussion without limit, the author will reserve further explanations and criticisms on this topic for later articles.

OF THE peace terms of Germany, the proposition that she be compelled not only to reduce her army to the size of a mere police force (100,000 men), but also to abandon the national and compulsory "manhood conscription" system and, instead, maintain a paid professional volunteer army is of great importance to all the nations as it might prove the means, in a short time, of compelling all of them (through popular demand) to adopt the same plan. The proposition indicates, however, that the statesmen of Europe still believe, League or no League—that wars will occur again and that the nations should be armed, at least on a moderate scale—and we in America seem to share this opinion by our war preparations. The propaganda for practical disarmament recently launched

in this country has made but little headway either in Congress or among the people because of the very uncertain international situation still prevailing. Indeed, there can be no question that future wars are not only **a possibility but a certainty —and even a necessity,** especially in Europe! Organized military force is primarily the necessary agent of the State to enforce law and order internally—in labor disturbances, political riots, etc.—and to insure its security externally in case of attack or in satisfaction of well-founded grievances. It would be ideal if the use of military force could be confined to these legitimate purposes; but this will be as difficult a task in the future as it has been in the past, because those human-nature traits which are at the bottom of great political eruptions—ambition to rise and expand, covetousness of advantages possessed by others, vanity of race, economic necessity, etc.—have not changed in the ages! They appear, at times, to be well under control (particularly while the horror and effects of a a war still linger with a people), but soon revive to concentrate upon even larger aggressive enterprises. (A more extended treatment of the ethical aspect of war will be found in Section "B" of this article.) The more the nations advance in population and power, the fiercer becomes the violence and the greater the extent of war when it does break out! From this point of view, the size of the army to be allowed each state and the manner of their organization become important points. Such regulation would be particularly the province of a League of Nations or of any similar World Tribunal, together with all the related details of warfare; but whether the present League is strong enough to take and enforce any steps in this direction is very doubtful. In fact, the question immediately arises: Can regulations of this kind be enforced by the strongest kind of a League or Tribunal, and will they stand the strain of actual war?

We have on a previous occasion made the observation that "modern armies are the people" and "the people are the armies," and the author believes that this must continue so in the future; it is a product of the times. It is not at all conceivable that another war among the nations of Europe could be confined to such limited armies as have been tentatively

proposed to be sanctioned under the League-of-Nations powers. Any future conflicts will immediately develop **with great intensity to "wars of the nations,"** the whole nation on each side, and the actual fact of war will automatically suspend all artificial agreements and limitations as to size and manner of the forces to be employed—each side will proceed to put forth its utmost effort. It is the writer's opinion, therefore, that a conscripted "citizen soldiery" of short-term enlistment is far preferable to a long-term professional army. Not only is such an army, drawn from all ranks of the people as an obligation of patriotism, more **national** in character, but its plan **conveys upon the entire manhood of a people the very desirable benefits of strict discipline and physical and moral training associated with the military service.** Under this scheme, in case of war, the entire nation is prepared and ready to meet the enemy. The size of these "people's armies" could be regulated in some proportion to the total population of each country, and the drafting done in such relays as to furnish this training **to the entire able-bodied manhood population,** while maintaining the actual numbers in the graduating year, at any time, at the agreed total of effective forces.

Much misinformation and bad logic have frequently been expressed, **particularly in socialistic literature,** as to the "crushing cost," the "awful burden upon the people" of such large national conscription armies. The figures of expenditure for them, certainly, appear enormous—but they are deceptive; **the cost is not all outgo;** the hardship of taking men away from their regular occupations for a few years can be reduced by running government trade shops to do government work (at regular pay under contractors) for certain definite hours per day, or days per week. This plan would not interfere with outside labor and would keep the men in trim at their trades and also furnish them with extra income in addition to their pay as soldiers. The fact that neither Germany nor France, nor any other of the nations who had maintained universal military service before the late war had suffered economically from this institution in any manner—quite the contrary, they had all prospered greatly—is the best proof that the "crushing-cost" argument against it is not borne out by actual experience.

LOOKING back over the great war from the position taken in this book, both the war and the victory must be adjudged **a tremendous fiasco.** None of the objects sought have been attained, at least not in the way and to the extent hoped for. Russia is not in Constantinople, and her southern-seacoast dreams are further removed than ever. Serbia has helped to crush Austria and has escaped the latter's dictation over her, but at what cost! France—**if she could but undo the war**—would gladly leave Germany in possession of Alsace-Lorraine, and forget her desire for revenge! England has, temporarily, destroyed her rival, and no Berlin-Bagdad scheme will now be carried out by Germany, and the latter's commercial and naval competition is at an end for the present; but for how long a time and at what a price has England accomplished this? Italy's "Irredenta war" will turn out **such a meagre practical success as to be almost a defeat,** in view of the enormous cost to her in men and treasure. The once proud enpire of Austria is dismembered forever, and the newly-formed states appear like old castle ruins looking down upon a vanished past of a thousand years of stirring history! Poland is grinning a ghastly ironical smile and rattling the skeleton of her "national independence" at the scene of ruin all about her and at her own helplessness. Germany is beaten down and disorganized, crippled for decades to come; her case is that of a courageous man who meets six powerful bandits in the street who demand his money, **but who resists,** trusting to his strength and good right as a free man, **but is promptly clubbed to death and robbed.** America, who nervously hid her share of materialistic aims and pitiable jealousies behind the bold and disinterested face of democarcy, liberty and justice for all mankind—**what has she achieved in the war?** She has helped to bring about the fall of the German and Austrian empires, true; but has anything better taken their place, **or is anything better than that which had been** likely to come out of these arbitrary and violent transformations? Is it any benefit or "progress" to throw a string of half-cocked "nationalities" and "republics" into the world to live or die as best they may?

And what about Russia whom we abandoned at the moment when she needed our encouragement, recognition and support

in her struggle for democracy to prevent her falling a victim to the terror of radicalism? Have we cleared up Europe and the rest of the world of autocracies, kings and kingdoms? There are still the following left requiring our attention—as we declared ourselves to be the elected authority for dictating governments: The kings and kingdoms of Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Serbia, Roumania; also the Sultan of Turkey, the Shah of Persia, the empire and Emperor of Japan, the British Indian empire, and sundry smaller principalities and princes of various degrees scattered over the world! **We yet have a right goodly task before us!** And how about justice? **Has justice been done at Paris under the vaunted inspiration of our President?** This answer we believe is given in this book, decidedly in the negative, a verdict more and more supported by the public opinion of the world!

IN CONTRAST with the artificial and almost "imposed" aspirations to freedom and national independence of the new countries named above **there stands the case of Ireland,** to which we have already briefly referred, of Ireland denied and defied, of Ireland **so indubitably a people and a nation!** She possesses the absolute and unquestioned boundaries of an island in the ocean, and an absolute racial solidarity and unity, except for the small minority of the Scotch-Irish in Ulster province. And this unfortunate—nay, disgraceful—internal division **rests three-fourths on religious grounds and is only one-fourth political.** This legitimate, historical and irrepressible aspiration of Ireland for freedom and independence, with which **a large majority of civilized mankind of every race and people is in hearty sympathy,** has been coldly and offensively ignored by the peace conference at Paris—by the unmistakable order and insistence of England! She insists that the Irish agitation "is a domestic question"; that to encourage and sympathize with Ireland in her struggle "is to interfere in the domestic concerns of Great Britain" and to commit an unfriendly act towards her; that Ireland should **be left to herself to settle the question with England, unsupported, unaided!** The equal of this cold-blooded

hypocrisy and ranting assurance of the British is not to be found on the face of the earth! And even we Americans, twenty per cent Irish in race, **acquiesce in humble submission** to the dictates of the British lion and convulsively but obediently gulp down our grandiloquent declarations about "the rights of small nations to liberty and independence." The author declares this to be a shameful attitude of dishonor, cowardice, injustice, self-condemnation that makes a pitiable parody of all our "war professions" and **steeps our people in deep mortification!**

But Ireland's freedom must come as surely as the rising sun of to-morrow if there is to be any honor and honesty about this idea of assisting small nations to independence; if it is to be "a real principle" and not merely a political pretense invented to meet temporary exigencies. In that case the entire Entente world, including America, would stand convicted of hypocrisy and moral fraud beyond all measure! But we have stated the real crux of the Irish question in our previous reference to it: "What was done, and done justly and to some extent from noble motives, in the case of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Jugo-Slavia **was feared to be done in the case of Ireland because of England's opposition!** It is not that there is any doubt of Ireland's title to her independence; it is recognized that her title **is greater than that of any one of the other peoples named,** but the Entente allies and ourselves are entangled with England in the peace settlement and financially to such an extent, and are otherwise so thoroughly cast down with the fiasco and the burdens of the war, **that action even by those whose sympathies are unequivocally with Ireland seems impossible at this time.** May Ireland take courage—and gather patience and self-restraint—from these statements, and continue her struggle in full confidence that **but a short time more will see her hope and dream fulfilled, her faith rewarded, her glorious independence a reality!**

AT HOME, in America, the illusions of the war are still largely prevalent, but a reaction and slow awakening to "its realities" has begun. We are beginning to see that we were deceived, our ignorance of Europe imposed upon and our generous impulses exploited, but we have the good conscience that

we acted in good faith! Great, therefore, and well justified was the exultation of this country in the part it played in the war and in our military achievements! The victory celebrations and joyous troop receptions were an inspiring expression of our gratitude and satisfaction at the outcome. **Too much honor and praise could scarcely be offered to our valiant troops!** But, alas! for the dismal day not far distant when we shall fully come to realize that these brave boys—our crusader boys—**fought for a chimera only, for an illusion revealed to have been a delusion!** Fired with a noble but artificial ideal—as the whole nation was—our soldier boys were unknowingly deceived and sacrificed! What an awakening for us when we look upon the faces of "THOSE WHO HAVE PAID IN FULL," the faces of this fine young American manhood, to realize at the end **the terrible truth that they have really died in vain!** How maddening to think—and how pitiable—that all our fine patriotic effort, devotion, self-sacrifice, energy and skill of organization should have been **wasted upon a false issue with a barren result!** The "Huns" indeed!—but not the Huns in Germany, but the war-maker and profiteer Huns in Washington. Empty-handed we are!—we have achieved nothing! Nothing is better, no one is happier for our interference in the war; chagrin at the outcome, alarm for our future, a huge debt, personal sorrows and sacrifices are our reward!

Are the couple of millions of German shipping tonnage we took over as helpless war prizes and those seven or eight hundred millions' worth of German-owned industries established here, which we seized, an adequate compensation for us? We should think not; not even if the entire German shipping and commercial competition against us were destroyed forever.

How different our exultation and pride would have been if we had gone to war **in a real cause, against a real enemy** who had tried to trample upon us, to interfere with our liberty and independence; how different if Germany or Austria had conspired against us politically and committed wilfull acts of enmity against us! But there was nothing of this kind going on against us in 1914 or at any time later, **not till after we had declared war!** The acts of "espionage" by Germany and Austria before our entry into the war were acts of legitimate self-

protection only, mostly provoked by our own conspicuous unneutrality. Those acts of offense and enmity which happened later—and which we greatly exaggerated to make out a good "casus belli" for our conscience, were mostly unavoidable results of the existing state of war and its pitiless necessities. Had we had a **real enemy** before us, then, indeed, would William Jennings Bryan's "million men have sprung up armed overnight" to guard the country's safety and honor! No need, then, **to enact compulsory conscription, to suppress freedom of speech, publication and assembly, to hound innocent aliens, to insult and persecute loyal foreign-born citizens, to muffle and browbeat the Congress and to turn the country into a madhouse!**

After-War Anti-German Demonstrations. The continuance of strong anti-German feeling in many quarters in this country need surprise no one who has observed the scarcely abated activity of the British and American propagandas since the closing of the war. Adding to this the repeated inflaming speeches of President Wilson and other leaders and the unchanged hostility of a large part of the press, it is but natural that the "perverted view of the war" and its feelings of hate should still be with us. The fight against ignorance and deep-seated prejudice is ever a hard fight! Conspicuous in this persistent attitude are the **American Loyal Legion,** a national association of ex-soldiers of the war; also the American Defense Society and the National Security League; also sundry organizations of women-patriots who seem to think it necessary to demonstrate their new political status by the extra zeal which everywhere characterizes the neovite. That our young soldiers, only a short time home from the war, their ears filled with the popular praises of "our heroes," should have an elated conception about the great importance of their services to the country is perfectly natural and fully justified. At this very writing, renewed affirmation is being made throughout the country—from Secretary of State Hughes down—of "the high idealism which inspired this people and our troops in the war," all **in answer to Ambassador Harvey's common-sense speech of qualification** made at the London Pilgrim Society dinner. While the administration evidently **thinks the same** or nearly the same as this foolhardy ambassador—for otherwise he would have been promptly disavowed and recalled—it is clear now that the sober view of the war is not yet deemed "good and safe knowledge" for the American people. Now, without wishing to utter one word or thought in disparagement of the splendid showing which our troops and navy made on land and by

sea, the author submits that this extravagant language about their "idealism" is out of place and in bad taste, now that the war excitement should subside, **because it is not in accordance with the facts.**

We all know that the call for volunteers was not a success and that the government was quickly obliged to institute **compulsory national conscription** to obtain the forces required. While it is quite beyond question that among these drafted troops there were many individuals who would have offered themselves as volunteers and who were animated by a deep interest in the war, high-minded patriotic devotion and "the humanitarian ideals" of the hour, it is not likely that these were more than probably 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the total numbers and that 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the men were in the war **because of no particular enthusiasm and merely because they had been drafted and had to go!** Resistance meant imprisonment; evasion and desertion meant death. This statement of the plain facts can scarcely be questioned; hence, the continuance of the exaggerated, fulsome talk about our soldiers' "unselfish and voluntary sacrifice in the service of ideal objects," etc., stultifies both the men and those who indulge in it from a mistaken sense of patriotic zeal.

A desirable sobering-up on this subject is gradually taking place among the more informed and thoughtful sections of the people and has found expression in the press and in Congress. Let us hope that it may soon spread among the general public so that we may regain our former international reputation of being a serious and sensible people!

As to the "excesses of patriotism" of the Loyal Legion and other offenders, we repeat that they are chargeable to a superebulition of animal spirits, national sentiment and war glory, perfectly natural and excusable but which should now be allowed to retire to the normal proportions and sober view in harmony with the facts. This applies to all that has happened in New York in this direction, from the blockading of the German opera to the "Rhine Horror" scenes and the following All-American demonstration and speeches in Madison Square Garden; equally to all similar occurrences in other cities.

B. WAR AND CIVILIZATION. MISLEADING ILLUSIONS. A "NATURAL" VIEW OF LIFE AS THE REMEDY. THE TRUE HISTORICAL AND ETHICAL VIEW OF WAR.

The most absorbing questions above all others within the awful war turmoil are these: "What about civilization; has it been lost? if lost, what was it and where is it gone?—or is

it still with us?" What is its character and position in relation to the world tragedy just closed? There are thousands, millions who ask these questions, who have been deeply stirred by the occurrence of the war, who have lost all moral faith and self-confidence, who feel that we—**mankind**—have been deceived by our teachers, that we have wilfully deceived ourselves about ourselves and this pretense of civilization. In view of what has passed over us, the specific question knocks loudly at the door: **"Is man really something more, something better than merely an educated and dressed-up animal?"** How can we reconcile the terrible brutality of war with our pretensions of religion, education, refinement, humanitarianism—of superiority over the animal world? How can we reconcile it with all else that we comprise in the terms "civilization", "civilized life", with our pretensions of being "higher beings" made in the image of an all-perfect creator,—embodiment of wisdom justice and all the virtues—**God?**

The answer to these harassing contradictions which torment so many of us and which outrage so poignantly our self-esteem and so-called "higher consciousness" **is simple enough if we will but be honest with ourselves, strip off all accumulated artificiality, and contemplate the real natural Adam.** But to perform this feat is not as easy as to state it; the great part of educated mankind are brought up to regard civilization and man from the exalted standpoint (above indicated) which supernatural religion or equivalent systems of egotistical philosophy have implanted in us and which, in spite of our doubts and disillusions, are firmly grown into the flesh and blood of the great majority of men. These make us regard ourselves as beings of a "spiritual nature", as standing apart from the remainder of created life, in fact **as the very objects for which the world was created** or, rather, exists. In practical application, however, "the world" shrinks quickly to the size of our little home-sphere, **the earth;** the suns and stars are but a setting and decoration for it; everything upon the earth is here for man alone; we are beings of a supernatural destiny of resurrection after death; we have an **immortal soul,** something which is distinct from the body and lives forever; animals die, and that is the end of them, but we die—**and yet live again!**

Such is the "monument of conceit" which man has made of himself and his terrestrial abode! Can there possibly be a more narrow view of "the world" and a more sophisticated one of the earth and its little insect-product man—when we think of the boundless extent of the universe, the millions of stars and other "worlds" which circle around, of the great forces which work all through this wonderful maze of cosmic activity and which, even at this "advanced" day, we but imperfectly understand!

Those who hold to this supernatural-life conception surround **the real man** with a glass house, a kind of showcase of self-admiration and exultation at our supposed select position in nature,—a showcase which for particular circumstances has its practical uses, but whose artificiality is incontestable. Inside of it is "the artificial man," man not "as and what he is" but as and what we, or they, the believers, would wish him to be, **an ideal man, the goal-man, the god-man, the higher ego.** With those who hold to this conception (with most of them merely a matter of acquired mental habit, not of self-evolved convictions) "civilization" in all its manifestations partakes of this same artificial character and point of view; hence, war is to them **an atrocious, revolting, accusing, debasing, incomprehensible contradiction.** The terrible reality of its occurrence makes their artificial creation tremble, and, for the moment, shakes their faith! And one should, indeed, think that this orgie of blood—war—with its thousands and thousands of the slain and maimed, its boundless suffering and sorrow spread throughout the world **without a sign having come from this God in this Heaven** would knock the last prop from under the belief in a personal, responsible and "benign" power as the creator and ruler of the world, and destroy all faith in the higher nature and destiny of man. But the oblivion brought by time restores the tottering confidence of "the believers" and they soon return to their flattering weave of self-deception. History might teach them their error, but they close their ears; nature all about them could do so still better by her denials and contradictions: The living in filth and degradation of millions of these exalted humans; the starving to death of other millions annually from want, while "their

brothers" have super-abundance; the character of other millions who are in sense and sensibilities below the stage of many animals; the hopeless depravity of other millions living in the very centers of progress and refinement; the shocking spectacle of the unpitying killings of millions of heads of cattle, sheep, hogs, beasts of the woods, birds, fowls and fishes for **human food** that this special creature—man—may gratify his Lucullian appetite when, yet, **there is abundant palatable and more wholesome food in the world which is not of the blood of life of other creatures!** All this evidence there is and more, but they, the believers, close their eyes and ears for fear of disturbing their vainglorious dream!

We also have the evidence of our general helplessness and of the absence of any "specially favored destiny or protection" when a Vesuvius or an Aetna, a tidal wave or a monsoon, an earthquake or a great epidemic breaks loose and sweeps man and his works away like leaves before a wind! And, further, there is the death and suffering wrought by the lesser "accidents" of life due to the imperfection of man's own work or to his fallibility—railroad accidents, ship disasters, explosions, conflagrations, inundations, machinery accidents, electric shocks, cuts, falls, etc. With all these, and with "moral" pains and disappointments, we are "but a bit of chaff", helpless at the caprice of the unfeeling, unreasoning and irresponsible forces of nature.

Or, would anyone be bold enough to say that in these visitations and accidents "the victims" are **a specially selected congregation of humans or specially wicked individuals, in each case,** ordained by the assumed agent of eternal justice residing in an assumed "heavenly" abode to be thus specially **punished** for wrongs each and every one so visited had committed? The proposition is too absurd to be entertained; but what, then, must be our conclusion? How can we reconcile these facts with our vain assumption that we are the objects of a "divine solicitude and providence" and of a pre-designed destiny for eternal, imperishable conscious life? **No reliable sign and evidence of such conscious existence of man after death on earth has ever come!** Nor is there any evidence of any intelligent destiny and direction to a steadily progressive purpose in the

history of the human race; there is no continuous advance from a lower level to a higher one, each individual, each people and period of civilization handing on to the next, unabridged, what they had inherited and what they had themselves won in order for them—their successors—to build further and higher. Such continuous progress appears only over periods of limited duration—a few thousand years at best—which are insignificant in the arena of cosmic cycles of time. On the contrary, we climb—and slide back a little; we climb some more—and slide back some more; we climb again—**then slide back** the whole length of the ladder to the bottom! Such is the history of **the coming and going civilizations** in respect of the various races and peoples of recorded time; but in a later article the author will attempt to give even a larger perspective of this subject, from which it will appear that **man's entire known period of existence is but one of many similar predecessors which all rose to their height—then fell to extinction, separated by ages of stagnation.**

Quite different from the supernatural is the "natural view" of life, the view in calm harmony with the facts of nature and with man's physical character, capacities, disposition, necessities and opportunities. It sees man as a product of this earth, similar in origin and makeup to all other animal life, merely of a higher order and development of facilities (erect stature, freedom of hands, articulation, etc.) bringing increased opportunities to learn and develop and with them the growth of "reflective intelligence." We perceive the structure and functions of our thinking and feeling apparatus to be similar to those of the higher animals, only so much more developed by constant practice and the ability of free movement over the earth and the sea, and by readier climatic accommodation. The sensations of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, pain and wellbeing, joy and grief, sexual desire, love of life and pressure of self-preservation **link us to the animal world and to nature at large inseparably with unbreakable chains** and in every way so categorically that it makes the opposite conception appear a mere childish freak of ignorance and foolish vanity. All this is demonstrated very prosaically (and in some respects **very offensively** to that refinement of sensibilities which is the

accompaniment of civilization) by the identical physical functioning of our bodies with those of the lower "animals"—the processes of breathing, nutrition, excretion, growth, reproduction, disease, decline—death and dissolution. These truths are **pitilessly destructive** of our assumed pretense of importance and dignity as "special and immortal beings"; if we were such, why are we not made different? Why has this immortal soul of man not yet been identified and proven different from the soul of the animal, the flower or the apple tree, that soul which is individualized in the myriad exhibits of nature—**which is nature itself?** While the gulf which separates the most advanced animals from man is immense, it is **a difference of degree only and not of fundamental kind.** Why have not all the countless ages of man's development succeeded to eliminate **one dot** of his animal physique and necessities, of his mental and emotional character, of the limitation of his understanding? We have the right to ask these questions of supernatural religion with its claims and confident assurances—**but receive no intelligible answer.**

In this natural and truthful conception of life which the author attempts to convey "civilization" is not anything so very remarkably advanced, wonderful or exalted as we are wont to proudly believe; it only appears to us to be so **relatively;** the foundation, **nature,** and the material, **man,** are and remain ever the same; it is astonishing and instructive to see **how thin is this artificial product,** how easily it is stripped off, how near man is at all times to his "natural" state. The war has, once again, pointed this lesson with a terrifying eloquence! That civilization is not regular, continuous and permanent we have already pointed out, **nor is it at any time of very great absolute perfection.** It should be regarded as merely a logical result of man's momentary state of development at any given epoch, the result of the challenge thrown out by nature to the forces within him to make their utmost demonstration under the many varried conditions of existence. It measures the degree of man's conquest over nature at any given time, over the many obstacles and uncertainties, the arbitrariness and unbending dictation which he encounters in the path of his struggle for self-preservation, for a living,

comforts, enjoyments, position and power over others, individually and collectively, in various directions.

In proportion as civilization advances, it is, in a measure, a getting-away from nature; and it is a nice question as to how far man may proceed upon this road, individually and in a mass, with impunity, i. e., with immunity from harmful consequences. Evidently, being nature's children (altogether so in our view) the artificial life of civilization must reach a limit at some time at the point where we begin to suffer and deteriorate physically, and where life, as such, becomes unenjoyable, where **a state of weariness at the oppressive surfeit of the artificial sets in.** At that point we are compelled to stop and turn back. Individual men, peoples and entire periods of civilization reach that condition from time to time. As to attaining perfection of development, history shows civilization in its various periods among different peoples to have been one-sided and imperfect in each, now excelling more in this direction and now in that, here showing deficiencies of one class and there of another; also it shows it to have been irregular and flitting in its coming and going from one people or part of the earth to another. Each period seems to have left **some things attempted unattained, notable achievements of former times lost and forgotten, those of later periods not even dreamt of.** However it be, it rises like a wave to its crest, then recedes to a calm, to exhaustion, to recuperation and a new rise and swell to eminence at some other place; it is the picture of ever-continuous life within transformation and death, the reflection of nature itself in her round of summer and winter, resurrection and burial.

It follows that in the view of life and man's character here presented, **war is not anything unnatural.** All nature is the scene of perpetual war of contending forces; self-preservation is a battle from the smallest creatures up to man; every living thing seems to have its "natural" enemy (by instinct) whom it wants to destroy, and many "live upon each other" for food; peace within this unceasing struggle is only recuperation for new effort of demonstration, acquisition, domination; **absolute peace means stagnation and decay.** Man's nature is animal—imperative physical necessities to be satis-

fied, the passions of the flesh to be appeased, the emotions of love and hate, jealousy and vengeance, desire for possessions and of power over others to be asserted—and leads inevitably to contention and strife with his fellowman and equally among entire peoples. Nor is man, the animal, when aroused in his fundamental physical character, a gentle animal like a cow, a fish, a fowl or the little things which creep in the ground; **on the contrary he is fierce, bloodthirsty and terrible like the wolf of the steppes and the tiger of the jungles.** Thus the essence of war is ever present and ever the same whether man meets man with a spiked club, a flint-lock gun or a modern repeating rifle, with a Roman catapult or a fifteen-inch breech-loading gun! And while mechanical and scientific progress have, on the one hand, produced the awful agencies of destruction, death and mutilation which this war has shown, they have happily, on the other hand, produced the amelioration of suffering by modern surgery, medicine and hospital nursing, and the vastly improved care for the soldier from every point of view. Hence, there is for those who subscribe to a rational and normal view of life, including war, **no conflict, incompatibility or accusation between war and civilization, no disillusionment and no remorse;** these sentimental agonies belong alone to those who are morbidly illusioned and oppressed by an artificial conception of the character of man, his life on the earth and assumed destiny after death.

But an important differentiation must be asserted. While war, in the view stated, is inevitable from time to time as a condition "natural to man" and as the final appeal and only definite conclusion in serious enmities between nations, there is, nevertheless, a great distinction to be drawn **as to the character of wars;** as to quality of motives and any real unavoidable necessity. Those of the past which have been pure wars of aggression and conquest of the stronger upon the weaker for political and material gain, or those of injury and subjugation from mere envy, greed and racial jealousy, or those of mere monarchical or imperial self-perpetuation, or those—most execrable of all—of religious contention and persecution **are to be entirely condemned and should be made impossible in the future by every means which can be devised.**

But there are other wars of the past—such as will also be justified in the future—**which have been as the beacon lights in man's general advance, intellectual, moral, material.** Such were the wars in revolt of oppression by tyrannical, arbitrary governments, whether they were those of monarchical or popular tyranny; those for national consolidation and independence when conditions for such were ripe, above all those for man's intellectual and moral emancipation and for free popular government in agreement with modern thought and feeling.

History is replete with these commendable, constructive wars: The wars of the Greek and Roman republics of old; of Spain, Holland and Switzerland, and others more, for national independence; the wars of the "reformation" for religious freedom and tolerance; that of America for freedom from England and establishment of our republic; the civil war for the maintenance of the American Union; the wars of the French revolution for the intellectual and political emancipation of mankind; the smaller modern revolutionary wars; those of Germany's and Italy's consolidation to nationality; finally, the struggles for free institutions in Russia and Germany as the result of the great war just closed. But of the condemnable wars of olden and modern times **none approaches in absence of justification, in low grade of motives and falsehood of every species the war of 1914-1919 on the part of five original war powers of 1914, but overwhelmingly of the three Entente powers!** Its cupidity was surpassed only by its stupidity; it was in fact, the unintentional result of a fatal diplomatic miscalculation, as fully explained by the author in Article VIII. It forced Germany and her allies to challenge the world to a war **in self-defense of their honor and independence,** the grandest in scale, courage and devotion which the world has seen. This will be the universal verdict on this war in less than ten years from now, when complete calm will have replaced the present mental and emotional disturbance.

In the largest view, however, the direct motives and incidents which led to the outbreak of the great war were not in themselves **the primary cause,** but, rather, an effect, a consequence of our decadent and barren system of morals which

is incapable of exercising effective control over men's minds and emotions and serves only as a cloak for the inherent evil impulses of a race unchecked by genuine ideals. To this must be added the accompanying state of "Spiritual Inertia," previously discussed in Article VII, mainly produced by our preoccupation with material subjects and achievements. But had there been in practice a sound system of personal and political ethics founded on natural facts and unprejudiced reason, one the truth and power of which men **would have felt in their inmost hearts as a true guide to right action,** this spiritual inertia could not have been influential! Now that the war is past and we realize its monstrosity and are cast down with chagrin and remorse, we make a concerted but imbecile effort to prevent a similar disaster by a purely political and one-sided scheme of a League of Nations. The more credulous pretend to believe that this means will be effective; but how should this be possible if the fundamental ethical errors and deficiencies, which we have named as the real underlying causes of our condition, **are left untouched?** We must go deeper—to the very bottom; we must tear off our old dress of hypocritical and worn-out ideas and plunge into the fountain of real truth, naturalness and genuine human brotherhood-sympathy for our regeneration. **A radical remedy is needed!** While there is no harm in supernatural religious assumptions as a speculation merely of the imagination, as a subject for mythical poetry and art, as a pretty fancy for primitive peoples, children and the mentally simple, **these fancies must not be transformed into beliefs in their actuality and made the foundation of our practical life conceptions and rules of moral action.** Herein lies the danger and harmfully misleading influence of religion; it furnishes a false environment and perspective to our existence, fills the mind of man with impossible illusions and puts him in constant contradiction with the hard facts of daily life experiences and the whole history of the race. This condition leads to a perversion of the judgment and the impulses until our whole position is become unnatural, diseased and theoretical—and we have, in short, the glass house and its inmate!

It is an interesting question whether the periodical stagnation and collapse of civilizations, this puzzling fact of climbing and backsliding and losing of achievement, **this absence of a steady continuity in man's advance** may not be due to the influence of these unsound life views, these hallucinations about ourselves **which from time to time are bound to end up in a climax of reaction, of revelation of their unsoundness, and in a consequent moral and spiritual débâcle.** In the rational view and practice of life, as suggested in this book, it is, on the contrary, possible to encompass the attainment of this continuity and the advent of a steady progress of man of unbounded scope and splendor!

Excrescences of Religion. Apart from the many "sects" of the Christian and other religions which have, at least, some theological dogma or interpretation of the Bible for their foundation, there are all those strange modern vagaries—Spiritualism, New-Thought, Christian Science, Theosophy, Occultism, etc., which are neither religion, dogma, schools of ethics, systems of philosophy nor anything else definite and classifiable. These negative "cults" are, however, very important for the author's argument by proving—from their **great number and very large following**—the utter dissatisfaction with orthodox supernatural religions by a growing section of the public, and its yearning for something more satisfying and convincing. With all that, these "cults" are not atheistc nor even strictly agnostic, and hold fast to the fundamental ideas of supernatural religions, as set forth in the preceding text. Regarding spiritualism, spiritism, re-incarnation, occultism, and all other forms which believe in "spirits", "messages", "manifestations", "materialization of the departed", etc., these strange vagaries have the ardent object of **proving the theory of supernatural existence** by finding and producing evidence of its actuality. (The evidence is "found" in various ways and very often "produced" in the literal sense). This object and its methods cannot be regarded as anything else but a species of **pitiable self-deceit** proceeding from, and appealing to, minds naturally weak or pathologically affected, in other words "unsound" in the sense of being super-credulous, morbidly impressionable, unclear, and unable to bring logical reasoning powers to bear on the physical processes by which the various forms of "supernatural evidence" are manifested. The physical processes are the well-established facts and methods of mesmerism, trance, somnambulism, thought-influence or telepathy, hypnotism and every other form of "super-excited psychological manifestations." Their names are many and impressive but their nature is

identical, and rests upon the general principles, facts and power of psychology and metaphysics. In the hands of the trained scientist, physician and minister of religion these facts and powers are of the greatest value—whether applied to spiritual, moral, medical or merely material problems—but in the hands of the half-trained professional "teachers" in these lines and the many unprincipled charlatans who thrive upon them and the public's credulity, they are mostly a deception and merely a means of financial exploitation.

XV. THE SUMMIT

The Nineteenth Century. Progress or Decay? The Philosophy of "Rationalism" vs. Supernatural Religions. Its Practical Application.

When at the battle of Waterloo, in 1815, the great Napoleon was defeated and European peace established soon thereafter, a new era began to dawn upon the world. The European nations—the flower of the earth—were at last permitted to turn from the horrors and distractions of war to the hopes and beneficent employments of peace. A great mental reformation, a resurrection or intellectual *renaissance* had been wrought by the French Revolution and the years of political, military and philosophical strife which followed in its wake. The new theories of individual rights and increased personal liberty—the new intellectual and moral freedom—had gone into the flesh and blood of men and become a living faith. Now that peace had come again with a fair promise of permanence, after a period of twenty-six years of turbulence, this new philosophy imperatively called for demonstration in all the fields of human endeavor—and the territory and all attendant conditions were ripe for this demonstration. It was, moreover, a case of urgent material necessity. The world had been impoverished, famished, disjointed! Destruction in town and city, of farm buildings and country estates, and devastation of fields and forests had been going on for two decades in France, Central Europe and Italy. The scale of living had been reduced to the minimum required for bare existence, except for the very rich,

and many of that class also had suffered severe privations through political persecution and exile. No wonder, then, that the world now began to draw a new breath. The problem for it was "to get on its feet again", to work and plan with diligence to replace the waste, to accumulate new resources for a new era of material progress. In this new era, pursuant to the new ideas, **a greater number of all the people should share** in the material wellbeing hoped for, than had formerly been possible.

At this period the world was a different one from that of to-day. It was a great world of new ideas in politics, philosophy, literature, art and music, in theoretical science and mathematics, but **in applied sciences it was a world in its infancy compared to our day.** Although only a hundred years behind us in point of time, it stood nearer to Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages than to us. There were no power engines of any kind except simple hydraulic and other mechanical devices; no railroads or steamboats, no telegraph, telephone, gaslight and power, or electric-light and power; no automobile, aeroplane, submarine or wireless telegraph. Mechanical science, electricity, chemistry, photography, sanitation, medicine, hygiene and surgery were still in their early stages of tentative development, pregnant of great things to come, but practically just emerging from the darkness of the Middle Ages. In the finest residences and hotels of those days there were no water-supply and heating systems, no sanitary plumbing apparatus and sewage disposal, nothing but candle light and primitive oil lamps, and the cooking apparatus and other domestic appointments were of the simplest kind. Scientific ventilation was entirely unknown. Cities had no public water and sewer systems. No long-distance communication of any kind existed; the post-chaise-and-four was the means of traveling and mail service; everything in all these respects was of the simplest kind compared with the conveniences, comforts and advantages of our time. It is not easy for us to form a correct mental picture of the living and working conditions of those days, so great is the difference!

But the awakening of the world **to a new life** was on its way. James Watts had seen the kettle-lid moving; Volta and

Franklin were experimenting in electricity and galvanism; chemists and physicists were delving and brewing; later the great Faraday came with his startling discoveries. Fulton had made the first tentative runs with his steamboat on the Hudson, and the mechanism of the steam engine—that greatest single achievement of modern history—was being perfected. Soon that "wonder engine" set the wheels a-rolling, **we might say all the wheels of the modern era, of the greatest of the centuries.** In a short time there were railroads, steamboats, steam engines of every sort to drive mechanical-power plants, and manufacturing establishments arose of every variety. The loom, the lathe, the scientific pump, many kinds of power tools and wonderful hand tools were being invented; the sewing machine and knitting machine came in due order. Meantime, in the scientific world discoveries of a marvelous kind were being made which soon gave us artificial gas light and domestic water service, the telegraph, the telephone, the great printing press that works like a thing of life, the dynamo for producing electric light and the motor for power, the typewriting machine, the phonograph, cinematograph and dictagraph, gas and oil and compressed-air engines, the gasoline engine and the automobile, the electric power battery and storage battery, the submarine boat, airship and flying machine, wireless telegraphy and aerial telephony, and countless wonderful applications of these forces and devices. Chemistry kept apace with its valuable discoveries in the field of the hydro-carbons and coal-tar products, in finding new substances and processes—liquification of air, many new gases, Roentgen rays and radium, refrigeration and food preservation processes, etc., while physical and mechanical sciences hastened to apply these new means in the thousand-and-one ways and uses with which we are familiar. It was a stupendous century of research, study, invention, progress in knowledge and revolution in methods and scale of living, working and enjoyments!

In all this there was **the stimulus of a goal, the ambition to advance from that which had been attained, stepwise, to that which loomed up ahead as something still newer, promising, fascinating;** and between pure experimental science and necessity —between the insistent demands for new conveniences and

facilities, new life benefits and attractions and the power of discovery and invention—there ensued **the restless chase of the galloping nineteenth century for more and more of new thrills of achievement.** We have been to the North Pole and the South Pole; we travel upon the water, under the water and in the air with the certainty of land locomotion; we have delved into analytical chemistry and biology to a point which brings us close to solving the riddle of life. The general advance in theoretical and mathematical astronomy has been so wonderful that with the aid of the modern monster telescope we can almost walk around on Luna and Mars as if they were the earth itself, and the progress in photography has fixed their pictures with astonishing accuracy. Utilitarian physics and chemistry have taught us how to turn the very dust and debris of the earth and the life processes into useful material! We fly across three-thousand miles of ocean in a few hours, and with the aerial and land telephone can talk around the earth; the engineering marvels of the railroads, with their tunnels and bridges, have been supplemented by the great canals of Suez, Kiel, Corinth and Panama. In our cities magnificent buildings for hotels and offices, of thirty to forty stories in height, have been erected and in their internal equipments are compendiums of everything that science and art have developed for the service and gratification of this luxurious modern man, while the ingenious subways and sub-river-tunnel railroads furnish rapid city travel free from interference from street traffic. Our transatlantic, lake and river steamers are floating hotels, wonders of strength, size, speed, ingenuity of arrangement and elegance of installation. It would seem that our every thirst and ambition for knowledge of the earth and of the heavens, of man and his life purpose, of physical satisfaction and pleasures are now satisfied and **that we are apparently arrived at a summit in all of these respects.** The state of "continuous expectancy" of the last seventy-five years is abating, the book of wonders is closing, the summit of our powers and dreams seems attained!

In truth, what is there left for man to achieve of additional marvels to minister to his service or progress unless he develop some new intellectual sense, like the comprehension of the

fourth dimension, or turn to a new philosophical idea and life perspective, as he might, by abandoning the cult of the supernatural? There will, no doubt, be perfectioning of detail and increasing variety of all that we now possess, and extensions into related fields. The imagination can see a thousand things to which the powers which we now control may yet be applied. But, **what essentially new great problems and ambitions** in the lines of discovery and invention are there really and visibly left to us—objects of our ardent desires—links to our knowledge, necessities to the enlargement and improvement of our existence?

Only a few years back there was still the North-pole lure and the South-pole lure, the submarine boat, the navigation of the air, wireless telegraphy and telephony. Today we have left only two or three major problems of burning interest to excite our energies. One **is the penetration into the bowels of the earth to** such depth, and at sufficiently numerous points, as to enable us to solve the question of the structure of the earth's crust (if it be a crust) or of its interior formation—whether it be a mass of molten stone and metal or a cold solid of silicious and metallic nature—or, perhaps, a hollow space filled with hot gases. Modern engineering should be able to sink open steel-tube shafts to such depth—twenty-five miles or more—that a safe surmise, at least, might be made as to the earth's interior structure. Another problem left is **the penetration into the air region around the earth** to the limits of this gaseous envelope to ascertain its nature and, perhaps, beyond **into the ether of light and electricity,** even far enough to establish communication with, or at least gain precise information about, the nearest heavenly bodies to our earth—our satelite Moon and the planet Mars and its moons. With the discovery of explosive agents of unbelievable power, and our ability to construct titanic guns of corresponding strength, the vision rises of **our ultimately reaching these bodies!** These two quests into the unknown are no more chimerical than many of those which we have solved would have appeared to the people of a hundred years ago. The third visible problem is the continuation of advanced biological research **to discover**

the process of the spontaneous generation of organized self-conscious animal life—of our life. THIS IS THE GREATEST.

These three major tasks still before us are, undoubtedly, of absorbing interest and scientific value; yet, if we reflect, it may be seen that they are of much less **direct human-life usefulness** than those which were the effort and grand success of the nineteenth century. Thus the immediate future before mankind lacks, in comparison, the stimulus of similar powerfully incentive subjects of science and life problems as those were which gave such a zest of endeavor to the immediate past. Even the wonderful new cosmic theory of "relativity" as expounded by **Professor Albert Einstein**—relativity of the values of time, space, motion, gravitation and all other cosmic forces—holding the prospect of completely changing our conception of the universe and all its processes, does not affect or interest us deeply in regard to our mundane life-existence. For a considerable period, no doubt, we shall remain at our summit to perfect, enlarge, exploit and enjoy our accomplishment. Then, if no new conditions shall arise to give a fresh aspect to life, with practical tasks of immediate necessity or great desirability, **different in kind from the three stated above, and now hidden from our view,** there must inevitably follow a period of indifference, stagnation and decay similar to those of past ages.

SO much for the outward demonstration and effect of things. But everything in life, every fact and exhibition, is founded on ideas and is guided by ideas. Behind the act there stands the thought, behind the intention and method the philosophical basis. That day when primitive man first stopped to act and desire from mere unreasoning animal impulse **and began to think and reflect about things, including his own acts and feelings, and to develop the sense of right and wrong, was the greatest day in the history of this earth and its animated inhabitants.** Mind and moral principles together—with necessity as the mainspring—determine quality and scope of action; and as, from time to time, new levels of station are reached, new adjustments must be made, new perceptions and convictions translated into practice **if action is not to deteriorate to**

mechanical repetition. Thus in the world of pure thought and emotion—religion, morals, philosophy, political and social systems—identical astonishing development has taken place in this remarkable nineteenth century, and we seem to have similarly arrived **at a summit of outlook,** scope and means where either new standards must be found or stagnation and decay result from the insufficiency of the old ideas to provide a satisfactory working guide and stimulating goal for the new future. The following reflections have been expressed in connection with the topics of preceding articles: **"A new, vigorous, clear and bold philosophy is imperatively needed for the freely-thinking, emancipated sections of mankind, lest we be willing to see this civilization die of the poison of impotent resignation to the contradictions which confront supernatural religions and which other systems of thought are likewise unable to meet to our satisfaction.**

In the article on the ethical transformation of large numbers of the working and business population of the most advanced countries—Article XIII, Part B—we spoke of the inability of the new views of mere religious **negation,** of indefinite ethical theories and of unnatural human-rights doctrines **to furnish a firm moral basis to the individual,** especially when associated with an insufficient educational foundation. The state of confusion and exasperation produced by this mental condition is directly accountable for the unfortunate prevalent misconception of the ideas and aims of socialism and of popular political institutions by those so affected. Religious and other reliable guides **are wholly or partly discarded in these cases without a firm level of new views having been gained.** As we said, only few, in proportion, have in this struggle "attained the confidence and serenity of full new convictions," of a new rational moral outlook and conception of life. But these difficulties and errors and discouragements do not remove the causes of the existing doubt and distraction; the life-problems and the mental conditions, as we described them, cannot be removed by merely ignoring them; **they are the stern reality with which we must deal—and the remedy and new rejuvenated confidence must be brought to all!** What is lost entirely or become unreliable by having proven itself insufficient cannot be rein-

stated, nor can the new positions and visions gained, even if yet imperfect, be dissipated by denial. These new ideas and feelings have come to stay and they demand an answer, a satisfactory answer which will appeal to reason: It is our problem—**the greatest problem before mankind**—to give this answer, to furnish to all men and women that new and truer conception of mankind and life upon which a new era of civilization, of increased and more equal happiness may firmly be built and the fatal inertia and decay which face us be averted! It is this new idea of life, this new moral basis which must regenerate man's imagination, disclose new paths and objects of work and living and thus **prevent the surfeit of material achievement and the oppression of dead religious conceptions overwhelming him.**

What the character of this new faith and guide must be, and the reasons for its being and its acceptance, have now been outlined: It is to be the naturally-ethical view of man and life, free from all supernatural attributes and destiny. Reason and physical probability must be the test; our attitude in all questions must be "rationally critical"; consequently we must repel the hypnotic thraldom of supernatural conceits and come down out of our artificial heaven upon this earth altogether, to the bosom of our mother, our alpha and omega, **and make this life here our heaven, and our character and works our only possible, desirable and comprehensible immortality.** This philosophy sets us in complete harmony with nature upon a basis of facts instead of illusions; it removes those doubts and fears which confront us the moment we shut ourselves up in that glass house, and, instead, gives clearness to our view and firmness to our purpose. It centers our moral responsibility directly in the individual, or in the community, and confines it upon this earth alone, free from any artificial reservations of "accounting" in a future state of life. Being **of and through nature,** this mode of thought must rest upon the study of her laws and works and upon the study and discipline of our own "human nature," **making them jointly the source and guides for our code of practical morals and life ideals.** In this way shall we acquire that clearness of thought, faith and aim which will permit us to bring the new socialistic and free political

ideas which are active everywhere **into a successful combination** with which to overcome our dangers and build a new period of progressive civilization. This system of life philosophy we will name **"The true Rationalism."**

How is this revolutionary transformation in life-view, ethics, in social and political institutions to be promulgated and guided along? We are not only speaking of the correction and broadening needed in those already inculcated with the new thought, but particularly of the conversion of the yet unaffected or only partly touched sections of the people. On the practical side of this program there will not be much difficulty—it is even now almost conquered territory; the only real opposition will be from the rich and privileged who will have to surrender a portion of their favored positions and advantages for the common good. But on the ethical side the transformation will not be so easy or so rapid. The average man is quick enough to see the practical points in a new movement, but slow to assimilate the theory, the idea which is behind it, **and to feel the close connection between the two.** But this theoretical side, the philosophy of the new conviction and aspiration, is the most important part because it is the foundation of the practical embodiment. We know how deeply rooted with many is the fascination of the supernatural, the thought of our superior quality and destiny, the hope of a blissful state in a hereafter!

And yet it is the truth that **these beliefs are today in overwhelming preponderance more a matter of early teaching, of mental habit, of force of association, of practical "business" value, even, than of true conviction!** They flatter our vanities, lull our apprehensions, reassure superficially our natural timidity as to death being the ultimate and definite end of us—**but they do not satisfy the critical reasoning faculties of very large numbers.** The progress in breadth and boldness of intelligence of the educated man of our time over the same man of even sixty years ago **is immense** (excepting the small army of the pioneers), and the similar progress of the ordinary man of today is even greater! The effect of the wonderful one-hundred years past has been to sharpen the reasoning faculties, to eradicate timidity and bugaboo fears of the supernatural and to make man self-reliant of opinion. The lure of "a heaven"

and fear of "a hell" are broken with millions and have become a matter of doubt with even greater numbers; in truth, **if the mental inertia in matters of abstract thought, which holds so many captive, and all the social and utilitarian influences were removed from the practice of religion, the proportion of "serious and convinced worshippers" in our churches would shrink to a surprisingly low figure.**

It is this **indifference** to, this disappointment with supernatural religion because of its delusive teachings and impotent results, which has, in the absence of a clear and strong new philosophy to take its place, produced the moral bankruptcy of the masses and laid them open to every revolutionary theory in ethics and social and political reform. But it is **the fact of the great war—the possibility of its occurrence**—which has brought all this unbelief and dissatisfaction to a focus and **added millions more of disillusioned and mortified humans** to the others already in that condition; it has given the knock-out blow to the pious belief in a kind and just heavenly father, a reigning providence and future eternal life of higher destiny! The conspicuous fact is demonstrated on all sides that there are great multitudes of men of all classes of society, and belonging to the most advanced peoples of the world, who are **ready for a new philosophy of life based on natural facts and reason** which will remove their perplexities and bring firmness and a new hope to their thought; they are ready to receive a plain, simple and convincing view of man and his relation to his surroundings; they are eagerly waiting for the system and the teacher! With many of the highly educated and specially intelligent this hope and wish is an accomplished fact; for the others the advance must be secured through transforming our system of teaching the moral perceptions, the rights and duties of the individual to himself, the family, the community; the real relation of man to his fellow-man, to the animal world, the mother-earth and the universe. It has long been a conviction among thinkers and social students—and is a growing suspicion among the masses—that **as long as man remains possessed by the idea of his special destiny and a life after death in which the inequalities and wrongs of the life on earth will be rectified, he will not attain to the exercise of his free untrammelled moral nature and will not extend to his brother-man that full**

sympathy, helpfulness and justice of treatment which is his natural right—the right of each other—but will continue to deploy his one-sided selfishness and—with a grin—leave the wrong he does, and in turn suffers, to the after-death adjustment, both for his victim and for himself. The moral threat of religion has lost its strength as against that of the passions, and creates unconsciously in the individual an **unfavorable attitude** for the exercise of the highest conscience and sense of justice and of a genuine interest in our fellow-man—**the very opposite result of what religion claims to do and to achieve.** It is the author's firm belief that the view of life he advocates will make man clearer and truer to himself, more honest and truthful, more just and kind to his fellows.

Therefore, additional to the teaching of the general thought of the new rationalism, **it is education—on the right lines—** which must assist to break down this unfavorable influence of religion which centuries of habit have made a very part of ourselves! Compared with any faith of after-death religion, the new philosophy advocated will automatically produce the opposite mental attitude on all questions of earth-relations and conduct by enabling us to realize **the identity and equality of limitations** of the destiny of all of us on earth. It must thus lead in a natural way requiring no arguments to **the true brotherhood of man!**

The system of teaching which the author believes to be required will not be one of fixed tenets and precepts but rather of instilling and generating ideas and impressions which will lead to processes of thinking and feeling—in other words, **the creation of an attitude and the building of character**—to be won from the interested and attentive study of nature's laws and wonderful works, revealing lessons of order, system, gradation, submission of the lower in position and value to the higher, advancing in varied combinations to the highest development of variety within unity, of freedom within authority. With such perceptions solidly attained, and as much as possible in nature's workshop itself—by work on farms, in gardens, in woods, by breeding of animals, hunting and fishing, etc.—and supplemented by general education, the reading of history and good literature, the study of art and music, the result could not fail to be **the intimate conviction of our wholly "natural"**

origin and destiny and would become a living faith and stimulating life foundation. Once this position were attained, all that which is unsound in reason in present socialistic and political doctrines, opposed to our nature and impossible of attainment would be abandoned and the way opened for a new human society of true internal strength and boundless external possibilities!

To resume and condense: The essential thought of the author is this that man's social nature, sense of responsibility and the ethical precepts for the conduct of intercourse between man and man, the social fabric as a whole—including also the political State—must rest upon **a purely mundane foundation** (excluding the whole array of "supernatural" assumptions) and must be evolved from nature's facts and laws and from her teaching. That which we know as "morals"—and which is ethics resting upon the ideas of supernatural religions, assumption of special origin, kind and destiny for man—must be transformed into "pure ethics" evolved entirely from our position on the earth, our relation to and **complete dependence from unreasoning nature** and our intercourse with each other, and with the animal world of which we are a part and the leading exponent. The teaching of ethics, as distinguished from religious morality, has achieved a position of increasing importance in modern educational work—as illustrated in America by the notable work done by the "Society for Ethical Culture" (New York) under the leadership and inspiration of its gifted founder and president, Dr. Felix Adler, and his able and earnest assistant teachers. Yet, all this work, wherever done, has not reached the full usefulness and effect **which it should have had** and has not found the extended following by the public which should have been its share, because its teaching has not represented a clean-cut departure from supernatural religions. It has attempted to rest its "system" upon both the fundamental assumptions of "religion" and the conclusions of natural human "reason," **two irreconcilable ideas** the union of which cannot produce that clearness of conviction which is necessary for a true and vigorous philosophy of life. In the propaganda for the "rationalistic" system of thought, and in its methods of teaching, every form and manner of compulsion, not to mention persecution and violence, must be rigidly shunned. The primary requisite

from the public must be the **concession of the equal right of existence and the full tolerance** of this new life-view with all other forms of natural and supernatural religion or philosophy. As long as the purpose is pure and earnest, every road of inquiry into man's character and life questions should have equal opportunity; there must be no weapon of attack or defense used except that of persuasive argument resting on indisputable facts and man's ability to think and reason. Conquest in the kingdom of ideas must be won by argument and convincement only!

We have on a previous occasion expressed the thought that the true democratic state is in its idea antagonistic to theism, and vice-versa, and that the perfected republic of the future will require the naturalistic system of ethics, as here presented, for its full success and assured permanence. As between moderate socialism and the fully developed form of communism now known as "bolshevism", the latter demands positively both political democracy and the ethical freedom of "rationalism"; it is, with all its present faults of theory and application, **a complete doctrine of morals, society and political form combined in one system,** and thus covers the three fundamentals which we have previously designated as the essentials of civilized life. This broad and definite position of bolshevism gives it a distinct advance over merely utilitarian socialism; it is more complete as a political theory and is also a creed of life. Bolshevism believes, **with incontrovertible logic,** that so long as socialistic projects and democratic political theories **remain associated with a supernatural philosophy in contradiction with life-truth,** and also with the idea of classes—be they of birth or wealth or pre-advantages of any kind—the combination can produce but **an incomplete and contradictory scheme upon which no thorough remodeling of human society can be built.** It believes in coming down to "rock bottom," free from all old shackles, and building up anew from there. Our criticism of bolshevism is in the main the same as of moderate socialism, as expressed in Article XIII, Part B. It must be brought in better harmony with the facts of nature and the traits of human nature—in other words, into full accord with the ethics of the true rationalism. How this can be accomplished by specially directed education has been argued in the preceding par-

agraph and is further elaborated below. **The correct conception of the doctrine must first be thoroughly implanted and become fully appropriated by the masses before any really fruitful progress upon this path can be attained.** When thus worked out to greater perfection, bolshevism may in time become the universal system of a new society and civilization—**an international democratic communistic state—socialism.** (Additional comments on this topic will follow in Article XVI.)

HERE, then, there is a call for a departure in education, a new direction and system to secure the basis for a practical new morality to clarify, reinforce and enhance our civilization to new life. Some progress has already been made in recent years on the road indicated as far as nature-study, manual training and hygiene are concerned. The new idea should begin with the grammar-school course; and in order to obtain more time for the new system, there should be rigidly excluded from it all those scientific subjects which really belong to a college or technical education and on which much valuable time is now spent without corresponding useful results. The same criticism applies to foreign and classical languages; they should be studied in the High school or at home, or later at college. Combined with the nature-studies and practical gardening work, etc., must go **the teaching of morals, or ethics, the principles of just and considerate conduct in daily intercourse and business, and also "the virtues" so necessary to health, beauty and refinement.** All this is not anything new in itself; the newness resides in its new and free basis, point of view, or motive—in the thought behind it and in its ultimate purpose which, both, are **mundane instead of supernatural.**

The above instruction must be given absolutely without the aid of any supernatural beliefs, fancies, threats of punishment or promises of reward, and must proceed solely from the idea and object of the system—**the training of a human being absolutely natural and rational in its manner of reasoning, feeling, acting, views, tastes and ambitions of life!** This same system of teaching must, necessarily, be continued in the home-training of the young to make the effect complete. We will leave it

to the professional educator, the student of sociology and the practical statesman to perfect the necessary details and devise the ways and means of setting the ideas here advanced in motion. The author firmly believes that this is the road to take to save us from the existing surfeit, confusion and falsity, and which must engulf our civilization if not checked by the light of a new guide and the inspiration of a new promise!

Looking at this proposition of a new philosophy merely from the point of view of the **everyday morality and average personal character** of our time—from the outward exhibition of the inner want—the need of a change of the underlying ideas is shown by the shortcomings exhibited in these respects in all civilized countries. And, apart from morals, as such, normal reason and feeling seem to be upset, and there is urgent need of producing **a better-balanced man, better balanced in his intellectual, moral and emotional nature** than is shown by the average man of today almost everywhere. The race has become one-sided, super-nervous and morbidly emotional, intolerant and over-sensitive—all symptoms of the nervous exhaustion of the period, the result of the severe tension and continual excitements of modern life. **This lack of balance and repose is conspicuously shown by the American man and woman.** Our intemperate, hysterical conduct towards our enemies in the war is an illustration; another is found in the selfish and tyrannical fanaticism of the compulsory total-abstinence legislation (not to mention its violation of personal freedom and right); another by the sensational "religious revivals" bordering on the ludicrous and offensive; another by the morbid and literally "hair-raising" character of the movie-picture presentations and the exploitation of savory "scandals" by newspapers and stage plays; another by the ever-abundant crop of "cranks", fanatics, faddists, reformers on every subject under the sun; by the "psychology exploiters" and "new-thought" conjurers, the "spiritism" and "theosophy" humbugs; another by the flagrant tendency to public indecency in the flesh-advertising style of women's costumes and in many of the entertainments offered to the public, even to young boys and girls.

In all lines **the sensational, extraordinary, abnormal, huge, catastrophal, soul-tearing** seems to appeal to us in preference to the reposeful, harmonious, beautiful! (Oh! memories of Greek art and philosophy!) Our minds seem to lack the sense of proportion, appropriateness and contemplative reflection, rushing hither and thither in the search for something still newer and more startling. Other nations have similar abnormal records of their own, the whole indicating **an age deficient in mental balance and self-possession.** It seems as if the world were losing its faculty of philosophical reflection, the habit of trying to understand the ideas underlying things! In Germany and France, where in former days this faculty was conspicuous, as evidenced by the rich literature relating to it, indifference is growing. In England this trait was always obscure and held down by the rule of unquestioning orthodox religions; in America, it is almost absent among the general public. Thus the world is rushing along pell mell on the road of practical work for material success, comforts, enjoyment, prosperity of the individual—but reflection as to elementary ideas and causes and the inevitable results to flow from the prevailing spirit and practice are neglected. We stride along blindly, unconsciously towards an unknown end—it recalls in all its aspects the fall of ancient Rome! Does it suggest itself to the reader that this condition must in a large degree be due to the irritating contradiction existing between our plain "reason and observation" and the irrational ideas of our "supernatural character" **which are driven into us when we are young and so difficult to shake off when we are older**—making slaves of us to a lifelong attitude of presumption?

As to the very cornerstone of any code of ethics—truthfulness and plain honesty—the war has been a shocking revelation of our unbounded depravity! The author has repeatedly referred to its shameful record of lies, slanders, abuse, brutal selfishness, prostitution of patriotism, lowness and moral perversion of motives—for which ten millions of men were slain, or crippled and ruined for life! And the part we—America—was compelled to play in this awful record by the actions of our war party was enacted under **pretenses of high ideals and unselfish purposes** which were put into our hearts and mouths

without proper explanation. What a mockery of reason and truth! What a mountain of callous hypocrisy! What an accusation of the impotency of supernatural religion to produce even these simple virtues of truthfulness and plain honesty in men!

For, it cannot be said that this awful record was caused by a sudden irresponsible access of moral corruption due to the mental consternation produced by the war; **it was, or is the plain reflection of our times.** The above-stated cornerstone of all the virtues and moral covenants—the free exercise of truthfulness and plain honesty—has disappeared; what there is left of them in practice rests upon **the existence of police courts and prisons!** Men and women will lie, steal, rob with violence, repudiate their word, give and take illicit "graft" and criminal bribe money and commit every other violation of "good conduct" with perfect unconcern and total absence of any sense of wrong or shame! The spoken word today must be received with distrust and be "proven" before it can be accepted; the printed word in newspapers, magazines and books on matters of international events, home politics, public movements, etc., cannot be taken seriously. These publications do not exist today to give honest information, as in the days of Horace Greeley, for the general good but **exclusively to advocate a certain policy and defend its representatives,** and to make everything subservient to this one purpose, by withholding or misrepresenting of news, by lies and fabrication, abuse, slander. And, worst of all, there is in most cases behind all this not honest (if interested) conviction, not mistaken enthusiasm for a cause but mere lucre or other material reward. In merchandising there is diminishing reliability as to material, purity, weight and measure, and false statements are made with the boldest assurance. All mankind seems to be deceiving and defrauding each other!

The High Cost of Living prevailing ever since the war, representing an advance of from 75 per cent to 150 per cent in prices, has long been proven by careful and impartial figures of professional statisticians, culled from income-tax reports, stock-company statements, etc., to have been caused to its largest extent **by direct "profiteering"** (artificial and arbitrary

raising of prices for extra profit) and only to the extent of about 25 per cent to reflex increase of wages, rents and other factors due to the war cost. It is thus proven to be overwhelmingly **nothing less than wholesale and retail stealing, looting of the pockets of the helpless public** in a veritable orgie of money making. When these "patriots" bought their "liberty bonds", did they make up their minds "to get their money back," even if they would **have to rob the public to do it?** Is it, perhaps, all a game on their part of "passing the buck" (to use an expressive curb phrase) **through the people back to the door of the government?** This seems to be the true explanation. And the government, being **the people itself,** returns "the buck" to them through increased taxation, and the people pass it back to the originators through increases in wages and retail prices of merchandise.

Here we have the "endless chain", but with this important distinction, **that those who have power and means can play this game to the limit,** while the great mass of men who are dependent and not free can retaliate only partially. The high cost of living is thus exposed to be, fundamentally, **an attempt by those who possess control of the necessaries of life** and the staple materials of production **to get back their compulsory liberty-loan investments in a few years** by excess profits on these commodities, instead of considering them as bona-fide time loans to the government! And, as the limited retaliation which the people are making is, in the main, a matter of sheer necessity and self-defense, the crime of the high cost of living **is directly chargeable to the rich and powerful!**—and we have one more illustration of the moral laxity, the ease of conscience, the abeyance of the sense of fairness and plain honesty, the coarse greed for money which characterizes our times! To the author nothing appears more contemptible than this high-cost-of-living exhibition and nothing more pitiable than the inability of our government to arrest it!

But face to face with the preceding "pictures", are we not entitled to ask this question: "Wherein is the merit of this supernatural religion on which our "morality" **is based if this is its fruit, if it is thus proven powerless to restrain man's impulses and, instead, gives full reign to the lowest and meanest**

passions of greed, covetousness, hate, revenge, lust, violence?" Think of the war! its horrors and sacrifices and sufferings; think of the indescribable fiendishness by these "sons of God"; of the murder of Mayor MacCurtain of Cork and of Magistrate Alan Bell of Dublin; of the hanging of six young Irishmen in Mountjoy jail, March 14th, 1921, and of ten others at a later date, for no greater crime than the wish to see their own countree free; think of the lawlessness in Germany, of the many brutal murders and great bank robberies in New York, of the era of extravagant and licentious life which seems to prevail all over the war-stricken world—in the very midst of the greatest misery and helplessness—**all the result of a complete state of literal demoralization**—the church doors gaping wide open all the time, but no live response, no message, no convincing explanation coming from within!

Are we not also entitled to ask this other question: "How is it that under this popular-government form of the United States and other republics **nothing can be done about these conditions?** Why is this **government of the people incapable of acting for the people's benefit and protection against those who hold power of position, money, influence, combination?** Where is the tangible, practical demonstration of our much-advertised 'liberties' and 'rights' as free men **governing themselves?"** As in the case of the churches, the doors of the capitol at Washington and of our State Houses are gaping wide open, but no response, no explanation comes from within! Such a combination of moral, social and political disorganization breaks down all confidence between man and man and **begets a deep-set disgust of ourselves and of our civilization;** it makes men who have not yet lost their "natural honesty and kindly instincts" to long for a simpler social and political and truer ethical existence in which the dangerous intricacies, the utter falsity and oppresiveness of our present civilization would be impossible—**to a form of sound communistic socialism, in short—founded on a system of natural ethics, and combined with a simple form of equitable and real "people's rule."** Can we pretend astonishment at, or utter our protest against, this revulsion of feeling, this radical departure from the tradition of the thought of 2000 years? No! the foundation for it is all too firmly laid!

FROM the material of this article the thought previously stressed rises again with convincing force that the breakup of civilization is more a result of surfeit and disgust at general conditions, of moral inertia, of callous sentimental indifference, of coarse materialism and absence of real ideals and an honest ethical basis than of material and intellectual exhaustion. **The philosophy upon which all is built becomes dubious and unsatisfying** and is left behind in the march of mental and material advance, leaving a void in that which is the most essential element of progressive development and happiness—**a sound and fully trusted life-philosophy!** (See also Article VII, in connection.) Something new must be found to take the place of that which has become discredited, or, in a short time, stagnation and decay must come. As to the present times, we have already stated that the various forms of supernatural religions **have lost their power of conviction** and fail to supply a rational faith that appeals to the advanced intelligence of the modern man and is capable of furnishing him **with a trustworthy basis for the moral covenants of daily life.**

Also, in the preceding article, we drew a sketch of the incompleteness of past periods of civilization, of their erratic course and character. They all rose to a summit, remained stationary at the pinnacle for a time, then swayed and fell! Such periods have been those of Egypt, China, India, Assyria, Greece and Rome and the Middle-Age European empires. Why did these civilizations not continue on their road of progress? Why did they not, after a period of stagnation, revive and roll on? In answer we speak cleverly of "natural exhaustion", of "having run their course", etc., but the true explanation is that such decay was caused by the fact **that a summit of effort had been reached with no more of great and inspiring aims in sight** (such as might have been within the mental and physical range of these respective periods) **and that interest and incentive to work and strive had been deadened because of the insufficiency of their religious or philosophical systems! The sterility of their daily ethical code, resulting from such conditions, and the absence of spiritual imagination prevented the birth of stimulating new visions in harmony with the intellectual and material level which had been attained!**

Not one of these past civilizations has been proven to have fallen because of unavoidable material or political necessity; in each case the foreign conqueror only came after decay had well begun. **They died from moral and spiritual inanition!** Doubt and contradiction between the new and the old caused vacillation and decay! Each such case needed a Messiah, a teacher to point a new way, but who failed to come;—and thus they left the pomp and circumstance of their civilization and **returned to the simple life**—to the bosom of nature for recuperation. Have we arrived at a similar stage and prospect? Are we, also, to fall to the ground with our civilization in the conflict between the categorical but unsatisfying **Old,** become a structure of tyrannical doubts, and the—as yet—unclear, but promising **New,** full of beckoning assurance of a larger, truer and better life? Will for us the Messiah come in the **rise of the philosophy of "true rationalism",** of the acceptance of physical truth and naturalness, in the clear recognition by us of our real character, position on earth and opportunity for happiness? If so, as we may well wish and hope, our present summit of material surfeit, intellectual unrest and moral distraction may prove but a short resting period of recuperation for the upward flight to yet greater heights of the twentieth-century phoenix!

XVI. AFTER-PEACE CONCLUSIONS.

The League of Nations and America.—Modification of the Treaty.—Revelations from Paris.—President Wilson's Position.—German and other War Publications. Present Situation in Europe.—England and France Show Their Hand at Last.—Final Summary of the Moral Aspect of the War.—The Russian Drama.

The manuscript of this book was completed soon after the signing of the peace treaty with Germany at Versailles, June 28th, 1919, but publication had to be deferred for various reasons. More than two years having elapsed since, during which time important developments have taken place and much

new information come to light, the author found it necessary to add this article to bring the book up to the date of its publication. Some of this new material has been incorporated in the body of the original text at appropriate places or put in the form of special explanatory notes, and the balance and final resumé **appear in this special article.**

The opinion heretofore expressed by the author that the peace pacts concluded with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey are settlements of bad faith, vengeance and duress, and of bad judgment even from the position of the victors, has since been abundantly verified by the present political and economic condition of Europe. All this being matter of the daily records of the past two years, we can confine our remarks to the principal features. The League of Nations, to which so many had been led to look with great hopes, is already proving its cumbersome inefficiency to deal with the problems of the Ruhr Valley and of Upper Silesia, and their solution is left in the hands of France, England, Italy and Japan, exclusively.

The United States has not yet ratified the treaty of Versailles **because of determined opposition to the idea of the League of Nations,** which was made an integral part of the treaty. After months of discussion over various proposed "reservations" to the League by the United States Senate, as affecting specially the interests of this country, some of these reservations were adopted and others defeated and the treaty as a whole finally rejected by a decisive majority and returned to President Wilson for his further action, March 20th, 1920. This outcome furnished the world with a strange spectacle. In this country alone of the five Entente nations (Russia being out of the count), where the idea of the League had been eloquently advocated by the President and largely approved by the people, a determined opposition had arisen in the course of time to the idea of the League in general but especially to Article X which was interpreted as **obligating this country to further participation in the contentions of the European States and to furnishing military forces in pursuance thereof.** There was the additional objection to the proposed details of the voting in the League deliberations, which, by putting a con-

siderable preponderance of power into the hands of the European nations, particularly England, limited the influence of this country in matters which we might deem incompatible with our judgment and interest.

The above opposition took shape in the Senate, led by the Republican majority, but was also supported by a considerable number of Democratic Senators and backed by a large section of the people. President Wilson's position was clear and firm in this controversy (from his point of view); he vetoed the proposed reservations to the treaty and also the rejection of the treaty as a whole, and likewise the Senator Knox resolution for a seperate peace with Germany. The object of the "Knox" resolution was not only a final attempt to dispose of the treaty and the league but also to prevent the entire tangle becoming an issue in the Presidential election of 1920. That the opposition to the League was well justified is proven by the fact that gradually many of the ablest political men of the country who had at first been in its favor changed their opinion, also by the attitude of the Press and the overwhelming verdict given in the said election. The entire matter was thus passed on to the new administration and Congress. The new Senate has recently passed a revised "Knox" resolution for a separate peace with Germany. This has now been consummated, all but final ratification.

This tortuous, involved and-to-them-inexplicable action by the American government and people produced a distinctly "disconcerting" impression in Europe and has led to a weakening of the confidence and cordiality formerly existent between us and our war allies. The League-of-Nations idea has received a serious check through our opposition; on the other hand, the disposition of the leading members of the League to grant to America certain reservations rather than lose her as a member altogether **opens the door to other nations also to demand special privileges in the League,** all of which would tend to paralyze its essential idea. The elements of doubt thrown upon the peace of Versailles by this prospect, joined to its general inertia, has gradually produced a disposition for its revision, at least in respect to some of its most exacting and degrading terms. The foolish proposal to prosecute the

Kaiser as the "responsible author of the war" has been dropped, and Germany has been conceded her plea for the right herself to prosecute the so-called "war criminals" for alleged atrocities committed by them. The knotty problems of the war indemnities due by Germany, of her "deliveries" required under the armistice, of her disarmament and of other lesser demands have, at last, been settled by the Supreme Council conference of April-May of this year on a basis somewhat more reasonable and practical than that originally intended. These terms have now been accepted by Germany—reluctantly and in the same spirit of helplessness in which the armistice and peace terms were accepted—but they constitute at least a definite program for both sides and for some time to come. (See the special explanatory Note "The Reparations Settlement.") The most important concession—the omission of the demand for her **"war guilt acknowledgment"** by Germany and its relation to the general spirit of the Versailles peace has been illuminated in detail in the above Note. As there stated, these revised, or rather adjusted terms, require the early additional elimination of the remaining unjust, impractical and dangerous provisions of this treaty which are today condemned by the most enlightened section of public opinion all over the world. **The conscience of mankind, enslaved by the passions of the war, is regaining its normal balance and demanding a more reasonable final settlement of the great conflict than that effected by the Treaty of Versailles.**

For, in addition to those terms which have now been slightly reduced, there still remain the crimes of awarding Alsace-Lorraine to France without the authority of a popular plebiscite; of giving Posen to Poland without compensation for the public improvements made by Germany; of seizing a strip of purely German territory—with the old German seaport of Danzig—to annex to Poland to form "a corridor" of access to the Baltic sea; of practically robbing Germany of the Saar valley and of Upper Silesia; finally, of confiscating every one of her foreign colonies in Africa, China and the Pacific Ocean. All this is exaction in addition to the financial penalties of the "reparations" terms, the surrender of all war material, submarines, aeroplanes and Zeppelins; of thousands of locomo-

tives and freight cars; of horses, pigs and cattle, sheep and barn fowls in great numbers—all these physical exactions were made under the armistice terms—and in addition to the enormous cost of a minimum fifteen-years' occupation of the left bank Rhine zones and the right-bank bridgeheads! These terms would deliver the German people into complete economic bondage—slavery—to the victorious Entente nations, mainly France, Belgium, England and Italy for three generations to come—60 years—and into political extinction at the same time. Without an army, Germany would be at the mercy of every large or small "armed" country adjoining her; without a navy, her merchantmen would be subject to the caprice of any hostile port official in a distant land.

Does the public of the United States comprehend and realize all this; does the world at large realize what the peace of Versailles means **to all the peoples,** not only to Germany herself? This peace must be rewritten in all its terms, not merely ameliorated in a few of its hardest conditions. And, as repeatedly stated in these articles, the basis of this revision must be **the full acknowledgment by the other nations of their share in the war guilt!** In the above review we have spoken only of Germany, but there are also unhappy Austria, wronged Hungary, pillaged and crumpled Turkey and Bulgaria, all victims of this peace of political rape. The world can never be right again until all this is settled right! America must and will be the nation whose innate sense of justice and fair play **will ultimately induce this revision!**

There are many who maintain that below the crushing terms of the peace treaty there are hidden blacker designs than those of mere political revenge and victor's lust; that it is the covert design of England and France **to ruin Germany as an independent and self-asserting country forever and to convert her into a dependent helpless slave sweatshop for the benefit of the victor powers;** that, as to France, the outspoken design is to acquire at least the now occupied territories on the left bank of the Rhine **for permanent annexation** and to have the whole of Upper Silesia, in spite of the plebiscite, turned over to Poland. The author hesitates to accept these fears in full, although in regard to imperialistic France the signs are omin-

ous; but he believes absolutely that America—as an enacting if not ratifying member of the Versailles peace powers—will, in spite of her present strong friendship for France, **never tolerate an international wrong of such magnitude to be perpetrated!**

The Reparations Settlement. The first "Reparations" meeting in London, which followed the "Paris agreement" of January, 1921, on a 226,000,000,000 gold marks indemnity, and which was called to receive Germany's acceptance of this demand or equally satisfactory counter-proposals, adjourned on March 7th, 1921, having failed of an agreement. The author of this book was at that time engaged on the final revision of his text. This afforded him an opportunity to introduce here some comment upon the speech of declination of Premier Lloyd George in rejecting the German counter-propositions. The details are too recent to require detailed statement. In summing up, Mr. Lloyd George made an emphatic declaration on the English and Allied position on Reparation and the Versailles peace terms in general. He said: "He (Dr. Simons, Germany's spokesman at the meetings) refused to accept, on behalf of Germany, **responsibility for the war,** which is the very basis of the Treaty of Versailles. Not only did he refuse to accept that basis but appealed to history for revision of the sentence imposed. The Allies cannot possibly enter into any discussion on that basis. **The responsibility of Germany for the war is with them fundamental. The whole treaty of Versailles depends upon it."** Here, then, we have the issue squarely put! **Of course** the responsibility of Germany is fundamental with the Allies; **of course,** the whole treaty of Versailles depends upon it. **It is precisely because this responsibility is assumed, not proven, a mere assertion of the Allies, a colossal deceit perpetrated upon the entire world by the infamous British propaganda,** that this false treaty with its revolting terms, fabulous reparation demands, robbery of territories and colonies must be uprooted and a new treaty written with terms based on facts, judicially ascertained from documents and personal testimony now available, **if Germany and France are not once more to be drenched in blood!**

The second reparations meeting, held in London in the first days of May, has at last brought a result and settlement, even though it can only be a temporary one. Germany has accepted the terms under protest, helplessly, unable to resist further and compelled by her economic and political conditions to settle down to a definite program of peace—and to go to work. This decision was largely influenced by an important change which accompanied the terms: **The demand for admission of the sole war guilt had been waived, at least tacitly!**

This demand which had figured so prominently in the negotiations which ended on March 7th, (see the above quotations from the Lloyd George speech) had raised a storm of renewed indignation and protest in Germany and indicated to the Allies very plainly that if they really desired to arrive at a settlement without recourse to force, **this demand would have to be excluded.** Under the final terms, accepted by Germany without reservations and counter-proposals, on May 10th, 1921, the total reparations indemnity is to be about 133,000,000,000 (133 billions) gold Marks, equivalent to about $34,500,000,000. But to this must be added 5 per cent interest. Germany is to pay annually about 2,100,000,000 gold Marks, plus a 25 per cent tax on her exports, to provide a fund for this interest charge, against which sum bonds will be issued periodically, or annually, in proportion. This arrangement restricts the interest charge to the amount of bonds actually outstanding—or, rather, vice-versa. Also, Germany is to fulfill the Versailles treaty in all other respects—disarmament, punishment of war criminals, etc.

But the mere omission from the final reparations settlement of the demand for Germany's admission of her sole guilt and responsibility for the war—done in a laudible effort to present the second settlement proposals becoming a fiasco like the first—is not sufficient in the way of admission and correction of a great wrong. As the claims of this sole guilt of Germany was the very principle of the sweeping armistice and peace terms, these terms must not merely be ameliorated a little, but must be **fundamentally remodeled** on the basis of the fully admitted joint guilt of the five original war nations. No other settlement will ever bring a true and lasting peace!

Additional Remarks on the Reparations Settlement. Now that this whole matter of Germany's war indemnity is settled for the time being, it is very useful to remind the reader of the utterances and incidents which occured in connection with the Paris conference of January and the first London reparations meeting of the end of February, 1921. At Paris, where the reparations amount was determined at 226,000,000,000 gold marks by the Supreme Council (without waiting for the official computations of the Reparations Commission) it was a significant accompaniment that during and after this meeting the French press and statesmen were prolific in announcements about the "enormous amounts of gold and other liquid wealth still owned and hidden in Germany" and about "how well able Germany was to pay" the amounts demanded by the Allies. All this was pure imagination, if not wicked fabrication. It is true that Germany was very wealthy in 1914, when the war broke out, but these French visionaries forget conveniently that she had fought a four-years' war during which gigantic

national loans had to be issued which gradually absorbed the floating wealth of the country. The clash between these colored assertions about "the hidden wealth of Germany" and the daily press reports describing the financial and economic collapse of that country, the starvation and general misery prevailing, was positively ludicrous.

But the Supreme Council had its theory all worked out: "Germany can pay if she will but go to work; if she will but **economize** as the Allies have done; if the German people be but made to **pay heavy taxes** the same as the people of the Entente countries do." (Extract from Lloyd George's speech of January 28th, 1921.) This is surely amusing, especially when the Premier remarks that "the revival of German industry and trade was to be hindered by all kinds of **restrictions** and by the imposition of oppressive **export duties**"; for, said he, at the first London reparations conference at the end of February of this year: "Germany can only pay by being put on her feet again so as to be able to manufacture and export, **but great care must be taken that she may not quickly manufacture and export too much** and thus damage our own prosperity."

In other words, Germany is to be given a chance to work and produce but no more than just enough to pay the reparations debt; she is to slave for the Entente allies for sixty years or more and remain poor, helpless and dependent as to herself. Here is where we can see **the grand human ideals** for which the war was fought! Mr. Briand, the French Premier, was likewise very amiable in his utterance of January 28th, 1921, at Paris, when he said: "Germany must pay to the limit, and no sum must be fixed **without thorough investigation** (those cellars in Germany full of gold) lest it may quickly prove **too** small (only the modest sum of 226 billions of gold marks were being asked, equivalent to about 55 billions of dollars) and **the Germans "jeer" at us for our ignorance and timidity.**" Mr. Briand, also, was in a very great hurry about collecting this little bill, and added: "A settlement of this difficult question must positively be reached before the end of to-morrow."

It was fortunate for the Germans that, on their part, they were not in such a hurry to be intimidated. The Reparations Commission was, meanwhile, completing its figuring and brought in a final verdict for 132½ billions of gold marks—**a reduction of nearly one-hundred billions.** Mr. Keynes is right: The war was largely an economic war, but diplomatists were allowed to camouflage its character into one of false pretenses, and were also allowed to settle the peace on these same false pretenses and, in other respects, on purely political lines. Can we be surprised that we have economic depression and confusion and financial instability—two years after the war—of a worse kind than during the war itself?

In connection with the London reparations meeting of end of April, 1921, the incident of the German government appealing to the government of this country for its good will and offices to endorse and submit its latest reparations offers to the Supreme Council is noteworthy for what it revealed. The incident disclosed, on the one hand, that the Germans had not yet learned their lesson, did not understand the depth of feeling engendered here against them by the war; on the other hand, as to ourselves, it disclosed the strange, distracted attitude of this country, torn between pride, resentment and an uneasy conscience and unable, as yet, to come to an honest and candid opinion on the war! (As we know, America declined to endorse and sponsor forward the German propositions, after having ascertained their unacceptability by the European allies, and advised Germany to negotiate directly with the Supreme Council in London.)

IN corroboration of the author's position on the war, the revelations made on the course of the **Paris Peace Conference** are of first importance. These negotiations are now very fully disclosed through the book by Maynard Keynes, that by ex-Secretary of State Lansing, that by Charles T. Thompson on "The Peace Conference Day by Day", that by Col. E. M. House on "What Really Happened at Paris", that by André Tardieu, "The Truth About the Treaty" and through the articles by Lincoln Colcord in "The Nation" and by many other books and contributions by "intimates." (Additional reference to these books will follow later.) They have set free the fact that the Allies at first only accepted the League idea to please President Wilson and the American people, in order to win the continuance of our sacrifices for them. Later, when they supported the League more decisively, it was because of the discovery that it would offer a useful means of deception under which to continue, at the Paris peace table, **the pretense of the false war motives of the propagandas.** This revelation should show us how weak the sentiment for a League of Justice really was among the European governments. The politics of Europe are too intricate for an idea so simple and general; they must inevitably gravitate towards secret diplomacy and secret treaties between the nations, in pairs or in groups of related interests; and this method has even now been resumed although the

League is fully organized in its formal existence in pursuance of the Treaty requirement. Under the prevailing sentiment and relationships in Europe, the League will prove to be no more than an association of the leading powers for the regulation of the smaller States who are members thereof.

By comparison, the former "Hague Tribunal" was a judicial body instead of a political one; its deliberations and judgments were to rest on general fundamental laws, accepted propositions and covenants as to international rights, regulations of warfare on sea and on land, use of special weapons, treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of war, etc. Its decisions were to be "judicial", based on evidence by plaintiff and defendants and were to be free from political, racial or personal bias—in short, were to be based on "law" as expressed in codes and rulings and rendered impartially by "jurists" instead of by Prime Ministers, ambassadors, diplomatists and army chiefs. Such was the conception of the Hague International Tribunal held by Mr. Evarts, Mr. Choate, Elihu Root and other leading American and European jurists. It may be confidently hoped that the prospective failure of the purely "political" League of Nations created by the Versailles Treaty will ultimately be transformed into such a "legally advising and judicially deciding" league. Such a one is the vision of the best thought in this country—and probably the aim of the present administration—and could be whole-heartedly supported by the American people. Its motto must be: **Peace and international justice by law and understanding, but including the recognition of force and war as necessary and useful agencies of political and general progress. Arbitrary** aggression from low motives and a false, maudlin sentimentality about war **must be equally excluded from its program.**

In the United States, the opposition to the League is based not only on its political grounds, as examined above, but not a little on a feeling of resentment against our associates in the war, as before stated. This country has gradually found out a great deal about its former friends—England, France, Italy, Japan, Russia—and their political aims and methods **which it did not know when it entered the war** and the sum of which is a growing conviction that we were deceived by them

about the origin and issues of the war and their charges against Germany and Austria, also in regard to their faculty of making secret treaties among themselves—Pact of London on Trieste-Fiume agreement with Italy, pledges to Greece, Roumania and Poland, and the Shantung convention with Japan—while all the time acclaiming the American revived plan of a League of Nations and its cardinal principle of "open covenants openly arrived at" and open diplomacy generally among nations! The secret agreements referred to were made before this country entered the war, but were purposely hidden from us in order not to jeopardize our expected war decision; they were in existence at the time of the visit here of ex-Prime Minister Viviani and Marshal Joffre, of France, and of ex-Prime Minister Balfour, of England, and of the Italian statesmen, all of whom came here in the early summer of 1917 to stir our war fever into maximum action—and to obtain loans—**but never did they breathe a word about these secret understandings** for fear that our eyes might be opened to the abyss of hate, greed, bad faith and chicanery of European politics! Our sensibilities, prejudices and national vanities were exploited by these allies by every means in the repertory of suptle British diplomacy—by the most insistent pressure upon existing social and racial ties, the ostentatious praise of our President's "idealism" and our national "humanitarianism", by the foulest misrepresentation of Germany's and Austria's position, motives and actions in the war.

Now we know all these things and know that we were deceived and victimized! Not until February, 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, during the debate on the Japanese claims to the German Pacific islands, were these nefarious secret relations disclosed and President Wilson publicly and officially apprised of their existence, both in regard to Japan and Italy. (See the article by Lincoln Colcord in "The Nation", of May 17th, 1919.) Publication of these agreements had been made in November, 1917, by the Russia Revolutionary Government, which had found records of them in the Imperial archives; but being unofficial, and coming from that source, the reports were at first discredited. But even after their authenticity had been established, **no action was taken by President Wilson in**

regard to them towards the Entente powers, no explanation demanded, no change of policy proposed! The detailed accuracy of the above-related incident at Paris was attested by ex-Secretary of State Lansing before the Senate Investigating Committee. It was a pleasant discovery for the American people, after it had brought its sacrifices and saved the Entente nations from defeat, to realize the kind of treatment it had received from them and—inferentially—to realize that all this chagrin was due to our own super-sentimental war enthusiasm.

There is authentic report of a similar "acute" scene, early in November, 1918, at the Foreign Office in Paris, in regard to the repudiation of the binding power of the President's "fourteen points," which had been made the basis of the armistice negotiations by Germany, and which had previously been accepted by the Allies, in principle at least, as the basis for the ultimate peace to be concluded. At this meeting of the European Premiers, the fourteen points were—one by one—brushed aside as having **no definite meaning** or binding power, some being repudiated altogether. When Col. House, who represented our President, then in America, was bluntly asked by Clemenceau "whether the President would terminate the armistice negotiations (then proceeding between himself and Germany) if the Council of Ministers should repudiate these fourteen points," he was momentarily put in a quandry, not being in possession of definite instructions from the President on such an abrupt challenge,—**and gave an equivocal reply.** This was immediately seized upon by the astute Clemenceau and construed to mean **that the President would not abandon the peace solicitations, although they would, in that case, be carried on under a condition of "false pretenses" towards Germany.** With that interpretation—Col. House sitting silent—he closed the argument. Premier Lloyd George, of England, at the same sitting emphatically "excepted" the point which aimed to establish "the freedom of the seas"—one of the most important of the fourteen peace planks—**as having any binding force upon England.** These two far-reaching repudiations were not challenged, qualified or amended subsequently by President Wilson **although they were in complete opposition**

to everything he had uttered on the war and the peace to follow!

The foregoing exposition shows the spirit of the European powers in regard to the binding validity upon them of these "fourteen points" so grandly formulated by our President and so ignobly abandoned by him. They were entirely disregarded in the armistice terms and equally so in the later peace terms —with never a protest from our President. And as regards the League-of-Nations' fate in the earlier months of the Conference, the real spirit of these powers was shown by the fact that only the determined insistence by the President, and his threat to break off his further participation in the peace conference and to return to America forthwith, **succeeded to put the covenant into the peace treaty as a leading and integral part thereof.** This League and its inclusion in the Treaty was the one thing above all others upon which the President had set his heart and on which he would accept no compromise—and the Premiers yielded for the reasons before stated. But it may have been "a deal" after all, as all the inside facts are not yet fully clear. The President may have made concessions to the Allies for the acceptance and inclusion of his league—and some day the revelation of the actual facts may be made by Col. House or by President Wilson himself. Colonel E. M. House, of Texas, has played a secret and somewhat mysterious part in the inception of the war (on our side) and in the later peace negotiations in his capacity of **confidential adviser of the President.** So far, in the books on the conference which he has written or edited, he is discreetly silent on every point of "real enlightenment" on the war itself. **But that is the great point.** The details of the fight for "the spoils" are interesting and valuable, yet secondary. These two men are separated now, to all appearances; and before long we shall receive more intimate and constructive information on this and many other matters of war policy and peace negotation. The main truth for us, however, has become perfectly clear: President Wilson was honored, feted, petted, "decorated" and presented with beautiful gifts; he was publicly lauded and acclaimed as few men have been, in every European country he visited, **but at the peace table, in the practical work of diplom-**

acy, he met his match—and was checkmated! Our armies won victories, but our high published aims for mankind were lost in the selfish and brutal scrimmage of the Paris peace conference!

The real interest of the Entente in the League has been given as one of false pretense for the purpose of preserving their "war motive" myths at the Paris conference for their own selfish purposes, and for their ruling power over the smaller nations. As to their pretended great concern over the non-ratification of the peace treaty by the United States, **let no one believe that they are greatly worried over the possible failure of the humanitarian objects of the League** but very much so over the carrying of the material burdens arising from the suicidal peace settlement, and of which they had counted upon this country (through its participation in the League) to assume a large share. In the proposed "pooling scheme of war costs", which was incorporated in the Treaty, we would lose fully one-half of our war loans to the Allies, an item of over 4½ billions of dollars, not a small figure even for this rich country. Of other burdens there was the proposition of having us assume the "mandate" over Turkey entirely, or at least over Armenia, and other similar honorary tasks involving extensive organization and heavy financial outlay for many years to come, and holding the constant risk of involving us in disputes and, perhaps, hostilities. All this is our allies' **very practical interpretation of our grand war ideals of "fighting for human rights and freedom, universal justice, independence of small nations, making the world safe for democracy!** They have taken us at our word—or at the word of our President—which they mistakenly thought was that of the American people. But can we blame them for their error in the circumstances? Beyond these material considerations, however, including financing of the enemy countries to start them on the road to recovery, there is good reason to believe that our late allies **view our rejection of the League plan and retirement from European politics with remarkable equanimity!** This country, having done the share of war-work which the European Allies had planned for it to do, may soon be dispensed with;—thank you, sir! In pursuance of the general situation of disillusion-

ment on our part with the final results of the war—and especially if no early revision of the present Treaty can be brought about—we should try to forget our "splendid mistake" as speedily as possible, ignore the treaty of Versailles and escape its burdens and ignominities **and make separate settlements with our enemies of the war.** In this way should we wash our hands of the evil which has been and of that which is yet to come!

The cornerstone of our changing opinion on the war is the realization of the joint responsibility of the original six powers for the war. And had we, at all times, understood that Germany was really waging a defensive war and that the Entente Allies were the real aggressors, our attitude in regard to the sea zones and the American Shipping question would have been different, **more like that of the European neutrals,** and we would have followed a policy of stricter neutrality in regard to shipping of arms and supplies to the Allies. Our whole attitude would have been different; that which under a state of fancied hostile provocation led us into embitterment and, finally, into war, would have become amenable to diplomatic adjustment, as, in similar relations, was the case with Holland, the Scandinavian countries and Spain. We see it now all very plainly **that the Paris Peace was erected upon an error of fundamental fact as to the war causes and the war guilt** and that the monstrous terms of punishment and humiliation inflicted upon the Central powers were the direct outcome of this artificial and maliciously assumed position of the Entente allies. It reveals the treaty of Versailles as a shocking piece of political fraud which not only dealt out destruction to the enemy but also besmirched his honor by mean slanders. These advanced views have been hastened not a little by the publication of the books on the war by the leading military and diplomatic figures of Germany and Austria, in correct translations free from the intentionally garbled versions of the first American newspaper notices, and unfolding the war story in measured and dignified statements of fact. The American people cannot be a party to a treaty of peace of such injustice and infamy; they must not be! The League-of-Nations proposals, while dishonestly made and specially objectionable to us, **are really**

of secondary importance; it is the Treaty as a whole which must go!

All this means for us somewhat of a disagreeable admission, but America, as well as the rest of the world, must come to it! The way is not easy—and it takes time. It was expected by many that in the heat of the campaign of last fall some open repudiation, some candid avowals of error would be made, but the open secret was kept well by both parties—the people were not yet considered ripe for hearing the truth—their enthusiasm and sacrifices were yet too recent! Instead, there was extra vociferous and violent denunciation, on the one side, of the League and the terrible things it would do to us, and, on the other side, equally strenuous denial and defense. It all looked as if we tried by our vehemence to hide our real thoughts and feelings on the subject! Neither side **really believed one-half of what was said.** That the League and Treaty deserved to be beaten is surely this writer's view, and must have been the view of the overwhelming election majority; but below the great outward contention there lay hidden those other things which we were afraid, as yet, to stir up and name—our hurt feelings, on account of our allies, our wounded pride and sense of stultification, our uneasy conscience! But time will bring truth and the courage to face it—**as with Colombia.** This people is honest enough at heart to insist that right shall prevail once error has been recognized!

IN this progress towards a juster view of the war, **President Wilson has taken no part.** The total failure of his League-of-Nations western campaign tour, in the early fall of 1919, and the popularity of the Senate attitude left him untouched. Considering the great part he had played, it was, perhaps, beyond the power of human nature for him to admit any errors of judgment, and even partially the failure of his high endeavors. He could not bring himself to give this country a chance to withdraw from the dangerous position into which he had led it, to settle down and forget the war, but **continued, instead, to pour out his invectives against Germany and to reiterate his idealistic war declarations.** Like an evil genius this

man has sat upon the soul of this country—and, in fact, of the world—with his inflaming fanaticism and the seductive persuasiveness of his pronouncements! The fire of his argument was almost uncanny in its sweeping self-confidence and grand disregard of the axioms of human knowledge, experience and of the voice of history. His sincerity and honesty of conviction are beyond question; but he believes himself, even today, not only right, but infallible in his position on the war; he combines in his character the merits of great energy, unbounded enthusiasm, and the lack of practical good sense of the **confirmed visionary.** In his speeches in the aforesaid tour he **boldly assumed that the American people had not learned anything about the war** since that great peace had been made at Paris, and repeated his pre-war arguments unchanged, and displayed his intense personal bias against Germany unsoftened. But, in addition, he descended to a political cunning and unscrupulousness in his arguments which astonished the country and provoked strong disapproval.

He began his war argument regularly with the murder of the Archduke in Serajevo, and from that basis developed an exasperating picture of the dark purposes of Austria and Germany in regard to their vengeance upon that poor, innocent country of Serbia, but **remained entirely silent on the historical background of the war and the motives behind the murder of Francis Ferdinand, silent on the sordid purposes of France and England!** This mode of presenting the war issue left one part of his hearers as much in the dark as they had ever been, while that section which "had learned something" was both irritated and offended by his lack of courage to tell the truth—**that truth which they felt he must surely know.** Herein lies, in the writer's opinion, the crucial mistake which has cost the President his reputation! **He failed on his return from Paris, himself disillusioned about the Allies and the whole war—a wiser and sadder man—to take this people into his confidence and to state the facts—gently and dicreetly but yet the facts—and to admit his error of judgment and our error of exhuberant patriotism!** He remained silent, and is silent and obdurate today; but the facts have not remained silent; **and the**

moral strain upon the President of this irritating and depressing situation has boken his body and mind!

The general tone of the President's tirades against Germany in these L. of N. campaign speeches, and his evident intent **of inflaming anew the feeling against German-Americans by his taunting charges,** entirely unproven, of "their lifting their heads again in propaganda" were exhibitions extremely demagogic and regrettable in a man of his intellectuality and position. His general characterization of the Senate opposition to the peace treaty and the aspersion cast upon the personal motives of the Senators were most lamentable utterances! It seems incomprehensible that President Wilson should have stooped to such raw political methods! Was this loss of poise and mental integrity an indication of the unfortunate physical collapse which was to overtake him? Was his soul not "torn to shreds" as between the merciless jabs of his assailants, his own remorseful conscience and his obstinate refusal to acknowledge any error? **Is it not his moral nature which is sick and wounded much more than his physical body?** The President must realize today that he was possessed by a mistaken conception of things—carried away by ideas which resided in his imagination and not in the real war situation in Europe; that he has failed at the Paris peace conference; that the League of Nations is an illusory plan and its indorsement by the European governments perfunctory or, at most, politically selfish; that the most intelligent section of the American people have had their eyes opened and cannot be deceived any longer about the war and, therefore, do not approve of the Treaty of Versailles. What a realization for him! Can we wonder at the result? Even the strongest man has his limitations. **His breakdown is a national calamity, a great national loss!** What a sad difference between this broken, disappointed and discredited leader of today and the **Woodrow Wilson** who marched down Fifth Avenue, New York, at the head of the war parade, defying the whole world to say him nay!

But scarcely had this indomitable spirit recovered somewhat from his attack of collapse but that he rushed forth anew, carried away by his obsession. In his letter to Senator Hitchcock, of March 9th, 1920, stating his views and probable action

on the proposed Senate reservations to Article X, we read again the same extravagant declarations about the victory of the Allies **"having saved the world from dire calamities which were iminent from the aggression and pretensions of Germany"!** Just what these aggressions and pretensions of Germany were, the President did not say; and **no one else has, as yet, set them forth even in general outline, not to mention in such detail as would, in honor, be required in a matter of such terrible possibilities!** It is one of the greatest puzzles of the American war delusions that this people should have taken these wild-goose accusations against Germany without ever demanding facts or documentary evidence of these plots of aggression by Germany! Nothing of the kind ever appeared in print in any part of the world! The said letter to Senator Hitchcock was, in part, a deplorable attempt to galvanize the dying war feeling of the country to new life and to reaffirm the artificial illusions of the war—one purpose as reprehensible as the other. In line with his letter was his indorsement of the Virginia State Platform as the model for the Democratic platform in the 1920 election, which stated that we went into the war "to crush a colossal scheme of conquest"—by Germany, of course. This country, certainly, had worked itself into a state of near insanity on this subject! Further, the President attempted to make a "point" in the above letter to Senator Hitchcock by representing the apprehensions of "reservation" Senators as being unfounded, saying, in effect, **"that it was a matter-of-course that the recommendations of the League of Nations Council were subject to being passed upon,—accepted or rejected—by the Constitutional powers of each respective country."** But, if the President's assertion was correct and sincere, and the League of Nations will merely "advise and recommend" subject to approval—individually—by the powers which compose the League, **what great good may be expected from it in the hot contentions of self-interest and ambition which have ever characterized European politics?** Many other similar impassioned and hallucinatious pronouncements on the war and against Germany have been issued by President Wilson, notably his veto messages on the reservations and the "separate peace" resolution. He is possessed by a strong racial

bias against Germany and is full of resentment against her for spoiling his world-savior ambitions; also he holds a set of political theories and assumptions of his own with which he plays to the world as upon a musical instrument, in disregard of actual facts and reasonable possibilities. We are afraid that no such arbitrary political dictums and altruistic visions will ever fit the case of Europe!

Judging President Wilson calmly in his gravitation from ostensible neutrality to open hostility towards Germany, it is generally accepted in the country today, even by his admirers, that he was **strongly pro-British from the beginning of the war, in 1914.** His ancestry and mental cast attest this; while he tried, at times, to be high-minded, just and impartial, he was unable to overcome his natural bias. The German Government slighted him twice—very imprudently; the first time by its utter silence in answer to his address to the Congress and the following declaration of war against Germany on April 6, 1917; the second time by its independent peace initiative, in November, 1916, after having waited for seven months for the President to take his own promised reciprocity and peace steps (which he finally did on December 18, 1916). In both instances **the President's pride and egotism were deeply wounded!** and after the complete fiasco of his peace endeavors of December 18, 1916, to January 25, 1917, he threw himself into the arms of England without further reserve. Thenceforth he was **the implacable enemy of Germany,** as convincingly stated in von Bernstorff's book, and his utterances increased in vehemence with every speech he made. Colonel House had succeeded completely in his work; while, on the one hand, duping Ambassador Bernstorff to believe in the President's peace professions, he led the latter into a fanatical frame of mind about "fighting for liberty, democracy, and **saving civilization"** from those savage Germans. All this was agitation for a definite purpose—the purpose, first, to prevent Germany continuing her U-boat warfare at a time when it had the best chance for complete success, and, secondly, to deliver this nation as quickly as possible as a belligerent ally into the lap of England and France! We will conclude this subject with the following instructive American estimate published in the New York papers of April 23, 1919:

SEES DESPAIR OF PEACE.

Europeans, Says C. S. Davison, Have Turned Against Wilson Ideals.

"Charles Stewart Davison, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American Defense Society, who arrived from Europe on Monday, said yesterday that both in England and France he found among persons representing all social classes and occu-

pations the opinion that the situation in relation to the Peace Conference was unsatisfactory.

"Some characterized it as a failure," he said, "some as a farce; all denounced the failure to make peace while discussing theories of the future relations of the nations. The existing situation was attributed to the personal idiosyncrasies of President Wilson.

"Among Americans, the opinion was freely expressed that the President ought to return home and let Europe settle its own questions. All nationalities seemed to agree that the situation was growing steadily worse throughout the world and would soon be intolerable.

"All agreed that, on the President's first arrival in France, he was generally received as the embodiment of the salvation of civilization, and that now Europe was divided into three categories in her estimate of him—those who were puzzled, those who were angry, and those who despaired.

"I did not hear the President's course of action approved by a single person. The people who seemed to be the most bitter about the situation were American army officers. Meanwhile the general impression throughout Europe appears to be that, owing to the situation which has been created, the war will have to be fought again in twenty years.

"The opinion appears to prevail that President Wilson and his policies will come to be execrated throughout the world. Whoever may be at fault it is a sad ending as it stands today to high aspirations."

America's Unbridled Language. Additional to what has been stated on this subject in the supplementary note "The Reign of Blind Hate," Article XI, and elsewhere in this book, and in the references to President Wilson's speeches in this Article XVI, we feel it necessary, as a matter of justice to the history of the war, to give a few more of the "pithy" pronouncements of Mr. Wilson.

In his message to Congress, early in December of 1917, when he was apprised that the German Government was preparing to take the initiative for a peace move without waiting any longer upon his own dilatory tactics, he vented his ire by denouncing the German Government as one "without honor, conscience or qualities for entering into a peace by treaty," adding that "this power must be broken to the ground **if not literally exterminated.**" He made an appeal to the German people "to get rid of their horrible masters," then would it be "possible to conclude **a peace of "justice** for all peoples." (Probably something like the peace of Versailles.) This message of the President was followed by an almost equally violent speech by Lloyd George, English Premier, in which he called the Prussians "criminals and bandits"; he had previously called

them "savages, barbarians and huns." On January 18, 1918, President Wilson made his speech of "the fourteen points," in which he again urged the German people" to get rid of their masters" and erect a power of popular authority "with which the Entente could deal." (All this was merely political harangue to exasperate and divide the German people still more.)

Following the desperate appeal of Lloyd George to America for quick help, in March, 1918, Mr. Wilson replied again: "Germany—without conscience, honor or understanding—must be crushed;" and on April 6, 1918, at Baltimore, came the famous: "Force, force to the utmost, force without measure and limit, triumphant force, to restore respect for laws and treaties" and to "crush every form of selfish autocracy into the dust." To these quotations of what was uttered by the leader of this nation must be joined the unbridled abuse of Germany politically and of Germans as a race and people by the daily papers and periodicals of America and the innumerable "addresses" made by public men and women throughout the country.

Today, only two years after the signing of peace, this attitude and language appear to all rational men as **incomprehensible and absolutely inexcusable!** The "blind fanaticism of war" is patent to us now by the mere reading of these expressions of opinion and feeling. What right did these men have to use such language towards a country, its executive heads and people with whom we were at complete peace only two years previously and for whom we had professed great respect and even admiration? The "state of war" cannot excuse such presumptuous, dictatory and villifying language against another people! Excepting a few abusive outbursts by the English Premier, the **foreign statesmen, press and peoples** showed much more self-restraint in their utterances than obtained here, although the war concerned them to a much more acute degree!

THE author's views on the war have been unaffected by the Peace Conference books, nor have they been qualified by the new information brought by the important war books which have been published in Germany and Austria during the past two years—**the books by General Ludendorff, Admiral von Tirpitz, von Bethmann-Hollweg, Karl Helfferich, ex-Premier Czernin of Austria, ex-Ambassador von Bernstorff and others. We may add to these the authoritative English book by Keynes on the economic side of the peace treaty, the Memoires of Lord Haldane and many other political books and magazine articles aiming to explain the war.** They make it clear beyond

question that an understanding, later extended to a complete convention, existed between France and England from the beginning of **the Morocco difficulty, 1898-1904,** which culminated in the Algeciras conference through Germany's protest at being ignored by France and England in the **African colonization questions.** And these books make it equally clear that this approachment between France and England **was not provoked by any unwarranted assumption of rights in the above questions by Germany, nor by any fears of designs of foreign conquest** or continental domination on her part, but were solely inspired by jealousy of her economic rise, military power, growth of commercial shipping and naval strength. On the part of France, this feeling was augmented by the agitations of the irrepressible Delcassé faction for "revenge" for 1871.

And when, as related in the respective Articles of the book, Russia began to realize that the Triple Alliance would compel Germany, through her union with Austria, to work against Russia's designs and hopes in her southeastern policy, **she lent a ready ear to the advances of France to join with her and England in a general combine**—the Triple Entente—against Germany and her associates. The entire background of the war as given by the writer is thus confirmed: The strengthening of the Triple Entente to crush their rival when Germany's near-Oriental extension policy should become fully developed; the diplomatic moves to alienate Italy from the *"Dreibund"* and to weaken the ties between Greece and Germany; the checking of Germany in her endeavor to make other alliances; ultimately, the creation of, or seizure, of an opportune occasion to bring about her humiliation and retreat under the threat of an overwhelming military combination against her. All this design was directed by the superior diplomatic skill of the British against which the open and blunt, not to say clumsy, methods of the Germans did not avail. It is also made clear that **Germany's political form or the personality of the Kaiser had absolutely nothing to do with these political and economic rivalries.** There is nothing "new" in these views; they are the views of the well-educated European of every nationality. They were "ignored" only in America; and it is upon this ignorance that the Entente built to draw us into the war—on their side!

The book by **General Ludendorff** is very valuable in that it sheds much light upon the military phases of the war and also upon the political developments towards the end of the year 1918. And here, again, the author's conception of the events, as set forth in Article XIII, is fully sustained by additional proofs from Ludendorff's statements. The general had been violently attacked in Germany for his apparently contradictory course, to wit: First, as early as August 11, 1918, soon after the first German reverses which followed the successful German drive towards Amiens and Ypres, **he suddenly pressed for immediate peace with all his influence on the plea of the rapid deterioration of the army** and its inability to win victory against the increasing favorable situation of the enemy; second, he issued an emphatic call for the resumption of the struggle and **for a decision on the battlefield** in answer to President Wilson's surrender of the armistice negotiations into the hands of France and England by his tacit consent to the excision of the "fourteen points" as the basis of the negotiations. What is the explanation of this apparent contradiction in Ludendorff's course? The General does not openly state it, but his cautious silence is "revealing" just the same, and is no reproach to him. The motive is too intimately connected with the change of government in Germany, still in the formative process, to have permitted him to speak frankly; but it is not difficult to put the matter together.

The doubt entertained in Germany, and by the enemy also, as to the fact of the precarious position of the German army when Ludendorff first sounded his alarm, has since been proven to have been well founded. There were at the time still some four millions of well organized soldiers in the German armies in France, with ample military supplies, before the final battles of the fall of 1918 began. Under united military and political leadership **they might still have won the war!** These armies subsequently went through the windup campaigns in the West, center and North of the great French fighting ground; and they still fought well, yet were steadily driven back because they were morally discouraged and disgruntled, and were, of course, greatly weakened in numbers by this retreat. Yet it was **after these losses,** which no one knew better than Luden-

dorff himself, that he flung out his bugle call and demanded resistance to the utmost, and pretended to believe in the possibility of its success! The motives are very clear now; thew were entirely **political** and such as we have partly given them in Article XIII: **Ludendorff plainly saw the coming of the great political storm in Germany and the threat it held to the dynasty, the empire and the German people.** It was to avert this danger, from patriotic motives and fealty to his sovereign and the German Constitution, that he worked for peace in the early fall of 1918, **but for peace to be secured by the Kaiser and his government, by Germany as an empire, while these were still existent,** and before they should be engulfed by the gathering forces of the revolution!

In his estimation, an acceptable peace was at that time still procurable from the enemy, though it might have had to fall much below what had once been hoped, but would certainly have been greatly preferable to the débâcle he saw coming. Had his view been able to prevail, had it been backed up by the required diplomatic ability and the necessary spirit to sacrifice national pride and political party ambitions for the sake of the rescue of the Fatherland by the offer of "sufficiently humble terms," **then Germany, the empire and the dynasty might have been saved, and the revolutionary eruption, the humiliating armistice, the shameful peace, the like fate of Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey averted and the entire European and world chaos of today made impossible!** But it was not to be. The political coalition which pressed for surrender, largely to attain its own victory and elevation—a design which received strength and countenance from the allied, and particularly from the "Wilsonian" demand for a "new government emanating from the people" in place of that of the Hohenzollern dynasty—did not want a peace that would have saved the Imperial government! As between that course and risking the abject surrender of the country—but under their political victory—**they chose the latter!** This combination of incapacity and perfidy has seldom been equalled. When Ludendorff became convinced of this design, he quickly reversed his position and called for a renewal of the struggle **to save the burning ship by a last determined effort!** But his call came too late; the ship was

already sinking; the Imperial authority was already gone—and Germany went down in the turbulent waves of military defeat and political revolution! It is the greatest tragedy the world has ever seen!

The book by **von Tirpitz** gives us much valuable information on pre-war events and important junctures during the conflict, but is historically less valuable from its pronounced gossipy and vehement "personal" character. The ex-Admiral is intensely aggrieved against the Kaiser and his government **because the policies which he recommended were not adopted;** and he is convinced that if unrelenting U-boat warfare had been continued through 1916, instead of being arrested in deference to the protests of the United States, **Germany would have won the war**—and there is much evidence to sustain his opinion. Being an intensely patriotic man, and believing his estimate of the situation absolutely correct, the bitterness of his mind is easily understood and his offensive method, in some measure, excusable. The inroads that had been made upon English shipping by the U-boats up to April, 1916, were considerable and, had this continued, England would have had no chance whatever to prepare herself with protective measures against them; **she would have been starved out by the spring or summer of 1917 and compelled to sue for peace.** This almost certain outcome would have made America's entry into the war highly improbable!

How must the Germans feel today, in their terrible plight, on reading the Admiral's emphatic statements, on realizing "how near they were to victory" at that time, had they but possessed the insight and courage of one great statesman at home, supported by an ambassador at Washington strong enough to withstand the beguiling promises of **Col. House** about the President's "early steps" at London for "reciprocity"! This much is certain, that if Germany had even remotely believed at that time that America would, at the end, be drawn into the war, **nothing in the world could have prevented the advice of von Tripitz being followed and prosecuted to a victorious finish!** The whole history of the U-boat warfare, as given by the ex-Admiral, is also interesting as revealing—from the vacil-

lation and irregularity in its employment—that the heart of the German government and people was never fully in this measure **as applied to merchantmen and passenger vessels;** it was countenanced only as "a warfare of desperation" against the English food blockade which was relentlessly squeezing the life out of the country, civil and military.

The books by the German and Austrian statesmen, which we have mentioned, occupy themselves chiefly with the historical background and the political situation just prior to the war, and with the diplomatic "note exchanges" from the day of the Serajevo tragedy to the actual beginning of hostilities. Very valuable is the light thrown upon the relations between Germany and Austria and upon the "peace moves," the substance of which endeavors is embodied in preceding text notes. The gist of the contents of these books corroborates the author's conception of the war and establishes the following main facts beyond question: **First,** that the knowledge by Austria and Germany of "the real inner meaning" of the Serajevo murder, of the attitude of Russia and the obstinacy of Serbia had, from the first, not only an exasperating effect upon them **but a depressing one also as to the possibility of preserving the peace;** the whole of the events were to them a clear manoeuvre, pre-concocted, to "force the situation" which had been long preparing to bring on **a tryout** between the rival power combinations, and the real objects of which were well known to them; **second,** that in spite of this conviction the German Government, and the Kaiser personally, did all that could be done to induce Russia and Serbia to recede, to urge England and France to do the same, to let these powers know that Germany was in honor bound to stand by Austria and would not shrink from war even if forced to it; **third,** that it was equally clear to Germany and Austria that the failure of England to exert pressure upon Russia, together with her ambiguous attitude—holding herself threateningly in the background while pretending to be working for peace—**had no other meaning than that a united attempt was being made by the Triple Entente to coerce the Triple Alliance to a diplomatic backdown under the threat of war, involving a consequent retraction of its political and economic aims, position and power.**

As there was nothing unwarranted about the latter, this purpose of the Entente was bound to be indignantly rejected!

From the work by **Karl Helfferich,** former German vice-Chancellor, we obtain unimpeachable and intimate testimony of the Kaiser's absolutely peaceable intentions and of the great mental agony the prospect of war caused him; likewise of the total absence of any schemes of conquest by Germany. How the policy of the Entente was wrecked by Germany's energetic repulse of its implied insinuation has been described in Article VIII of this book. It is now equally clear from these German and Austrian books that Austria's exacting terms to Serbia and Germany's pledge of support **were not addressed so much to Serbia as to Russia and the other Entente powers to coerce them—on the part of the Triple Alliance—to back down and relinquish their selfish designs.** Had the Entente yielded and Russia arrested her mobilization, Austria would then, no doubt, have agreed to suspend her terms to Serbia (another term for Russia, only). An attempt at a real conference of the powers might then have been made to prevent the extremity of war. Whether success would have been attained is very problematical, but the attempt would have been worth the making.

The Kaiser himself has also written a book on the war—a book giving his **personal** views and aims—and intended only for limited private circulation. As the author has not been able to see a "copy" and is confined to "newspaper reports" as to the Kaiser's statements, he cannot speak about it with any real knowledge. It appears, however, that on the basis of the "review in the N. Y. " World," the Kaiser's explanations of the long-time political war causes and the course of diplomatic events in the month between Serajevo and August 4th, 1914, as well as in regard to **Germany's readiness for peace at any time on reasonable and just terms to all,** are identical in all principal features with those given by the author in this book.

The "Diplomatic Memoirs of Lord Haldane", to which we have given some attention in a previous article, treat mainly of the "Berlin-Bagdad" negotiations with Germany and reveal the subtle English methods of diplomacy in furthering grasping and dominating designs upon other nations by outward

candor and affability. The presentation of the same subject in the Vol. I of Karl Helfferich's "The World War," in which the negotiations are given in detail, step for step, effectually disposes of Lord Haldane's position and explanations.

In addition to the deductions we have previously drawn from the various "books of revelation" on the **Paris Peace Conference,** they are all open to the charge of being written strictly from the position of the Allies, which is assumed to be infallibly correct; they do not contain one illuminating ray of truth on the main issue—the political and ethical causes of the war—and are, therefore, worthless historically except in so far as they record the detail incidents of the conference and reflect its atmosphere and the relative positions and aims of its leading figures. The "conference" followed too soon upon the war itself to allow those who attended it—from Prime Ministers down to newspaper correspondents—to disembarrass themselves of its sinister influence and obtain the judicial and his-historical viewpoint. The atmosphere of concealment and false accusation, which we have fully analyzed in a previous article, **gave the keynote to everything that was said and done!**

But on one subject these several books are not only valuable but also unanimous, either by direct statement or permissible inference. From all of them the extraordinary fact appears that, with all his lofty declarations of idealistic world policies, the President seems to have had **no definite and practical plans as to how to attain these objects by political enactments.** His energies were mainly bent upon the adoption of his League-of-Nations plan and its inclusion in the treaty; beyond that object he seems to have allowed Messrs. Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando to do much as they pleased with his ideals, the enemy and world peace! For instance, the territorial assignments made, on the President's plea for the "self-determination of nationalities," were so unjustly and ignorantly made in regard to Germany and Austria **that it is impossible for them to stand.** The crime committed against Austria and Hungary particularly under this impractical Wilsonian dictum is a frightful one! Hate, greed for political power, and a spirit of unparalleled victor's vengeance reigned at Paris—not humanitarian ideals and a genuine and intelligent desire to secure

a just and lasting world peace. Yet, President Wilson was present all the time and agreed to the monstrous settlement made!

The book by **ex-Ambassador von Bernstorff** is very interesting to America in showing that through the absence of frequent and ample communication with the German government, he became, in a measure, **isolated** and out of contact with the true state and relation of events at home, and perhaps through that fell a victim to the persuasiveness of Colonel House and the President's promises on the subject of America's peace endeavors. He gauged the American trend for war correctly, and so informed his government, but **failed to see the game of procrastination being played in Washington to frustrate Germany's U-boat warfare** and thus gain time for Allied counter-preparations. He is frequently in flat contradiction with Karl Helfferich, but the latter's explanations of events have the weight of full knowledge and official evidence on their side. The ambassador makes an emphatic denial of his connection, officially or private, with the German propaganda in this country.

On the economic and financial side of the Versailles peace we must speak again of the English book by **Mr. Maynard Keynes** because of the thoroughness and lucidity of his statements and the irresistible logic of his facts and figures, compiled by an expert in statistics. His book is a scathing arraignment of the work of the Paris conference, **of the incredible ignorance and shortsightedness on all practical matters of production, commerce and finance on the part of the men into whose hands the fate of the world was committed!** The testimony of this cool-headed author on the "pitiable littleness and arrogant hypocrisy" of the spirit of the Paris conference—its total lack of broad outlook and loftiness of conception of its great task—throws a vivid light upon the mockery of reason, pledges, justice and ordinary foresight which produced the abortive peace of Versailles.

All the above books, and many others, **leave a common void**—to the great disappointment of the deluded public of the world—**the void of failing to disclose the slightest evidence of the existence of a set design by Germany, or Germany and**

Austria, to precipitate a war of conquest and domination, as has been represented by the war propagandas. The policy of the two empires is clearly revealed to have been nothing more than the legitimate protection of their political integrity and the making of such extensions of influence and economic connections by treaties and commercial enterprises as were entirely justified and to the injury of no other countries. On all this, the war and Paris conference books coming from the Allies **are silent;** no acknowledgements, no admissions of error, no explanations on the basis of well-established facts; nothing but a stubborn adherence to their fabricated war story! And this void has been greatly deepened **by the absolutely barren results** of the much-heralded "disclosures" to come from the examination of the **"secret archives" of the Berlin and Vienna Foreign Offices.** The expectations of the extreme socialists particularly, who had worked themselves into a fury of hate against the old order, were sadly discomfited by **the emptiness of said archives,** which held no "secrets" of any importance and furnished no additional information of moment upon the diplomacy of the war. Nor did the new democratic German government's official investigation by a special committee of the Reichstag into the "causes of the war", with the aid of these papers from the archives and the personal depositions, under oath, of ex-Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Karl Helfferich, Von Jagow, Zimmermann, General Ludendorff and others who had held important posts in the army and navy and Imperial Foreign Office, **bring out any evidence of nefarious designs or world plots, of secret terrible conspiracies against other nations or interests!** Alas! it was all the other way; the plotting for suppression, conquest, gain and revenge was on the part of Germany's enemies; **and German diplomacy was all too blunt and candid and lacking in *finesse* to be able to checkmate or dispel these machinations!**

THE political plight of the four new states carved out of the old Austrian empire carries less danger to peace (they all being too helpless and distracted) than the situation on the Rhine and in Upper Silesia, but it is for that **so much more**

pathetic and dramatic. The treatment of Hungary by the Paris peace, in having some of her choicest districts, overwhelmingly Hungarian in history and feeling, wrenched away from her without even a plebiscite, and arbitrarily assigned to Serbia and Roumania as "political rewards" is an act almost unbelievable in its brazen unscrupulousness. As to German-Austria—the heart of the former empire—she has not only been crippled economically beyond the power of existence, **her agricultural mainstay divided among the adjoining States,** but her "natural" and ardent desire for economic union and political association with the German Republic has been denied at Paris from motives of arrant political jealousy and in open defiance of the dictum of "self-determination." To let her join Germany would have added to the strength of both—and that would be entirely opposed to France's imperialistic policy! In the South, the contest between Jugo-Slavia and Italy over the possession of Fiume, etc., and the control of the Adriatic has at last been settled, but it is a **temporary settlement,** dictated by the stern necessity for peace and recuperation, and the issue will be reopened before many years will have passed. In Czecho-Slovakia (formerly Bohemia, Moravia and the eastern part of Galicia of the Austrian empire) there is a reign of close rivalry and bitter feeling between the Slavs and the Germans, who in many cities and districts are almost equally matched in numbers and influence, preventing the country settling down to peace and work.

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that **it would be no surprise of history if these four States of former Austria should, after a few years, draw together again to a new "confederation"** to act as a unit in regard to economic necessities and external policies. There are indications even now that such currents are at work. This prospect arises from the very nature of the former Austria. The old monarchy, or rather confederate empire, was not, properly speaking, the result of conquests but of a natural association of States or peoples which, individually, lacked the necessary physical and political qualifications **for independent life** and were thus combined to a unit able to hold its own in the broilpot of European politics. Thus may history repeat itself! Adding to all the foregoing the

chaos in Russia and Turkey, the Shantung dispute, the total collapse and intense suffering of all these peoples, we have before us **the complete failure of the Versailles treaty: Nothing definitely settled anywhere and resolved in a statesmanlike manner and frankly accepted; no one satisfied, not even those who were assumed to have been benefitted; everywhere gaps and fractures and open wounds left to breed new complications, thoughts of retaliation, resolve to force necessary corrections!** The author ventures to predict that if this monument of incapacity and cupidity—the Versailles Treaty—is not speedily revised **by man,** by man recollecting his proclaimed principles and promises, it will be revised by irresistible fate itself—the cold logic of facts and events—in a manner too awful to contemplate!

THE most illuminating political dénouement of the war is now taking place in the Turkish dominions and Persia **by the gradual unfolding of England's Oriental policy.** Daily her scheme of converting Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Persia, Palestine, Egypt and Arabia into "a political and economic dependency" of Great Britain becomes more clearly apparent. This need not necessarily mean conquest or literal annexation but **merely such political control as will insure the desird economic advantages for England,** including the incidental protection to her Indian interests. It includes **a continuous land-route of communication with India** in addition to present and future sea routes from ports of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Seas. **How familiarly all this sounds!** Did we not have occasion to say something at several places in this book of a certain Berlin-Bagdad railroad and eastern-extension policy by that black-souled country—Germany—for the purpose of securing additional supply sources of raw materials and new markets, and a land-route and sea connection to the Orient, independent of the unreliable sea-route through the English channel? And did we not say that this foolhardy plan on the part of upstart Germany **was not much to the liking of England** because of its threat of interference with the latter's own plans and interests and be-

cause of the challenge it offered to her "undisputed supremacy" in European affairs? Again, has it not seemed strange to large numbers of the credulous of the world that England, who was very hard-pressed in Europe in the war up to the last six months thereof, should, instead of concentrating all her forces in Europe, have maintained from the beginning large forces to challenge the Turk in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Arabia, Egypt?

The reason of this is now made plain to all: England wished from the very start **to secure her victory in the Orient above all else, because it was there where her real interest in the world war lay!** Is there anyone left, after these revelations, to believe that anything else but commercial and political antagonism was England's motive in the war? Does anyone doubt that **France** shared these motives of jealousy and, in addition, had for years nursed her ambition to repay her defeat of 1870 and reconquer Alsace-Lorraine and inaugurate a policy of imperialistic annexations against Germany? Can there be any question that **Russia's** sole purpose in the war was to bring her rivalry with Austria and Turkey for domination in the Balkan States to an issue to realize her Constantinople-Mediterranean dream by any means, at any cost? There were other contributory but secondary causes of the war, but the above were and remain the principal ones! There were important incidents—the defection of Italy, Greece and Roumania—all accidental, political and not elementary. The entry of America, important as it was in its results, was also merely **an incident, in no wise connected with the "beginning-causes" of the war.** We can thus say with full conviction that the mendacious and malicious war motives advanced by the European and American propagandas against Germany **are now disproven and have collapsed!** And we can also say that these false war motives of England and the other Entente powers—**advanced to hide their real designs**—were, unfortunately, believed by the majority of the American people **to be the genuine ones**—a delusion which has cost us a hundred thousand lives and a twenty-billion war debt!

There will be many readers who will find it difficult to harmonize the emphatic condemnation of the spirit of England's

war politics contained in this book **with her evident disposition to be much more reasonable towards the Germans and other former enemies than the French and other Entente allies,** and willing that they be given a revision of the peace terms—by enactment or interpretation—and every help and opportunity of rebuilding their shattered countries. To those who are deceived by these manifestations of kindliness as to their real nature we will say that the British character and position towards other nations have ever been this: **Admit our mental and physical superiority as a race, and our consequent natural right to the dominating position we occupy as the first political, commercial and sea-power—and we will be quite glad to let you live alongside of us—as our contributing friends!** But regarding **France,** it is quite clear that her unflinching ferocity towards Germany, exacting the ultra maximum possible of "punishment" and "restitution" at the same time, including annexation or control of her most valuable natural resources in her desire to crush her enemy to the ground forever, is born of the fear of Germany's inherent strength **to rise again in spite of all and strike back!** Does she realize the awful wrong she is committing **in thus planting the seeds of a new war of revenge more terrible than the last?** England, equally guilty of the war, and even more so than France, has a different temperament: She knows neither fear nor pangs of conscience, and is ready to assuage the consequences of the war—**now that she has won**—no matter how—and wants to enjoy the fruits—by her conspicuous suavity and apparent fairness, no less agreeable and effective because thoroughly hypocritical!

LEAVING the political side and turning to the moral and material situation of the people of Europe, we find them in a state of sentimental disorganization and physical suffering which defies description. In Germany, Austria and Hungary the extreme socialistic and democratic sections are possessed by a frenzy of violent hatred of the former Imperial governments and their rulers, and all and everything connected with them, and of the idea of the monarchy in general. **All this has found expression in most shocking and humiliating exhibi-**

tions of revolution and indescribable acts of brutality. We have referred to this before. From the manifestos issued by these "parties," it is seen that nothing could exceed their fantastic conceptions of the "idea" and the merits of "people's rule." Not even the unreasoning opposition to "capitalism" by the socialists in general equals the blind hatred of these political extremists for the empires which have been destroyed—only yesterday wonderful aggregations of organization, prosperity and power, and the admiration of the world!

This new "democratic" element calls upon the German people particularly for "confession of their guilt," for repudiation of their former political spirit of achievement and greatness, for "repentance" and humble petition for reception into the haven of the League of Nations of their enemies! **No conduct more craven, abject, demoralized has ever been shown before the world and exposed a great and deserving people to its contempt and ridicule!** It is the work of men who have cast aside all self-respect, racial pride and patriotism, of men led astray by alluring political doctrines and distracted by unsettling social and ethical theories—left devoid of old ideals and new guides alike. ALL our reasoning on these subjects, as given in Articles XIII, XIV and XV, has thus received **a terrible confirmation** beyond the author's worst apprehensions! One should have to despair utterly of Germany's right and ability to revive if this spirit were prevalent to a decisive extent. But the quiet people of Germany—those who "suffer and hide their faces"—are yet as stunned by their experiences; the whole situation is still **unreal** to them; daily they ask themselves the question: "How did it happen, how could it ever happen?" Their thoughts and emotions are turned into morbid channels, their mental balance is upset; their sad condition raises the threat **of psychological disorders on a national scale** which it may take decades of normal, quiet existence to overcome. Similar conditions prevail in Austria and Hungary—complete political, social and ethical disruption and material collapse!

To these mental and moral sufferings must be added the physical ones of hunger, cold, want of every kind—intense and widespread as described in a previous chapter. The evidence

of the many committees of investigation and relief and the report made by Mr. Henry P. Davison, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the League of Red Cross Societies, about a year ago, and other similar reports show that the conditions were not overdrawn in the daily press. They are only slowly improving now. Scarcely a family can be found on the continent of Europe that has not suffered the loss of one or more sons, or of the father or both, in the war, the destruction of business, income and capital. The harvest of death from sickness and malnutrition in Germany and Austria has been frightful! The American people has generously opened its heart and purse-strings to the appeal for help, but more and continued assistance is needed to prevent these abnormal conditions reacting upon our own welfare, in the opinion of Mr. Davison, Mr. Hoover and other observers.

Yet, all this harrowing picture has not brought the understanding in America, to any great extent, that these conditions are not so much the result of the war itself as **of the infamous life-crushing Versailles peace treaty** which has paralyzed all material agencies of existence and killed all ambition and hope in the former enemy countries. Nor is it, as yet, fully understood that the same cause is at the bottom of our **own after-war conditions** of inflation, profiteering, economic and financial disorganization. **The burdens laid upon the enemy are inhuman and cry out for quick relief before it is too late!** Let us hasten! Let us also speak the word of regret, of acknowledgement of error and of injustice done in the heat of war passion, and therewith rekindle in the hearts of these stricken people of Europe **their faith in mankind, their hope, self-confidence and energy to live and work!** This would be worth more to them than all the millions of money we could send; it would include all else from us and from themselves! The American Senate—and people—should not only protest the League-of-Nations plan on account of its un-American conditions **but should insist on a rational and just revision of the Versailles Treaty on the basis argued in this book as the** *sine qua non* **requisite of the United States of America becoming a party to this peace settlement and assuming any of its burdens!**

But the preceding is not the whole after-war picture; there is another side to it even more alarming. There is the evidence that the war has been an orgie of legitimate and **even more of illegitimate money-making**, of heartless exploitation of inexorable conditions of necessity, of fortunes lost by thousands and won by lucky or unscrupulous other thousands, involving a widespread shifting of social relations and scale. This happened not only in the defeated countries, but also in those of the victors. And turning to these, we find that the war has left psychological scars upon them no less deep and far-reaching than upon the others. Due partly to this sudden acquisition of wealth by many, also to the general rise of earnings by labor and of profits by merchants **but even more to the disgruntlement at the disappointing final results of the war, we have the reigning era of extravagance, gambling and fast living now running in England, France and America and even in the large cities of Germany and Austria!** One should think that the colossal catastrophe of the war upon victor and vanquished alike would have cast a deep gloom upon all, even the fortunate, and have directed their minds into serious channels. This is no doubt the case with the majority in the defeated countries. But even there, to some extent, and generally in the other countries, the public seems to be in a veritable riot of frivolity as if possessed by a **sub-conscious impulse to stifle by the din and excitement of purely physical extravagances the recollection of the awful tragedy of the war and the reproach of the tormenting aftermath**; silence the unrelenting "knocking at the door of consciousness and conscience" of all those disillusions and revulsions of feeling which we have endeavored to analyze in the preceding articles.

No published books or magazines, as far as the writer is aware, have made a serious and adequate attempt to describe and sum up this psychological affliction. Superficial explanations, lame excuses, vain boastings, artificial reinforcing of our shattered self-confidence are filling the air aplenty, but of fearless critical examination there is little. But the world **is too deeply torn and stirred and too seriously sick to be thus easily pacified and cured!** It needs the surgeon's scalpel to cut out all the dead ideas of the past, the accumulated errors of concep-

tion and practice which the war has brought to the full consciousness of startled and trembling mankind! The feeling of doubt and anxiety which permeates all men, from the statesman to the laborer, from the preacher to the business man, must be met with something tangible, something positive. Not opiates and plasters are wanted to ease the symptoms but **a real elixir of new faith, hope, life!** This author claims no patent in the premises; there are many minds of authority, learning and influence **who know the cause to be as he has stated it**—but only a few seem to have come forward to speak out and shake the fabric of our inherited delusions and their tyrannical embodiment. The war has unmistakably brought the growing skepticism of a century and a half of "free thought" to a focus; it has struck a stunning blow in the face of our high-flown pretensions and has exposed our littleness, wickedness, silliness, arrant conceit and skin-deep civilization **to our own contempt!** The amazing revelation should make us sick at heart and thoroughly ashamed of ourselves!

The author has in preceding articles set forth in main outline a "philosophy of regeneration" for these conditions. It is a radical plan, a complete reversal of life conception and outlook; but he is convinced that the current propositions of "practical" betterments, of concessions to this class and that, of the whole line of the present groping socialistic and political endeavors will bring but superficial and temporary results, if not accompanied by a new system of ethics. **Men and women everywhere are yearning and crying for the truth about themselves, for a new, natural and appealing life philosophy founded on that truth and free from the buncomb, cant and imposition of past teaching!** A new point of view is needed, a radical change of feeling and reasoning, a vital ideal in which we can truly believe! May the light of this new view of the world and of our existence here rise aggressively from this war and purge our effete civilization of all its ailings! Then shall we perhaps be able to say that the great war was not fought in vain!

IN view of the position this author has taken in regard to "Bolshevism," it seems desirable to add a short word on the present situation in Russia. We have credited bolshevism with a promising framework of political and social reform, far in advance of merely utilitarian socialism in lucidity and comprehensiveness. It represents a "fundamental" reform of society in all its aspects, not merely a plan of change and adaptation within the existing ideas. It addresses itself to a radical reform of those material causes of discontent, surfeit, inequality, injustice—and those of ethical perversion and false pretense—which we have pointed out. We have criticized the movement on the general lines of the "rationalistic life philosophy" as to its detail aims and methods. These, however, may in time be corrected to a more perfect and practically workable system of great merit.

Has bolshevism, with its radical departure from the old ideas of government and society accomplished anything real, akin to success in Russia so far? As yet the answer must be uncertain; and the reasons for this are many and varied. While the other countries of Europe are today deep in the struggle with the disastrous after-war results, **Russia has had even a harder road to travel.** Emerging, after her important efforts in the war, from the blood and fire of one of the most violent political revolutions the world has seen, she gravitated, after the second stage of her revolt, in November, 1917, to her present form of a **communistic republic,** organized in "communities of common interest"—geographical and occupational —and based on advanced political and sociological views long advocated by the best thinkers of all nations on these absorbing topics. Thus Russia has, in addition to the effects of military defeat and revolution, **gone through the upheaval and severities of a complete political, social and ethical transformation such as has never before been undertaken in any country.**

The transformation is even greater than that attempted by the French revolution. It has brought a radical change in the Russian people's life relations, mode of work, civil administration, public and private ethics, property standards, etc. And at the same time that this tremendous work of reorganiza-

tion was proceeding, the new government had to face and combat internal opposition by masses and classes, counter-revolutions **and the attacks of the external enemies, sent or supported by Russia's former allies in the great war,** to destroy this viper of Russian freedom and independence—bolshevism—because its principles are considered a threat to "the established social and moral order"—that order which produced the brutal war and the brutal peace—and which we have analyzed in this book in all its disappointing aspects! The bolshevist government has performed the marvelous feat of beating down most of its military enemies, native and foreign, and of overcoming much of the internal opposition to the new idea—but there is a force which it has not been able to overcome and which is working to bring about the failure of the whole program of bolshevist reform. That force is **the ignorant ilwill of a prejudiced world clinging to its old social and ethical ideas** although the failure of these ideas has been demonstrated for a half-a-century and been made glaringly apparent to all by the occurrence of the war and its revelation of our cupidity and littleness. This force of ignorance, prejudice and blind hate is not content with throwing every vile epithet at this movement and stamping it as the work of the devil himself, but has left—**and continues to leave—Russia isolated, shunned, abandoned to herself to sink or swim as best she may, refusing all commercial intercourse, all supplies of materials for industry, all financial aid or credits!**

It was but natural that the great reformation of society attempted in Russia should, at the beginning, have interfered with normal activities and that, in consequence, production was curtailed and want and suffering brought on in many directions. It was, also, unavoidable that in the working-out of the details of this system many mistakes would be made. This circumstance had gradually somewhat reacted on the general situation in Russia, producing a degree of disappointment with, and accusations **against, bolshevism as having failed to realize its expectations and promises.** In combination with the external pressure, the total result today is a situation of want, suffering, business collapse and general disorganization even greater than that in the defeated countries. In consequence we have this

disgraceful position which the world today occupies towards Russia: **To push her, by refusal of all material help, by refusal to fully lift the blockade of her ports, by refusal to recognize the bolshevist government to her utter ruin—and then to point to "bolshevism" as the cause of it all and thus strike it down by indirection!** It is not fought squarely on the value of its socialistic theories or political aims; brute force is the agency used in the place of argument! It is to be denied a chance even to demonstrate its alleged "errors" by its failure in practical application, and is to be killed by imposing upon the Russian people **hunger, despair, collapse, desperation!** Daily the papers print these exulting reports: "Bolshevism cannot last six months; bolshevism is doomed; the industrial standstill of Russia is complete; bolshevism succumbs to the blockade," etc. And all of this shameful, cruel, cowardly demonstration is made while mankind **is fully aware of the anomaly of its old ideas of society, morals and political form, aware of the fermentation among the masses, the friction among the classes, the sham of our "democracy", the arrogant triumph of "money" over everything else, the breakdown of the old codes of conduct and the demand for new standards, views, methods, ideals!** Now that this dark design of driving Russia—because of bolshevism—to economic collapse and starvation has succeeded and famine has actually overtaken large sections of the country, these same external enemies rush in with "relief trains" to ameliorate the misery and failure to which they have so largely and designedly contributed!!

The great difficulty in Russia with bringing the communistic republic to an immediate success lies largely in the fact that the leaders of the movement had no concrete example of a **successful similar form of society and political State** before them from ancient or modern times from whose record they might have profited and whose "constitutions" they might have adapted to their requirements. It is also particularly unfortunate that this form of socialism should have been first brought to a practical test in so vast and populous a country as Russia, with such limited means of communication, and under the hindering material conditions which followed the war. Reason and former experiments of similar character demonstrate that any highly advanced form of popular government, combined with socialistic ideas (which exact the best grade of popular

education, intelligence and personal devotion from the individual citizen) should first be "worked out" in a smaller country of the size of Holland or Belgium or Bavaria and not exceeding twenty millions in population. Within such a modest compass the problems of principle and practical application of such a new system can be more readily tested and perfected and made ready for adoption in larger countries. (See the fuller elaboration of this thought in "National Evolution" by this author.)

But Bolshevism—a simple form of democratic communistic society—whether the present experiment in Russia survive or go down—has at least successfully revealed a "new idea," a step forward towards freedom and salvation from present disappointments, because even its worst enemies could not deny—if it should succumb—that its fall came from outside opposition more than from internal weakness! The compound combination of forces against it never allowed the system a fair, full and peaceable chance of demonstration. The experiment may yet succeed; at all events **the idea will survive and return soon,** purged of its present shortcomings, as the new star out of the East to show the world a new and better way to live!



MIDDLE EUROPE
OR
THE GREATER GERMAN EMPIRE
May 8, 1918

GERMANY
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
BULGARIA
TURKEY

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

Main route to the East showing the continuous route from Berlin to Bagdad for all oriental ports

7050

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